 Hello. I am Scott Cameron, a member of the Board on Earth Sciences and Resources of the National Academy of Sciences. I want to welcome you today to the webinar on the Cascadia mega quake, Current Strategies to Mitigate Loss of Life. This is the second in a three-part series on the mega quake. Our speakers for today are Timothy Walsh of the Washington Geological Survey and Yu Mei Wong of the Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries, also known by its abbreviation as Degami. The webinar series addresses a key question. Is the West Coast ready for a 9.0 magnitude earthquake followed by a large tsunami? Data collected over the last 30 years show that multiple giant earthquakes and associated local tsunamis have struck the Pacific Northwest for at least the past 10,000 years. The 800-mile long Cascadia Subduction Zone, or CSZ, which extends from Northern California, Oregon, Washington, and into southern British Columbia, is the main source of these earthquakes and accompanying tsunamis. This three-part webinar series looks at the science and engineering associated with the earthquake source, the hazards, current strategies to mitigate loss of life, and emerging opportunities in early warning and reducing uncertainty. Now, just a few quick housekeeping rules before we get started. First, the audio for today's event will be streamed through your computer speakers. We will be taking questions through the Q&A box located in the lower right-hand side of your screen. Simply type your question in the box at any time and click Send. We ask you that you leave the box set to send your questions to all panelists. Second, the webinar is being recorded. Please understand that any questions you submit may be read aloud and included in our recording. A link to the recording as well as a copy of the slides will be posted on our website within the next week or so. Finally, if you have any technical issues during the event, please contact WebEx Technical Support at 1-866-229-3239. Once again, the number for WebEx Technical Support is 1-866-229-3239. And with that, I'd like to turn things over to our first speaker, Tim Walsh, of the Washington Geological Survey. Over to you, Tim. Thanks, Scott. So what I'm going to talk about today will be a little bit of the history of how the tsunami program came about in the United States and then focus in more on what we're doing here in Washington, which is a little bit different from some of the other states. So Washington has a number of earthquake hazards and some of the other hazards, like the Seattle and Tacoma Fault, are much more serious near some of our heavily populated areas, the cities of Seattle and Tacoma, for instance. The strongest ground shaking that we would get from a Cascadia event, of course, would be along the coast. And as you can see here, we have a broad area of intensity eight and probably some intensity nine as well. And here you can see that for the entire subduction zone. Again, the strongest ground shaking would be along the coast and would be less strong in the areas of the major cities. And so the strong ground shaking from some of the... Would you mind sharing your screen, please? I am sharing my screen. Would you mind going into the WebEx window and then hitting Share Screen again? So we're waiting for it to load. There are the slides for us. Thank you. I appreciate it. Sorry. So the strongest ground shaking, again, would be closest to the coast. But the most devastating part of this would be that these Cascadia subduction zone earthquakes are accompanied by tsunamis, which would be devastating within a few miles of the coast. And so in the early 1990s, a confluence of several events, the realization that the Cascadia subduction zone produced both major earthquakes and tsunamis, which was based on work by pioneering paleo seismologists, Brian Atwater, Kurt Peterson, Gary Carver, John Clegg, demonstrated that this was a major issue. And then in 1991, there was an earthquake in Northern California, the Petroleum earthquake, which generated a small local tsunami detected at the tide gate at Crescent City. And then in 1994, there was a tsunami warning for an earthquake in the Coral Islands that didn't go as it should have. So the confluence of these events led the Senate Appropriations Committee, chaired by Marquette Field of Oregon at the time, to direct NOAA to form a partnership with the five Pacific states to develop a plan to safeguard the West Coast from local tsunamis. So that led to the creation of the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, which, among other things, creates these hazard maps for U.S. coastlines. This is the first one that we did in Washington for the southern Washington coast. And what you can see in the reddish and orange areas, which are the tsunami hazard zones, most of the hazard is focused along spits, which are low-relief accretionary shore forms. And that's where most of the resident population of the outer Washington coast lives. And because these are low-lying and because they're very long spits, the Long Beach Peninsula, for instance, is 26 miles long, the time for evacuation is very short. And in some of these places, it would be impossible to reach suitable high ground in the amount of time available, which could be as little as 20 to 30 minutes. So in 2002, we held a workshop to investigate the feasibility of designing facilities to both withstand a near-field magnitude 9 earthquake and suffer so little damage as to be attractive for an evacuation refuge, and also be high and resilient enough to serve as a shelter for perhaps a day only for people in the near field. And you can see the participants that we had in this workshop, people in from all of the Pacific states, and the membership was nominated by them, plus representatives of NOAA and FEMA. And so that led to a study of the characteristics of buildings, such as the one that you see in the upper left corner, and others like them that survived when devastating tsunamis destroyed everything else in the area. And that was documented in the report that you see on the right by Harry Yeh, Ian Jane Proust. Following that, we formed a partnership with FEMA and the Applied Technology Council to create building code-style guidance for building such facilities. That was eventually published as FEMA 646 in June of 2008, and it was revised after the Tohoku earthquake to update some of the science that happened after that. So we then had some recommendations on what sorts of things to build and where to site them, but how to build them. They cost money. And so John Schelling, then at Washington's Emergency Management Division, launched the Washington approach to creating these tsunami evacuation structures. It's called Project Safe Haven. And what we did was to hold workshops in each of the communities that had these difficulties with evacuation. And we pointed out the issues to them. We made overlays to the orthophoto maps that we put out to show how far people could walk at a slow walking speed or a fast walking speed to get to high ground. And so we had them then nominate places where vertical evacuation structures ought to be built and what kinds of things they should be. Should they be parking garages or hotels, berms, artificial high ground, or viewing towers? And so near Westport, which was the logical place to do that, was at the site of Ocosta Elementary School that was shown several years ago in that yellow box. It's an old school. The district tried twice to replace it, but their bond issue failed twice. But in April of 2013, another bond issue was put on the ballot to replace the school, but this time it included an extra two million dollars for a wing to be built to these FEMA 646 standards. And that time it passed 70 to 30. So the people of the Ocosta School District are to be commended for taking this bold step. They're not a very affluent school district to support the safety of their school children and anyone else who would be in the vicinity. So let's move now to some of the other issues associated with this. Land slides are often collateral damage during earthquakes. In the upper left corner, you can see a landslide generated by the April 13th, 1949 Puget Sound earthquake. It caused a tsunami that reflected off the opposite shore and drowned the houses that you can see on the beach. And landslides often recur in the same place. So in the 2001 Nisqually earthquake, the same slope failed, as you can see in the lower right corner, and damaged some of those very same houses. And much of the Washington Coast is made up of either low-lying accretionary shore forms or bluffs composed of weak sedimentary rock, which is sometimes disrupted by gas seeps that are landslide prone. And you can see a big landslide out on one of these coastal bluffs here along the Washington Coast. So as part of the task of evaluating the suitability of potential sites for tsunami evacuation structures, we evaluate the vulnerability to earthquake-induced ground failures, landslides, and liquefaction, both for siting the facilities in the first place, but also to include in the tsunami inundation modeling that's necessary to do at the tsunami evacuation structure. And in this case, that tsunami evacuation structure is right about, I think it's right about, I'm sorry, no, north, there we go, it's right up in here, in behind a dune that is somewhat landslide prone. So once we had all that modeling done, the Dagen-Call engineers was retained to make the seismic and tsunami designs to comply with FEMA 646. So this is a mock-up of what the new structure would look like. They replaced that old school and built a new gym, and the new gym that you can see in the upper left would have a roof that is the tsunami vertical evacuation structure designed to hold more than a thousand people with each having about 10 square feet of space. Not a lot this is not meant to be a shelter and to follow Red Cross guidelines for sheltering, but rather to be a place that people could survive the tsunami for half a day or a day, however long tsunami attack took place. And one of the other things that you can see in this gym is that the corners are stair towers, and so the rooftop here is accessed not by going through the gym itself, but from outside stair towers that have no access to the inside of the school, because school safety is an important issue here as well. This is the groundbreaking for that school. You can see a bunch of third grade girls in pink hard hats and golden clam guns digging the first shovel foals out, and then here is the old school the project team that designed and raised the money and did all of the ground work to cause this thing to happen. And so this is what it looked like it was dedicated June 11th of last year. Again the roof is accessed by these outside stair towers so that no one would have access to where the school kids are. And on the right side you can see that the school district decided to keep walls up rather than allow people who were escaping from a tsunami to actually be able to see what was happening to their town. An interesting add on to this feature. So in 2011 we started planning for a second tsunami evacuation structure. Actually we thought this would be the first but it's been delayed for a number of reasons. And this one would be at Long Beach and be located back here behind Long Beach Elementary School. And one of the things that you can see in the design philosophy here is that we want to have it in the tsunami inundation zone because people can't get out of the tsunami inundation zone. But we also put it as far away from the beach as possible to gain some higher ground and make this one of the least vulnerable places that people would still be able to get to. So this is a diagram of what the consultants rendering of it would look like. Long Beach Elementary School is here and this is their soccer field and the berm would be back here and would hold in this case about 850 people. But since we developed FEMA 646 the American Society of Civil Engineers has updated ASCE 7 which is the design loads that are used or referenced within the international building code for seismic loading, snow loading, wind loading and all of that. And they added a chapter for tsunami loading following some of the guidelines in FEMA 646. But they also did this as a probabilistic hazard analysis rather than relying on the scenarios that were being used in FEMA 646. And they put together Monte Carlo simulations to come up with a 2% and 50 year probability of the tsunami inundation at the site. But as I say, we started this process before FEMA ASCE 7-16 came out and it is going to be implemented in the international building code 2018 version. But it is not yet law in Washington and it may be modified. We don't know. It hasn't been taken up yet by our building codes council. So we started out with a scenario earthquake and tsunami and here is the location of that again back from the school. This is the modeling that was done in feet on the left meters on the right for these inundation depths. And you can see back here the inundation depth at that location is about 5 meters in this modeling. So Frank Gonzalez and Randy Levec using Geoclaw, which is a UW model, based this on an event that we thought had a 2% or so probability of exceedance in 50 years or colloquially the 2500 year event. And so design work started on that basis. But then once the ASCE 7-16 modeling came out, we discovered that our site was very close to the amount of inundation distance, but probably not quite as high as would be required to comply with FEMA or with ASCE 7. And so we've gone back and are doing some more modeling in order to assure compliance with that. That's the work in progress right now. So here's another element that may help in this process, earthquake early warning, which is a project that is being worked on all up and down the Pacific Coast. Right now it has been unleashed as a seamless product, although not all of the instrumentation is in place that would allow it to work. But it's an undergoing beta testing right now, and it could help facilitate successful tsunami evacuation by giving a few extra minutes to the short already only a few tens of minutes time available to reach high ground. So here is the location of that tsunami vertical evacuation structure, and you can see this color coding is 31 to 40 minutes. So if you can give yourself an extra five minutes, perhaps, or four minutes, you might be able to increase the distance fairly significantly for people who would be able to reach this high ground or this artificial high ground and be able to evacuate from the impending tsunami. But there are significant uncertainties in calculating these tsunami inundation depths and loads. In the building code, that's typically handled by adding safety factors. But the most significant uncertainty is in the generation of the tsunami itself. Slip distribution on the Cascadia subduction zone and the surface deformation are the drivers of the tsunami, but they're poorly understood because we haven't had one of these events for more than 300 years. And so, Kellan Wong of the Geological Survey of Canada has been working on some models that can be used as the scenario models. And these are some of the ones that he's come up with. And the one that we are using because it produces the largest tsunami is one in which all of the slip is partitioned onto a splay fault that arises through the accretionary wedge. And so it's a little bit closer to shore and it produces more uplift because the fault plane is at a steeper dip than it would be if the fault simply ruptured all the way to the trench. And so these are some of the different models that Kellan has put together. And you can see the uplift and subsidence differs significantly in all of these. And if you have a rupture on the splay fault, for instance, which is this one that ruptures closer to the coastline, that would mean that the tsunami would arrive in perhaps four or five minutes earlier than it would on a trench rupturing fault such as this. So these are some pretty significant research priorities that people like Kellan and others are currently working on. There's a project at the University of Washington called M9 that is looking at the variable slip distributions and how they would affect not only ground shaking but the tsunami as well. And it's a research project that is about half over at this point. And it promises to have some significant results that will be useful here. And perhaps these long-term measures which will take years to implement at the local level will be available to us in time because we may have only a couple of years until the next Cascadia event, but then again we may have a hundred or more years to it. And so with that, I turn it back over to Scott. Thank you. Thanks, Tim. That was a great talk. We'll have time for questions in a little bit, but before we do that, I'm going to turn it over to our second speaker. You may long from Dagami, you may over to you. Thank you, Scott and Tim, and hello, everyone. I will be talking about Cascadia with a focus on the state of Oregon a little bit about the science, the expected impacts, and what Oregon is doing to improve our resilience. So we'll be able to bounce back after a Cascadia disaster. And I'll wrap up with some information on existing gaps. That's where we need to make some improvements. As Scott and Tim just discussed, the magnitude nine Cascadia earthquake and accompanying tsunami is looming in our future. So depending on where you are, we'll dictate what your experience will be like. In Oregon, the coastal region will experience the strongest shaking. That shaking that can occur about five minutes on the coast. The interstate five corridor, which runs north-south, is about 50 miles inland from the coast. We'll experience moderate to strong shaking. This includes Portland, Salem, Corvallis, Eugene, in the Willamette Valley and other cities. On the central Oregon and eastern Oregon, we'll experience light to moderate shaking. And this shaking will trigger liquefaction. And the concentration of liquefaction will occur along the rivers and in the Willamette Valley. There will also be seismic landslides with thousands of expected landslides in the coast range and task aid range. And as Tim just focused on, there will be a tsunami in the lowline coastal areas that will arrive in about 15, 20 minutes or so. And these hazards and this pattern of hazards will be very similar for the entire Cascadia margin. The expected impact from the shaking will be widespread damage. On the left, you see a map of the expected highway damage in the U.S. What the red lines indicate is that the coastal highway would be completely impassable. The interstate five corridor would have extensive damage. And at the same time, there would be no east-west routes connecting I-5 in the coast. Coastal communities will be isolated. In the middle of the photo is Oregon's critical energy infrastructure hub. This is where over 90% of Oregon's fuel is distributed from. And the area that you see, the fuel terminals, used to be the Willamette River. But about 100 years ago, the sandy soils from the bottom of the river were hydraulically dredged and created into this developable land. This hydraulic landfill has a very high liquefaction hazard. And during an earthquake, during the shaking, much of the land can temporarily turn into a thick, sandy liquid. On the right, you see a close-up of a photo of one of the piers. As everyone can see by today's standards, this is clearly substandard construction. This pier would fail with the slightest ground movement from liquefaction. Yet Oregonians rely heavily on this old pier and other structures with similar deficiencies. This situation with the fuel facilities at high-risk liquefaction and extensive damage poses an enormous problem for the state of Oregon's fuel supply chain. This is Oregon's Achilles' heel. A Cascadia Seduction Zone event will have farther reaching impacts from that of Katrina and Sandy combined. This is a direct quote from Ken Murphy, the former Region 10 FEMA administrator. Ken put together this table with sobering statistics. It compares three areas, fatalities, people needing short-term shelter, housing units damaged, and expected numbers for Cascadia. For fatalities, the Cascadia estimates are on the order of six times higher than Sandy and Katrina combined. Six times higher. For shelter, two times higher. For damage, housing, again, two times higher. Can also show these statistics from the 2011 Japan tsunami. Cascadia estimates are similar to those. So for fatalities, the Cascadia estimates are on the order of 12,000 or more people. Shelter needs are approaching a million people. Damage housing units are also approaching a million units. Our nation has never experienced such a disaster. The state of Oregon has recognized that a Cascadia disaster is in our future, and we're at the beginning stages of building resilience. So we'll be able to limit our losses and have a speedy recovery. Let me tell you a bit about what Oregon is doing as a state on our journey to improving resilience. Dogamy, the state's Geological Survey where I work, conducts risk assessments. We estimate the impact of a Cascadia earthquake and tsunami to our people and the built environment. Dogamy's first Cascadia risk assessment was back in the late 1990s. We modeled a magnitude 8.5 and estimated damage and losses for the entire state, and it was then that we realized our dire situation. The state immediately enacted policies on the seismic safety of schools and emergency facilities, and about that time is when Dogamy started to conduct risk assessments on the county level. And this slide shows where the counties that we have completed in the 90s, the ones that we are currently analyzing, and where we're going in the near future. Over the years, Dogamy's analyses have been getting better and better, and our results are used to understand the risk and to help prioritize mitigation activities. And this is an example of a recent risk assessment for Tillamook County, which is on the coast, sits above the Cascadia Selection Zone, perhaps you know of Tillamook because of its famous trees. For Tillamook County, we evaluated each community in the county. We looked at each building, determined the age it was constructed, and this is important because the age ties back to the building code, which dictates the level of seismic design. We determined the structural type, whether it's wood, concrete, steel, et cetera. This is important because the various structural types have a different response to shaking. We determined the use of the building, for example, whether it's the house, or school, or building, business, or government building, and so on. And we determined if it's in the tsunami hazard zone, and then we estimate the damage and loss from a Cascadia magnitude 9 earthquake. I mentioned that the state prioritizes schools and emergency response facilities. In 2001, that was made official through law that these need to become seismically safe. From Cascadia earthquakes, schools have students who are vulnerable populations. We want schools to be safe in every community, and hospitals, place fire stations are what we rely on every day, as well as during disasters. It's important that these provide services immediately after a Cascadia earthquake. So in 2007, Dogami completed a statewide seismic needs assessment on schools and emergency facilities, which is what this slide captures. And since then, Oregon has established two new grant programs that uses the Dogami vulnerability data to help those that most need assistance. The Department of Education provides technical assistance grants to help pay for seismic engineering evaluations of their buildings. And since 2009, the state has been awarding seismic rehabilitation grants to schools and emergency facilities. Because schools and emergency facilities are such critical community assets, these grant programs can help all of our people become safer in all Oregon communities build resilience. Last year, Oregon's first state resilience officer was hired. The state resilience officer is part of the governor's office and is bringing new levels of statewide collaboration. Collaboration among state agencies, as well as with the feds, the locals, private sector and nonprofits. The state resilience officer has brought a renewed focus of improving resilience from a future Cascadia disaster, specifically focusing on earthquake insurance, mass care planning, fuel planning for response and recovery, as well as continuity of state government. And on the right, you see the image of the Capitol Mall and the location of two buildings that are currently being designed to be able to function off the grid immediately after a Cascadia earthquake. We're referring to these buildings as the Oregon resilience buildings one and two. One of the exciting statewide collaborations is Oregon's two weeks ready campaign. For many decades, emergency planners have guided people to prepare 72-hour emergency kits. 72 hours may be adequate for a bad storm, but it's clearly inadequate for Cascadia earthquakes. The idea behind the two weeks ready campaign is for people to get ready to be self-sufficient for two weeks. And by taking small steps over time, getting prepared for two weeks is achievable for many people. Now the tougher part, what are the gas and resilience and how do we close them? Let's take a look at some of the gas in Oregon. This is Seaside. It's a wonderful community appropriately named. It's by the sea. Well over 80% of the population is within the tsunami hazard zone. The hotels are concentrated along the beachfront. Evacuation to high ground for safety is a long ways for many. And most evacuation routes rely on old bridges, which could fail during earthquake shaking. This is a problem. And this problem is well known by the residents and the local officials, but it's difficult to address. Protecting a town with a tall concrete seawall like those in Japan, that's not going to happen here. I'm moving the entire town. That's not financially feasible and also it's the community of seaside. It wouldn't be by the sea. Vertical evacuation structures are technically feasible, such as those presented by Tim Walsh. Seaside would need to have several structures to protect people who cannot get to high ground. And this could get expensive. Communities like Seaside need help. So on a brighter note with Seaside, I'd like to point out some progress. The Seaside school district will soon be building a new school complex on high ground above the tsunami zone and closing down their schools that are located in the tsunami zone. And this will protect hundreds of students. This slide shows the existing seaside high school in the yellow circle in the tsunami zone, which will soon be relocated in the hills. It also shows some of the students involved with an awareness and fundraising campaign. Okay, a second example. This is a slide showing the coastal town of Reedsport, which was built at the confluence of three rivers. So the entire downtown is in the tsunami zone, which is shown in red. On the right, it shows the main highway bridge that connects downtown to the uptown area, which is where the schools, the hospital and other facilities are located. This highway bridge is shown here on the map in bright green. And you can see that this bridge is ancient. It is expected to collapse in an earthquake. But not only would people not be able to get from downtown to uptown, the water main hung on this bridge would break. And this would take out water services for this town, including the schools, the hospital, the main fire station and other facilities. But it would also cut off the water supply to several surrounding smaller towns that rely on Reedsport's water system. Reedsport used to be economically vibrant with five timber mills. Now it has none. So it's unemployment rate, the poverty rate. All these are extremely high and bad. They understand their risks and they want our help. Just replacing that single bridge would help protect several thousand people. Why is it that Oregon has so many seismically vulnerable buildings and lifeline infrastructure and entire communities and harm works away as Cascadia tsunamis? It's because scientists didn't know about Cascadia earthquake hazards until the late 1980s and Oregon's building codes did not include seismic provisions until the mid-1990s. Take a look at the left part of this slide. The 1996 National Seismic Hazard Map has a red circle around Oregon and indicates that there are virtually no known seismic hazards in Oregon. Fast forward to 1994 on the right and because of the influence of Cascadia, Oregon seismic hazards look very much like California and Washington. All of the buildings built before the mid-1990s were not designed to Cascadia earthquakes. Or four Cascadia earthquakes, and consequently were faced with an enormous vulnerability. Finally, I'd like to end my presentation showing you the expected down times for infrastructure on the Oregon's coast. These estimates are consensus numbers that were developed by the State of Oregon's Earthquake Commission, the Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission, and 170 stakeholders who contributed to the development of the Oregon Resilience Plan, and you see an image of that on the left. Census completion in 2013, it has served as Oregon's roadmap for building resilience to Cascadia earthquakes. So for down times for healthcare, water, wastewater, fire, police, normal service levels are expected to be down for over 36 months. That's three years. For schools' emergency, I'm sorry, for schools' electricity, communications, the estimates are slightly better but better as relative imagined months without electricity, internet, phone, schools. And note that for fuel, the last one on the list, there is no estimate. As I discussed earlier, this fuel supply chain is Oregon's Achilles' heel. Most all fuel distribution relies on old structures in fuel terminals located on liquefiable soils. These down time estimates indicate a major problem. We have to do better than these. And we can. In Oregon, we understand our situation and many are making smart investments, but it's really a drop in the bucket compared to what is needed to be resilient. All of us have a role, and it will take all of us working together to make the biggest impact, scientists, governments, individuals, businesses, nonprofits. In the Pacific Northwest and as a nation, we need to work collaboratively to lower our risk. We need more proactive investments to retrofit or replace vulnerable critical infrastructure to protect lives, reduce losses, and to speed recovery. Thank you, everybody. Thank you. Thank you, Yume. That was another great talk. Much appreciated. Also a pretty sobering message for all of us on the line here. We're going to turn to questions now, and I want to remind the audience that you have an opportunity to submit questions through the Q&A box located in the lower right-hand side of your screen. Simply type your question in the box and click send. We ask you to leave the box set to send your questions to all panelists. So far, we haven't got too many coming in, so feel free to fire them off. In the meantime, though, the moderator will exercise his prerogative and ask a couple questions. My first question is back to you, Yume. Specifically, what sorts of investments would most effectively improve safety from the Cascadia subduction zone hazards? We need to continue to put science-based findings into action so that our investments get the biggest bang for the buck as far as improving people's safety. The number one investment should be on lifeline infrastructure systems, including fuel, electricity, water, wastewater, transportation, and communication. These lifeline services support our day-to-day lives, and without them, we're in big trouble. We need to have sound seismic safety and reliability policies and programs for the lifeline sectors, and because these systems are often dependent on each other to function, we need to have a coordinated investment plan in place. So as a quick example, the State of Oregon just started to fund seismic mitigation of some key highway bridges, but we would need to have fuel in order to drive on the highways for a response and recovery. And as number two, I would say, we need to continue to really invest in our critical community assets, those being schools and emergency response facilities. I already talked about that. And three, education. Awareness about Cascadia-Housards by society at large will help a lot with public safety, how to protect oneself, you know, drop-cover and hauled. And if you're on the coast, how to get to safety by moving up to high ground and also be prepared in the aftermath by having a two-weeks-ready kit and being ready to be self-sufficient. Great. Thank you very much. My next question is going to be for Tim. Really, you both have talked about what appears to be the tsunami, threat of a tsunami appears to be the greatest single threat to loss of life. Tim, and you've shown the importance of the vertical evacuation structures can make a huge difference here. How many more would it take for everyone on the coast to have an evacuation option? Roughly, here's a question also from the audience that builds on that. Roughly what percentage of the coastal population currently has such options? And ultimately, what would it cost to make that a reality for the most vulnerable on our coast? Well, I mentioned the safe haven process that we went through starting back in 2011. And interestingly enough, we were doing a workshop about that at Ocean Shores the night of the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. It was very poorly attended that night, but the next time we came back, the room was packed. And ultimately, we came up with nominations for 57 of these along the Washington coast. We're going through a second phase of safe haven now because we're looking at larger tsunamis than we were looking at in those days. We also are doing evacuation modeling that's more realistic. So we have better information on how long it will actually take people to get to specific sites. So we're going to have a lot more detail, ultimately, than we do have now. And what the cost would be is very difficult to estimate accurately because as you saw with the Ocasta School, part of our strategy is to have leverage for these things, to have them be part of a structure that is otherwise usable on an everyday basis. To do these as stand-alone structures, they would typically cost on the order of $2 to $3 million a piece. So on that basis, we might say that it would cost $170 million to complete these for the Washington coast. But I think when we finish with the current round of safe haven, we'll find that we need more of these and they need to hold more people. And back to another piece of that question, the only one that exists right now is the Ocasta School, which can hold as many as 1,000 people. The total number of people at risk from tsunamis on the Washington coast is about 70,000. So that's less than 2% at this point. Right. A long way to go. Here's a question really for both of you here. Clearly, the 2011 Japan earthquake and resulting tsunami was a major wake-up call for the Japanese. A lot of surprises there that led in part to some of the large numbers of fatalities as well as other losses. What are the key lessons that folks in the Cascadia area have learned from the Japan disaster? And this is really for both of you. Well, okay, let me start. One of the things that it did was reinforce our using a very long recurrence interval event or a relatively low probability event rather than designing our infrastructure for the most probable event. There was evidence that there was tsunami inundation that went that far inland in Japan at least three times previously, one of which was a historic event, the Jogun earthquake and tsunami of 869. So that was certainly reassurance. A couple of other things about it, though, is that they had tsunami vertical evacuation structures. Not necessarily designed as that, but they had them designated. And in the case of Minami Sanriku, it wasn't tall enough, and they lost almost all of the people who had gone to the roof of that building because it was overwashed. The only people who survived climbed the radio tower at the top. So that's another lesson that we want to have conservatism built into these structures. And then the third thing, and in many ways among the most important, is that the Tohoku tsunami in Japan was the best recorded tsunami event in history, and the amount of data that came out of it was truly immense and allowed for a lot of calibration of the tsunami models that we used, allowed for calibration of the current modeling and validation of some of the engineering aspects given that we could look and see what happened to a lot more buildings in Tohoku than we had previously had when we started this process. Thanks. Yeah. So I think that, like Tim said, it afforded people, and very importantly, people in the Pacific Northwest to better understand the potential impacts from MegaQuake. And there has been a lot closer collaboration and opportunities to learn from each other. That's Japan and the Pacific Northwest. Oregonians had engineers on teams immediately after the earthquake and tsunami disaster. There were a lot of engineering successes that we saw with the Japanese designs. And even just earlier this year, for the sixth anniversary, there was an Oregon team who went over there to learn about the recovery efforts. One of the landmark steps that Oregon took, especially after seeing the horrifying videos of the powerful tsunami, the Oregon legislators unanimously passed in 2011, House Resolution 3, that was spearheaded by Representative Debbie Boone. And it called for the creation of a state resilience plan, which was then developed in 2013. And that's the state's roadmap on building resilience. I mentioned that. I would also say there's been a lot more discussion on tsunami vertical evacuation. Both sides want to learn. People on our coast who can't evacuate to high ground need to avoid the tsunami, incoming tsunami. And I wanted to mention that in Oregon, I'm aware of one tsunami vertical evacuation structure, which is currently in design. And that's at the Oregon State University on the Central Coast. Thank you. So several of the questions that have come in ask about, clearly we've spent quite a bit of the discussions on the coastal zone, but clearly the more populated I-5 corridor, which extends from the Lammet Valley up through Fugit Sound, is also going to be affected by a major Cascadia quake. I wonder, Oomey first, could you just talk a little bit about, particularly some of the numbers that you gave, what give a sense of what the impacts are going to be in the I-5 corridor sector relative to the totality of the numbers on your slide of downtime impacts and overall losses? Yeah. And then I have a question for Tim, follow up. Yes, of course. I recommend people take a look at the 2013 Oregon Resilience Plan, which is online, but for the valley or the I-5 corridor, so the Oregon Resilience Plan broke Oregon up into four sections. The coastal area that's in the tsunami inundation zone, the coastal area that is not in the tsunami inundation zone, and that's what I showed you some numbers for on my last slide. The valley and then central and eastern Oregon. So as far as the valley, here are some of those estimated downtimes. For healthcare, it would be over a year on the order of 18 months. For water and wastewater and for highways that are part of the main highway system, it would take up to a year, over six months, up to a year. And for police and fire and for electricity, one to four months. So the numbers are really, these downtimes are a problem, and we need to do better than that. Tim, a question for you. I know Washington has also been looking at these impacts in the I-5 corridor up there. Are you looking at comparable impacts to the types that Umea has described? Pretty much so. The first slide that I started with was a shake math that was put together by Art Frankel of the U.S. Geological Survey that shows how strong the ground shaking would be. And we've done an analysis using Hazas just as Oregon and Umea did, and we posted that on our website. We have a seismic scenarios catalog that you can access at dnr.wa.gov. You can go in there and look at what Hazas has estimated the impacts would be along the I-5 corridor. And they would certainly be significant. The ground shaking would be less than it would be on the coast, but again, these are long duration events. And one of the other things that's being done in the M9 project that I mentioned earlier is they're looking at some of the amplification that would happen in the Seattle Basin. And it's turning out to be more significant than had been thought 10 years ago. And so we may wish to be revisiting some of these loss estimates that we've been doing by putting in some of the newer values for earthquake amplification, particularly in the Seattle Basin, but in others that the M9 project is highlighting. One other question relative to potential tsunami threats. We've focused on the coastal zone, but are areas like the Straits of Wanda Fuka, Puget Sound, or even the lower parts of the reaches of the Columbia River between Astoria and Portland, are they at risk as well? There are a couple of things to say about that. There is a project going on right now through the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program to model various scenario tsunamis in the Columbia River estuary. And those are in progress, and so I don't have results to mention at this point. But we're also doing modeling down the Straits of Wanda Fuka and into Puget Sound, particularly now looking at currents rather than inundation. And some of the modeling that we've shown, that we've done shows some significant currents, particularly at places like the Port of Tacoma, where tsunami currents may be as high as 9 or 10 knots. And one of the reasons that this is significant to the state of Washington is that we have the largest ferry system in the country. And at any given time, there will be quite a number of ferries in the water that really don't have a lot of evacuation options. So we're working closely with our Department of Transportation now to try to mitigate some of the effects of strong currents and figure out what the safe places are for any of these tsunami, any of these ferry runs for where they should go if there is a tsunami generated by Cascadia. Fortunately, the travel time into Puget Sound will be a couple of hours, and so there will be time for mitigative actions. But on the other hand, there is so much boat traffic in Puget Sound that it probably won't be possible for everyone to be able to get to suitably deep water. So it's a work in progress. Right. Thanks. This is another question that came in from the audience. I'm going to ask both of you to comment on it. Have these assessments that you've shared with us today gain traction with decision-makers, political leaders at the state, county, and local level in your states? One, just give us an assessment of that. And have they, in turn, started a dialogue to find ways to obtain the massive amount of investment that will be needed to mitigate these risks outlined in both of your talks? You may have a much better story than Washington does, so you may go first. Why don't you go first? All right, thanks. I think that the 2011 Japan tsunami was definitely a very, very big wake-up call. So, like I mentioned, the House resolution 3 was unanimously passed. And think about how seldom things are unanimously passed through the legislature. After the development of the Oregon Resilience Plan, where there were hundreds of recommendations, lots of them really good, but just overwhelming, the legislature called for a task force to be put together to really focus down on the most important recommendations, which they did. There were 10 of them, and those are being pursued. The top recommendation was to establish a state resilience officer in the governor's office so that there would be a very high-level, high-profile visibility, and that's been done. So that's a huge innovation for us, and it's been very, very productive. And then for a number of years, we've been investing in helping schools and emergency facilities that don't have the money to do retrofits themselves to do retrofits because this is a state priority. And the legislature has put in close to $400 million since the grant program was established in 2009. So, not only is a state investing funding in this, the school districts and emergency facility districts themselves perk up and pass their own bonds, so the investment has been really widespread throughout the state. Lots of school districts, for example, are passing bonds to do seismic upgrades. But I would say it's not all that rosy, so I should say that there really isn't enough state funding to get where we need to, and there are always lots of competing priorities, healthcare education, what not. That will always be competing against preparing for Cascadia, and we need to make sure that Cascadia is getting a commensurate amount of money associated with the risk so that we can buy down the risk. Right, right. Tim, maybe a question for you because you've worked pretty closely on the tsunami program, which has a big coordinated effort with several federal agencies. Do you feel like the federal agencies involved like FEMA, NOAA, are giving you the support you need to address the kinds of issues that are coming out right now? What's going well and what could go better? We could always use more support, but we are being supported well by the NOAA, the Weather Service hosts the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, and they've been very responsive. The amount of money that's available is, of course, limited, but that's to be expected in the federal budget, which is where the money comes from. Right. FEMA has also been a valuable partner, and the berm that I mentioned at Long Beach is being funded by a grant from FEMA. Right. And that's the first one of these. It took a lot of convincing to get FEMA to include things like tsunami vertical evacuation structures as eligible for this kind of funding, but that has now happened and we're hopeful that we will be able to use that as an avenue to fund more of these as well. Well, thanks a lot. So I think that's it for our questions today, and I want to thank our speakers. As a reminder, we will have Part 3 in this mega-quake series later this year. Details we posted at the Beezer website and shared by email at the time. A copy of today's recording and the slides shared will be posted on the website within the next week or so. And with that, I'd like to thank our speakers, Tim Walsh, and Yu Mai Wong, again, for a great job, and thank all of you for participating. Have a great day. Thank you.