 Welcome to NewsClick. Today we have with us Lieutenant General D. S. Huda, who retired as GOC and C, the General Officer Commander in Chief of the Northern Command, which is Army's, one of the largest commands in 2016. He happened to be in command of, in Jammu and Kashmir when much talked about surgical strike took place. We'll be discussing today the national security strategy, which he and his team prepared for the Indian National Congress Party. Welcome, sir, to NewsClick. I'd like to begin by asking you, and we'd like to focus, I'd like to focus only on internal security, although your draft covers the entire range of issues that impinge your national security, but we are focusing only on internal security. I'd like to start with, as you, your draft also begins with Jammu and Kashmir. You start off in, in the section on Jammu and Kashmir by pointing out that it has both the internal as well as an external dimension and both have to be kept in mind. I'd like you to elaborate on the external which vis-a-vis Pakistan and the internal vis-a-vis the local population and why you think both the dimensions are important to be kept in mind. So, Gautam, we are, we are well aware as I've written in this that there is a transnational dimension and that transnational dimension is the support that comes in from, from Pakistan in terms of infiltrators who are coming in, weapons coming from the other side, there is support for funding etc. also. So, that's one dimension which also manifests on the border because the kind of ceasefire violations that you are seeing today are also an attempt I feel by Pakistan, you know, to keep this issue alive in the international sphere that, you know, there is so much trouble along the borders with Pakistan. And second, of course, is the internal dimension which we just cannot ignore. There is, there is alienation, there is anger, there is angst among the people. There is a, there is a growing sense of radicalization that is happening. You see more and more local youth who are joining terror ranks. So, I think both these dimensions need to be looked at equally. Typically, in the, in the military, we always talk about one center of gravity, but I have always believed that, you know, here in Kashmir, there are two centers of gravity and both need to be tackle equally. In your draft, you make a reference to an issue which I think deserves to, I mean, I would like you to explain. You point out that there must be a clearly defined political objective that aims to mainstream Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India. Now, before we come to the whole issue of mainstreaming, the point that struck me is that you are asking for a clearly defined political objective. My question to you, sir, is, has there been no clearly spelled out political objective for the army when it was asked to intervene in Jammu and Kashmir? And if there was, why is it that 30 years down the line, we are still back to talking about clearly spelling out. See, Gautam, so this is a tragedy because I, I believe and a lot of us believe that there is not been a clearly defined political objective where the government says, this is what we need you to do and that is why you see because of this mismatch of between political, a clearly defined political objective and military objectives, we often hear statements like, you know, the military has brought the situation under control, but unfortunately the political solutions that were to follow have not taken place and therefore, we do not find a resolution to Kashmir. So, I think we now need to start, you know, changing our outlook and saying that we need a political military strategy. Too often, we have tried to say in these situations that, you know, military does its own job and then the politics will do its own job. So, I am saying we need a clearly defined political objective and from this political objective will flow how the military should be acting. Right now, sometimes my sense is that the military is focusing purely on sort of counter-terrorism kind of roles and therefore, the whole of government approach which requires, you know, good governance, development, economic issues, counter-radicalization. Some of that gets into the back burner and so that is why I have said that we need a clearly defined political objective about what the government needs to do. In the political objectives, where do you place the issue of peaceful resolution because dealing with economic hardships or employment or the so-called radicalization, etc., these are secondary to the primary issue, the still confences which is the unresolved issue over Kashmir which keeps on erupting again and again last 30 years we have seen. Yeah, so it is, as I said, Gautam, this is to be defined by the government. It is not for me to say that the government should take A, B, C, D political approach. It depends on the government in power, how they view it and how they see that steps that need to go and to be taken towards, as you said, a peaceful conflict resolution. Now, surely two different political parties with different ideologies could look at different routes. So, it is, I do not think we can say that only A particular route is what is going to get us there. My point is whatever it is, whatever the government decides, it must clearly enunciate its policies and objectives and what we are aiming to achieve in Kashmir. And once that is done, then the other organs of government can then work their plans so that we are moving towards achieving this objective. What should be the metrics for gauging success, for example? Is it merely the killing of terrorists? Because that seems to dominate, you know, all our success strategies. And therefore, the government clearly enunciates that this is what we want to do. Then the military also starts looking at its, of how it gauges success differently. Would my reading be correct that there has in the last 30 years, the political objective has not been very clearly spelled out for the military? Absolutely, absolutely. So, if we are back to, we return back to conditions in Jammu and Kashmir, which after improving a bit relapse is because there is no political direction to. And also because we have tried to look at this whole problem of Jammu and Kashmir, you know, from a very security perspective. So, when things improve, let us say the security situation improves, then the governments, I feel, you know, sometimes think that your things are much better now. Nothing is going wrong. And that is why long-term political steps for resolution are not taken. 2011-12 were extremely, extremely peaceful years. But again, we did not find, you know, matching steps that could have led towards conflict resolution. 2005-6, I think there were 5 or 6 working groups which are constituted for Kashmir. But again, their reports, which they submitted, you know, nothing happened to that. So, I think we should go beyond the security narrative as far as Kashmir is concerned and not purely look at it in terms of that, you know, improved security and conflict resolution will automatically follow. I do not think that is going to happen. Now, since 2014, I mean, if we come to the recent period, you mentioned also that after 2012, things, you noticed things, you know, or the militancy slowly stepping out. You noticed that. But after 2016, it erupted. Between 2012 and 2014, I mean, 2015 was the period it was slowly building up. And you were aware of it. Now, since this new government has taken over, it seems that they appeared to have, without stating it so clearly, a political objective, because the way in which they are pushing their policies, for instance, the rules on the highways of restricting military convoys to Sunday and Wednesday, without consulting the army and the army coming out even on other days to make a mincemeat of it. Where does it, this is one, then the banning of Jama'at-e-Islami JKLF, which laid down arms in 1994 unilaterally, the arrests that are taking place, the co-ordinate search operations that have increased. It seems that there it seems to be a clear military direction, because the government's political objective seems to be to forcibly set the terms of debate by removing the very idea of negotiating with anybody who even talks about autonomy. So, how do you see that? I mean, here is a clear political objective, which has been assigned to the military, and the military is carrying out the operations, operation all out. So, where does your the need for a clearly spelled out political objective come in? No, so I was there till the end of 2016, and what you are saying that a clear political objective was laid out by the government, I did not see it. We did certainly see what is being called as a more muscular approach to the problem in Jammu and Kashmir. My sense is that, yes, you need to act up against terrorists. You need to ensure law and order is maintained in the streets, because people are out every day not letting governments function. You have to take strong action as a state against that, but at the same time, I think the other issues that have been ignored is why are so many youngsters actually joining terror ranks? Why have violence levels gone up? I talked about radicalization. The political process is dead now. You have the governor's rule. So, I think some of these issues also need focus. So, I did not see something being spelled out to me as an autonomic commander that this is a political objective and please go ahead and do this, but I certainly did see a more muscular approach and somewhat ignoring our other issues that parallely need to be taken up. Operation All Out began after you demoted office. So, this is something happened after you left. Now, you are one of the few serving generals who had the courage to come out and point out at the height of insurgency in 2016 that we must talk to all stakeholders and thereby implied the need for dialogue and also pointing out the indigenous nature cannot be ignored. Now, in light of your understanding, while you were there as the head of Northern Command, do you think there has been a shift since you demoted office? Because operation All Out began after you left and all the crackdowns that one sees has taken place since June of 2018 now, where there has been a stepping up in terms of the curves that have been imposed. So, do you probably feel that after you demoted office they were more? You know, so everything also depends on you know, who are the commanders in place and what sort of directions they are getting from the higher end quarter. I in fact inquired about this operation All Out and I was told by a very senior officer in the valley that there is no such name of any operation All Out although somehow you know it is got fancy and this name has come up and everyone saying that the army is carrying out operation All Out. So, but on ground there is no operation such as operation All Out, but having said that you know the the coordinate searches large scale operations have increased over a period of time. I personally think it is counterproductive, we used to always say that it is time for you know small team intelligence based operation. So, that you know people are not put at discomfort, I think we should now look at going back to those kind of operations rather than this huge coordinate search operations which actually end up you know alienating the people. So, maybe we have to look at what are you know military tactical operations and how they should be conducted, but you know I am not there on ground. So, that is also an issue you know sitting here in the comfort of you know my home in Chandigarh to give too much advice to people who are on ground is also not right. So, but it is striking that contrast to the 2000, 2001 to the number of militants and the number of infiltration which you already yourself point out in this draft that infiltration has been more or less plucked by the army along the LOC and the ID. Now, if that be true and the number of militants does not exceed 300, 350 in which is in sharp contrast to earlier times where they numbered in thousands. Militancy per se does not pose as bigger threat. It appears that the brunt or the target seems to be the civilian population because of the numbers of militants are low, the infiltration is low and does not pose a serious threat. Then the deployment of such a huge force and all the steps that have been taken in recent times seem to be that they are targeting the civilians. How sensible is that? No, no. So, I do not think so. You know that the army has been there for many number of years and clearly they understand that you know the civilians are the center of gravity and that civilians must be put to least discomfort. I think there is a very clear understanding of this sort of strategy that the army needs to take. I agree with you that the security situation per se is not such that it appears to be out of control. 350 terrorists can easily be looked after by the presence of the of the military there. I think what is missing is what other steps do we need to take? What is the kind of narrative we are building? What are the perceptions we are creating? And you are right in that you know some of the perception that is being created is that here is this population of Kashmir valley that is being targeted. There is some deliberate effort you know the recent order to close the highway for two days again seems to be as if it is targeted at the civil population. This large scale coordinate searches are targeted at the civil population. I think that is where some of our actions may be need to be modified and I think we also need to come out with a with a good and effective narrative that here we care for the people of Kashmir. Somehow that narrative is also missing. So, you do find some statements, isolated statements particularly by the home minister is I think he has been saying just the right thing. But sort of overall perception has been created that the state is at war you know with its own people and I think that is the perception that needs to be reversed. Let us move to the other dimension Pakistan. You mentioned that we must and this is in fact quite a remarkable point that you the draft also advocates is that we have to be engaged in dialogue with Pakistan at the same time you link the progress with visible results. Now can you spell out. So, the reason I say this Gautam if you see why is it that dialogues with Pakistan have sort of stopped or broken up in the past. It always follows some terror incident. It always follows something that is happening on the line of control some attack on our you know garrisons or post and that is why I say progress cannot be made unless Pakistan visibly shows that they are willing to somehow crack down on this and that is the. So, dialogue I always say dialogue is necessary. How could you how could you not talk to your neighbor and particularly where you having problems with him. But can there be some visible results that we are having dialogue and because of this dialogue you see an improvement in situation. So, if the Prime Minister goes and meets Nawaz Sharif and a month later you have Pathan Gaut obviously people are going to say what use is this dialogue and that is why I said if it could be properly structured and if it could be based on some visible results I think that is the way to go forward. Now, when we talk about visible result obviously since Pakistan is also a party in this in the conflict resolution overall conflict revolution Pakistan has to be a party to it. What visible results would they be looking for from our side? What I mean is surely they would be expecting some change or some movement on Kashmir from the Indian government side. So, I mean there has to be a quid pro quo. So, Gautam I agree with you but you know when does that quid pro quo come? If we think that you know you sit across the table and start talking and immediately you know you will look at making Pakistan a party to the Kashmir resolution issue I think it is not going to happen. Look at what happened between you know Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan saying. So, it took a whole series of actions starting with the ceasefire along there was there was check on cross-border terrorism. Talks and negotiations took place and it is only then that you know they were somewhere close to coming to some kind of you know solution on Kashmir on you know soft borders etcetera. So, I think Pakistan should be realistic enough to understand that unless you know they take this step of stopping cross-border terror. I do not think we will get to a resolution. I am saying this is this is actually the practical way of going about it. I want to ask you on northeast as well as on as you what you call the left wing extremist the issue of the Maoist insurgency. There are two questions that come to mind-mind on the one hand in northeast government of India has been engaged in Nagaland with the Nagar underground for umpteen years and they are talking to all sides. They even met abroad at the level of Prime Minister. What is it that prevents government of India to also open up and talk to Hisbul Mujahideen which is an indigenous force. Especially if there were also to think of what you suggest where the left wing extremist is concerned where you put emphasis on the socio-economic background to the conflict. What I am trying to say is that the indigenous the root causes or the domestic reasons for why people are alienated or discontented has to be addressed. So, in the case of Nagaland we are talking to the Nagar underground. In the case of Maoist the draft advocates looking and taking a serious look at those features I mean Adivasi dissatisfaction alienation displacement all the problems land grab that they are suffering from. Why can't the same approach be adopted where Jamun Kashmir is concerned in so far as the internal aspect is concerned. So, there are there are one or two crucial differences you know the the NSC and IM is in a ceasefire agreement with India. They are all they are all based here. I know they are sort of collecting taxes and almost running and I have said this almost a parallel government, but really they are not engaged in terrorist activities or operations against the Indian forces. But when it began when the talks began when the government of India took the initiative of talking to them at that point the conflict was or armed conflict was going on. On on the issue of Hizbul Mujahideen it is not as if it is not been tried. So, it was tried once when we had 1999. Even last year when the government said you know we will seize operations during the during the Ramzan period we didn't see any reaction coming from the Hizbul Mujahideen to say that we reciprocate this. I think it was a good gesture by by the Indian government. I still feel it could have been extended you know for a little while longer, but you know those are government decisions to take. So, I don't think and it's been talked a lot in the in the past that let's try and get you know the local terrorists to surrender. Even when I was in in northern command we did discuss this whole issue of you know cessation of operations during the winter months. So, it is something that we are conscious of. I think the problem will be will the Hizbul Mujahideen agree to this and being based in Pakistan. Will Pakistan support this initiative by Hizbul Mujahideen? That's where I think the doubt comes. So, we end part one of our conversation with General Huda here.