 Ladies and gentlemen, we're talking about shifting sovereignty in the Middle East. But I think we should probably not say shifting sovereignty, but changing sovereignty, changing the significance of sovereignty as it has been known in recent decades and recent centuries. What is sovereignty and what does it entail? I think today in the Middle East, sovereignty to a large extent is a very, very critical point in its history in the Middle East. Whether there is still sovereignty in the traditional form that we have known it is a question in itself. Because if we look around us, we find that more and more areas in the Middle East are devoid of sovereignty. And where sovereignty is not exercised and cannot be exercised. And one of the characteristics of the Middle East, since what is called the Arab Spring, is that the areas where sovereignty is absent are becoming more and more prevalent in the Middle East. And the problem of what will happen there in those areas is a serious problem for those countries which still try and exercise sovereignty when they are unable to do so in any practical form. But there is also, of course, the actors, the shifty actors, as we said in the name of this lecture this evening, or as we call them the non-state actors, who are becoming in certain aspects of the events that we are now following, prime actors, leading actors in what is happening today. And I will be addressing these non-state actors first and foremost before even talking about the states and where the leaders and the presidents and the sovereigns of state are and where they are going. There are two main non-actors in the Middle East who are having an enormous influence on events at present. The one are the Hezbollah in the north, the Shiite grouping in the south of Lebanon, and the other is the Hamas, which is in Gaza. Let us look at the Hezbollah to begin with. The Hezbollah began as a terrorist organization in the north of the Shiite majority in Lebanon. Almost 50% of the population in Lebanon are Shiites. It began as an organization which carried out terrorist acts across the border against Israel. And within the period of time that it has been active from the 80s of the previous century until today, it has developed into a force which is a driving force and will probably be a force which will influence the outcome in Syria, which I will talk about in a minute, in probably a manner which is incomparable to any other actor in the Middle East. The Hezbollah has developed into a fighting force. It's no longer what we used to call a terrorist organization which sends in groups or squads across the border to carry out a terrorist act or to detonate a car bomb in Beirut or elsewhere. It is a fighting force. It is organized as a military fighting force. It has companies. It has battalions. It has commanders. It has areas. It has regional commanders. It is a fighting force which has shown its metal in more than one occasion in fighting us. And I will say in all due respect that I think in recent years it has succeeded in creating a balance of deterrence with Israel. And we have this situation in which we have a state, Israel, with a constitution, with a population, with a civilian life, with a life in areas of science, technology, and whatever it is. And there is a balance between a state like Israel and a non-state actor which has terrorism on its must head. Hezbollah has not only developed as a fighting force, it is in constant process of upgrading its equipment. The equipment is being upgraded from several sources, from Iran to who they owe allegiance because they are Shiites and the leadership of the Shiite forces in the Middle East are in Iran. And they also have relations elsewhere. They receive quantities of equipment and arms from the Iranians, from the Syrians, directly and indirectly from the Russians. And they also have their own development of arms. And they are now entering into areas in the military field which you would normally associate with states. One of the areas that they are now trying to enter into is the area of drones. Drones not only for the collection of information but drones also as a means of transporting weaponry and then letting the bombs drop from a drone into whatever target you have chosen. Drone warfare now has become something in which the Middle East is experiencing in other places. But that a group like the Hezbollah would have a drone capability, this is something I think which one would not have expected so soon. And I believe that they are preparing for a showdown with Israel sometime in the future. They're not yet ready now. And uncharacteristically, the head of the Hezbollah only said a month ago that they do not seek a war with Israel at this time. And this was mistakenly interpreted as saying that possibly they might not seek war with us any time and anywhere. But this is not the case. I believe what they're saying is we're not ready yet. The Hezbollah is also being supplied with a lot of surface to air, missilery, anti-aircraft capabilities since they believe they needed a response to the power of the Israeli Air Force, which has been omnipotent in the Middle East for a very long period of time. And they're preparing for themselves for this kind of showdown. But they're also very active, as I said, in Syria. They are the main fighting force on the side of Assad today. The Syrian army today is in very bad shape. They have no recruits, no new recruits for the last few years. Their units have been decimated by the forces that they have been fighting. And apart from the air capability which they have, which is used mainly in order to drop either incendiaries or all kinds of weaponry on civilian populations, as far as the units are concerned, the land units are concerned, they are not in good shape. And the match of the fighting, the main fighting on behalf of Assad in Syria today is carried out by Hezbollah, which, A, of course, causes them a lot of casualties, but also gives them a lot of experience, battle experience. And it also makes them a player, a player which has to be contended with, a player which has influence, and a player which will determine to some extent what will happen in Syria. There is another actor in this drama, and that is Russia. We all know that Russia is a main supplier of arms to Syria. Russia has staked its revival in the Middle East, its comeback in the Middle East on retaining Syria, come what may. And that is why in the command posts in Damascus, you will find Russian senior officers not only observing what has happened in the field, but also advising on actions and activities and operations. This is a departure from what we have known up to now, but this is something we have to take into account. Russia has no intention whatsoever of giving up what's going to happen in the end in Syria. For Russia, this is the asset test. After having lost Libya, after having lost other footholds in the Middle East, including Iraq, Russia does not want to leave Syria. And therefore, for Russia, this is also a test for the comeback of Russia as a world power. What is happening in Ukraine is a European issue. It is related to Russia's necessity, the way they see it, of having what they call the Cardon Sanitaire around Russia. And therefore, Ukraine is part of the Russian Theater of Influence. Syria is a different story. Syria is the test for Russia of making it back to the seat of power around the Security Council, not only technically as a member of the Security Council which has a veto, but also as a world power recalling days gone by. And we have Iran in Syria today. Iran, for which Syria is key, because as an Iranian said to me a couple of months ago, an Iranian part of the entourage of Rouhani, we need Syria as part of the fertile crescent. It is essential to us in order to, A, to be the area through which we will conduct our activities with Hezbollah, they are the go-between, we do not have a direct contact with them otherwise, and B, because we need Syria in order to deter Israel. And this is for them the asset test. Will they be able to retain their position in Syria? So in the end, the way it looks at the moment, apart from the forces that are fighting in the north, the forces of the Muslim, more extreme people, the Sunnites, who are organized in one way or another, but also organized as fighting forces. Al-Qaeda, the word Al-Qaeda, which is always associated with the fact that you have groups of people who carry out terrorist acts from the 9-11 or here in 7-7 in London. The Al-Qaeda in Syria is a totally different story. It is organized groups, it is a fighting force which is organized, it may be badly organized, but conducting conventional warfare with all that that entails. So we see this combination of non-state actor of a major power in the world, an Iranian effort to become the hegemon in the Middle East, all of it converging on Syria with all that that entails. And with, as I said, Hezbollah being a very, very important player, maybe the most important player in the field. For us, this has consequences. After the Yom Kippur War of 1973, we signed an agreement with the Syrians on a separation line, it's called. It's not a border in the normal sense of the term, it's not a frontier, but we have a separation line and this agreement has been internationally recognized and also is policed by the United Nations Security Council. If ultimately in Syria, we're gonna have an Iranian presence there, if ultimately the Hezbollah is going to be entrenched in Syria, will they respect the separation line? What will be the relationship between us and them? Will the Iranians in effect assume responsibility and assume the responsibility for respecting the separation line? Then we will have the beginning possibly of an initial mutual acceptance between us and the Iranians. If not, we do not know what this can entail. I told this Iranian I was talking to that I feared that this could be an occasion in which we would start a process of serious deterioration and he said to me, you are threatening me. I said, I don't think I'm threatening you, I'm simply telling you what are the facts of life? And all this within the concept of what a non-state actor is doing. And we have Hamas in the South, Hamas which today, as I speak to you today, is probably one of its lowest in its history after having suffered setbacks, having been forced to leave its traditional base in Damascus after having been declared just recently a terrorist organization by Egypt which is on its southern borders, totally isolated almost from the world, both physically and politically. And suddenly at that given moment, after a year or so when we had a confrontation with Hamas, a confrontation which entailed amongst all things, 1500 air sorties flown against the Gaza Strip within seven days, we reached a quasi agreement with Hamas in which we agreed that they would be able to do certain things that they were not allowed to do up to then and we would allow them to receive the kind of materials which up to now we had not allowed them to receive through our checkpoints. And here again, we are having this mutual deterrence, if you like, a non-state actor and Israel in a situation in a setup which is very, very uncommon in other parts of the world. Hamas today has a military capability, despite all the setbacks it has been, been experiencing. Hamas today does have an individual capability of producing weaponry. In the last confrontation we had, they tried to get a missile as close as possible to Jerusalem and they weren't far off the mark. And although we had our means of preventing this and we were successful in repulsing this effort and this attack, we nevertheless agreed to a ceasefire seven days after hostilities had begun. And this point has not been lost on the countries of the Middle East. Now, as you know, the Hamas has now sort of emerged suddenly out of the doldrums. Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the Palestinian Authority, has turned to the Hamas and offered them again to, shall we say, to enter into an agreement in which the Hamas would become part of the leadership of the Palestinians again, that they would become a respected partner on part of the Palestinian Authority, although they have been declared worldwide as a terrorist group. And here again, the net result of this is the Hamas has been able to obtain a veto, a political veto on the discussions going on between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on a possible progress in seeking peace between us and the Palestinians. Now the Hamas will be able, at every given point in time, will be able to stand up and say, we don't agree to this or we don't agree to that and scuttle the talks or scuttle the discussions. And as you probably know, Israel has said that we will not talk to the Palestinian Authority if they don't abrogate this agreement they have just made with Hamas. But this does not seem to be the case at the moment. So on both sides of our borders in the north and the south, we have a non-state actor which is having an enormous effect on both the political dialogue which is going on between us and our neighbors and on the military and the security situation which we are facing in the north and in the south. I would like to move now to say something about other actors in the region and other areas in the region. First of all, I'd like to point out that I've talked about Hamas and I've talked about Hezbollah, but those are not the only areas which are to some extent devoid of sovereignty. One is the Sinai Peninsula between us and the Egyptians. This has always been a buffer between us and Egypt after we made our peace with Egypt and we have a peace agreement. The Sinai was considered to be an area which would be clear of arms and clear of forces. And according to the agreement, by the way, the Egyptians were not allowed to introduce certain types of weaponry into the Sinai Peninsula. And they honored this part of their agreement, of the peace agreement. But now, we're in a position that we accede to constant requests of the Egyptians to introduce weaponry in order that they should try successfully, if this was possible, to overcome terrorist activity in the Sinai. And as I speak to you today, this has not been achieved. So the Sinai, to a large extent, is a no-man's-land with all that entails, with all kinds of terrorist groups moving around there with a lot of weaponry being sent into there. And this is a very explosive situation, explosive in two aspects. One, it could be a launching pad for activities against Israel and we have had several serious problems with serious attacks on our southern border, including missile attacks on Elat, which is our southern port. And secondly, if this continues and the Egyptians have to be there, then the concept of a buffer zone with, by the way, a trip line, a small little trip line between the two sides of the buffer, which are manned by an American, a U.S. force, not a force that can actually enter into combat, but it's a trip wire in order to designate where the line is between us and Egypt. This could be in jeopardy. And this, again, could have an enormous effect on our security and our future. We have other areas where you have no sovereignty. In the north of Iraq today, the Kurdish province is, to all intents and purposes, a semi-autonomous region. And they can do whatever they like and however they like. And then you have Anbar province, which is, as you know, the basis and center for the Sunnites in the region. And there again, an area which is, to a large extent, a no-man's land. So you have areas, islands of no-man's lands in the Middle East. And this, of course, could be festering in ways and means which would be extremely dangerous to all of us. I'd like to add two aspects to this. This grim picture, if I can call it that, somewhat grim picture. And that is that I want to add another element which I think is important in order to understand what exactly is happening today. Economics is playing a role in the Middle East, the like of which it has never played before. Iran came to the table to discuss and to negotiate on their nuclear military programs, not because they were under threat or military threat, but because the sanctions which were imposed upon them by the international community were extremely effective. And the problem reached a point where the regime felt that if it did not enter into negotiations, it could risk losing control of the country, simply that. Iran, despite the fact that it is battling in Syria and elsewhere, is now engaged in a very, very frantic effort, a frantic effort to try and restore some kind of decency to its economy in a condition in the situation in which problems are multiplying galore in two areas. One, a growing scarcity of water in Iran, drinking water in Iran, and food in Iran. The Iranian population of Iran has doubled in the last 30, 40 years and to feed 90 million mouths and to provide for water for 90 million sore throats. This is a very, very difficult task to be able to meet. So Iran at the moment is also on the verge of serious decisions it has to make. And I believe that the way the negotiation will be conducted with Iran will have an enormous effect on the future of that country, on the future of Syria and elsewhere, one thing leads to another. And I would like to conclude not by talking about Egypt, but talking about another country, and that is Saudi Arabia. And I want to devote the last minutes of my talk here my introductory talk to Saudi Arabia. It is conventionally believed that Saudi Arabia has been one of the most implacable foes of Israel and of Jewish people in time immemorial, certainly as of the moment that the Ibn Saud Dynasty took control of the Arabian Peninsula. Ibn Saud was considered, has always been considered as the most rabid anti-Semite in modern times. And he has spoken that way, he's spoken out that way in very, very, very stark terms. He has said very often that the time had come to send in forces into Palestine to remove the vermin, the Jewish vermin which is polluting Palestinian sacred soil. The terms and verbiage he has used have been atrocious from every point of view. And one could have gained the impression that Saudi Arabia was the number one foe of Israel, both ideologically, religiously, if you like, and philosophically, if you wish. But if you examine the facts very closely, you will find that when it comes to the Palestinian issue which was the issue which supposedly would have been the issue which the Saudis would have espoused in a manner which almost no other country would have done, the Saudis have been absent almost all the way. And they have not supported the Palestinians with arms, they have not trained them in any form or fashion, they have not participated in warfare against Israel, except nominally in the War of Independence. And I can tell you that if you look back at the records of World War II, an initiative was once promoted by St. John Philby, the father of his son, obviously, called and named Kim Philby, to create a federation in the Middle East which would be under the ruler of Saudi Arabia, under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, and the king of Saudi Arabia would actually move from Riyadh to Damascus, which was his dream initially to be the king of all the Arabs of the Middle East in Damascus. And within this shape of a kind of a federation, there would be room for a Jewish entity in Palestine. And he tried to sell this idea to Churchill in 1942 in the middle of World War II. And Churchill called in the president of the Zionist organization, Chaim Weitzman, and told him about it and told him this is a great secret. You must go to Washington to get the Americans to support this, because if they will support it, I will be able to support it, the way things are at the moment, I can't do it on my own. And Chaim Weitzman actually played a secret visit to Washington in 1942. And he tried to convince the officials in the State Department to go along with this and he did not succeed. But that's not the only thing which happened in 1942. A colleague of mine in the Mossad retired several years ago and at the age of 66, he decided to write a doctorate, to research a doctorate on the question of the Saudi attitude to the Palestinian issue. And amongst the things he was able to ferret out from all kinds of archives was the fact that two very secret Saudis received medical treatment in the Hadassah Hospital in what was then Palestine on Mount Scopus and there was a shroud of conspiracy about their visit there and so forth and nobody really knew what this is all about. Well, he went into the archives further and further and he found there a letter on the letterhead of the House of Saud, of Ibn Saud, of the Saudi monarchy, a letter in which the writer thanked the doctors and particularly if I may say the nurses of the hospital on Mount Scopus for the wonderful medical treatment that had been given to himself and to his brother. And this beautiful letter was signed Fahed. Fahed was one of the sons of Ibn Saud. He later became king of Saudi Arabia. Fahed, together with his brother Mansour, who was the first ever minister of defense of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, received vital medical treatment in the Jewish hospital, is Jewish hospital on Mount Scopus, the main hospital at that time in the Middle East, by the way, and they were grateful for it. And Fahed was the man as a king who first formulated the policy of Saudi Arabia to effect a peace between Israel and the Arab world. It was called the Six Points which later on became in 2002 the Saudi peace plan, which has yet to be taken up as a major document for negotiation. Saudi Arabia is behind much of what is going on in Syria. Saudi Arabia is supporting the forces who are battling against Assad, battling against the Iranians, battling against the Russians. This is not only a battle between the Saudis and Bashar Assad. This is one of the major battles between the Sunnites and the Shiites in modern-day history. And after many, many years in which this relationship was a latent relationship of enmity, which did not break out into open warfare, now there's open warfare between the Sunnites and the Shiites. And I'd like to remind all of you that in the Middle East, whether we like it or not, the Sunnites are the majority and the Shiites are the minority. Because Egypt is Sunnite, because Turkey is Sunnite, because Saudi Arabia is Sunnite, because half of Syria is Sunnite, and so forth. And it is this element of a non-state actor. Religion is not a state. The Shiites and the Sunnites are non-state actors in a different sense, not territorially, but conceptually. And this is something which we have to take into account and to study well. There are many other issues in the Middle East which I have not touched upon. I try to touch upon those elements which I believe are essential to understand what is happening now, here and now at the moment. And I believe, unfortunately, that these problems are not going to be resolved in the very near future. The nature of these conflicts, which I have mentioned this evening, the nature of the conflicts are such that they cannot be resolved overnight or by a simple negotiation in which you reach a agreement of that kind or another. We have to be patient. We have to know how to manage the conflicts, how to live with the conflicts, how to be able to turn certain elements of the conflicts into coalitions which would serve our interests, the interests of the Western world or Western democracy and so forth. It will not be easy. And I believe that there's a lot of work to be done. And as we look at the Middle East a hundred years, almost to the day, minus two years in which the United Kingdom played the key role in creating the entirety of the configuration, political configuration of the Middle East, the states, the kingdoms and the which groups would be in power and which would not be in power. I think now we have reached the point where all this is now up with a big question mark. And the resolution will not be easy. It will not be easy, it will not be smooth because you have the elements in the region, you have the superpowers, you have the Russia and I mentioned Russia in great detail. I didn't say anything about the United States. The United States is also not prepared or not preparing just to leave the Middle East for a variety of reasons which I don't have time to go into. So with this note of cautious optimism, should I say? I don't know how you would characterize what I've said this evening, but I think of maybe not cautious optimism but of realism. I think we have to face what is happening with all the consequences and the fallout for almost everybody on this globe. Thank you.