 Let's move to Laila. Thank you, Tanaka-san. Well, we are on the second day of the World Policy Conference, the end of the second day, so I will not insist again on the fact that the global context has changed again over the last decade, and I think, and I have some slides actually that need to be, that they need to be projected, but thank you. And after, I think they're very comprehensive and excellent picture that Olivier has shared with us on all the aspect that have changed over the last decade, I'll just focus on a couple of points, some couple of subtle trends that are, that have been changing over the last 10 years, but not going a little bit more unnoticed than the rest. Should we wait for the slides or should I just proceed? Is the slide coming? It's coming, but you can talk. All right, so the first point that I wanted to mention, I mean, Mr. Bakuri over lunchtime has rightly pointed out that, for example, PV, solar PV module costs have decreased over time, so they have actually dropped 80% between 2010 and 2017. That's a massive drop, but I would really want to insist on another cost decrease that is happening in the energy sector, which is related to storage, electricity storage. And that's, I agree, mostly driven by EV batteries, but at the same time, I mean, it's quite important to mention those cost drops that we've seen in the battery in the, including the stationary applications, the grid-scale batteries. So electricity storage in general have been decreasing 60% to 80% since 2010. And they are expected to drop by the various agencies, investment banks and researchers by an additional 50 to 60% by 2030. But I really want to point out the large uncertainty that is prevailing in these outlooks. Large uncertainty because we don't know which technology will prevail. We don't know which chemistry is going to prevail. We don't know how much money, R&D money will be put in those technologies where the manufacturing capabilities will be focused or concentrated in the next few years. And of course, government support. How will government support will evolve over time? But I think it's fair to say that we can see some additional cost decreases in energy storage as well in a wider sense. The implication for me or the implication for any energy player in the scene, companies and countries alike is a race. A race to gain leadership in technologies. And beyond that, a race to secure access to the materials and commodities that are underlined these storage technologies. And I will give some examples later on. The second point, the second subtle change that I am seeing at least in the energy sector over the last decade. I mean, of course, there has been an unprecedented volatility in oil prices. And it has been widely documented in press. And we all know about it when oil prices increased to $140 in 2008 before dropping to $20 to $30. And now we are in that 70 to 80 band around that. So here again, we would argue, I mean, any planner will argue that this is just another commodity cycle and nobody really likes commodity cycles. And it's an uncertainty that we have to live with. And I think the industry has been very used to live with this sort of uncertainty. But the implication of these volatility is, I think, every planner's nightmare. We are today in a situation where oil demand outlooks can go from, I mean, today's market of around 100 million bars a day to anywhere between, I mean, it can increase to 80 million bars a day by 2040 or grow, increase to 112, 150 million bars a day. When you are in an industry with huge capital investment programs, it's really a nightmare to be able to plan in those circumstances. So today that gives another type of race as well. Race for cost leadership, race for profitability, but also a race to guarantee some sort of security of demand. And that security of demand is slightly different from the traditional definition of security of demand that we have seen over, I would say, the last two decades in the oil markets. We are seeing today several players investing in securing demand for oil and gas in established markets. So you invest in making sure that the IC engines continue to be the engines of the future for sustainable transport. You continue to invest in low emission fuels. And in onboard CO2 capture, we see that in the heavy duty vehicles, in the shipping industry as well. We are seeing a lot of changes happening there in those established markets. But you also see another trend in a race to capture market share in new markets for crude and gas. And I'm thinking here about, of course, petrochemicals, plastics, polymers for crude and for oil products in general, and transportation for gas. And in this context, there will be, in the discussion to prepare this panel, we talked a lot about revalories. And I prefer to use the word shifting alliances. So there will be a lot of shifting alliances. There will be a lot of, I would say, proactive strategies. I prefer to use this word. But, and we should not forget that in addition to the traditional alliances that we are used to in this, here again, highly capital intensive sector, the alliances today in many cases are being driven by large corporations, private corporations, but also large, increasingly large sovereign funds, other national champions of new forms, and national oil companies, large national oil companies which in many cases are being perceived as competing with each other because they are pursuing similar objectives and similar strategies. They all want business integration. They all want downstream investments. They all want global footprint because there's a limit to what you can achieve in your domestic market. There's a limit to what you can sell in your domestic market. And there's, especially if you are heavily exposed to mature domestic assets. So these proactive strategies that I've been talking about, all those shifting alliances are driven by these three key aspects. The first one is, as I mentioned, the race to secure market share by making sure that we are, that we continue to be low cost as much as possible. And through, of course, optimal extraction of resources and increasingly important capital discipline, especially after the volatility of all prices that we have seen. And in addition to the low cost position, this would be coupled increasingly with the low carbon intensity of some operations. So you put that in a melting pot. And the conclusion is that, of course, the Russians in the Middle East and NOCs are very well positioned because to take advantage of their low cost position, we are talking about 2 to 4 dollars per barrel of oil equivalent for development and production costs. There will be a bigger challenge, of course, for Latin Americans, Asian NOCs, because simply their costs are more than double that. Or for Canadian players, which are disadvantaged by the carbon intensity of their upstream operations. One word on capital discipline. I mentioned spending rates in the industry have been scaled back in the wider industry by NOCs and IOC's majors all alike. And we've seen cuts in exploration budgets, which, and I will talk about it a little bit later on in my conclusion, might be triggering another commodity cycle that none of us actually like in the end. But most of the national oil companies today are investing at higher rates than the majors. But in general, I think it's quite important to mention here, just a caveat, that apart from CNOC, Petronas, and Sinopec, investments of most national oil companies are very much focused on domestic projects and domestic markets. And this is the reason why you see now this rapprochement that Olivier has mentioned between the Russians, which are differentiated by their, by the scale, by their portfolio longevity. The Russians, which are now courting national oil companies from the Middle East, while you have the Asian national oil companies still focusing very much in the short term on resource capture initiatives, but not at any price. And we have several examples in the headlines. I mean, you're all aware of the OPEC plus Alliance, rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Russia, several investments or potential investments in the international gas industry. Qatar emerging as a major shareholder in Rosneft. That's another example, 18.95% in the $9 billion deal because the talks with China's CFC have collapsed. So these are all examples in the headline that sort of support these hypothesis that I presented here. And since we are talking about market share, I thought it was quite important to say a word about the chemicals business more specifically because there's a question that I very often get is why is the chemical business increasingly considered in integration with refining capacity, with downstream investments. One example is Saudi Arabia aiming to increase refining capacity to 8 to 10 million bars a day and to double the pet cam capacity by 2030. Here, the scale of the investments definitely has a weight in the market of some key petrochemical products, but also potentially it raises some concerns around the long-term financial performance of the business because the issue that we are facing is that in many cases the return on capital employed of a petrochemical project or a chemical project is registered single-digit percentages while the industry, as we all know, prefers to have 15% returns usually. So the integration with refining becomes very valuable and very important. We need much more capital discipline in the area. In the basket of opportunities, it would be also great to add some quick wins in terms of merchant acquisitions to be able to build this sustainable chemicals business coupled with refining. But these are really the only ways that we could see to improve the financial performance of this important business for the oil industry. The upside is that market access to the same demand growth centers targeted by oil and gas, namely China, India, Southeast Asia, et cetera, really facilitates the building of brands, the building of presence, which is much more important in the petrochemical industry. And it also facilitates strategic partnerships with major corporations in those countries. But we still need, and I think the industry is realizing that we really need large marketing efforts, large branding efforts to be able to establish a presence, a sustainable presence in this important market for crude. And the third race that I mentioned in my introduction was around the technologies and commodities. We are faced in a situation. I used the example of energy storage where many countries and companies are engaged in a race to secure the minerals and materials to take leadership in clean and storage technologies. So for example, I mean, it was already mentioned a few times that China has been leading global investments in renewable energy. We all know that. What has been less documented is that the country has been quite aggressive in its race to dominate in energy storage as well. So for example, and now it's very clear, by the end of 2017, the country has issued a unified nationwide policy to boost the energy storage industry in the country. So to give you just some order of magnitude, the Chinese industrial capacity at the end of last year was around 389 megawatt. And between in January and June of this year, so during six months of this year, they put in place new energy storage projects of around 340 megawatts. So we are doubling the capacity in six months. And that's across the country in various provinces, including Guangdong, including Jiangsu, et cetera. One word about the technologies themselves, I mean, apart from hydro, where we have many countries that have installed them over the years, the three key other families, lithium-ion flow batteries and high temperatures, they all have this large cost reduction potential that I mentioned earlier with the caveat that it comes with a large uncertainty. So for example, lithium-ion batteries for stationary applications could drop up to 60% by 2030. And that will depend a lot on which battery chemistry we are following. But the stationary applications and I insist on that have much higher costs than the EV applications because you need battery management systems. You need more hardware for the stationary applications. But they are benefiting, of course, from the growth in the EV industry. And the flow batteries, and these are my personal favorites, not only because of the beautiful colors that we see in a Venetian flow battery, these batteries can actually drop, the other costs can actually drop two-thirds between now and 2030. Here again, huge uncertainty, but the beauty of flow batteries is that they are independently scalable and the power and energy storage characteristics make them very much scalable and modulable, which makes them very well applicable for grid-scale solutions. But all this rosy picture, of course, decreases, comes at the price. And the price that I wanted to highlight here is the minerals and commodities that are on which these technologies are dependent on. So the issue that we have today is that all the technologies around energy storage revolves around just a few key commodities. We have the NMC, the Nickel Manganese Cobalt. We have copper, lithium, of course, graphite, zinc, and now increasingly, vanadium. Copper and nickel are already key industrial materials, key industrial metals, which are trading on commodities exchanges and consumers are very much used to managing supply risks. Manganese and graphite supplies are available in sufficient quantities, but the issue now is really around cobalt, and you see in my slide the price volatility in cobalt and lithium, because there are major concerns, as we know, around security of supply for those two commodities. And cobalt primarily is driving some country's strategies, including China, and China's aggressive investments in DRC, Democratic Republic of Congo, where 60% of supplies of cobalt are concentrated, is quite key there, but it comes, as we know, with political instability, with conflicts over mineral issues, et cetera. So even if the industry and the research development in the energy storage is trying as much as possible to reduce its dependence towards cobalt and other key commodities there by switching to less cobalt-rich cathodes or trying other alternatives, the five leading lithium-ion battery manufacturers that Mr. Carlos Ghosn has referred to are definitely still dependent a lot on cobalt supplies. So in conclusion, we talked about the U.S., Russia, Middle East, China, a little bit about the EU as well. I mean, of course, there is a lot of repositioning and alliances and changing alliances in today's world, but I think it's quite important to mention that there is still continuous emphasis and a continuous focus on the key fundamentals, which is growth, profitability, and increasingly trying to have a proactive technology strategy because that's really a must for the future. One key area that has been neglected so far, and I would like to finish on that, is really system flexibility, much more than system security, actually. And I see that, and I've been an advocate actually myself of the LNG industry as well because it's bringing liquefied gas from the other side of the world frozen at minus 162 degrees Celsius minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit is a beautiful technical challenge. It's a beautiful commercial challenge, but it does not necessarily answer the issue of system flexibility simply because the market mechanisms that we have today are not mature enough to reward system flexibility. We still have pricing mismatch. We still have arbitrage that the traders and the industry is taking advantage of and we still have marketing efficiencies that hampers energy system flexibility to be properly rewarded. So ideally, we want to have more tradability, more connectivity between regions, between neighboring countries and with global markets. And then there's no secret there. We need more investments in infrastructure, in midstream and downstream infrastructure for that. So that's why I focused surprisingly most of my presentation on storage because there is a growing awareness in the industry, whether we like it or not, that energy storage is of incredible paramount importance because in the country where I'm based there's a large swing of demand, for example. You see in many other countries a massive introduction of renewable energy and in many cases, this questions the large capital investment programs in the oil and gas part of the industry and that creates another commodity cycle, another cycle of volatility that is definitely not in the interest of the producers and not in the interest of the consumers. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you, Leda. Very good presentation. One point, I want to ask you that IA3 agree with many of the points you raised. For example, the industrial use of gas and oil will increase rather than fuel. The future of the gas, for example, it's not the fuel for the power generation. It's going to be the petrochemical as an input. So, and also I understand that for the storage, it's Saudi Aramco serious about using hydrogen as a possible way of storage of the clean source of hydrocarbon, I mean, non-carbon fuel. I talked with some of the CTO of Saudi Aramco that taking out the carbon dioxide and put underground as an enhanced oil recovery is a capture and storage. So, the hydrogen becomes the clean source. So, by doing so, exporting clean oil as hydrogen is one of the technological options for Saudi Aramco. Are you seriously thinking of this option? Here, I am not speaking in my capacity as Saudi Aramco here. So, I will not make a comment on that. I think, I mean, I can only comment on what the industry is doing on that. And there are many, many initiatives. OGCI is one of them. And I think a lot of the players in industry are quite serious in investing as much as possible. As I mentioned earlier, to reduce, to try to preserve market share in established markets as much as possible and include in capturing CO2 in multiple applications. That's all what I can say on that. Thank you very much.