 Can I ask you to explore with us kind of the evolving power geometry of the Persian Gulf? How do you see this power geometry? Evolving now especially in light of the so-called Arab Spring Probably in a messy fashion Very bluntly It's very difficult for us to have a consistent policy there because we have conflicting interests We have a base in Bahrain a very important base which is critical to our military supremacy in the Persian Gulf Which needs to be maintained in the short run? But at the same time it's a base without a solid social foundation Because our presence there politically works in favor of the ruling dynasty and of the Sunni minority that is in charge I am fearful that the policy of repression that the Bahrain government may be now embarking upon Is going to make that even worse the notion for example of doctors and nurses numbering almost 50 Being tried because they treated the wounded who happened to be in the main Shia because they were the ones were demonstrating It's to me appalling and yet we are in effect identified with it because we have such a stake In our base secondly, we have a stake also in Bahrain because of its importance to Saudi Arabia and The Saudis naturally attach great importance to it But the Saudis are currently totally disillusioned with us That's a fact of life and to some extent their disillusionment is reflection of their own internal problems But to some extent it also may be to some extent a reflection of their sense that our policy in the region Has not been consistent with our public stance And even with some of our negotiating commitments And that does involve what is one of the critical problems in the region namely the persistence of the Israeli Palestinian conflict and the growing perception in the region that we're not serious about solving it We're not serious about using our influence to bring it about to an outcome, which I personally still think is attainable But with growing uncertainty namely an accommodation that makes Israel a Permanent part of the Middle East and even an accepted part of the Middle East and is assured of its security But at the same time by creating a modus vivendi with the Palestinians Creates a potential of Israel and Palestine together Co-operating because they will be intermeshed if they become two states Becoming in effect the Singapore on the Middle East Yeah, I think that's an opportunity that's being wasted and it's an opportunity which in the short run Works against our interests and maximizes resentment such as those which are now being expressed more openly in Saudi Arabia And in the long run poses a danger not only just to our general interest in the region, but to Israel's well-being So I'm Of the view that in effect This aspect of our policy has unfortunately had the effect of then intensifying Saudi Suspicions about democratic change They're probably inner fears of it affecting them as well Because that will happen at some point and thus has put us on a course in which alienation Between us and the Saudis is deepening and that has an immediate impact A kind of a paralyzing impact and then a constructive approach to the issue of Bahrain as a Symptom as well as an issue in the short run, but also as something which foreshadows a much Deeper reality, which is this We entered the Middle East as a major power only right after World War two Until then it was largely a domain of the British and the French Since the Treaty of Versailles But even somewhat earlier with the French the British and the Italians making inroads already in the latter part of the 19th century All of that came to an end in 1945 and we were welcomed into the region with open arms by the Saudis and others who saw in us as an international guarantee of their new status of independence and in that context we had the relationships with the countries in the region to which I referred earlier and today I think all of that is changing and the Arab Spring which creates such fear in Riyadh and which has unleashed such hopes in Washington. I Fear is gradually going to become the Arab winter and that is to say we're not going to see really democratic governments emerge that quickly I think the preconditions for that in Egypt not to mention Syria are not very promising I am skeptical that we will see some serious accommodation between the Israelis and the Palestinians because we have chosen to be passive We're going to find the Arabs Driven by resentment and insecurity Perhaps engaging in conflicting policies among themselves We're yet to see what's going to happen in Yemen and then between Yemen and Saudi Arabia Because that's perhaps in the cards next in and as a result our exit from the region which is Exits not the willed by us, but forced by circumstances Will continue and perhaps become more marked and the question will arise what will happen in the region and who on the outside Will begin to capitalize on it