 Propositions 180 to 199 of The Elements of Theology by Proclus, translated by Thomas Taylor. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Proposition 180. Every intellect is a whole, so far as each consists of parts, and is united to other things, and at the same time separated from them. But imparticipable intellect indeed is simply a whole as containing all parts in itself totally. But each partial intellect possesses the whole as in a part, and thus is all things partially. 4. If a partial intellect is all things according to one, but a subsistence according to one thing is nothing else than a subsistence partially, the whole is in each of these intellects partially, being defined according to a certain one particular thing which predominates in all of them. Proposition 181. Every participated intellect is either divine as being suspended from the gods, or is intellectual only. 4. If a divine and imparticipable intellect has a primary subsistence, the intellect which is allied to this is not that which differs from it in both respects. Which is neither divine nor imparticipable. 4. Things which are dissimilar in both these respects cannot be conjoined with each other. It is evident therefore that the medium between these is partly similar to that which is primarily intellect, and partly dissimilar to it. Either therefore it is imparticipable and not divine, or it is participated and divine. But everything imparticipable is divine as being allotted an order in multitude analogous to the one. Hence there will be a certain intellect which is divine and at the same time participated. It is necessary however that there should be an intellect which does not participate of the divine unities, but intellectually perceives them only. For in each series such things as are first and which are conjoined with their monad are able to participate of things proximately situated in a superior order. But such as are far distant from the primary monad cannot be suspended from the natures that proximately belong to a higher order. There is therefore both a divine intellect and an intellect which is intellectual only. The latter indeed being established according to an intellectual peculiarity which it possesses from its own monad and from imparticipable intellect. But the former subsisting according to the union which it receives from the participated monad. Proposition 182 Every divine participated intellect is participated by divine souls. For if participation assimilates the participant to that which is participated and renders the former cognisant with the latter, it is evident that the participant of a divine intellect must be a divine soul as being suspended from a divine intellect, and that through intellect as a medium it must participate of the deity which it contains. For deity conjoins the soul which participates of it with intellect, and binds that which is divine to that which is divine. Proposition 183 Every intellect which is participated indeed, but is intellectual alone, is participated by souls which are neither divine nor subsisting in a mutation from intellect into a privation of intellect. For neither are divine souls of this kind nor such as participate of intellect, for souls participate of the gods through a divine intellect as was before demonstrated. Nor are souls which admit of mutation of this kind, for every intellect is participated by natures which are always intellectual, both according to essence and according to energy, for this is evident from what has been before shown. Proposition 184 Concerning Soul Every soul is either divine or is changed from intellect into a privation of intellect, or always remains as a medium between these, but is inferior to divine souls. For if a divine intellect indeed is participated by divine souls, but an intellectual intellect by those souls alone which are neither divine nor receive a mutation from intelligence into a privation of intellect, for there are souls of this kind which sometimes perceive intellectually and sometimes do not. If this be the case, it is evident that there are three genera of souls, and the first of these indeed are divine, but the second are not divine, yet always participate of intellect, and the third are those which are sometimes changed into an intellectual condition, and sometimes into a privation of intellect. Proposition 185 All divine souls are indeed gods psychically, but all those that participate of an intellectual intellect are the perpetual attendants of the gods, and all those that are the recipients of mutation are sometimes only the attendants of the gods. For if some souls have divine light supernally shining upon them, but others are endued with perpetual intelligence, and others again only sometimes participate of this perfection, if this be the case, the first of these will among the multitude of souls be analogous to the gods, but the next to these will always follow the gods in consequence of always energizing according to intellect, and will be suspended from divine souls having the same relation to them as that which is intellectual to that which is divine, and the souls which sometimes energize intellectually, and follow the gods neither participate of intellect after a manner always the same, nor are always able to be converted to the intelligible in conjunction with divine souls. For that which sometimes only participates of intellect cannot by any contrivance whatever be always conjoined with the gods. Proposition 186. Every soul is both an incorporeal essence and separate from body. For if it knows itself, but everything which knows itself is converted to itself, and that which is converted to itself, does not pertain to body since every body is without conversion to itself, nor is inseparable from body since that which is inseparable from body is not naturally adapted to revert to itself as it would thus be separated from body. If this be the case, every soul is neither incorporeal essence nor inseparable from body. Moreover, that the soul knows itself is evident. For if it knows the natures that are above itself and is also naturally adapted to know itself, it will in a much greater degree know itself from the causes prior to itself. Proposition 187. Every soul is indestructible and incorruptible. For everything which can in any way whatever be dissolved and destroyed is either corporeal and a composite or is allotted its hypothesis in a subject. And that indeed which is dissolved is corrupted as consisting of many things, but that which is naturally adapted to be in another thing vanishes into non-entity when separated from its subject. Moreover, the soul is incorporeal and external to every subject, subsisting in itself and being converted to itself. Hence, it is indestructible and incorruptible. Proposition 188. Every soul is both life and vital. For that to which soul acedes necessarily lives, and that which is deprived of soul is immediately left destitute of life. Either therefore it lived through soul or through something else, and not through soul. It is however impossible that it should have lived through something else alone. For everything which is participated either imparts itself or something pertaining to itself to its participant. But if it suffers neither of these, it will not be participated. Soul however is participated by that to which it is present, and that which participates of soul is said to be animated. If therefore that which is participated introduces life to animated natures, it is either life or vital alone, or both life and vital. If however it is alone vital, but not also life, it will consist of life and non-life. It will not therefore know itself, nor be converted to itself. For knowledge is life, and the Gnostic power so far as it is such is vital. If therefore there is anything in soul without life, this will not possess essentially the power of knowing. But if soul is life alone, it will no longer participate of the intellectual life. For the participant of life is vital, and is not life alone, he asked, the first and imperticipable life. But the life which is posterior to this is both vital and life. Soul however is not imperticipable life, and hence it is at the same time both life and vital. Proposition 189. Every soul is self-vital. For if it is converted to itself, but everything which is converted to itself is self-subsistent. The soul also is self-subsistent and produces itself. But it is likewise life and vital, and its aparxies is according to vitality. For it imparts life by its very being to the natures to which it is present, and if the participant is adapted, it immediately becomes animated and vital. Soul, in effecting this, not reasoning, nor acting from deliberate choice, nor vivifying by cogitation and judgment, but by its very essence and by that which it is, supplying the participant with life. Hence the being of soul is the same as to live. If, therefore, the soul possesses being from itself, and this is the same as to live, and it has life essentially, if this be the case it will impart life to itself, and will possess it from itself, and this being admitted, soul will be self-vital. Proposition 190. Every soul is a medium between impartable natures and the natures which are divisible about bodies. For if soul is self-vital and self-subsistent, and has an aparxies separate from bodies, it is in consequence of being more excellent then, exempt from everything divisible about body. For the natures which are divided about bodies are entirely inseparable from their subjects, being co-distributed with divisible bulks. They also depart from themselves, and their own impartability, and are co-extended with bodies. And, though they subsist in lives, yet these are not the lives of themselves, but of participants. Though likewise they exist in essence and in forms, yet they are not the forms of themselves, but of those things which are fashioned by forms. If, therefore, soul is not these, it is a self-subsistent essence, a self-vital life, and a knowledge gnostic of itself. Hence, it is entirely separate from bodies, but is a participant of life. If, however, this be the case, it also participates of essence, but it likewise participates of knowledge from other causes. It is evident, therefore, that it is inferior to impartable natures, because it is filled with life externally. But, if with life it is evident, that it is also externally filled with essence. For, in participable life and in participable essence are prior to soul. That soul, however, is not primarily gnostic is evident. For, every soul indeed, so far as soul is life, but not every soul so far as it is soul possesses knowledge. For, a certain soul, while it remains soul, is ignorant of real beings. Soul, therefore, is not primarily gnostic, nor does it possess knowledge from its very being. Hence, it has an essence secondary to those natures that are primarily, and by their very being, gnostic. Since, however, the essence of soul is divided from its knowledge, soul does not belong to natures entirely impartable, but it has been demonstrated that neither does it rank among the natures that are divisible about bodies. Hence, it is a medium between both. Proposition 191 Every participable soul has indeed an eternal essence, but its energy is accompanied with time. For, either it possesses both eternally, or both temporally, or the one eternally, but the other temporally. It cannot, however, possess both eternally, for it would be an impartable essence, and the nature of soul would in no respect differ from an intellectual hypothesis. We dare leak it, a self-motive, from an immovable nature. Nor can it possess both temporally, for thus it would be generated alone, and would neither be self-vital nor self-subsistent. For nothing, which is essentially measured by time, is self-subsistent. But soul is self-subsistent, for that which is converted to itself according to energy is also essentially converted to itself, and proceeds from itself. It remains, therefore, that every soul is partly eternal, and partly participates of time. Either, therefore, it is essentially eternal, but participates of time according to energy, or vice versa. The latter, however, is impossible. Hence, every participable soul is allotted an eternal essence, but a temporal energy. Proposition 192 Every participable soul ranks among the number of truly existing beings, and is the first of generated natures. For, if it is essentially eternal, it is truly being according to its hypoxies, and always is. For that which participates of eternity, participates likewise of perpetual existence. But if it is in time according to energy, it is generated. For everything which participates of time, since it is always becoming to be, or rising into existence, according to the prior and posterior of time, and is not at once that which it is, is wholly generated. But if every soul is in a certain respect generated according to energy, it will be the first of generated natures. For that which is in every respect generated is more remote from eternal natures. Proposition 193 Every soul subsists approximately from intellect. For, if it has an immutable and eternal essence, it proceeds from an immovable essence. For that which proceeds from an immovable essence is essentially changed in every respect. The cause therefore of every soul is immovable. But if it proximately subsists from intellect, it is perfected by and converted to intellect. And if it participates of the knowledge which intellect imparts to the natures that are able to partake of it. For all knowledge is derived from intellect, and all things have their progression essentially from that to which they are naturally converted. If this be the case, every soul proceeds from intellect. Proposition 194 Every soul contains all the forms which intellect primarily possesses. For, if it proceeds from intellect, and intellect gives subsistence to soul, and if intellect subsisting immovably produces all things by its very being, it will also impart to soul which it fabricates the essential reasons or producing principles of all things which it contains. For, everything which produces by its very being imparts secondarily to the thing generated by it, that which it is itself primarily. The soul therefore contains secondarily the representations of intellectual forms. Proposition 195 Every soul is all things containing indeed sensibles paradigmatically, or after the manner of an exemplar, but intelligibles, iconically, or after the manner of an image. For, subsisting as a medium between impartable natures, and such as are divisible about body, it produces and gives subsistence to the latter of these, but pre-establishes in itself the causes from which it proceeds. Those things therefore of which it is the pre-existent cause, it antecedently comprehends paradigmatically. But it possesses according to participation, and as the progeny of first natures the causes of its subsistence. Hence, it antecedently comprehends according to cause all sensible natures, and contains the immaterial productive principles of things material, the incorporeal principles of things corporeal, and without interval the principles of things which possess interval. But it contains intelligibles, and the forms of them after the manner of an image, so that it receives partably indeed impartables, with multiplication, unical natures, and in a self-motive manner, things immovable. Hence, it is all beings containing such as are first, according to participation, but paradigmatically such as are posterior to its own nature. Proposition 196 Every participable soul primarily uses a perpetual body which possesses an unbegotten and incorruptible hypothesis. Four, if every soul is essentially eternal, and by its very being primarily animates some particular body, it will always animate this body. For the essence of every soul is immutable, but if this be the case, that which is animated by it is always animated, and always participates of life. That, however, which always lives by a much greater priority always exists. But that which always is, is perpetual. Hence, that which is primarily suspended from every soul is perpetual. But indeed, every participable soul is primarily participated by a certain body, since it is participable, and not imparticipable, and animates its participant by its very being. Every participated soul, therefore, uses a body which is primarily perpetual, and essentially unbegotten and incorruptible. Proposition 197 Every soul is in essence vital and nostic, and a life essential and nostic, and as knowledge, essence, and life. All things likewise subsist in it at once, the essential, the vital, and the nostic, and all things are in all, and each is separate from the rest. Four, if it is the medium between impartable forms and those which are divided about bodies, it is neither so impartable as all intellectual natures, nor so partable as corporeal forms. Since, therefore, essences, lives, and cognitions are divided in corporeal natures, these subsist in souls impartably, unitedly, and incorporeally, and all of them exist at once, through their immateriality and impartability. Since, likewise, in intellectual natures, all things subsist according to union, they are distinguished and divided in souls. All things, therefore, subsist together in these, and at the same time apart. But, if all impartables subsist together and in one, they pervade through each other, and if they are separate, they are again divided, without confusion, so that each subsists by itself, and all are in all. Four, in the essence of soul, there is both life and knowledge, since every soul would not know itself, if the essence of it was of itself deprived of life and knowledge. And, in the life of the soul, there are both essence and knowledge. Four, unessential life, and which is without knowledge, pertains to material lives, which are neither able to know themselves, nor are genuine essences. Knowledge, also, which is unessential and without life, is without subsistence. For all knowledge belongs to that which is vital, and which is of itself allotted an essence. Proposition 198. Everything, which participates of time, and is always moved, is measured by periods. Four, since it is measured by time, the motion of it also participates of measure and bound, and proceeds according to number. But because it is always moved, and this always is not eternal, but temporal, it is necessary that it should use periods. For motion, indeed, is a mutation from some things to others. But beings are terminated by multitude and magnitude. These, however, being bounded, there can neither be a mutation to infinity according to a right line, nor can that which is always moved make its transitions finitely. Hence that which is always moved will proceed from the same to the same, and thus will proceed periodically. Proposition 199. Every mundane soul uses periods of its proper life, and restitutions to its former state. Four, if it is measured by time, it energizes transitively, and possesses a peculiar motion. But everything which is moved, and participates of time, if it is perpetual, uses periods, periodically revolves, and is restored from the same things to the same. And every mundane soul possessing motion and energizing according to time will have periods of motions, and restitutions to its pristine state. For every period of perpetual natures is apocatastatic, or restorative, to a former condition. And of Proposition 199. Propositions 200 to 211 of The Elements of Theology by Proclus, translated by Thomas Taylor. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Propositions 200. Every period of soul is measured by time. The period of other souls indeed is measured by a certain time. But that of the first soul, since it is measured by time, is measured by the whole of time. Four, if all motions have prior and posterior, so likewise have periods, and on this account they participate of time. That also which measures all the periods of souls is time. But if indeed there were the same periods of all souls, and they were about the same things, the time of all would be the same. If, however, the restitutions of different souls are different, the periodic time also, and which restores to a pristine state, is different in different souls. That the soul, therefore, which is primarily measured by time, is measured by the whole of time, is evident. For if time is the measure of all motion, that which is primarily moved will entirely participate of time, and will be measured by the whole of time. Four, if the whole of time did not measure its first participant, it would not measure anything else, according to the whole of itself. From these things, however, it is evident that all souls are measured by certain measures which are more partial than the whole of time. For if these souls are more partial than the soul which primarily participates of time, neither can they adapt their periods to the whole of time. The multitude of their restitutions, however, will be parts of the one period, and of the one restitution of things to their pristine state, which is affected by the soul that primarily participates of time. For a more partial participation pertains to a less power, but a more total to a greater power. Other souls, therefore, are not naturally adapted to receive the whole temporal measure according to one life, because they are allotted an order inferior to that of the soul, which is first measured by time. Proposition 201 All divine souls have triple energies, some indeed as souls, but others as receiving a divine intellect, and others as suspended from the gods. And they provide indeed for the whole of things as gods, but they know all things through an intellectual life, and they move bodies through a self-moved apartheid. For because they psychically participate of the natures situated above them, and are not simply souls but divine souls, and are established according to an order in the psychical extent analogous to the gods, they energize not only psychically, but also divinely, being allotted a deified summit of their essence, and also because they have an intellectual hypothesis, through which they are spread under intellectual essences. Hence, they not only energize divinely, but also intellectually. The former indeed according to the one which they contain, but the latter through an energy established according to intellect. A third energy likewise is present with them, according to their own hypoxies, which is motive indeed of things naturally alternative, but is vivific of such as possess an adventitious life. For this is the proper employment of every soul. But such energies as are intellectual and providential they possess according to participation. Proposition 202 All souls attending upon, and always following the gods, are inferior to divine, but are expanded above partial souls. For divine souls participating of intellect and deity, on which account they are at the same time both intellectual and divine, are the leaders of other souls, just as the gods also, are the leaders of all beings. But partial souls are deprived of a suspension from intellect, in consequence of not being able to participate proximately of an intellectual essence. For they would not fall from intellectual energy if they essentially participated of intellect, as has been before demonstrated, in Proposition 184. Hence the souls which always follow the gods are of a middle condition, receiving indeed a perfect intellect, and through this surpassing partial souls, yet not being suspended from the divine unities. For the intellect which they participate is not divine. Proposition 203 Of every psychical multitude, divine souls indeed, being greater in power than other souls, are contracted according to number. But those that always follow divine souls have a middle order among all souls, both in power and quantity. And partial souls indeed are inferior in power to the others, but proceed into a greater number. For divine souls are more lied to the one on account of their aparctis being divine, but souls of a middle rank, through the participation of intellect, and those of the last order are essentially dissimilar both to those of the middle and those of the first rank. Among perpetual natures, however, those that are nearer to the one, are more single in number, and are more contracted in multitude than such as are more remote from it. But such as are more remote from the one are more multiplied. The powers, therefore, of superior souls are greater, and have the same ratio to those of souls in the second rank, which the divine has to the intellectual, and the intellectual to the psychical peculiarity. Inferior souls also are more in number, for that which is more remote from the one is a greater, and that which is nearer to it is a less multitude. Every divine soul is the leader of many souls that always follow the gods, and of a still greater number of such as sometimes receive this order. For, if it is a divine soul, it is necessary that it should be allotted an order, which is the leader or generator of all things, and which has a primary rank among souls. For, in all beings, that which is divine is the leader of whole. It is likewise requisite that every divine soul should neither alone preside over such souls as perpetually follow the gods, nor over those alone that are sometimes their attendants. For, if any divine soul should alone preside over those that sometimes follow the gods, how can there be a contact between these and a divine soul? Since they are entirely different from it, and neither proximately participate of intellect, nor much less of the gods. But if it only presides over those that always follow the gods, how is it that the series proceeds as far as to these alone? For thus intellectual natures will be the last, and will be unprolific, and unadapted to perfect and elevate. It is necessary, therefore, that such souls as follow the gods, and energize according to intellect, and which are elevated to intellects more partial than divine intellects, should be primarily suspended from a divine soul. But it is necessary that partial souls, and which through those that are divine as media, participate of intellect and a divine life, should be suspended from a divine soul in the second place. For, through those which always participate of a more excellent condition, those that sometimes only participate of it are perfected. And again, it is necessary that about every divine soul there should be a greater number of those that only sometimes follow, than of those that always attend on the gods. For the power of the monand always proceeds into multitude according to diminution, being deficient indeed in power, but redundant in multitude. Since every soul also of those that always follow the gods is the leader of a greater multitude of partial souls imitating in this a divine soul, and elevates a greater number of souls to the primary monad of the whole series. Every divine soul, therefore, is the leader of many souls that always follow the gods, but presides over a still greater number of those that sometimes only receive this order. Proposition 205 Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul under which it is essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one to the vehicle of the other. For, if the distribution of vehicles to souls is according to nature, it is necessary that the vehicle of every partial soul should have the same ratio to the vehicle of the soul which ranks as a whole, as the essence of the one to the essence of the other. The distribution, however, is according to nature, for things which primarily participate are spontaneously conjoined with the natures which they participate. If, therefore, as a divine soul is to a divine body, so is a partial soul to a partial body. Each soul essentially participating. If this be the case, that which was at first asserted is true, that the vehicles of souls have the same ratio to each other as the souls themselves, of which they are the vehicles. Proposition 206 Every partial soul is able to descend infinitely into generation, and to ascend from generation to real being. For, if it sometimes follows the gods, but sometimes falls from an extension to a divine nature, and participates of intellect, and the privation of intellect, it is evident that it is alternatively conversant with generation and the gods. For, since it is not for an infinite time with the gods, it will not for the whole of the following time be conversant with bodies. For, that which has not a temporal beginning will never have an end, and that which never has an end is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, therefore, that every partial soul must make periods of ascents from, and of descents into generation, and that this must be unceasing through an infinite time. Every partial soul, therefore, is able to descend and ascend infinitely, and this never ceases to be the case with all of them. Proposition 207 The vehicle of every partial soul is fabricated by an immovable cause. For, if it is perpetually and canesently suspended from the soul that uses it, being immutable according to essence, it is allotted its hypothesis from an immovable cause. For, everything which is generated from movable causes is essentially changed. Moreover, every soul has a perpetual body which primarily participates of it. Hence, the cause of a partial soul, and therefore of its vehicle, is immovable, and on this account super mundane. Proposition 208 The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial, essentially indivisible and impassive. For, if it proceeds from an immovable fabrication and is perpetual, it will have an immaterial and impassive hypothesis. For, such things as are adapted to suffer essentially, and to be changed, are all of them material, and in consequence of subsisting differently at different times, are suspended from movable causes. Hence, likewise, they receive an all-various mutation, being moved in conjunction with their principal causes. Moreover, that this vehicle is indivisible is manifest. For, everything which is divided, so far as it is divided, is corrupted, in consequence of departing from the whole, and from its continuity. If, therefore, it is essentially immutable and impassive, it will be indivisible. Proposition 209 The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed with the addition of more material vestments, but becomes united to the soul by an ablation of everything material, and a recurrence to its proper form analogous to the soul that uses it. For, this soul indeed descends irrationally, assuming irrational lives, but it ascends, laying aside all the generation producing powers, with which it was invested in its descent, and becoming pure returns to the pristine condition of its nature. For, the vehicle imitates the lives of the souls that use it, and they being everywhere moved, it is moved in conjunction with them. By its circulations likewise it represents the intellectuals of some souls, but the falling of others, through their inclination to the realms of generation, and the purifications of others, through the circumductions which lead to an immaterial nature. For, because it is vivified by the very essence of souls, and is knasent with them, it is all variously changed in conjunction with their energies, follows them everywhere, becomes copassive with them, is restored to its pristine state together with them when they are purified, and is elevated when they are elevated, and aspires after its own perfection. For, everything is perfected when it obtains its proper perfection. Proposition 210 Every kinescent vehicle of the soul always possesses both the same figure and magnitude, but it is seen to be greater and less, and of a dissimilar figure, through the additions and oblations of other bodies. For, if it derives its essence from an immovable cause, it is evident that both its figure and its magnitude are defined by this cause, and each is immutable and invariable. Moreover, at different times it appears to be different, as likewise greater and less. Hence, through other bodies added from the material elements, and again taken away, it exhibits a different appearance both in quantity and form. Proposition 211 Every partial soul descending into generation descends wholly, nor does one part of it remain on high, and another part descend. For, if something pertaining to the soul remained on high in the intelligible world, it will always perceive intellectually, without transition or transitively. But if without transition, it will be intellect and not a part of the soul, and this partial soul will proximately participate of intellect. This, however, is impossible. But, if it perceives intellectually with transition from that which always, and from that which sometimes energizes intellectually, one essence will be formed. This, however, also is impossible. For, these always differ, as has been demonstrated, to which may be added the absurdity resulting from supposing that the summit of the soul is always perfect, and yet does not rule over the other powers, and cause them to be perfect. Every partial soul, therefore, wholly descends. End of Proposition 211 And End of The Elements Of Theology by Proclus Translated by Thomas Taylor Sections 1-9 of On Providence and Fate by Proclus Translated by Thomas Taylor This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Geoffrey Edwards On Providence and Fate, and that which is in our power, to Theodorus the Mechanist I am of opinion, my friend Theodorus, that the conceptions of your mind are mature, and adapted to a man who loves the contemplation of beings, and I am gratified that you have thought fit to write to us on these subjects, though there are many among you that are able to investigate, and doubt with you about such like problems. But it is requisite, as it seems, that we also should adduce what appears to us to be the truth on the subjects which you have proposed for our discussion, and what we conceive to accord with things themselves, and with the opinions of the most celebrated of the philosophers prior to us. And, that we should not, in vain, hear the inquiries of a man eminently skilled in mechanics, who was formerly known to us, as I conceive, and as you have asserted. You inquire, however, about things which have been a thousand times investigated, and which, in my opinion, will never have any rest, because the soul is excited to the discussion of them, much light having been already thrown on them by the elaborate writings of Plotinus and Ambulicus, and prior to these by the Divine Plato, and, if it be not too much to say, such particulars respecting them have been proclaimed by the divinely inspired most of theologists, as Plato alone has unfolded by demonstrations. And why is it requisite to adduce to you Plato and men who were divinely wise, since they have been most luminously developed by the gods themselves, who transcendently know what pertains to themselves, and what they have produced, and have not been delivered by them in enigmas as by theologists? It is requisite, therefore, that we also, writing conformably to them, should, as I have said, adduce to you, what appears to us to be the truth respecting the subjects of your inquiry. 2. You deserve indulgence if looking to the all-various tragic and comic and other connections of human affairs, you have conceived that there is only one fabricator and maker of such colligations in the universe, and have called this fate, or rather, you have denominated it the series and consequent generation of things. Have thought that such a dramatic scene is alone directed by some inevitable necessity, and have celebrated this as providence, and asserted that it alone possesses freedom of will and is the Lord of all things. But you have conceived that the freedom of will of the human soul is only a name, and is truly nothing, since she has an arrangement in the world, is subservient to the energies of other things, and is a part of the mundane fabric, or rather, that I may use your own words. The human soul is a machine, since there is an irrefutable cause which moves all things, that the world comprehends in itself. But the universe, being as it were one machine, the whole spheres are complicated in each other analogously to certain drums, but the partial animals and souls that are moved by them, and in short all things depend on one mover. And perhaps, in consequence of honoring your art, you have conceived that the maker of the universe is a certain mechanic, and that you are an imitator of the best of causes. These things, however, we have written, mingling the jocos with the serious. 3. But taking ourselves, therefore, to the contest, we say that the difference of these three things ought especially to be considered by you, if you intend to arrive at the gate of the subjects of investigation. And of these, the first indeed is that providence and fate do not differ in the way in which you conceive they do. We dare leak it, that the one is a connected consequence, but the other is necessity, the cause of this consequence. For both indeed are the causes of the world, and of whatever is produced in the world, but providence subsists prior to fate, and all that is produced according to fate is by a much greater priority produced by providence, but the contrary is not true. For in short, the natures which are governed by providence are more divine than those which are governed by fate. The second thing is this, that the son, which is separable from the body, and which descends into this mortal abode from the gods, is different from the son, which is in bodies, and which subsists in, and is inseparable from its subjects, and that the latter essentially depends on fate, but the former on providence. The third particular is that the science and truth which are inherent in souls conversant with generation, though they may lead an immaculate life, are different from the science and truth in souls that have fled from this abode, and are established in that place, whence they first fell, and descended into the realms of mortality. Of these three particulars therefore, and as we have said, if you can discover sufficient solutions, you will obtain a satisfactory answer to your inquiries. For providence, indeed, differing in the above mentioned manner from fate, it will be evident that many things escape fate, but that nothing escapes providence. That providence, supernally governs fate, produces it, and has limited its empire by alter-mode of natures, we'd add a liquet, by things which are allotted their first subsistence in beings that are moved by something else. But again, having shown that the son, which is separable from bodies, is different from that which is planted in bodies, it will be manifest to you which of these two possesses freedom of will, and that which is in our power, which is subservient to necessity, and is under the dominion of fate. And where the complication of these is to be found, on account of which the one dulls the freedom of the will through a subordinate life, but the other participates of a certain image of election, in consequence of its greater proximity to a more excellent nature. And science, appearing to you to be too foamed, it will be evident, after what manner both Plato and Socrates, and to these also may be added the great permenades, assert that the son, while here, is capable of knowing truth, when it is purified from material darkness, and the passions introduced into it by the body, and its co-mixture with corporeal natures, but that it is allotted science in a greater degree, and in a more genuine mode, when it exists beyond bodies, and generation, and bitter matter. Four. These three problems, therefore, being necessary, and having been well discussed by the ancients, partly by Iamblichus, in his copious and elaborate treatises on providence and fate, and partly by all the lovers of Plato, who proclaim that the soul is too foamed, by Platinus likewise in many places, and also by Porphyry, who make a distinction between contemplation and contemplative virtue, and in short by all who are able to understand Plato, this being the case, it is necessary that beginning from the first thing proposed, we should discover the difference between providence and fate. But in everything, says Plato, it is requisite to know the one principle of that, which is the subject of speculation, or we must err in everything. It is necessary, however, as the demoniacal Aristotle teaches, after inquiring if a thing is, to investigate in the next place what it is. If, therefore, you inquired whether providence is or is not, and in a similar manner concerning fate, it would be requisite in the first place to show you that each of them is, and, if you still doubt it, I should be unwilling after this to answer your doubts. But, since you acknowledge that both of them have a subsistence, and that all things are comprehended in their dominion, it evidently remains, I conceive, that I should demonstrate to you what each of them is, for from this it will be evident what it is in which they differ, and this being known, many of your doubts as we have said will be solved. But again, because to the discovery of what a thing is, the dividing method is said to contribute, which Socrates in the Philippus celebrates as the gift of the gods to men, and because what are called our common conceptions contribute to the discovery of principles, from which conceptions it is possible, as Aristotle writes, to investigate many things that are demonstrable. Hence, it is requisite that we also, employing both things, should unfold providence and fate. So far as pertains to what we say they are, using common conceptions, but so far as pertains to other things, employing distinctly the divisions of beings, from which, as it appears to me, we can alone discover what the definitions are of providence and fate. But these, being known, will encindle a clear light in the subjects of investigation, and will perhaps free us from the doubts by which we are at present detained. Five. The common conceptions therefore, of all men, and which possess indubitable evidence, assert that providence is indeed the cause of good to those beings for which it provides, and that fate is also a cause, but the cause of a certain connection and consequence to those things that are generated. Four. That all of us have these irrefutable conceptions about providence and fate is evident from our asserting that men, who are the procurers of good to others, have well provided for the subjects of their beneficence, and again we denominate that which is evolved through many causes complicated with each other and unknown to us, no otherwise than fate. Our life also is full of these names, because names testify the truth of these conceptions. For the word providence, pronoia indicates that energy which is prior to intellect, and which it is necessary to attribute to the good alone. For this alone is more divine than intellect, because much honoured intellect desires good, together with all things, and prior to all things. But the word fate, emermeni, indicates that which connects all things that are naturally adapted to have such a connection. Moreover, that the thing which is provided for is not the imparting nor that which is connected, fate, nor that which proceeds into this connection, but that which connects. You may assume from this that all of us conceive providence and fate to be certain productive powers. But everywhere effective causes are distinct from their effects, and these three things differ from each other. That which makes, that which is made, and the energy of making, just as in what pertains to providence and fate there are, that which provides, that which is provided for, and the effect of energy which proceeds from the providing cause into that which is provided for, and again there are that which connects, that which is connected, and the effective energy proceeding from the connecting cause into the thing connected, and it is evident that according to each of these triads that which makes is not such as that which is made. But if the latter is various it is necessary that the former should be simple, and that if the participant of good is the thing made, the maker should be imparticipable. For everywhere that which makes is allotted apart more divine than that which is made. When we say therefore that providence is the cause of good we must also say that it is the fountain of good which does not require to be benefited by other things, and admitting fate to be the cause of connection we must not say that it is itself connected by other things. Such therefore being the common conceptions which we antecedently assume of these two it remains in the next place that we should consider what it is in which each of them excels and by which each is characterized, and first in what the characteristic of fate consists. 6. From these conceptions therefore we infer that fate is the cause of things that are connected. But let us consider what the things are that are connected. Of beings therefore some have their essence in eternity but others in time. By beings however whose essence is in eternity I mean those whose energy together with their essence is eternal. But by beings whose essence is in time I mean those whose essence is not, but is always in generation or rising into existence though it should be in generation for an infinite time. And the natures that subsist between these are such as have their essence indeed permanent and better than generation, but their energy measured by time. For it is necessary that every progression from things first to last should be affected through media. Since therefore there are beings which are eternal both in essence and energy it is necessary that there should be a middle extent and that it should either have an eternal essence but an energy indigent of time or the contrary. The contrary however is impossible that we may not confess that we place energies prior to essences. Hence it remains that the medium must be that which has an eternal essence but a temporal energy. We say therefore that we have exhibited to you these three orders of beings, the intellectual, the psychical and the corporeal. But I call the intellectual that which exists and is intellective through all eternity, the corporeal that which is always rising into existence or becoming to be either in an infinite time or in a part of time, and the psychical that which is eternal indeed in essence but which employs temporal energies. Where then must the things which are connected be arranged? Consider, assuming from the gods the meaning of the term irestei to be connected as implying nothing else than this, that the natures which are differently produced according to time are conjoined with and not separated from each other, and if existing at one and the same time they are distant from each other according to place, yet they have a certain coordination with each other. Hence, being separated either by places or times, they are in a certain respect collected into unity and into one sympathy through connection, and in short the things which are connected cannot suffer this from themselves, but require something else which may impart to them connection. If therefore the natures which are arranged under fate are such as are connected with each other according to our common conception of fate, but the things which are connected are partable, being distant, either in places or times, and are naturally adapted to be connected by something else, on account of the opinion of connection which prevails among all men. And these are moved by something else and are corporeal, for of the natures which are beyond bodies, some, ideste, intellects, are better both than place and time, but others, we dare liquet sans, though they energize according to time, appear to be pure from place. If this be the case, it is evident that the things which are governed and connected by fate are moved by something else and are entirely corporeal. 7. If, however, this is demonstrated, it is evident that admitting fate to be the cause of connection, we must also admit that it presides over alter motive and corporeal natures. But assuming this, we will ask ourselves what that is which is said to be the cause of bodies, which is proximate to them, and by which things alter motive are inspired and contained, and accomplish whatever they are able to effect. And, if you are willing, looking in the first place to our bodies, let us consider what it is that moves and nourishes, and always reweaves and binds them together. It's not this that which is innate in bodies, which also in other animals exhibits a similar energy, which extends as far as to things that are rooted in the earth, and possesses a twofold energy. This, indeed, renovating bodies, that they may not by deception entirely vanish, but that preserving the several individuals in a condition conformable to nature. For it is not the same thing to add what is deficient, and to preserve the power of things that are held together. If, therefore, not only in us and other animals and plants, but in this universe also, much prior to bodies, there is one nature of the world which is connective and motive of the subsistence of bodies, as it is also in us. Or, why do we call all bodies the progeny of nature? It is indeed necessary that nature should be the cause of things that are connected, and that in this what is called fate should be investigated. And, on this account, perhaps the demoniacal Aristotle also is accustomed to call those augmentations or generations which are affected, beside the accustomed time, deviations from fate. And the Divine Plato says, quote, that the world, considered by itself, without the intellectual gods, is convolved as being corporeal by fate and innate desire, close quote. The oracles of the gods also accord with these and bear witness to our demonstrations when they say, quote, look not upon nature, for the name of it is fatal, close quote. And thus we have discovered what fate is, and how it is the nature of this world, and a certain incorporeal essence. For it presides over, and is the life of bodies, and this, essentially, since it internally moves bodies, and not externally, moves all things according to time, and connects the motions of all things that are distant, both in times and places, according to which also mortal are adapted to the participation of eternal natures, are convolved together with them, and these are mutually co-passive. For the nature which is in us binds and connects all the parts of our body, and their operations on each other, and this also is a certain fate of our body. As in our body likewise, some parts are more, but others are less principal, and the latter follow the former. So, in the universe, the generations of the less principal follow the motions of the more principal parts. Videre liquet, the sub-lunary generations follow the periods of the celestial orbs, and the circle of the former is an image of the circle of the latter, and these things which have been divulged by all the ancients I am unwilling to prolong. 8. It is not therefore difficult for you to see what providence is. For if you assert that the fountain of good is primarily the divine cause itself, you will speak rightly. For whence, except from divinity, is good imparted to all things, so that, as Plato says, no other cause of good than God is to be admitted. In the next place providence, being established above both intelligibles and sensibles, is superior to fate, and those things which are under fate are also under providence, possessing indeed their connection from fate. But their participation of good from providence, so that the connection may have a good end, and that providence may contain the end of fate in itself. But again, with respect to things that are under providence, all of them are not likewise indigent of fate. But intellectual natures are exempt from it. For the Empire of Fate is entirely in corporeal natures, since to be connected introduces time and corporeal motion. To these things also, as it appears to me, Plato looking says that a subsistence of this kind is mingled from intellect and necessity, intellect ruling over the necessity of bodies. And in this place he calls the motive cause necessity, which he elsewhere denominates fate, conceiving that bodies act by compulsion, and this rightly. For every body is compelled both to do whatever it does, and to suffer whatever it suffers, to heed, or to be heeded, to impart, or to receive calm. But choice is not in bodies, because you may say that their peculiarity is the necessary, and an existence unaccompanied with choice. For if this were not the case, what could there be that is better than bodies? For the body, which is moved in a circle, and which is of an illustrious nature, is thus moved from necessity, in the same manner as fire is from necessity moved to the circumference, but earth to the middle of the universe. Plato therefore asserts that necessity presides over the generations of bodies, and on this account over their corruptions also, but he exalts intellect and determines that it rules over necessity. If, therefore, providence is above intellect, it is evident that it rules over intellect, and those things which are under this necessity, and that necessity alone rules over those things which are under its dominion. Hence, everything indeed which has an intellectual subsistence continues to exist under providence alone, but everything which has a corporeal subsistence endures under necessity. You must understand therefore that there are two genera of things, the one intellectual, but the other sensible, and also that there are two kingdoms of these, the kingdom of providence indeed above, which reigns over both intellectuals and sensibles, and the kingdom of fate beneath, which has dominion over sensibles alone. And providence differs from fate, in the same way in which a god differs from that which is divine indeed, but by participation and not primarily. For in other things also, as you may see, one thing has a primary subsistence, and another is according to participation. Thus, for instance, there is light in the sun, and light in the air, but the former subsists primarily, and the latter subsists on account of the former, and life is primarily in the sun, but secondarily in the body, and subsists on account of the life of the sun. Thus also, providence indeed is essentially deity, but fate is something divine and not deity, for it depends on providence, and is, as it were, its image. For if, as providence is too intellectual, so is fate to sensible beings, since the former reigns over intellectuals, but the latter over sensibles. Then, alternately, as geometricians say, as providence is to fate, so are intellectuals too sensibles. But intellectuals are primarily beings, and sensibles derive their subsistence from them. Hence providence is primarily that which it is, and from this the order of fate is suspended. But of these