 Good morning, everyone. Thanks so much for coming this morning out to CSIS and for those of you who are joining us via our webcast. In the midst of the many everyday crises that we are experiencing, it's awfully hard to take time out to focus on the longer term. Yet that's just what we're going to try to do here today. I want to thank, in particular, the Raytheon Corporation for providing support for this conference today that allows us to get a little bit out of the everyday. This event today is beginning the public face of CSIS's efforts to examine the prospects for potential architecture of a federated security cooperation approach for the US and its partners in the Middle East. CSIS has embarked on a series of projects, in fact, aimed at strengthening our defense engagement with allies and partners. Two reports in this series, one on federated approaches for Asia and one on the institutional foundations that support the security cooperation agenda, are due out in the next month. This overall federated defense project is rooted in a view that the United States must shift its paradigm with key partners from capacity building to federated defense. A federated approach, in short, is one that includes forward-thinking strategies for how to develop and share capabilities and even facilities that can knit together a community that understands each other and works more closely and professionally every day. We're going to begin today with an expert panel led by my co-lead for this study and colleague here at CSIS, senior vice president, Brzezinski chair, and director of the Middle East program, John Alterman, a man with many titles. And this panel is going to really focus on the security environment that we're facing, again, looking hopefully beyond the everyday. There is so much going on today. I know some people may have questions about that, but I really ask that we focus on what is going to happen in the next two to five years and not in the next week or two. So with that, I'm going to hand it over to John. Thank you, Kath. It's a pleasure to be here. A pleasure to see all of you and a pleasure to be working with Kath and her great team on this project. It's a little bit strange working on this project because when I got my PhD in the mid-90s, as many of you may remember, the Arab-Israeli conflict had been solved. Oil was permanently at $14 a barrel. The Iranians had gotten over the revolution. The idea that there would actually be interest in the security environment in the Middle East anymore seemed like a fantasy, so I was very close to a career in healthcare consulting. The fact that I'm here today is a sign that things turned out differently than everybody thought they would. And I'm especially delighted to be here because we have arranged for three old friends of mine who I think will give you three distinct and very valuable perspectives on the topic at hand or are going to walk us through. The one I've known the longest, Andrew Parasolidi, we met more than 15 years ago when he was running the programs at the Middle East Institute. He's now the director of the Center for Global Research and Security at Rand. Prior to joining Rand, he was the editor-in-chief of lmonitor.com, which of those of you who have followed Middle East issues for the last several years have realized that lmonitor came out of nowhere and became a must read every day. That is, in large measure, because of what Andrew did, building the organization. He also was the executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, U.S. and the corresponding director of IWS Middle East. He was a principal in government affairs at the BGR group. He was a foreign policy advisor to a Senator Hagel. I expect great things from him, yes. He worked for Chuck Hagel. He was director of the Middle East Initiative at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and as I said, was at the Middle East Institute. He got a Ph.D. from the NHTSA School of Advanced... Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies right around the corner on an MA in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia. Fred Wary, to his right, is a senior associate at the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on Gulf Political and Security Affairs, Libya, and U.S. policy in the Middle East. Prior to joining Carnegie, he was a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, a certain theme here. In 2008, he led a RAND strategic advisory team to Baghdad focusing on post-surge challenges in support of multinational forces Iraq. Fred is also lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force Reserve. He has completed tours in Turkey, Uganda, Libya, Algeria, and Iraq, where he earned a bronze star in 2003. He got his BA from Occidental College, an MA from Princeton, and a Ph.D. from St. Anthony's College, Oxford. At the very end, my old friend Nora Benzahel, she's senior fellow and co-director of the Responsible Defense Program at the Center for New American Security. She recently co-authored a study, Hard Choices, Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity and Sustainable Preeminence Reform in the U.S. Military at a Time of Strategic Change. Nora has the most remarkable range of interest. She is interested in stability operations, counterinsurgencies, civilian capacity for operations abroad and coalition and alliance operations. She's also an award-winning teacher in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown prior to joining CNES. Nora was at RAND, where she was a senior political scientist. She got her Ph.D. and MA at Stanford, her BA from Cornell. While at Stanford, she worked as a research assistant to William Perry, the former Secretary of Defense. So what I think we'll do is we'll sort of start with the Middle Eastern milieu and then move out a little more theoretically with Fred, talking about the different kinds of operations, trying to classify them in a somewhat political science-y way. We're just talking about it, what our Ph.D.s are in. And then Nora is gonna talk about what the implications of all this are, but Andrew's gonna start us, let's say with sort of the Middle East, what is the security environment in a sort of detailed, based in the Middle East way, and then we'll work more toward a more analytical and less Middle East-marinated perspective. But Nora acts like she doesn't know about the Middle East, Nora knows a lot about the Middle East. So I just, I give you that caveat. So Andrew, please. Thank you, John. That's a nice introduction. It's great to be here with you and my other panelists and to be here at CSIS and a great project. And I'm not gonna be comprehensive in my remarks, but I'm going to instead lay out eight questions, which I think will maybe helpful in trying to understand the evolution of the Middle East security environment. And that'll begin the conversation with Fred, Nora, John, and others here we'll add to. The first question for the evolution of the Middle East security environment, and I think this is the most important question, is whether there will be an agreement between the countries of the P5-plus-1 in Iran on Iran's nuclear program. In Iran that pursues and perhaps acquires a nuclear weapon or exists as an unmonitored or inadequately monitored nuclear weapons threshold state is likely to be more of a threat than in Iran forced to comply with IAEA and international safeguards and monitoring of its program and is being held by the international community to meet its obligations. In other words, a breakdown in the nuclear talks would likely make the regional security situation worse, not better. A breakdown or failure in the nuclear talks could be a catalyst for states in the region to seek a nuclear deterrent or for Israel or even the United States or others to consider a military attack on Iran's nuclear facilities which could be followed by Iranian retaliation which could be asymmetrical and therefore spark further conflict and instability in the region. It could also require a reorientation of U.S. and allied forces toward a containment policy which could be doable but costly as Ken Pollock and others have written extensively. That is why the fate of Iran's nuclear program for me is the first and perhaps second and third top priorities for the regional security environment. Now thinking about the scenario as it plays out over the coming years, I'd note here that Iran's study earlier this year by my colleagues Dalia Dasike and Jeff Martini concluded that while U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel may not support or be enthusiastic of such a deal, they might not aggressively derail it either. In other words, while neither scenario would be smooth sailing for the region given where we find ourselves a post no deal environment would likely be more risky than a post deal environment. Now there is an alternative argument that a bad deal or any deal is worse than a deal with Iran. The answer of course is it depends on the deal and we don't have one yet. Give the serious presentation of this alternative it's due, there is a record of Iranian behavior which has led to the Islamic Republic's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, abuser of human rights and perhaps a pursuer of clandestine military related nuclear activities. The latest IAEA report on Iran this month, the September 5th says Iran may have quote carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear device, unquote, and notes concerns about the possible existence of unclosed nuclear activities at military related facilities. The question is whether these troubling activities are potentially modified or able to be modified through an agreement, some agreement or no agreement. It's hard to imagine Iran coming clean on past and present alleged dual use activities if talks collapse. The IAEA also notes that Iran has not enriched uranium above 5% at any of its declared facilities since agreement on the joint plan of action in November 2013 and Iran no longer maintains a stock of enriched uranium up to 20% at these declared facilities. You may recall critics of any deal warned around this time last year about the JPA that Iran could not be trusted, that the centrifuges are spinning, et cetera, et cetera. Would U.S. and allied security interests have been served if Iran had been enriching uranium up to 20% these past two months in the absence of an agreement? I'm not here advocating a deal, yet what I'm trying to say is the answer to this question, whether Iran pursues a nuclear weapon, whether the talks fall through and the consensus of the international community about Iran's nuclear ambitions is the key question I think that will define the evolution of the security environment. A second and related question is whether the trend toward a truly regional counterterrorism alignment among the states in the region continues to emerge as we see happening now in the U.S.-led campaign against Islamic State. Here again, Iran will be key to whether such an alignment takes hold. Although Iran president Hassan Rouhani said at the United Nations that a nuclear agreement could lead to even more cooperation on extremism in the region, it's now well known that a degree of coordination is already taking place by Iran and the U.S. in regard to Syria. Iran as well as Iraq, which I'll discuss in a moment is playing the role as a kind of bridge to Syria providing the U.S. necessary cover because it would be impolitic for the U.S. to deal with Assad's government directly. Iran is also undertaking policies that complement U.S. interests in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, Kurdistan region president Masoud Barzani has praised Iran's intervention as essential to the defense of her bill. The U.S. and Iran both share an interest, and share an interest in the peaceful transition of the premiership of Iraq from Nury al-Maliki to Haider al-Abadi, and coming back to Afghanistan smoothing the tradition to allow Ashraf Ghani to assume the presidency after a disputed election. As the U.S. withdraws troops from Afghanistan, the constructive role of Iran in that country becomes even more essential. In Syria, I'll say flatly there'll be no political transition without the engagement of Iran, one way or the other, for better or for worse, a position recognized and endorsed by all honest brokers in the conflict, that is those who are not partisans in the war, or those hard over in seeing Syria and its people as a sectarian battlefield to beat back Iran and topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The United Nations Secretary General, an all-past and present Syrian envoys, Kofi Annan, Laktar Brahimi, and Stefan de Mastura, all have time and again made the case for a constructive Iranian role in serious transition. For a full elaboration of these trends in Iran's role and regional security against the Islamic State, I'd refer you to our monitors we can review, and thank you, John, for the plug about our monitor, which is over the past two years under the leadership of its chairman and the great team been out in front in covering all these trends. Third, will the new Iraqi government hold together, or will it slip back to what we might term a failing state? The invasion of the Islamic State into Iraq has pushed the Iraqi government in the Kurdistan region into at least for now a temporary alliance of necessity. The Obama administration's policy of utilizing the crisis to force the formation of new Iraqi government has, I think, been vindicated, at least till now. And as we pointed out earlier, Iran has enhanced its already significant leverage in Iraq with its political interventions and military assistance. The Kurdistan region may realize now that it needs to go slow on independence, that it cannot fully depend on Turkey, and that it needs Baghdad not just for balance and security, but also for finances, and this realization might be a catalyst for a compromise, maybe, on the hydrocarbons law. Iraq is playing a bridging role with Iran and Syria on the one hand, and is a member of the Arab League effort on the other, as relations with the Gulf in particular have smoothed as a result of Maliki's departure. And that said, we all know the challenges in Iraq that our body faces with the Sunni community and the frustrations of that community with governance practices there. And as the Kurdish parties have sent a November deadline on their participation in the new government, we will proceed from crisis to crisis in Iraq. Fourth, will Turkey now finally emerge as a full ally against the Islamic State and jihadist groups? With the release of 46 Turkish hostages last week, President Erdogan has said Turkey is ready to play such a role. If so, this will be a possible turnaround in dealing with the jihadist threat in Syria and Iraq and the regional security environment. The stakes for Turkey, I think, in terms of its relations with the United States in particular, could not be higher. Many in the US government, I think, in Congress and more broadly, may have been bewildered by Turkey's reluctance to engage against the Islamic State, even with its hostage situation. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon are all threatened by the IS and they all stepped up without qualification one way or the other. And of course, the US, the UK and French citizens have been beheaded and Turkey in itself have suffered terrorist bombing, so everyone is a threat. As the Wall Street Journal headline read on Friday, Turkey is getting the heat from the US and President Erdogan's statements in New York may be a sign of change in response to that pressure, which could be among the significant gains for the region if Turkey falls through, because over the last two plus years, many of these foreign fighters and affiliates have entered Syria through Turkey and I would again just one more time put in a plug, tell monitors coverage of Turkey and their reporters in Turkey for courageous and spot on coverage of these trends over the last two plus years. Fifth, will we see an expansion of ungoverned spaces, armed groups and failing states in the Sahel region and North Africa? Despite what might be characterized as a successful intervention by French forces in Mali to beat back the imminent threat from al-Qaeda and the Maghreb, the collapse of the Libyan government following the overthrow of Qaddafi and generally weak states in the region have not eliminated this threat from terrorists. For those who wish to understand more on Libya Mali and the interventions there, my Rand colleague Chris Chivas has done some fantastic work on this subject and I'd refer you to that. And to think even more beyond even the current year or two or maybe sooner, if the Ebola crisis expands from its area into Nigeria and beyond into the Sahel and gets into North Africa, there's the possibility for epic calamity when you mix this all together. Sixth, there is the potential for massive casualties and vendetta killings, especially where there has been a history of human rights abuses and war crimes and especially when the political violence is tied to religious or ethnic issues. One could highlight here the plight of Christian communities in those areas overtaken by extremists in Syria and Iraq and other religious minorities who have suffered as well throughout the regions controlled by these groups. The US recognized the urgency of such an imminent attack against the community and the threats to the Yazidis in Iraq and move quickly. I would add that the potential for vengeance killing it seems to me is a real life contingency before, during and after conflict. There is more work to be done to identify the causes and correlates of this type of political violence in all three scenarios. For those who like historical perspective on this, I'd recommend the book Savage Continent by historian Keith Lowe, it details the extensive vendetta violence in post-war Europe. There's a superb article yesterday in the Washington Post about the effects of genocide, how it's still affecting war in the Congo and Central Africa and it will be recalled as one anticipates a future Syria scenario that in Iraq, after Saddam was toppled with 140,000 American troops, there was a brutal sectarian driven civil war that included the headings, torture and ethnic cleansing again with 140,000 US troops in the country. The point here is that vengeance killing and the potential for mass atrocities must be considered as possible outcomes in conflict, post-conflict environments in the Middle East and elsewhere. Seventh, what will be the fate of the now three million Syrian refugees who have left Syria as a result of the war? The UN High Commissioner of Refugees has documented, these are the documented three million Syrian refugees outside Syria, another 6.5 million displaced in the country. The highest concentration are in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey and to compare there are approximately the same number of three million Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Absent in the political solution in Syria, these refugees could become a regular feature of the Middle East landscape putting further political and economic strain on Jordan and Lebanon in particular in addition to the urgent humanitarian assistance required to assist these populations. Refugee populations are also potential recruits for extremist groups. The refugee crisis will not and cannot be solved unless there is a political solution in Syria and even then we'll be daunting. And my eighth and final point, and this is both opportunity and challenge, what is the direction of youth ages 15 to 24 in the Middle East who will number approximately 100 million or 30% of the population? The official and I stress official unemployment numbers for this age group is roughly 25%. So the ability of governments to employ and engage its younger population politically and economically will test the capacity of the region states. And again, here at RAND, I mentioned my colleagues, Dahlia Daseke and the Middle East Youth Project, which I think is doing some important work in this area. I should add that these are my comments, not RAND's comments or any RAND project or position. As I said at the beginning, this is not comprehensive, but I wanted to lay out eight questions that I think might be helpful in beginning a conversation. I thank you for your attention. Thank you very much. Interesting for those of us who've been doing the Middle East for a while that the Arab-Israeli conflict came in just glancingly, talking about the refugee populations, which I think is not inaccurate, but I think talks about a new direction in the problems in the region in recent years. Fred. Well, thank you again for the invitation, and I'd like to just follow this very excellent, almost DNI-like overview of the future region with some sort of broad brush, polycyish, I guess that was my mandate, descriptions or trends that we're seeing in the region, specifically regarding our Arab partners and the Arab security environment. So again, sort of four overarching trends that I think will impact the way we interact with partners and also meet threats. The first is what I call the emergence of hybrid security orders. I think in the number of Arab states, we're seeing the breakdown of state authority, we're seeing pockets of autonomy emerge, we're seeing pushes toward federalism, the weakening of central control, whether we're talking about the Sunni Triangle, Southern Yemen, Northern Lebanon, Eastern Libya, Southern Beirut, we can go on and on. Some of this is not new, but I think some of it has been accelerated, especially in the Levant. And what we're seeing is that the security providers in these semi-governed or ungoverned states is being provided by a whole host of local forces, whether tribal militias, sectarian paramilitaries, some of them have names like popular committees in Yemen, some of them are being used as bulwarks against jihadists, against al-Qaeda. But the quandary really is what is the relationship of these sub-state groups with formal state authorities? And in a number of states, I think there's an arrangement where the formal armies and police have sort of brought these groups under their control nominally. There's a fusion really, they're working side by side, but it's always a very tense and tenuous, I think, relationship, and I saw this firsthand in a place like Libya where they're facing a huge militia problem and they're trying to bring them under the control of the state. So you have this sort of gray zone of sort of hybrid security actors, as I call it. In tandem with this, I think we're gonna face an enormous DDR challenge, post-conflict Syria with these militias. What do we do with these young men? Are these sorts of bodies really jobs programs to keep these young men under some sort of control? I think the question is how does the U.S. interact in such an environment with the authorities it has? I mean, we're dealing with formal state actors, but then at the same time, we're trying to set up a structure in Iraq like the National Guard, which is really a tribal militia. And I think we're gonna see more of this in a number of weakened and ungoverned states in the region. Now, the second trend is really in contrast to that. I think we're seeing the emergence of a new block of strong states in the region. I call it the trend, the new Arab assertiveness. I think in tandem with that, we can call it sort of a return to the strong state, to the Mojhabarat state even, if you really wanna get specific. In many cases, these are our traditional partners that are acting in various sort of ways. They've signed up to the war, to the counter-terrorism struggle against ISIS, but in some cases, they have their own agendas. And I'm speaking specifically here about the Gulf states, about Sisi's Egypt, perhaps Algeria. And I think the sort of opening salvo of this sort of strong state impetus was really the Peninsula Shield intervention in Bahrain. But most recently, and I think starkly, was the airstrikes in Libya by the Emirates and with the support of Egypt. And so these strong states are partners, but we have to recognize that they have their own agendas in the region. They may define counter-terrorism in ways that are antithetical to the way we define them. Most significantly, I think, with their approach to political Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood. We should also take into account what these states are doing inside their borders. This sort of return, I think, to some very repressive trends, there's a conference I'm attending in London called the return of the Mojhabarat state. That may be a bit strong, but we are seeing sort of a counter-reaction in many of these Gulf states. And the concern I have is that, okay, they're signing up for the fight against ISIS, but meanwhile, the way they're conducting their domestic affairs could be breeding a longer-term radical threat down the road that we may not be even aware of because we're focused on that 50-meter target, which is ISIS right now. The third trend, and I think Andrew really hit a lot of this, is very broadly the spillover from ISIS. I mean, we don't know which way this conflict will go, but we know it will have aftershocks throughout the region. Whether ISIS comes and actually threatens Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, who knows, but we do know that even if this entity goes away or if it's suppressed, what's gonna happen to the veterans of ISIS? Where are they gonna go? Are they going to try to open up new theaters across the region? Where are those theaters? The Sinai, the western desert of Egypt, eastern Libya, are we going to see a contagion effect of copycat groups? We're seeing a number of regional al-Qaeda affiliates defect from al-Qaeda, pledge allegiance to the Islamic State. That's gonna result in competition, I think, between ISIS and al-Qaeda core groups. We know that competition between jihadist groups tends to produce a lot of violence as they vie for support and vie for the limelight. And then, of course, the spillover effect of the refugee problem was alluded to quite nicely as a vector for new forms of extremism or activism and straining the state capacity of Jordan and Lebanon. The fourth trend that I'll mention is what I call third wave sectarianism. I think we're in the midst of a very toxic and dangerous form of identity politics in the Middle East now, the Shia Sinai split. We have to remember, I think there's sort of three waves. The first was after the Iranian Revolution and the Saudi counterreaction through the 1980s until the rapprochement in the 1990s. This was really state-driven sectarian rivalry, I think. The second wave was the Iraq War from 2003 up until about 2010. I think the states played in a significant role there, but there were also non-state actors involved as our Kawi group, Hezbollah, during the 2006 war. The third is what I call the third wave, the post-Arab Spring and especially the sectarianism of the Syria, Iraq, ISIS phenomena. And what's most worrisome for me about this is that it's escaped the bounds of states to deal with this. And it's coincided with the rise of social media, of Twitter, of YouTube, and that states can't really get a handle on these identities. And it's quite worrisome. I think even if there were a detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran, you would still have this very noxious Sunni-Shia split in the region because of what ISIS has done. I think ISIS has created a very dangerous form of Sunni nationalism. It's mutated. It's spreading across through social media. And we don't know what the aftershocks of that will be in the years ahead. We should also define sectarianism differently in terms of intra-Sunni conflict, intra-Sunni tensions. And here I'm talking about the split between supporters of the brotherhood and a more quietest form of Islamism. And we know who these states are. And I think this rivalry has been destabilizing throughout the region. I mean, again, I focus a lot on Libya. I was just in Libya. The entire intervention by the Emirates and the Qataris in that state was not necessarily, I think, to promote their interests in the state itself, but to check one another, to counter one another's influence over the future of political Islam in Libya. And it's incredibly destabilizing for a place like Libya. So the degree to which intra-Sunni conflict impacts a number of fractured states in the region will be very destabilizing. And I'll just close with some thoughts about sectarianism and how it impacts some of the bulwarks of our Gulf partners. It's alive in a place like Bahrain, in a place like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. And I think we do have to look at the long-term trajectories of these states from both a force protection standpoint and also an access standpoint in terms of how they manage sectarianism as a domestic threat, as a domestic pressure from within. And I'll close there. I'm a bit early, but I'll turn it over. Thanks very much. And thanks, John, for that kind introduction and the invitation to be here today. Excuse me. My job on this panel is to transition a bit from the regional perspective more to a military perspective to talk about what military capabilities might be needed to address the range of potential threats that could come from the region building out of the trends. The trends themselves are not necessarily threats, but we don't necessarily know which way in which they're going to break. And particularly how we might help our partners in the region build those capabilities. There are two different types of potential adversaries in the region, which I'll discuss in turn, state actors and non-state actors. But before I start, I had planned to pick up where John started in a bit. You talked about 15 years ago, we're considering a career in the health sector because the Middle East looked quiet and peaceful. It's even much more recently than that. Four years ago, if you had talked about the possibility of revolution in the Middle East sparked by some fruit vendor in Tunisia that would have widespread effects, we would have all been laughed out of the room wherever we posited that scenario. Even last year, a few of us would have predicted that the United States would be involved in Iraq in any way. And as recently as a few weeks ago, a few of us would have predicted that the US would be conducting airstrikes in Syria, something the Obama administration resisted for many years. So we need to have a little bit of a dose of humility in our predictions. At the same time, you need to do that in order to have some basis for planning. So there's a bit of attention there. So what I've focused on are the things that I think are in terms of military capabilities are most likely to be needed to address potential threats across a range of scenarios because the one thing we know is we don't know exactly how all of these trends are going to play out. And so hedging against some of that uncertainty I think becomes very important in any planning effort. Let me start by talking about the state actors. And this is a relatively easier one to talk about because for both the US and our partners in the region, Iran is the most obvious potential state threat. And I think that's likely to continue to be true for the two to five year period. That's something that goes back many years. That's not just because Iraq has been consumed in civil war for the past decade or so. The regional states fear of Iran always trumped that of Iraq, even though Iraq posed some more pressing immediate problems in the 90s and so on. So I think that, and I don't see any other major state rising to be certainly a state level threat to the United States. There's certainly going to be a lot of jockeying and there may be concerns internally, state on state, but I don't think ones that rise to the level that are going to play out in terms of major military capabilities. So addressing the potential threat from Iran over the next few years doesn't actually require massive changes in US conventional forces and the capabilities that are postured in the region. Frankly, because they're already postured to deal with Iran as the largest state threat. That's driven a whole lot of decisions about where the US puts its forces. There have been limitations on that, of course, because of political concerns and basing rights in the region. They need to balance that with having a relatively low profile because the US presence in the region is unpopular. So it may not necessarily be ideal, but we don't need to be looking for massive changes in order to address that potential threat. That said, though, the US may need to address its force structure in a couple of different ways. I think probably the most challenging one would be redistributing the mix of air power in the region and in particularly changing the balance of carrier-based and onshore aircraft. I say that because there are an ever-increasing number of pressures on US carriers. We're using some carrier-based aircraft, not exclusively, but some carrier-based aircraft for the strikes that are going on in the region right now. Obviously, we don't know how long this campaign is gonna continue, and it may be better over time to use a different mix of airplanes, but I think carriers are gonna continue to make a contribution to that over the long run. There are gonna be increased demands for carriers in the Asia Pacific. I know that the recent developments make it very easy, particularly for people who focus on the Middle East and on Europe, to say, well, the rebalance to the Asia Pacific is dead. I don't think that's the case in terms of long-term US interests. Certainly, we're gonna be pulled much more directly into the Middle East as there's an ongoing conflict there, but there's also gonna be pressure to be doing things in the Asia Pacific region, and that's a region where you're gonna need carriers. There's also the possibility, I think this is less now than it was, that we're gonna lose a carrier if the USS George Washington is decommissioned instead of refueled. That's something that the Navy proposed in its budget for this year. It seems unlikely that that's gonna happen right now. Congress basically forced the Navy to abandon those plans, put in money in the fiscal 15 budget to at least keep the refueling option open, but sequestration is very, very likely to hit with full force and not have any sequestration relief in fiscal 16, and so that may be something that Congress, even though it used some of the plus-up funds this year to reconstitute that, may not do that again. So I see a lot of pressures on carriers, and that may cause the U.S. to look for opportunities for increased forward presence for aircraft. That's hard to see right now. I don't see a whole lot of opportunities for that right now, but given the way the political trends might pan out over the next two to five years, particularly if some of the trends that Andrew mentioned comes to pass if there's a greater, I'm not sure what the right word is, but cohesion and consistency among a coalition to defeat extremist groups that might open up some space for this as well. So that's something to flag, although I don't think it's immediately likely. And the second thing, depending on how events in the region go, that the U.S. might wanna consider at some point, again, not where this is really necessary now, but might wanna consider some small ground force presence in the region as a deterrent, thinking perhaps an army brigade rotationally based in Kuwait, not permanently based, but to have some more troops on the ground that could be able to respond quickly in the event that something happens. Again, I don't see a scenario for that now, but that's something that depending on how the region evolves, the U.S. might wanna consider. These two are not particularly important. I mean, there are things to look for, but they're not where I would put the biggest emphasis. The biggest emphasis that I would put is on this third one, which is increased network air and missile defense capabilities. I think that one is absolutely vital for the potential state threat from Iran. The Iranian missile threat is the clearest and the most pressing one, and it is one that the regional states and the United States are most concerned about. Because there is general agreement on this threat, I mean, there's been lots of disagreement about how to address it, but there is sort of a common threat perception here. I think this is one of the areas where a federated approach can probably be the most useful where there's room to go beyond the traditional security partnership and to develop something in more detail and closer cooperation with our partners. And that would serve two benefits. It would help improve prospects for deterrence as well as the prospects for defense. This is not just about reacting to missiles coming in, though that's something that's very important to our allies. It's also about deterring that from happening in the first place. So, turning now to non-state actors, this is clearly the growing threat, right? I started by saying Iran is sort of the continuing greatest state threat, but the threat being posed from non-state actors as both Andrew and Fred have pretty comprehensively addressed are the real destabilizing actors throughout the region. And this requires different capabilities. They also lend themselves to this kind of federated defense approach since they almost all involve training and support for regional actors rather than US direct involvement. There are a number of key areas for this sort of cooperation. I'll identify four that I think are important. The first is continuing special operations forces and counter-terrorism support across the region. Special operations command SOCOM has an initiative called the Global Soft Network, which I think tries to get directly at this issue in these areas and is an example of the kind of approach I think that this project overall might be looking at. It's focusing on improving partnership capacity, helping countries develop their own high-end special operations capabilities, as well as being responsive to emerging threats. It has a number of different dimensions, and if you're interested in finding out more, there's some stuff that's been published on this approach, but I see that as one of the types of efforts that this approach could work well with. The second is training, advising, and equipping conventional forces in the region, both air and ground, but it's more difficult at the ground level just because the nature of ground combat and getting ground units to function effectively is a little bit different than the challenges in the air, though there are certainly challenges there as well. At the unit level, special operations forces are really quite good at this training, advising, equipment mission, but special operations forces I think are gonna face unrelenting demands in the coming security environment. I think SOF is going to continue to be the principal military tool of choice for U.S. presidents no matter who wins the next election because it's not visible to most people, low impact, doesn't make the headlines, and can be extraordinarily effective. So I see that this is a natural mission for SOF in some ways, but I think it's gonna have to expand to the conventional army as well, and the conventional army is not as good at this. Some pieces of it have gotten good in individuals and some units, but it needs to be better going forward if this is going to be one of the main avenues of our effort in the region, and I think it will be and should be. Overall, though, at the institutional level, the United States is absolutely terrible at helping other countries develop their ministerial capabilities, their advising capabilities at that level. This is a huge problem and limitation well beyond the Gulf, demonstrated in spades in Iraq and Afghanistan, but goes far beyond that as well, and I think that's going to be also an important avenue of effort for the US to help its partners addressing these types of challenges, because even if you have the best trained units, if they're not working within an effective ministerial structure, they're not gonna be capable of dealing with the kinds of challenges and complicated, ever-changing dynamics of the threats that are posed by non-state actors. Third area to emphasize is intelligence fusion capabilities against all types of threats. Fully understanding the intelligence picture is absolutely essential to be able to address non-state threats, and other types of irregular threats, and this is an area where the US doesn't have as much of advantage sometimes as its regional partners do. Regional partners have better intel and understanding of the dynamics going on in the region than very often we do. They have access to sources and methods that we don't, frankly, and so we do have very good intelligence relationships on key issues with partners in this area, but I think that extending it to, you know, intelligence fusion to build the fusion systems that turn very scattered information into real intelligence, into real understanding, and often into actionable intelligence that can be immediately followed or at least provide better understanding for policymakers who are trying to understand what the challenges might be will be absolutely critical. To run into a lot of logistical problems there, as Kath said when she opened this up, you know, looking at some of the constraints on the US side are very considerable here, but to the maximum possibility, maximum extent possible, I think that is something that really should be emphasized. And then fourth and finally, we should continue to be building integrated command and control capacities at something that is ongoing, but I think is really important over the timeframe we're talking about. The need to really blend the common threat picture, the common air picture, the common operating picture among friends across the region with each other as well as with us, I think is extremely important in order to make all of our efforts more effective. Let me conclude with two thoughts. The first is that I've talked about conventional state threats and unconventional non-state threats separately, but of course they can't be so easily separated in practice, right? I mean, our friends and allies and the United States itself are going to be dealing with all of these all at the same time and the potential for threats to grow in both of these dimensions. This means that DOD really needs to have a holistic and comprehensive approach. It's easy to separate it out analytically again, but much more difficult in practice. But fortunately the capabilities that I've outlined for each do help each other. All the things I mentioned under the non-state actor part about better information, better command and control, better training and stuff does help against the possibility of growing state threats, even if I'm wrong and others emerge besides the Iranian one in the timeframe that we're talking about. Second, I want to go back to where I started, which is the difficulties of predicting exactly how the future will unfold. A lot of what I've been talking about assumes that the United States still has some room to maneuver, to be present, to be active in the region. But the potential for a real regional sectarian explosion certainly exists and comes out of a possibility that comes out of some of the trends that both Andrew and Fred mentioned. I'm not saying that this is necessarily the likely outcome or even a likely outcome, but if something like that were to occur, the US may be forced to adopt a much different posture in the region, moving much more towards containment rather than direct involvement in many countries, partly because it won't be safe to do so, partly because of the regional dynamics and how they will have escalated under some version of this scenario, moving more towards containment from selected, secure bases, I put that in sort of quotes, because in a region that's engulfed in fighting, it's not clear where exactly those would be and the level of security can be achieved, but also more from offshore efforts. I think that part of this thinking about federated defense and how we work with our allies and partners, which I think is exactly the right approach, I think also needs to hedge against this possibility by thinking about ways to strengthen the ability to operate in the region and to cooperate from a much smaller presence, because even if our current friends no longer become our friends in some future scenario, we still are going to have the non-state threats and threats from extremist groups that will affect US national security interests and that the United States will want to protect the ability to address. And so to the extent possible, much easier to say than to do, of course, but I want to flag it, because I think it's an important point, DOD should seek creative ways to build in some of that ability into the efforts it is pursuing. Again, just as a hedge in case it becomes far, far more difficult for the US to operate in the region than it is today. I'll stop there. Thank you very much to our presenters for three very different, I thought, very rich presentations. And one theme that did run through is that issue of sectarianism. And as we open up to questions, I want to pick that up. When we ask questions, and we'll go to you very shortly, I'd be grateful if you'd wait for a microphone if you'd identify yourself if you'd only ask one question until everybody's had a chance. And if you would have the courtesy to ask your question, the form of a question, which is not to make a long statement and say, what do you think of my statement? So I'll try to model this. I'm John Alter when I run the Middle East program here. You all mentioned sectarianism. The president mentioned sectarianism last night. How do we deal with that as a category when we're thinking about security? Because if we don't see certain sectarian groups as a threat war, if we see the use of sectarianism as part of a problem set, rather than part of a solution set, and that gets in the way of the kind of cooperation we'd like, what do we do about it? That is, as a government, which is very careful to separate religion and state, how do we deal with environments where there may be governmental agendas that blend religion and state, and when people are trying to use us to use our power to work on other kinds of problems. And I heard sectarianism in each of your presentations. Should we pay attention to it, and how should we pay attention to it? Well, Fred just wrote a book about it. Maybe Fred should start. Well, again, I do think your question sort of almost answered. I mean, it's a tempting way to divide the region, looking at it, Shia, Sunni, but in many cases, it's almost sort of this static, this background noise, and it's a symptom of something deeper. I mean, certainly these identities matter, and there are sub-state groups that are deeply sectarian. I mean, the Shia militias, Hezbollah, the ISIS, of course. But again, let's look at the root causes. And I think from a U.S. policy point of view, pressing our partners to say, well, what's the real root of this? And in many cases, states, it's about institutional reform. It's the fact that there isn't good governance. It's the fact that groups don't have equal access to economic capital, or they don't feel sufficiently protected by their government. That's when these identities reemerge and become dangerous and become toxic. And I think the president in his speech mentioned that, that it's not just about religious understanding, but it's about getting to the root causes of good governance. So I would just argue for reform as really a security component to what we're doing in the region. And then also, I think just being mindful about the ways in which our intelligence, collaboration with these states could be used in certain ways that, I mean, yes, you're absolutely right that states do have good intelligence sources in the region, but I mean, my God, how many times have Gulf intelligence agencies said, well, the Iranians are behind? I mean, there's a threat inflation. If they want us to do something, the intelligence they pass us can certainly lead us down a certain path. And in a place like the Gulf distinguishing, okay, what's a true Iranian-backed proxy versus an indigenous Shia that doesn't really have ties to Iran? I mean, we really need to be careful about the way that our partners are sort of conflating threats and whether it's the brotherhood, tying the brotherhood to ISIS, I mean, these sorts of things. So I would just argue for greater sensitivity to those sorts of issues. Although Norr pointed out that we're often extraordinarily bad at building governmental capacity and precisely the kinds of areas that would address the threat, right? Do you wanna come in on this one? Yeah, I just wanted to quickly note that when I was talking about the possibility of regional sectarianism, I wasn't just talking, you know, Shia versus Sunni at the state level in the region, right? I mean, some of the worst violence in Iraq at the height of the conflict there was from Shia militias internally and Fred highlighted this too. I think that those kinds of dynamics that I think are, you know, as the spillover from Syria continues, as we become perhaps, again, looking over this longer timeframe, right? To the extent that we get more involved in the dynamics there, I think we can be unleashing, or forces will be unleashed, not necessarily by us, that could engulf the region in a huge patchwork of sectarian conflict, even if it's not just Sunni-Shia, but Shia groups for competition, Sunni groups from competition, some that are affiliated with states, some that aren't just in a, that's at least when I look forward, what I see is more likely than the traditional Sunnis ganging up on the traditional Shia. Can we do anything about it? I agree with my colleagues, but I think another point that the US can do, and I think is starting to happen, is not to get drawn in, and one of the, I think my second point, if you wanna do and develop or move the region into a regional security structure around counter-terrorism, which is what the president talked about, focus on the principles of that intervention, and not get drawn into the agendas of the countries who may have in part, there may be state-driven issues, there may be others, a sectarian agenda, and part of that is, like I pointed out in point two, the engagement of Iran. We have strong Sunni allies in the region, I'm just gonna pick on the case of Syria and Islamic State. They have an agenda in Syria that's beyond the defeat of the Islamic State, but if you modify that alignment with Shia powers focused on the principle, not pointing out that one Sunni one Shia, but focused on the principle of combating terrorism and extremism and working on it, I think you're off to a better start. And we of course have a problem in Iraq with some of the people fighting ISIS or Shia militias who see the problem somewhat broadly. That's why the principle is important. That's right. Why don't I open it up to you if I may, so if people would raise their hands and I will have a microphone come right there in the corner. My name is Sylvia Shavovska, I'm from the Polish Embassy. Thank you for the most interesting remarks. I have three, but very brief and short questions. The first one refers to what you mentioned about US kind of increased presence in the region and the issue of carriers. In light of the ongoing sequestration, how do you see this plans to keep the increased US presence in the Middle East and possible assistance, military assistance to the countries? That's the first question. The second one refers to Syria. How can we be sure that there will be any kind of transition, regime transition after let's say we hope that the ISIS has been defeated? If there will be any, what kind of situation development do you envisage after we have certain success with ISIS? Oh, defeating ISIS and the third one, what's the role of Israel in all of this? How can you, if you could tell us a bit about that? Thank you. I guess I'll go first since the first question was about the carriers and sequestration. This isn't a panel on consequences of sequestration for the US military. There have been many days long conversations about that. In terms of its immediate effect on US presence in the region, as I said, I think that the biggest effect may be on the carriers. In the timeframe we've been asked to look at here, which is two to five years, I don't think it's going to affect very much in terms of posture, in terms of what's located where. The more immediate consequences of sequestration are going to be lower levels of readiness for all of our forces because for a variety of ways, the way that the sequestration mechanism cuts are structured, you have to take money out of readiness in the short term in order to meet the targeted savings goals, the need to cut to a certain level. It may well affect our capabilities in the air though, and in terms of ships in the region over the longer term, looking a bit beyond the timeframe that we started out with here on this panel. I'll take the Syria question. Well, I'm not sure that the strategy against ISIS, if it is successful, will lead to a transition in Damascus. I mean, I think what we're looking at, even if we push ISIS out of Eastern Syria, is the emergence of Cantonments in Syria. I mean, the government structures in the East, I think are problematic there. There's no opposition that's capable of taking over. I mean, the stock of mobilizing the tribes. In the North, it's a bit more, we could be a bit more optimistic with the Syrian opposition gearing up there to replace ISIS, but I see, you know, Cantonments in this country. I mean, Alawite Kurd, the Sunnis in the East, so I'm not sure that I'm that optimistic about a real transition of power in Damascus. Let me say something on Syria and then something on Israel. I agree with Fred, it's difficult, but I think if there is cooperation among the states of the region to beat back the Islamic State, perhaps, perhaps, that can lead to some, the beginning of some confidence building in terms of their engagement on the future of Syria. I'd make a broader point about scenarios in Syria. I would say every day the war goes on in Syria is the risk threat of a continually broken, fragile, Cantonized state that leaves open the possibility of further armed groups and further instability throughout the region goes on. The risk goes down when there is a political engagement. The sooner you, if you envision the stopping of the war then you can envision greater engagement on dealing with Islamic State and other jihadist threats, rebuilding of Syria and dealing with the refugee crisis. All those things get worse the longer the war goes on. It's that simple. There are things going on in Syria in addition to what we're talking about this trend, perhaps a fragile trend of Iranian engagement. They hold the key to a peaceful transition in Syria. They and perhaps the Russians are the only ones who can talk to Assad and begin a conversation about how you manage that transition. The more they're on the outside, good luck. Without them. And then there are things happening that the UN is doing in terms of local ICs fires between the regime and moderate opposition groups organized around humanitarian issues. And I think these things can be exploited and developed in a more effective way. In terms of Israel and I think we could have gone on to many other scenarios. I mean Israel is obviously a key player, key US ally and quite concerned about the Iranian nuclear program I mentioned here that whichever direction Iran takes will certainly force a series of decisions in Israel. And John, I wouldn't, even though I didn't put it in my eight points, I wouldn't rule out the centrality or important centrality may be the wrong word, but that we should rule out the Israeli-Palestinian issue is one to cause problems and difficulties in the region. If you look at what just happened in Gaza, you could see the further difficulties, you could see the rise of more radical groups in Gaza and the occupied territories. You could see further conflict, not to mention the humanitarian situation and what has to be done now to try to rebuild and stabilize Gaza politically and economically. And then there's always the religious issues. You have the Temple Mount and you have a lot of issues around that which could also be a spark in terms of regional conflict if things happened around there. That's right there. Thank you. My name is Peter Bilderbeck from Third Way. Kind of a combined question for Nora and Fred. Nora, you talked about building up kind of a missile defense architecture for the federated defense thing, whatever that ends up looking like, as well as the potential for a ground brigade in Kuwait, special operations, training and capabilities for some of our allies in the region. That was right after Fred talked about the return of the Mukhabarat state and the return of some of this counter-revolutionary moment. So I'm just wondering, how do you square those two things and then how do we kind of walk and chew gum at the same time? Do you want those states to focus on the near term, the ISIS issue now, but then at the same time, avoid some of the simmering kind of bubbling things that doing those kinds of things perhaps don't address. Thank you. I mean that is a spectacular question with no easy answers, right? How do we balance our, in effect what you're asking is how do we balance our near term immediate interests with our longer term interests and that's always attention in US foreign and defense policy making. I guess what I would say is that the types of capabilities that I was talking about, and again, this is trying to look out a little bit, so it's hard to answer that without a specific scenario. It's at least easier to try to address it when you know what the exact trade-offs are. The kinds of capabilities that I mentioned, especially the training and special operations forces, I think, not easily, but we can try to target towards things that don't enhance the capabilities of state apparatuses that we don't like. So in terms of the kind of special operations forces training I was talking about, I was talking about our SOF working with elite SOF in other countries. Those are not the units, hopefully fingers crossed, gotta do a lot of security sector reform as well too, but at least let's say those are not the most likely to be the first ones out on the street cracking down on people and killing their own population if something goes bad. Things like integrated air defense and so on don't necessarily increase the capabilities of these states to engage in the kinds of activities we don't want. I don't wanna say that this is easy by any means because anytime you're strengthening state capabilities there's a potential that you're helping them do things you don't want them to do, but that's again, that's the tension between, we will need these again, no matter the sort of where I ended my comments and my response to the sectarian question, no matter what the trajectory of the states in the region, even if we'd all like it to go in a good way, but even if it goes completely in a way that is antithetical to US interests, both in terms of our security interests, but also in terms of democracy promotion and civil liberties and so on, we are going to have security interests in the region that we are going to need to protect in terms of direct threats against the US homeland and the trick of policymaking will to be balanced, to balance those in some way. I mean, that was just a great explanation of it, just to add, I think there's sort of a push and I'm seeing it in DOD and there's some working groups, some incarnates involved with this of pushing DOD engagement with these partners in a direction that emphasizes reform as a collaborative good that we're both moving toward this. It's in their security interest to start taking these steps gradually and how does DOD engage with that while building capacity, while engaging with the training and equipping piece, but at the same time using DOD tools to sort of promote a culture of reform. I mean, there's multiple levers. IMED is obviously a huge one, key leader engagements, DEERY, the Defense Institution Reform Initiative. So there's, and then exploring conditionality in our arm sales. When we tried this with Bahrain, it wasn't executed properly. And I think Nora's point is absolutely right that we really have to get down in these states about who's actually doing the repressing. And in some states, it's the MOIs, Ministry of Interiors, where DOD doesn't have the authority to deal with them, but sometimes the regular forces get roped into this. So you saw this in the case of Bahrain, for instance. But I think my point about this Mukhabarat state was just that we're attuned to it, that we focus on those long-term threats that could come about because of what's happening with these states. And there are other organs of the US government that are pushing on reform in human rights as well. And I think DOD needs to be integrated with that. Although, to be fair, the two largest training operations in recent memory were in Iraq and Afghanistan, where our ability to have success overcoming securing difference, building professional force, all those kinds of things has been moderate. Hi, my name is Whit Miller. My question is primarily for Dr. Ben Sahel. I completely agree with you about the expertise of SOF going forward in sort of foreign internal defense, security force assistance and so forth, but that there will be pressure on those units going forward. Everybody likes a small footprint. Nobody wants big boots on the ground. Considering General Odierno's recent push towards the RAF, the regionally aligned forces for the US Army as sort of ostensibly means to remain relevant and to have a larger force, do you think these forces could address those shortfalls, the issues of the elite forces and sort of the force economy going forward? Again, I don't want to turn this into a US defense panel. In brief, the regionally aligned forces initiative is a good one, but it is very, very modest and I don't see it having a tremendous amount of success outside of, I think it's a very good innovation for Africa, for example, where the US does not have a very, large military investment in terms of conventional forces in terms of having some forces that are ready for that. I think there are a lot of problems with the concept. I don't think the way it's currently designed, it's actually going to provide the level of regional expertise that it's designed to. But again, looking out in the two to five year period, if those problems are overcome, if this idea really comes on board, yeah, that can, but I'm not sure that's gonna be a really important part of solving this problem. Thank you. Leander Bernstein, Ria Novosti. This is a question for Nora. You could just elaborate a little bit further. You talked about the inability of the United States to foresee what's happening right now, the lack of foresight and you mentioned the possibility for regional sectarian explosion where it might become difficult or harder for the United States to operate in the area. I was hoping for you to elaborate a little bit on that because it seems like we should be looking at worst case scenarios, especially given the track record. Yeah, so the sectarian trends in the region are not good, right? I mean, that's been a theme across all of the panels. And I don't necessarily have a specific scenario in mind, a specific pathway that gets there. There are a tremendous number of ways that can happen, the increasing sectarianism in the conflict in Syria and Iraq, as John mentioned, with Shia groups helping in the campaign against ISIS. What do they do as they gain power? Does that spill over? Are they connected in Syria? To what extent are these groups connected with other groups? I mean, there are a million different pathways. I guess part of the reason why I'm harping on the point of we don't know what's going to happen as I look back on it is the spectacular effect that individuals have had on this conflict. I mean, really things that you can't predict that are not just the result of linear trends because we can talk up here and spin a story about how the sectarianism might play out among different groups. But again, you go back to what launched the Arab Spring. Yes, the region, there was underlying tension in the region and ripe for reform, but it was, again, as I said, a fruit vendor in Tunisia that launched all of this. You look at why the US is responding now in Iraq and in Syria, particularly in Syria after the Obama administration for so long said very clearly it was not going to do so. People may differ on the exact explanation. I strongly believe it was the first beheading of the journalist that caused that, enhanced by the second, which is a development you couldn't specifically have predicted and the effect that that had on public opinion. I think that that tremendously changed both public opinion on these issues and Obama's own calculations on this. So that's why I'm a little hesitant. I don't think it's necessarily going to be the result of structural forces. I think there are some that we can foresee, but just the element of really what comes down to chance and individual developments that can spark something really quite quickly. I'll give you the name of my psychic. It'll take care of those problems. It's your last one, Bill. Just wait for the microphone, please. Thanks. I think it's Bill Brear, a former CSIS person that retired FSO, never having served in the Middle East, I should add. You mentioned earlier about the huge numbers of young men between 15, and I've forgotten exactly what you said, number, are the Arab governments aware of this and concerned about it? And are they doing anything about family planning? And of course, are they doing anything about teaching women? I'm happy to jump in on that if you don't want to. They're aware of it, they have no idea what to do about it. There are a lot of obstacles to family planning. Egypt, for example, had a very successful family planning operation, largely funded by the United States. Tremendous drop, both in fertility as well as in under five mortality. One of the ways they have traditionally dealt with it is they gave people employment. And then the IMF and the World Bank say, well, you have to slim government payrolls. They say, okay, we won't hire people. They hope to bring in investment, but a lot of these countries seem politically unstable. People don't want to invest. Government employment remains attractive, so a lot of people wait for years for a government job to come around, years. And in many countries, it takes two or three years after you finish your education to get a job. And so what that means is that you have people who are sitting around when they're 18, when they're 22, and they don't have jobs, they don't have families, except for the family they live with, and they often misbehave. They look for adventure. They go off to places that are adventure. They go joyriding in Saudi Arabia, and there's some books about that. It's a destructive culture among youth because they aren't tied into the kinds of social responsibilities that we put people in so they behave. But if you don't have employment, if you don't have non-government employment that people are attracted to, if people have a sense of entitlement, it can be a very disillusioning experience. They feel there's nothing to do to fill your day. So people fill it on the internet, people fill it by raising hell, and they do. The governments are aware of it, and the governments are unaware of what they can clearly do to stop it. So they try things, but good governance is a lovely answer, except good governance is really hard. Ask anybody who lives in Providence, Rhode Island. Good governance is really hard. It's hard here. It's especially hard there where you have patrons networks, you have a number of other things that sustain political environments, but often have the political equivalent of non-tariff barriers shaping outcomes that people feel in their daily lives. I don't think, as Nora was suggesting, that we have a silver bullet for any of this stuff. We talk about how we'd like good governance. We try to train people. We bring people over. We work with people. We get all those kinds of things. But ultimately, these are deeply nested societal problems. There are reasons things are the way they are. They're often power structures that are deeply embedded in society which wanna sustain things the way they are. And this is an enduring problem for the region as the Arab Human Development Report published more than a decade ago pointed out. A real problem that countries have to deal with and countries have not yet been able to deal with it. And I wouldn't say the Arab Human Development Report predicted the Arab Spring, but the Arab Human Development Report pointed out a lot of problems that a lot of analysts subsequently have said this. These are the kinds of factors that help create the environment for the Arab Spring and it wasn't a surprise. Nobody knows how to get from point A to point B. And I think in many cases, people don't agree with point B looks like because everybody has a point B at which they somehow are the center of that subsequent solar system. It's funny the way people create futures that put themselves at the center, but there you are. Is there a last question before I release this panel? Hearing none, there's one. Yes, right there. My question is for Norm. I'm Mike Menahan with Lockheed Martin. Nora, you mentioned integrated air missile defense is one of the areas where the federated approach would make a lot of sense. And certainly the Gulf countries all have a common threat and there was a lot of great discussion about the Iranian missile threat. And CENCOM has certainly been working on short early warning for many years and yet you still hear terms like a hub and spoke approach or bilateral multilateralism which describes the tendency of the Gulf countries to want to share with the US, but not so much with their partners. And while there've been some baby steps of progress, such as the basing of Gulf country officers in the kayak at IUD, and as well as the integrated air missile defense center in Abu Dhabi, there seems to be still some great difficulty in getting past the traditional rivalries because we're still stuck I think in that hub and spoke approach. So do you have any thoughts on how to move forward and how to get past those rivalries? Is there a forcing function out there that would help with that? Thank you. I don't think there's a specific forcing function. I mean, I do think that a lot of times this kind of cooperation is built very painstakingly, small step by small step. And so where we are today is certainly an improvement over where we've been in the past. And so I would hope that that trend would continue in small steps. It is possible, again, looking out in the timeframe we're talking about here, that there may be some increasing constellation of interests that are seen as shared by many of our partners in the region, particularly depending on the path that Iran goes down, especially I would say if there's no nuclear deal, that may spur more integrated cooperation and perhaps a willingness to move away from a hub and spoke model, or to the extent that the common threat against ISIS and extremism will, you know, pulls countries together. The air and missile defense issue may not be quite as relevant to that as it is to the Iranian problem, but that may be an opportunity as, you know, because in that scenario, our general ties with a more commonly aligned, they're always gonna have differences, okay? But I'm just talking about relative to today, a slightly more commonly aligned region may have room for even things that are not as, you know, directly related just to ISIS, particularly if the threat from Iran, even if it's, you know, even if there is a deal, if there's still worry and concern about the direction that Iran is going in. I don't think we solved any problems, but that's good, because Kath still has her panel to run. So please join me in thanking our panelists for some very thought-provoking presentation. Thank you.