 Today, we are going to discuss about the concept of normativity and its association with the speech act. We have already discussed about Schiffer's intention-based semantics and we had stopped our discussion at this point that how morality and potentiality are part of the intention-based semantics. When we analyze the concept of meaning, we need to see where the speaker induces normative elements when he or she is engaged in performing speech acts. Speech is a performative activities. Whenever we speak, we consider speaking or making an statement is a performative act. This has been theorized by Searle following Austin. We have discussed that. Specifically today, we need to understand how the normative element comes into the discourse of speech act. In that context, it is through normativity, the intention-based semantics tries to approach the concept of truth. So, normative reason in a sense supports or works as a truth-supporting reason. So, in that context, Schiffer says when intentionally expressed statements, speaker is imposing an intention in the expression. So, it is not the case that speaker just imposes the meaning. Rather, the utterance also involves certain values. So, there Searle brings in the notion of commitment and obligation. When the speaker otters a statement, for example, the statement of promise, I promise that I would lend you 100 rupees. This promise involves the sense of commitment and obligation. The moment the speaker otters this particular statement, he means what he says, what he is committing and he tries to fulfill this promise. So, promise making as a kind of an intentional action shows that the speaker is not only inducing a kind of a special meaning to it, but also expressing commitment and obligation. So, commitment and obligation are the normative element of the statement. So, in that context, the speaker is not only inducing a kind of a special meaning to it, but also expressing commitment and obligation. So, commitment and obligation are the normative element attached to the linguistic representation that has been made through several formative expressions like promise, order, assertions, etc. Now, Schieffer says and agrees with this idea of intention-based semantics argued by Searle and Austin, but he further his thesis referring to this point that the statement of promise has an emotional or affective attitude and there is an intentional attitude. So, there are two kinds of attitudes that the statement exhibits. One is that the emotional attitude, the affective attitude and the rational intentional attitude of the speaker, because when the speaker says or otters a promise, he knows what is making said. He is aware of this fact that he is making this statement. He is also aware of this fact that he is committed to do certain things. So, the sense of commitment is the result of some kind of a rational deliberation. So, intentional attitude involves rational thinking. So, when we say that speech is a kind of a special kind of intentional act, we also presuppose this fact that it is a rational or deliberate action. In that sense, making a promise or an assertion is nothing but expressing our decision-making. So, when we say that speech is a kind of a special kind of intentional act, we also presuppose this fact that it is a rational or deliberate action. In that sense, making a promise or an assertion is nothing but expressing our decision-making. So, in that sense, little differs from the Graecian framework, which he says. In the Graecian framework, we fail to distinguish this motive and emotion. The motivating factors for intentional actions or making or forming, the motivating factors for intentional actions or making or forming. So, the the emotional factors that are attached with it. To see for intentional based semantics also refers to this idea that the semantics is compositional in nature, where the compositional aspect in the surest communicating circumstances, speaker's intentions are not only a subjective factor in bringing out the effect in the audience, rather the circumstance itself is an important and un-cellizable condition in bringing out the effect. So, Schiffer at the beginning tries to show that meaning can be analysed with reference to certain conditions and that is what he called the communicating circumstance, in which both speaker and hearer are participating and this condition has nothing to do with the habitant practices. So, meaning for Schiffer is not conventional the way Graeci has understood it or the way Schierl would construe it. The Scherlian interpretation to this intentional based semantics is precisely to argue that meaning is conventional and meaning is been intentionally composed by the speaker. the speaker. This is very fact that the speaker induces the meaning also implies this that the speaker is trying to compose a kind of a content that is embedded in the statement. So, Sol is in favor of arguing out a thesis called the compositional notion of semantics. Whereas, SIFER and others would agree with the compositional notion of semantics, but slightly in a different way. We would like to see how does SIFER differ from or disagrees with GRIES. Firstly, for S that is the speaker X may have some meaning other than P. So, it is cannot be as policy to utter X only if he wants some A to think as things that P. Now, SIFER is questioning the very intention of the speaker. How is it the case that such a coordination takes place? The GRIES in intention by semantics does not explain this coordination between the speaker and the hearer. Hence, there is a difficulty that SIFER is raising here. Secondly, S may have some other utterance style by which he also means that P. So, it cannot be as policy to utter X if he wants some A to think that P. So, in this context we cannot generalize this fact that the speaker X generalize this fact that the speaker S cannot have a subjective policy. Now, this intentional expressions when made by the speaker does not imply that the meaning is subjective, but according to SIFER, the meaning is subjective. For SIFER's criticism, one can get this impression that the GRIES in and the SIRLE in understanding of meaning particularly the intention based semantics gives an impression of the fact that meaning is subjective, but that is not the case. For SIFER, IBS the intention by semantic involves no subjective imposition of meaning in the conventional means of communication. Rather, the speaker and hearer must have or share some kind of a mutual beliefs or knowledge. They must be aware of each other and that awareness, that knowledge that is common to the speaker and hearer will help us explaining the coordination that prevails between them. Otherwise, what the speaker says and what the hearer will understand, how does the hearer know that speaker means this, not that. Whenever speaker orders P, he means X, not Y. So, this coordination is possible. The hearer would perfectly understand what the speaker means provided they share some common ideas or knowledge and thereby the coordination is possible. So, the perfect coordination or what you call the self-perpetuating regularity condition, in fact, talks about a strategic interdependence to regulate agent's goal-oriented behavior. In fact, SIFER further introduces the notion of coordination equilibrium to standardize that what is usually being expected whenever the speaker orders P. So, this would be a kind of a standard, an acceptable standard, what he calls the coordination of the speaker to talk about, to analyze the intentional meaning that is being imposed on a particular statement whenever something is said. He further says that meaning is not conventional, rather meaning can be analyzed through certain cognitive functions. Now, the emergence of new conventions, new practices, new orders would definitely be in hindrance and SIFER says that should not be in hindrance, provided we work out meaning in a way that the speaker would understand what the speaker means, provided we work out meaning from a psychological point of view or following a psychological model. So, SIFER ultimately argues for psychological model of meaning which replaces the conventional model. So, this idea that the new convention or the emergence of a new convention would create conflict, so far as this intention best semantics is concerned, because again and again bringing this coordination equilibrium will be a tough task, because that is grounded on practice or the notion of serability. How the speaker and hearer or a community says a particular knowledge, particular belief. So, therefore, SIFER tries to draw our attention to the fact that a psychological model would help us better explaining the intentional best semantics. Therefore, he argues that the new convention or the conventional best semantics. Therefore, he argues that we can replace the conventional notion of meaning through the psychological model. Convention has been defined by psychological and non-semantic terms. So, SIFER's notion of convention or the conventional meaning is to be defined with the help of certain psychological elements as well as the help of certain non-semantic elements. Now, what is non-semantic about SIFER's intention best semantics and what is psychological about SIFER's intention best semantics, particularly the psychological model that he is bringing into the discourse of meaning. Now, when we try to read SIFER's argument, one can very well imagine about the status of intentionality present in meaning. So, what would be the status of intentionality in this case? Whether intentionality remains as a psychological phenomenon or it is a non-psychological phenomenon. So, the intentional attitude of the speaker is caused by what SIFER says, the propositional attitude of the mental states. So, intentionality is in a sense connected with the propositional attitudes of certain mental or cognitive states. SIFER does not want to understand the notion of intentionality or the intentional attitude of the speaker referring to the conventional uses of language. So, it is the linguistic form of life for SIFER does not help to explain the intentional attitude. So, language per say is not autonomous, whether language is in fact dependent on the intentionality of the function of human cognition or the function of human mind. SIRL also argues that as I have said earlier, according to SIRL, language is an institution created by the intentional attitude of the human beings. In other words, it is intentionality through which we can explain the function of language in our everyday life. Intentionality is prior to language. SIFER on the other hand comes closer to the SIRLian thesis, but in a very different way argues that intentionality is not an independent property, rather intentionality is exhibited by the function of SIRL. So, SIRL is not an independent property, rather intentionality is exhibited by the function of certain cognitive states or the propositional attitude of mental states. So, the structural explanation is formed by micro constituents and these micro constituents are words in the one hand and the syntactical mechanism that is operating in our brain. So, syntax or what you call the grammar determines the language. The grammar is a part of the cognition and one that the function of this cognitive states determines the function of the language. Because expressions are when you talk about linguistic expressions are product of the cognitive function of human mind. This function, the cognitive function happens in a particular way. The logic of this cognitive function shows that there is an order, there is a structure, there is a grammatical structure which is involved in producing or making this linguistic activities possible. Hence, for SIFER the sentence of L, suppose L is one kind of sentence is nothing but the sentence of G. So, the sentence of L will presuppose that is the sentence of G. So, in that sense the meaning of whatever you said in this particular sentence, the meaning of the sentence L is connected with the meaning that is there in the mind. So, in that sense whenever we talk about understanding, knowing is a kind of a cognitive activities, those cognitive activities can be accommodated as a part of the function of the mind. So, when I listen to your promise or promise of the speaker, I understand that this is promise not an order or what does the speaker mean when he utters this particular statement. So, understanding or knowing are very much part of the cognitive activities, it is related to cognition. Hence, the linguistic component is part of the propositional attitude and there are also certain non-semitic functions involved and those non-semitic functions refer to the grammar. So, understanding and knowing are very much part of the cognitive activities involved and those non-semitic functions refer to the grammar that is the grammar of thought. So, see for in this connection comes very close to order. Now, let us read see for. See for says to know meaning of mental representation as is to know what one believes when as one believes that the content of one's belief is conveyed by that causes of belief predicates true. So, that is what the propositional attitude is not only exhibiting the intentional element present in the sentence, but also can explain how a sentence is formed, how a sentence is being composed by the speaker and what are the cognitive elements involved in composing the sentence or the expression. So, there are both psychological element and there are also non-semitical element preferably for see for it is the grammar which is primary condition for formulating the sentence. Hence, the see for's compositional semantics comes close to for's understanding of language of thought or Somsky's notion of a universal grammar because all this philosophers of language try to analyze meaning with reference to certain mental features and they all emphasize that it is the grammar which is primary. It is the grammar which is non-semantic. Now, one of the reasons why see for is talking about a non-semantic analysis of the semantics. It is precisely because see for finds the Grisians have given a circular explanation of meaning. He says if you would like to have an intentional semantics and it can be well argued without giving primacy to the semantics. So, therefore, a non-circular explanation of intentional content of an expression is possible and it is possible precisely with reference to this kind of model. The grammatical states believe states which are propositionally expressible are grammatical states which are non-linguistic mental states. They are not entirely linguistics. Following see for lower argues brain law argues that a non-linguistic account of content provides an alternatively flexible basis of basis for sketching the many fold possible dependencies of thought upon language. The key point is that the description of content to propositional attitude is more abstract level than the description of meaning to the natural language. The point is if my functional account of belief individuation is correct, intentions are not required in the theory of propositional attitudes and their intentional properties. It is without those intentional properties. One can individuate the speaker's belief or what does the speaker mean when he or she expresses a particular statement. So, their expressions are caused by certain propositional attitudes or mental states and those mental states are pre-linguistic mental states or we can call it non-linguistic mental states. The content is not part of that. One can also suggest that the content is explained with reference to those cognitive functions. Lower talks about the functional correlationship and plasticity. He says more and more beliefs states can be written in the brain. Hence, the function is plastic. Hence, the function is expandable. It is not limited to the function of the mental states. Hence, the function is expandable. It is not limited by this fact. The function is expandable in the sense that more and more beliefs can be incorporated to this cognitive chamber and hence, this notion of plasticity. So, far as this functional correlationship is concerned, they try to draw some kind of relationship between the neural structure of the brain and the grammatical structure of this cognitive states. Now, this causal relationship between these two states, the neurological functional states and the syntactically connected cognitive states are important to explain the intentional content of a statement. Hence, Puthlore and Schiffer would argue in favour of psychofunctional semantics precisely because the psychofunctional analysis of meaning is non-circular. We are not trying to explain meaning through a intentionality. Intention is not a primary factor to explain intentional meaning. Thus, it is non-circular. Rather, what is important is that the functional correlationship between the neural structure of the brain and the grammatical structure of the cognitive states, the syntactic states, how the syntactic states are formed and how they have been connected to the neurons and the neural circuits and how their function helps in producing a statement which is intentional one. So, this information processing model is in fact eliminating the notion of experience, the notion of consciousness precisely because such a model can be analysed accepting the functional theory of mind. And we have already discussed how functionalist theory of mind reduces the conscious experience to certain neural functions of the brain. Now, the urge here is this not to reduce consciousness, not to give this idea of experience from the discourse of meaning, but to bring them back and see how intention based semantics plays an important role in our everyday life. And such a model has been argued out by John Searle. Now, Searle's intention based semantics does emphasise the importance of the mind on this fact that intentionality is an intrinsic feature of the mind and the mind is conscious. And when the speaker is making a commitment, expressing a promise or giving an order, the speaker must mean what he says. Now, this idea of meaning goes very well with experience because whatever is being said by the speaker is being experienced. So, speaking as a kind of a special speech act, the special form of speech act in action also has a kind of a intention in action, because the speaker while speaking also means what is being said. So, meaning something cannot eliminate experience, rather speaking is an intentional action, it is a self-reflective action, it is a deliberate action, hence it is part of our thinking. So, intentional representation on intention based semantics, meaning is in fact connected with mind, but it is not disconnected with convention either. So, it is not disconnected. So, meaning is not entirely a kind of a intentional meaning is entirely intentional, so far as the relationship of intentionality with human mind is concerned and it is not entirely internal, it is intentional and not entirely internal. Meaning thereby, it is part of the convention, the practice, the uses of language. So, that is the linguistic form of life, the linguistic form of life is something which is important for Searle. So, Searle tries to show that meaning is internal as well as it is external. It is part of the convention, hence it is external. It is being imposed by an intentional mind by the speaker or the intentional mind of the speaker or an intentional subject, hence there is some kind of internality attached to it. Over and above to mean something is to experience the content of your statement. So, in that sense, the association of language or linguistic activities are part of the mental activities, but it is not entirely governed by the mental activities, it is certainly external. Searle does talk about the concept of background ability, which is a physical or a dispositional ability of the biological and it makes that intentional representation possible. The intentional representation is made possible through a non-intentional power, a non-intentional ability and what Searle calls the background ability. The background is biological. Searle says it is there in the mind, but we cannot completely characterize it as conscious or as a physical power. It is biologically evolved power because according to Searle, consciousness itself is being biologically evolved. So, Searle is not characterizing the conscious intentional attitude of human beings as something mental in a Cartesian sense, rather he wants to show that it is that physical capacity is a physical power, which makes intentional representation possible. So, he holds on to a physical ontology, but he also suggests that the normative element like commitment and obligation is not intrinsic to the physical ability of the brain, rather it is intrinsic to human consciousness. So, intentional representations particularly the linguistic representations, whether it is mental or it is in the form of language, whether it is in the form of thought or in the form of language or linguistic expressions. For Searle, the content is isomorphic. Then the normative element, which I am trying to bring in very briefly is to show that how human consciousness has kind of a deontic force, is a human consciousness has a deontic force, deontic power of human intentionality. A Searle would put it, the deontic power of human intentionality is important in this sense, because it is through this form of intentionality human beings have constituted institutions, human being have built up institutions. So, the creation of any institutions is possible with the help of this reflective attitude of intentionality or what Searle calls a self referential feature of intentionality. So, intentionality or intentional activities are self referential. In the case of speech act, whenever somebody is saying something, he means that, he experiences that. So, what is being desired to speak, what is being intended to speak by the speaker is being also experienced and it is that experiential component shows that intentionality or intentional activities are self referential activities. So, it is this self referential intentional act, it is this self referential act. So, it is this self referential intentional activities helps in formulating what Searle calls constitutive rules. The rules which are in this form called we mean x as y in the context c, x is meant as y in the context c. So, these are the rules which meant as y in the context c. So, this is what is the logical form of constitutive rules. So, it is through constitutive rules, institutions are formed. So, human normative activities is very much associated with the function of institutions. We consider p as promise which is been defined by an institutional structure that yes, this kind of statement will be considered as promise not as an order. So, it is the institutional which defines the meaning of the expression. So, meaning thereby is a rule governed activities. So, conventions are rule governed. Let me briefly talk about the literal meaning. The literal meaning determines the conditions absolutely in isolation, but literal meanings are vague and literal descriptions are always incomplete. Gator precision and completeness are added by supplementing literal meaning with collateral assumptions and expectations. So, Searle does the importance to literal meaning. This is literal meaning in themselves are incomplete. Hence, intentional semantics need to be bring into the discourse of meaning. So, the linguistic, so the development of linguistic categories and the ability, the intentional abilities of human beings are to be taken into consideration. And for that we need to talk about the conventions, the uses of particular concepts or categories and experience that is experiencing the meaning of the statement and which is very much part of an conscious, intentional attitude of the speaker. And I have already talked about self-reflexivity or self-referentiality that how we do, we modify certain things, how do we formulate a constitutive rules. So, and we have already discussed about the structural isomorphism. So, in that context we have also referred to how meaning is external that is how do we behave linguistically in the world. So, the linguistic field is an intentional field. It is a field which is connected to the mind. Mind is not in isolation because mind is experiencing things. The speaker is also an experiential subject. So, language and mind are very neatly connected. They are connected with the principle of intentionality. Hence, in the discourse of intentional based semantics we cannot rule out the significance of mind and consciousness. With this I conclude the discourse on intention based semantics. Thank you.