 Let me, we only have 15 minutes left, 14 actually, gentlemen there and the microphone is coming. Yes, maybe a question for Jean-Pierre Cabestan. As we understood from the panel, the Indo-Pacific is a rather floating concept. But as far as I know Jean-Pierre, it is not used as a research by Chinese diplomat. It is even refused. So what is the Chinese wording for the same region? Maybe it's not exactly the same limits. And which are the arguments to refuse the Japanese born Indo-Pacific concept? Thank you. Thank you for the question. Yes, I didn't mention that at the beginning but China, as you said, doesn't like the concept of Indo-Pacific because it sees in it an intention to contain China. And the alternative concept proposed by China and China's structure, it is the Asia-Pacific region where China is in a much stronger position. The irony is that China is more and more active in the Indian Ocean actually. And now it has a base in Djibouti. Every day, seven or eight of its naval ships sail in the Indian Ocean. So India is important for China also because most of its oil comes from the Middle East or Africa. So even if it has tried to diversify its energy sources in importing more oil from... It has access to the Indian Ocean through Gwalior from China. From Burma, yes, through Burma. And it has also diversified its sources of energy in importing more from the Central Asia and more recently from Russia. As you know, as double its trade with Russia and mainly importing much more oil than before. So that's where we are. And of course, the fact that the U.S. PAKOM has been renamed Indo-PAKOM in Honolulu has also contributed to China's suspicion about the Indo-Pacific concept. And the fact that it was Abe Shenzhou who coined the expression in 2007 and then it was picked up by the Trump administration in 2017 when the Trump administration decided to launch a new free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, of course, targeting China or anything else. So clearly there is no reason for China to promote that concept but just the opposite to... A question there, the microphone, two questions. Thank you. You can fight for the microphone. I take two questions from you first of all and then from the gentleman there. Sure. Thank you. Christiane Rodríguez-Cifero from the Boston Consulting Group. In a previous life I was one of Chile's lead negotiators for the TPP so I felt compelled given that you spoke a lot about the agreement. So the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the CPP TPP as the transatlantic treaty between Europe and the U.S. as the China-U.S. bilateral investment treaty which was negotiated for ten years and others are agreements, right, are rules such as the World Trade Organization is. Everything we're seeing today are deals, understanding alliances and question for anyone on the panel is do you see space in the short term? I'm sure no but even in the medium term for rules to come back, for trade agreements, for actual treaties that have provisions that become international rules which need to be abided by all countries. At the bilateral or pro-lateral level, I'm not dreaming about multilateral agreements anytime. Okay, question there and then gentleman there. Well, I think we had a very important discussions about the new trend in the Indo-Pacific. Well, I think panels really reflected, I mean, very important stakeholders in the region. Well, but I would like to bring your attention to the role Canada can play in the Pacific. Well, as late commerce, I mean, Korea and Canada released its important foreign policy and security guidelines in the Indo-Pacific strategy last December. So we will act, I mean, according to the strategy released between Canada and Korea. Last week, there was a forum between Korea and Canada and Canada emphasized they will increase and enhance the role play in the Indo-Pacific region by bringing in more resources than before. So they will help, I mean, some underdeveloped members of the Indo-Pacific for better, I mean, welfare and development of its, their economies. Well, I think we heard a very important point about the court, I mean, from Indian participant, my friend Narayan, well, he emphasized the way we look at Chinese military advancement or potential threats quite different from other members of the Indo-Pacific. So there is quad that is very important component of the security policy of all Indo-Pacific nations. So Korea thought about joining the quad as Quad Plus, but in the forum last week, well, some member pointed out, I mean, the point Narayan just indicated. So there was some proposal that because North Pacific threats, security threats from the countries in the North Pacific, North Korea, China and Russia. So what about we form the new quad US, Japan and Korea and Canada? So what do you think? Good question. There was a trade question as well from, so I couldn't remind me of that question again. Let me take on the question. Sure. I think as the TPP negotiator, you recall that in the early days, the question was, why do a TPP? And the answer from the negotiators at the time was if we create a high quality trade agreement, it will not be universal at the outset. Trying to get the WTO to do the Doha round was a great failure because consensus was the enemy of practical progress. But to do a TPP among the world's largest trading partners at a high level of equality would be an attraction for others to join. The idea is you start as big as you can with a coalition of willing partners and then you build on that by creating something whose gravitational pull will be very strong. I think as we go into a new period of reconstructing the world in this post-old war era, we're going to have to take things a bit by bit, step by step, practical measure, sort of the way Jean Monnet and George Marshall and others made small steps in the aftermath of World War II to rebuild Europe. The trade world we should view as something we can't do overnight, but we create a momentum toward an outcome that will in the long run be one that leads to a global consensus of just the right way to go. Thank you very much. Canada, of course, is always everybody's favorite North Americans. We only have five minutes and 43 seconds left. I know that both MK and HV wanted to say something, MK. No, there's no magic wand to deal with with China. I think the answer to how to deal with China is not to have modern of packs. I think there are enough packs available. I think the United States has taken on more than what should be its role in these matters. I think we need a concerted strategy as to how to reduce Chinese influence across the region. I think one measure has already started. Economically, if you can bring down China in many ways, you can do that. The other is for the other nations to understand the making of the Chinese mind. I think it's really a conflict. I think I would think that countries like Japan, India and others who dealt with China over the years can play a very major role. It's not merely a question of guns and butters sort of stuff. I think it's dealing with an ancient civilization. It's now divided and split in many ways. When we do something to reduce that, if there is a confrontation, the Chinese population will get together. We need to sort of get... how do you separate Xi Xi Ming from the rest of the Chinese? But a lot of people in China who want a different kind of a system, I think we should emphasize that. And I think that's why some of the things, thanks to others, can play a very major role. I do think it is counterproductive to add more and more facts. I'll stop at that. Thank you. Yes, I would be more pessimistic than Douglas. Since indeed the concept is really a floating concept and with the very difficult appreciation of situations, I believe that the multiplicity of organizations and schemes today is convenient for many partners. The major ones and the medium and minor ones. And I do not see why this should evolve in the short and medium term. Final question? Yes, gentlemen, over there on the right. Good evening. My question is... Sorry, we can't hear you. Yeah, my question is why South Korea was excluded from the Quadra Alliance between UK, US, Australia and Japan? So why South Korea was excluded from AUKUS? No, from the Quadra. From the Quadra? From the Quadra or from the Quadra. Was that a job? Well, Japanese invented the Quad, so... You may start with Yuji, yes. The question I think, if I heard it correctly, was why was South Korea excluded from the Quad? No, from the beginning South Korea didn't really like to join in a group which can be regarded as a confrontation to China because China is extremely important trading partner to South Korea. So in the beginning, well, I think South Korea thought that it was quite wise to join in. But wisely, the four countries, particularly India, partly Japan, have been transforming the nature of Quad at the beginning, Quad was much more security cooperation group. But after that, the four power are focusing on much more technology and the COVID-19 vaccination and so on, these kind of technical issues. That's why the Quad now is much less confrontational to China. So I think Quad can be accepted to much broader numbers of countries in the region, I suppose. 30 seconds, I think, just to add to what Professor Yuji has mentioned is that to answer your question, I think there are quite a myriad of issues or the regions behind the decision when Korea was not at the very beginning not to initiate and also take part in the whole discussion to join Quad. I think the main primary factor is how to deal with China. And the second is kind of the bilateral relations between Korea and Japan at that time. It was not that comfortable and a bit souring relations between South Korea and Japan. And also kind of the we do have, South Korea has quite rock solid alliance partnership with the United States. So I think this bilateral security alliance has been backbone of the whole the foreign policy foundation on the part of the South Korea. So those are the reasons why South Korea at the beginning has not joined the discussion. Thank you. We are almost out of time. There's a few seconds left. I mentioned at the very beginning that the Indo-Pacific region has plenty of flash points. So flash points by definition risk exploding. So on a scale of 10, they will explode somewhere, Taiwan or Korea or whatever. Or zero, no, they will not explode. If you take the next five years, where do you put your mark? Okay, 10, there will be an explosion flashpoint within the next five years. Zero, they will not be. Doug, it's a one number answer. When it comes to the Taiwan question, it's about two. Okay, two. All right. So it's a little, MK. I think the world has enough wisdom to avoid a flashpoint on Taiwan. So I would maybe have put it one or two. One or two, excellent. Very good. LV2. Two, okay. Do you know what I'm saying? It's about Taiwan, sure. No, any flashpoint. It could be as long as the Indo-Pacific. So Taiwan could be outside China and India. For me, it's South China Sea. Okay. And the answer would be on your scale of zero. It's no problem. I think it's a five. Sorry? Five. Five, okay. Excellent. I'm optimistic. That's why Taiwan, seven. Seven. Yeah. So big explosion. Wow. Okay. Is it up here? Well, two marks. One for the South China Sea. Three. Taiwan, four. Well, it's a kind of sobering outlook, perhaps, with a five-year time horizon. And there will be an important election in the United States next year. And the term will be a four-year presidency. So I suppose adds another perspective to the number. I'd like to thank the audience very much. I'd like to thank Sunim Antiriv, not here, for getting this excellent panel together. And I think the panel have been very good and deserve very good round of applause. Thank you very much.