 We are delighted today to have as our speaker, Matthew Goodman. The full bio of Matt is in your packet, and so rather than go through his long list of accomplishments and diverse background, I'll just say a few words. I do want to draw attention to his long and distinguished and multifaceted career in public service where he worked on virtually all of the key issues that we've been talking about today, working on finance and investment issues as the financial attache in Japan for a number of years. He's worked directly on building and improving regional economic architecture when he worked on APEC and other economic issues in the White House as the director for Asia Economics on the National Security Council staff. And he was a key advisor on the Asia policy team for candidate Obama. Now he serves as a senior advisor to the Undersecretary of Economy, Energy and Agricultural Affairs in the U.S. Department of State where his portfolio is quite broad and ranges across a number of important areas, but significantly he is working on a new initiative that Secretary Clinton launched, which is the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, the QDDR, in bureaucratic speak, which is supposed to now happen every four years, hence the name, but it's an attempt to really look at how we do diplomacy and development and strengthen the institutional basis for that. So I will turn the microphone over to Matthew and ask him to give his remarks. Thank you. Don't clap yet. You can decide at the end if you want to clap. Thank you, Amy. Thanks to CSAS for hosting this event. Thanks to the Japan Economic Foundation and Hatake Yamasan for inviting me here today. It's really always a pleasure to be at CSAS. This is the first time I've been back in a speaking role since I rejoined the U.S. government, and so I will try particularly hard to not say anything interesting, which is one of the burdens of working for the government in this town at least. So my topic is the economic outlook in U.S.-Japan relations, but since the previous panels, and particularly the last one, have already provided expert views on sort of both sides of that issue, I don't really have a lot left to say. In fact, the last panel, each of the speakers, touched on some of the things I'm going to talk about, so it may sound a little like an echo in here. I think they cover the ground very nicely. But I'll try to be as brief as I can so that we do have time for Rick Katz's rebuttal, and then for some questions as well if we have time for that. So the way I've structured my remarks is actually parallel to what Grant Eldonis I think was suggesting as a way to look at U.S.-Japan relations, which is to start by briefly describing a few global megatrends that are likely to shape the U.S. and Japanese economies and our bilateral relations over the next decade. Second, I'll discuss some of our key shared interests and objectives in that global context. And finally, I'll suggest the ways that the U.S. and Japan might work together productively to pursue those common interests and objectives. So to start with the global context, as part of the project that Amy mentioned that I'm working on at the State Department, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, or QDDR, we have sort of on an initial basis anyway because this project is just about at the midpoint identified a number of global megatrends that are likely to shape the work of state and the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is our partner in this project over the next decade. And those include globalization and interconnectedness, a changing geopolitical landscape, powerful non-state actors in a networked world, evolving security threats in the changing nature of conflict, shifting economic forces, including hundreds of millions joining the ranks of the middle class worldwide, while many more remain mired in poverty, hunger, and disease, demographic change, and climate change and resource scarcity. I think, you know, that list, the margins one might argue with, but I think that's not a very controversial list of the big megatrends that we're likely to face going out over the next decade. Now the lens we're looking through in the QDDR at these issues is the challenges and opportunities that these trends pose for U.S. foreign policy and the impact that they have on state and AIDs development and diplomacy work. But all of them could equally well be viewed as critical shapers of economic outcomes and economic policies within both the U.S. and Japan. To pick one trend that has been much discussed, demographic forces are clearly already having a profound impact on Japanese economic performance and prospects. With an aging and shrinking population, Japan faces a severe challenge in sustaining its productivity and growth while financing the needs of its older citizens. Addressing this issue is a matter for the Japanese government and its people, but many of the trends I mentioned present shared external challenges as well as shared opportunities for both Japan and the United States. For example, the growing economic strength and geopolitical influence of emerging powers such as China and Brazil are putting new strains on the international economy, growing demand for scarce resources, the spread of new economic standards and norms that are not always consistent with what the United States and Japan have operated by for decades, and other challenging issues. But the good news is that the rise of these powers is also stimulating global growth, creating new markets for U.S. and Japanese exports, offering new opportunities for partnership to address global challenges that we all face. One of those challenges, climate change, is another trend that obviously presents enormous difficulties for both the United States and Japan, but also creates opportunities for us both to leverage our comparative advantage and innovation to develop new growth-inducing clean energy technologies, and I'll talk more about that in a minute. Meanwhile, the continuation of grinding poverty, hunger, and disease around the world poses an economic, social, and moral challenge for both the United States and Japan, as well as another area of potential collaboration. So, against this array of global challenges and opportunities that are likely to remain with us in the years ahead, the United States and Japan have a number of shared economic policy objectives. First and foremost, following the worst economic turmoil in decades, we clearly share a desire to see a resumption and continuation of strong world growth, promoting more robust growth at home and abroad, lowering the risks of the kinds of boom and bust cycles we have seen in recent years, and creating jobs in sectors with good long-term growth prospects are top priorities for both the U.S. and Japanese governments. Stronger growth depends on more open markets for trade and goods and services, so both the United States and Japan have an interest in a successful conclusion of the Doha trade talks and in the promotion of economic integration in the Asia Pacific region. In addition to stronger global growth, we also have an interest in more balanced growth, and here I'm starting to echo Mr. Neeler. As the President said when he was in Japan last fall, one of the lessons of the recent economic crisis is that depending primarily on American consumption and Asian exports to drive growth is inherently unstable and unsustainable. Americans need to consume and borrow less and save more while Asians and other export-driven economies need to strengthen their domestic demand. Japan has demonstrated through its recent policies that it shares this objective. Third, we have a mutual interest in greener and more sustainable growth. Achieving economic progress while limiting greenhouse gas emissions is a particularly acute challenge in the Asia Pacific region, given that it accounts for over half of global energy consumption and for most of the rapid growth in energy demand. And finally, U.S. and Japanese prosperity are best assured not only by promoting robust economic growth, but also by encouraging broader participation in its creation and its benefits, both among and within nations. Such inclusive growth is not just politically expedient at home. Preservation of the open, vibrant international economy that has served both the United States and Japan so well for over half a century depends on spreading the benefits of globalization more widely. So strong, balanced, sustainable, inclusive growth. Given our shared interest in these four related objectives, it is no surprise that major global forums in which the United States and Japan play a leading role, notably the G20 and APEC, have made these central themes of their work over the past year to 18 months. So what can the United States and Japan do together to address these shared strategic priority objectives? Before answering that, I think we should acknowledge the various reasons that collaboration is difficult. We are both still coping domestically with the aftermath of the global economic and financial turmoil. We are distracted by an array of other issues at home and abroad. Both Japan and the United States have recently been through significant political change, and there are anxieties in both countries about a relative decline in our global influence. But this period of transition on multiple fronts also reminds us of our responsibilities for conscientious stewardship of the world economy. Still the world's two biggest economies, at least for a few more months, and we'll still be in the top three, Japan and the United States have important roles to play in international institutions, decades of experience in global governance, and strong habits of cooperation between us. The U.S.-Japanese partnership also enjoys strong popular support in both countries, with recent polls showing that over 40, sorry, 80 percent of the Japanese public strongly value the relationship with the United States. So there's a lot to build on and lots of scope for constructive economic partnership on a number of levels. And here again, I'm echoing Kubota-san whose presentation I thought was very interesting and the kind of thing that CSIS should do more to have a sort of different perspective from the kind of stuff that I'm saying, which is, you hear a lot. So an important starting point for cooperation is continuing to manage the bilateral irritants that inevitably arise in a deep complex economic relationship. In this regard, the recent agreements on open skies and Japan's so-called Cash for Clunkers program are encouraging. We need to apply the same constructive approach to addressing other long-standing issues on our bilateral trade agenda, such as beef, postal privatization, and a number of regulatory and business environment concerns, which we're all familiar with. Other building blocks for a strengthened partnership include joint work on intellectual property protection and clean energy technologies. On the former, we've worked closely to seek a successful conclusion of the anti-counterfeiting trade agreement and to streamline our patent procedures, among other efforts on IPR. Agreement to strengthen collaboration on clean energy technology was a highlight of President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama's meeting in Tokyo last November. Beyond the bilateral trade agenda, we can and should continue to work together on the major global economic priorities I mentioned earlier, that is promoting strong, balanced, sustainable, and inclusive growth. The fiscal stimulus packages and accommodated monetary policies that both governments adopted in the wake of the 2008 crisis increased liquidity and credit and financial markets and helped pave the way for global recovery. Based on these individual efforts, which are continuing, we have been partners and leaders in promoting a coordinated international response to the crisis through our work in the G20, APEC, and other forums. This collaboration should, and I believe will, continue. As I alluded to earlier, the U.S. government also appreciates the Japanese government's efforts to contribute to more balanced growth by shifting policy toward more domestic demand-led growth, and we look forward to seeing the details of the Japanese government's new growth strategy announced late last month. On sustainable growth, we welcome Japan's leadership on energy efficiency and climate change, and want to continue to work together in building a 21st century clean energy economy. We can learn much from Japan's remarkable achievements in increasing energy efficiency. Since he started handing it out over about a year ago, I've been carrying around Ambassador Fujisaki's colorful chart of statistics, which I'm sure you all have in your pockets, and there's one of these charts that it's entitled Japan's Place in the World, and there are a lot of interesting statistics in here, but there's one interesting one for me, which is that showing the energy necessary to produce a dollar of GDP, and where Japan takes one unit of energy, the U.S. takes two, China takes nine, Russia 17, so Japan is clearly a real leader in this area. If we had more time, I could tell a story about my own personal experience with energy efficiency in Japan when I had to spend a summer enduring the cool biz policy, which was not much of a trade-off. You got to take your tie off and swelter in 28 degree centigrade heat during the day. I actually will admit, as long as nobody repeats it to anyone, that I would sometimes get in at an American hour early in the morning when it was already hot, long before my Japanese colleagues had arrived, and turned down the thermostat a few degrees, but of course, at 9.30 or 10 when everybody arrived, it went right back up to 28. Seriously, again, we're doing a lot together already in the sustainable growth area, including working together last month to achieve the Copenhagen Accord, collaborating on clean energy technologies, both bilaterally, and I mentioned earlier the President and Prime Minister's agreement on this last fall, and in multilateral groupings like the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. There is also a great deal the United States and Japan can and are doing to help the developing world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, to alleviate poverty and improve food security, health, and social stability. We have both been leaders in providing development assistance and partners on a range of creative development initiatives, such as in the food, agriculture, and health sectors. And hopefully, fiscal constraints in both countries will not prevent us from continuing to do so. I think this area, which is broadly in the area of inclusive growth, is an interesting one that APEC is going to be working on, and I think it's been looking at issues like small and medium-sized enterprise promotion, women's empowerment, building stronger safety nets, and so forth, and I think that work is very important. So there's no shortage of important economic issues for the United States and Japan to work on together. How and where we pursue this multifaceted agenda is itself a multi-layered proposition. Of course, we do much of it bilaterally through standing forums such as the Regulatory Reform Initiative, as well as ad hoc discussions as issues or occasions arise. Moreover, as Japan begins its APEC host year, and others have alluded to this, and the United States prepares to host in 2011, we are working closely to coordinate and reinforce our host year priorities. We strongly share a view of our host years as a unique opportunity to shape a robust 21st century economic agenda for the Asia Pacific, one that would ensure long-term regional prosperity. Thus, the United States has not viewed 2010 and 2011 as individual APEC years, but as a combined one-two punchy, which, by the way, it was a phrase that my colleague Kurt Tong came up with and apparently has caught on in Katakana in Japanese, so that's why I said it that way. So while broader, the APEC agenda, particularly the growth-related elements, closely parallels the work of the G20, not surprisingly given that roughly half of the members of both institutions overlap, and there'll be a quiz afterwards on which those countries are. As I mentioned earlier, the U.S. and Japan have been close partners in the G20's work to restore global growth and financial stability. Going forward, we have an opportunity to instill in the emerging powers in the G20 the habits of cooperation that the U.S. and Japan have built up over the past several decades. There are, of course, a range of other multilateral institutions in which the United States and Japan work together cooperatively on common economic challenges. These include the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, but also a number of lesser-known organizations doing valuable work such as the APP, which I mentioned earlier, the International Renewable Energy Agency, and so forth. Again, all of this confirms that collaboration between Japan and the United States on economic issues is already extensive and productive and is potentially unlimited if we are both willing to seize the opportunities for continued leadership. So in conclusion, because I do want to hear your views, I sometimes find myself getting nostalgic about the good old days in the 1980s of when the U.S.-Japan economic relations were on the front pages of the newspapers almost every day. Well, not really. Fortunately, those days of widespread friction in our economic relationship are long behind us. Today, our relationship is one predominantly characterized by shared interests and collaboration. In fact, it's difficult to imagine the world successfully addressing an array of significant economic challenges from restoring and sustaining strong growth, to responding to climate change, to improving the lives of millions in the developing world without strong collaboration between the United States and Japan. So with that, I'd welcome views from this group on what our priorities for collaboration should be and how we should go about pursuing those. Thanks.