 need to have a very, very high pedestal in our considerations and so I was very pleased that we eventually formed a working group focused on safety culture and which has evolved into the working group on leadership and safety culture which is chaired by Commissioner Bond who will be speaking after me. And this group has been tremendously important and interesting because now that we have a high level group that is talking about these issues, we are now seeing how the expertise that exists in our member countries is being brought together to really look at issues that simply weren't being analyzed in the past. And certainly the first report, the mutual impact of nuclear regulatory bodies and license holders from a safety culture perspective is an extraordinary example of that. The issue of how the behavior of the regulatory body impacts the behavior of the licensees is something that has never really been discussed in any real detail. I certainly, as an NRC commissioner, saw examples where I felt that the behavior of the staff was actually affecting the behavior of licensees and this can be positive and negative, obviously. And I think one of the cautionary notes that I have always thought about and particularly as we go forward into the future, that regulators that take on too much of the responsibility for safety onto themselves do a disservice. In the attempt to try to improve safety, they take decision making, increasing away from licensees, which is not good for safety culture. It is actually very negative for safety culture. But it's something that I don't think regulators are very conscious of because they feel like they're just doing their job. This report analyzes that in other aspects. Many areas of safety culture, I think, clearly come down to leadership. The leaders of nuclear bodies and organizations are the ones that set the tone on everything they do and how they make decisions. This is extraordinarily important in establishing safety culture. It is not the only thing that's necessary for a strong safety culture, but is definitely a necessary part of it. Practices for enhancing leadership for safety and nuclear regulatory bodies is another report from this group that analyzes this in detail. It's very important to note that these are not philosophical reports. These reports were written by these task groups to be implementable, to be practical guides to help regulatory organizations not just think about these issues, but take substantive action to improve their posture. I really implore you to download the report. We have the QR codes on cards that are up here in front or down in the lobby, but just check the website from the NEA if you like. Download these reports and take a look at them because I think you'll find them to be quite interesting. Whenever we are looking at these issues, it's very important to recognize that we have made tremendous progress in so many areas of nuclear safety over the last 13 years since the accident. I feel that even before the accident, we had a very, very safe infrastructure around the world in our member countries. The work that has gone into the introspection of every regulatory body is represented here today to look at the accident, to question themselves, to analyze the safety of their facilities and the environmental conditions around those facilities. We have enhanced safety even further than we were before the accident, and perhaps more importantly enhance resilience against the unexpected. This is a huge accomplishment, but after all the procedures we've adjusted, the regulations that have been changed, the equipment that's been added to these facilities, they are still operated and overseen and regulated by human beings. And we human beings are usually the weak link in the chain, and so that is why this sort of thing is so important. Human beings and organizations that are responsible for nuclear safety and nuclear operations have to be well led and have to have the right safety culture. So it is certainly our hope that these two reports help organizations around the world further improve their safety culture and performance and help us bring a very, very high level of safety culture as we go into this future where it appears, for most accounts, that nuclear energy is going to be even more important in the future than it is today. So David, thank you for sharing this, and I'm looking forward to the remarks and conversations from my colleagues here, all of whom I've worked with over many years, and certainly look forward to the questions from the audience. So thank you very much. Yeah, thank you for those remarks. It really sets the table for a great dialogue today. I really liked your point on the practical nature of the reports. And I hope that our panelists can share a little bit about the practical experiences they've had or tools they've used for emphasizing leadership and safety culture. I also always appreciate the focus on human beings. I think that's our, that is a challenge, but it's the most rewarding part, I think, is changing hearts and minds. So thank you for that. With that, Commissioner Bond, I ask you to proceed. Yeah, thank you. I am Nobihiko Bond, a commissioner of nuclear irrigation authority Japan, and I am chairing the working group on leadership and safety culture of the NEA. I am excited to introduce our new report today. It has been published just today. Now, I give you a brief introduction of this working group, and it will be followed by presentations by two task leads. Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities, CNRA of NEA, created working group on safety culture in 2017. And it was restructured as working group on leadership and safety culture in 2023. Current bureau members are shown in the slides. The mandate of the working group is to exchange information and experiences and to provide practical innovative products to support the leadership and safety culture of the regulatory body and wider interconnected system. Member of the working group are regulatory bodies and technical support organizations. And interesting feature of this working group is it consists of senior management representatives and relevant experts, the mixture. And today's topic is output of the two task groups. One task group is impact of the regulatory body on the organizations it oversees and vice versa from a safety culture perspective. And another is leadership. These are names of the tasks, and the title of the reports are little different. And plans of these tasks were approved in the end of 2020. That means two task groups started their activities in 2021. And they finalized reports and they were approved last December and published just today. Now I would like to pass the floor to Mark McBride for his presentation on the first task. Mark, floor is yours. Thank you, Commissioner Barn. And good afternoon, body. And thank you for the opportunity to join this session today. So as Commissioner Barn said, I have been the task lead for the pieces of work that we are launching today, looking at the impact that regulatory bodies and license on their respective safety cultures. And I would like to pay tribute to my colleagues in the task group for their diligence and skill in producing a report of high quality. Please. So the task we set ourselves three years ago was to understand how through their everyday interactions, regulatory bodies and licensees impact their respective features and practices and learn in this regard. And this task address is important from events such as Fukushima Daichi and the Boeing 7-3 SMACS tragedies. Next slide, please. As you can see from this slide, we followed a rigorous methodology in conducting this study. We've taken nearly 50 interviews with senior stakeholders across 13 member countries, followed by extensive thematic analysis of the data. Next slide, please. So what did we find? Firstly, we identified the mechanisms by which each party influences the safety culture of the other. And primarily, this is through the communications, relationships and behaviors of staff at the interface between the two organizations. These in turn are influenced by the regulatory regime, for example, the system of legislation and standards and the regulatory body's priorities and decision making. As well as the leadership management and capability of each organization. And I've highlighted here leadership as a critical component, which is the focus of one of the two reports that the NEA is looking at today. And finally, the ability of each party to learn from its interactions and improve is key to the influence that it is able to exert. Next slide, please. So what does it look like in interactions between a regulatory body and other organizations? And the clear picture emerging from our study is of a reciprocal cooperative style interaction characterized by respect, openness, trust with a shared focus on safety learning. In other words, what we're describing is an adult-to-adult relationship where there is respect for each other's roles, openness and honesty and actions, but always with the common goal safety. And within style of interaction, the regulatory body fosters the licensee's outability for safety, enabling continuous improvement and growth of the licensee's culture towards more mature level. And we have called this accountability-oriented enacting regulation. This builds on the set of performance-based regulation, but includes a focus not just on outcome, but processes in other words how the outcome is achieved with a clear link to risk and an encouragement for self-assessment by the licensee. Now we recognize, of course, that this form of regulation is not always achievable and therefore that it's also important that the regulatory body is responsive in its approach and can adopt a more prescriptive style where that's needed. The aim, however, should always be to move towards accountability-oriented enabling approach. And we found two main factors which determine the balance of the regulatory body's approach, namely the safety culture maturity of the licensee and of the regulatory body itself. In both cases, the more mature the culture, the more likely an accountability-oriented enabling approach will succeed. And of course the approach that the regulatory body takes is also determined by the level of trust it enjoys from the public. Next slide, please. So from our study, we have developed a model for effective interactions between the regulatory body and licensee. And this comprises two continuous improvement circles, mutually reinforcing the safety culture of each organization. At the heart of the model, the green circle are the communications, relationships and behaviors of staff at the interface between the two organizations. Open, two-way, respectful and trustworthy. And the model identifies with the factors which enable such an interaction, the orange circles, and highlights the importance of learning and improvement, the blue circles, recognizing that we may not get everything right first time. We encourage regulatory bodies and licensees to use this model to assess the health of their own interactions, to identify areas for improvement and good practices to share. Thank you for your attention and I would now like to hand over to my colleague John Thielen. Thank you, Mark. And also thank you Commissioner Bond for your earlier introductory remarks. My name is John Thielen and I've been privileged to be task lead for the second NEA document mentioned by Commissioner Bond and I feel very fortunate to be here today. The document I will present highlights various practical practices for enhancing leadership for safety and nuclear regulatory bodies. And to echo Mark's comments, I would like to pay tribute to the hard work of my colleagues in the task group associated with this report for their diligence and expertise with a special recognition for the contributions of Joy Ho, Spencer Brown, and Catherine or Kitty Thompson who is with us here today from the USNRC. Next slide please. The NEA document that I will present today provides guidance to nuclear regulatory bodies to help enhance leadership for safety. Specifically, we set out to identify effective characteristics, competencies, and behaviors of leaders in regulatory bodies that have a healthy safety culture and compile the information in a manner that would serve as practical guidance. To meet this objective, the team worked diligently, as said earlier, over a three-year period, starting with the development of an outline and its approval, followed by a review of available literature, the conduct of an initial written survey which was then followed, as Mark had mentioned, by in-person and virtually held interviews with leaders across both nuclear regulatory bodies and industry. The outcome is a document that is readily accessible to the reader, one that you navigate using figures in a series of related matrices or tables. The intent is that regulatory bodies can navigate the document in this way to readily identify leadership characteristics, competencies, programs, and processes they need for and maintaining a healthy safety culture within their home organization. Next slide please. To expand on that a little further, the document is intended to be used in various ways by various audiences. We expect the document can be used as a tool that organizations can integrate into their management system documentation so that effective leadership characteristics and competencies are embedded within their internal programs and processes. We anticipate the document can also be used by managers and leaders at all levels in an organization, those who are responsible for or involved with regulatory strategies, activities, and interactions to strengthen the safety culture of their regulatory body. We foresee that training departments, human resources staff, and those that conduct self-assessments and safety culture specialists alike, they will also benefit from the document as it can be viewed as a reference for reviewing and improving regulatory body activities. Finally, we anticipate readers from regulatory bodies and licensees alike will be encouraged to undertake self-reflection, self-assessment, and related improvement activities. Next slide please. Figure 1 presented here depicts the 12 characteristics and competencies recommended in the document for the development of effective leadership for safety in an organization. The methodology for development of these categories is set out in the annex of the document. For the purpose of the document, the term characteristics is referred to as general personal or organizational traits or attributes that may be inherent or developed through experience whereas competencies represent the knowledge and skills required to perform a task or carry out responsibilities. Now these terms align with the practices and conclusions described in the NEA guidance on principles and attributes of a healthy safety culture and regulatory bodies published in 2016. However this document puts forth a new perspective on leadership for safety by organizing these characteristics and related competencies into the categories of intellectual, interpersonal, and influencing factors and linking these factors to effective strategies for their development. Intellectual aspects refers to the leader's ability to demonstrate knowledge, to identify, rationalize, and justify decisions, and to understand complexity in their operating environments. These aspects refer to characteristics and competencies that support decision making in leadership for safety. Interpersonal aspects refer to relationship building characteristics and competencies that assist in promoting safety within the regulatory body. Communication, role modeling, and actions taken to promote safety are highlighted under this category. And finally influencing aspects refer to relationship management approaches to reinforce safety within and external to the regulatory body. Now these categories and related characteristics and competencies presented in this figure were developed as I said earlier from the original data using qualitative analysis and have been expanded into three tables that accompany figure one. So within the document three tables follow that describe good practices and on the next slide I will show you an example of one. And they're intended for developing and demonstrating the twelve competencies and characteristics recommended for effective leadership for safety. Presented here is one example from the influencing aspects report table. The importance of reinforcing expectations externally is shown here, meeting the need to communicate clear goals and expectations both internally to staff and externally to license holders. Good practices for regulatory bodies as well as individuals within regulatory bodies follow in the next two columns shown here. As leaders exist at all levels of an organization these good practices are not solely for senior leaders but can be cross cutting. Next slide please. Next the report illustrates programs and processes that promote leadership for safety for regulatory bodies. Figure two depicts five steps that are recommended for the development and maintenance of effective leadership for safety in the organization of a regulatory body. The figure points to the need for regulatory bodies in a continuous improvement model to develop a clear leadership model or framework to identify leadership characteristics and competencies and to establish leadership expectations and behaviors. The recommendation to implement a program for leadership for safety training and development and the benefits of conducting safety culture self assessments. Next slide please. Table two within the document aligns with the figure and much like the first set of tables this table also describes good practices for the regulatory body as an organization as well as for the individual for the programs and processes recommended for the effective leadership for safety. In this case the excerpt provided here speaks to the conduct of safety culture self assessments and independent assessments. And over to the final slide and to recap and on behalf of Mark we're both proud representatives of team members within the working group of leadership and safety culture and are glad to be here today to share a summary of these two NEA publications. As mentioned earlier these two publications are now readily available for download and we do have QR codes up front to help with that. Thank you for your attention. Yeah well let me just offer a sincere thank you Commissioner Bond, Mark and John for the not just your presentation today but for the hard work and the working groups work that went into this very much appreciated. As Director General mentioned those reports are available. I think there are QR codes that will link you to their availability. At this point we move to the panel discussion portion of our session. And I will I think first want to let folks know that we didn't leave we didn't give the panel a blank piece of paper and say fill it with your thoughts on safety culture. It would have been fascinating had they done that but we did provide a few questions for them to at least consider. And I'll just let you know that each of our panelists has addressed one or more of these elements in their discussion but we wanted to also have a organic flow so that they could share their personal thoughts. And I'm just going to highlight very quickly our questions were were centered on what what does it mean to be a leader in safety what attributes and behaviors might a leader represent. What is the individual panelist experience with their ability to impact safety cultures within the organizations. How can regular regulatory bodies develop and sustain an accountability oriented enabling approach to regulation. How do you maintain and build trust in the public and how can regulatory bodies use the findings in the NEA reports to improve their regulatory effectiveness. You'll hear much of that touched upon by our panelists. And if we could Marta could we start with you. Yeah it's on. So thank you. In general, I fully subscribe to the word which they're set about publication by our distinguished representative Mr. Magwood as well as Mr. Ben. Due to the fact that safety culture was something will touch our lives directly after Chernobyl accident when safety culture idea has been defined by IEA. Though sometimes the way how it is identified for namely nuclear facilities when we started to discuss about safety culture for regulatory body. So it was quite difficult to properly communicate this to the to our employees. So it was much more better for them acceptable to call that the culture of organization. So anyhow it was clear that we should have this I would call the item in our system. We have management system and safety culture is one of the chapters in our managerial system. And it is something what have to be really carefully followed because if you say OK it is established. So it's something what is good. No. So we are conducting self assessment of our culture. We do not have specialist in our organization but we cooperate closely with the university which deals with this sciences and together. So it is prepared the questionnaire which is regularly filled by our employees. It is done on a voluntary basis. It is done on paper not to be afraid that someone can identify whose answers we are reading. And step by step. So we are collecting the ideas. What should be improved in the regulatory body to deliver in the proper manner the task which we have. Anyhow we are also evaluating in some manner safety culture of our license holder again. So it is process which runs usually two years. So our inspectors are collecting evidence during the inspection. So it is collected. Then there are also interviews again. So and at the end the evaluation of safety culture comes out. It is something what is what has to be properly communicate to our license holder. The safety culture is about attitudes of the leaders but also of the common people. So if we want to change that so we have to be clear and to show where we see some I would say deficiencies. What should be approved and due to the fact that it is compulsory for our license holder to conduct their self assessment of the safety culture. What was curious so we came to the same numbers which were not very high. We have to say. So therefore we said that it's necessary to go further that we should really start to communicate. What we evaluate as positive on our license holder where they should improve. Why sometimes we are really very very strictly verifying the requirements from legislation. And in general what was also not very positive. So penalties in the last years. So they're much more often that it used to be in the past. And what is very important from my point of view it is proper communication inside the regulatory body as well as outside. We are small regulatory body. So 130 people. So I know each one individually. So if they would like to communicate with me some aspect. So I'm always open to this communication. We always try to encourage them to think about how we can improve our job. How we should really have a proper communication with our license holder. Really not just to be the regulator which says it's bad. So but we try to say them try to establish such a system which will work for us. It is not that they are not the processes for us. They are for you. So it is something what is important in our discussion. But what is for us also quite difficult is the proper communication with public. It means with the people living in the close vicinity of the plants. Nevertheless also with the wider environment as well as with NGOs. So as it was said I'm from Slovakia. It is quite small. The support for nuclear is quite high in Slovakia. Nevertheless we have a neighbor who is not supporting nuclear. And namely their NGOs are quite intrusive and not very I would say a fair game playing. Nevertheless so it is important to learn other people that despite the fact that the question they are asking already has been answered. That the things they are communicating today in newspapers are not in equal to what we have said them that we have to be professionals and to keep calm and really just to repeat what we have said and to show that it is going in the proper direction. Also as far as concern our mission so in general in my view the more endangered if the operation of plant is not proper are the people living in the vicinity of the plant. So therefore I try personally and my people as well to take as many contacts as possible. So we are taking part in their gatherings but also we encourage them if they have any doubts to come to us and to let's say ask what they do not like. Even we invite them to visit regulatory body and to discuss about things how they it is managed so we can what we can do for them. So communication has to be really one of the of the critical things which we have to cope with. I have to say that we have quite a lot of training for other people as far as concern safety culture where we encourage them to fulfill questionnaires in self evaluation. We have training as far as concern technical aspects and what is quite important at the end of the year people can write down what is their view what they need to get some more information and to assure for them some training. The other part of these requirements is filled by the supervisors. So we try to have as competent staff as it is possible and I hope that we will be able to deliver our work so in proper manner in such that the people as well as environment are going to protect it for safe life of them. So thank you. Thank you Marta. I particularly really like the openness and the willingness to share insights on how best to kind of mobilise a safety culture and leadership approach that that was great. Thank you Mark Foy. Thanks very much David. I'm going to come at it from a slightly different perspective. So for me for a long period the industry that we have regulated was fairly quiescent. But during this time our understanding of human aspects of nuclear safety has evolved significantly particularly as DG Magwood has said in the period post Fukushima and indeed as Marta has also just mentioned post Chernobyl. We heard from my colleague Mark and John Thielen about the two NEA reports that capture some of this learning by focusing on the human aspects of nuclear safety. Specifically around the impacts of regulators and industry on their respective safety cultures and then secondly the importance of leadership for safety in regulatory bodies. Two very important areas. We actually need to use this understanding to good effect. Not just licensees but as regulators. We need to better consider human aspects and understand how our actions and behaviours impact on those that we regulate. This is important as the majority of national nuclear regulators are now facing a dynamic nuclear landscape with major new build ambitions globally. Reactor lifetime extensions are reality. We've also got major decommissioning programmes underway with waste management challenges and options for final disposal being explored and developed. Quite a challenging environment. This changing landscape will involve existing licensees but also many who will now be new to the nuclear industry and regulation. So it's important that we consciously consider what and how we do things as regulators to have the best impact. In the next few minutes I'll help to bring some of the content of the two NEA reports we have heard about today to life. This through real examples from a regulatory context from my experience in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, around 13 years ago, O&R or NII, our previous body, didn't secure the safety outcomes it required in a number of high hazard, high risk legacy facilities at the Selleville site in Cumbria. As a regulator, we'd actually taken enforcement action in the early 2000s, setting clear requirements of the end state that was to be achieved and by when at these facilities. As a consequence, we subsequently reviewed why progress hadn't been made in the 10 year period of the enforcement. The failure to achieve the right outcomes wasn't actually for the want of trying or lack of desire by any one organisation, be that the operator, government and also regulators. But what was clear is each stakeholder was viewing the challenges from their own perspective, not working together to solve the challenges. Each highlighting why things could not be done, with preconceived ideas of what the regulator requires and would or would not accept. During the review, we did recognise our own role as a regulator in this situation. We'd issued the enforcement and for many years, for its duration, we'd kept a distance. Very much a parent and child relationship, regulator to regulated and an us and them relationship. Leaving the licensee to solve the significant remediation challenges itself. This established barriers to progress and led to very fixed mindsets on stakeholders' parts. And those were not in the best interests of achieving progress and the required safety improvements. The magnitude of the remediation challenges there was such that they needed all stakeholders to work together constructively. Now the licensee does own and has to manage and control the risk. But it's reasonable to accept that we have to help them on that way forward. At that time in 2013, as a direct consequence of the review, we responded by developing our own enabling approach to regulation. Which is very much how we continue to work with the industry in the United Kingdom today. Subsequently publishing our own guidance of what it means for our inspectors and how they approach regulation. But also to provide clarity for industry on what it should expect from us as a regulator. It recognizes our own role in supporting the industry to achieve its desired outcomes safely. It involves, as has been mentioned earlier, a collaborative approach with licensees and wider stakeholders. All stakeholders working together to secure effective delivery against clear prioritized outcomes. But also early engagement and establishing an aligned, common, purposeful, respectful approach of each other's rules as well. But very much focusing on the outcomes that need to be achieved, not particularly the process to get there. This leads to fit for purpose solutions, aligned behaviors that build trust amongst all the stakeholders. With the ability to identify and work together to remove blockages together. This response from us as a regulator was a fundamental change in our approach to being supportive with open and constructive dialogue. Very much in the manner of what is set out in the documents developed by the NEA and the registry team. This led to a significant shift in culture of the licensees on site. Moving to a much more can do attitude, solution focused with improved learning and confidence in delivery. Which spread much wider than the immediate projects on the site and have endured since. It provided for credible accelerated programs for mediation and much improved mutually beneficial relationships that have endured since. This is a prime example of what has been articulated in the documents about regulators stopping to take stock. Reflecting on what was needed to change to enable progress and adapting our approach. Which resulted in major changes in those that we regulate. The example emphasizes the importance of having the ability to understand and recognize how the interactions of regulatory bodies impact and influence the nuclear industry. Turning now to a second example that looks at nuclear safety leadership in regulatory bodies. As John Thielen has indicated, the new NEA report on leadership for safety highlights five steps for the development of effective leadership for safety. I'm going to focus on the last step and my own personal experience on conducting an independent assessment of my own organization is safety culture. The Office for Nuclear Regulation in the United Kingdom commissioned an independent study by an expert independent organization linked to academia in the United Kingdom. Which considered our own organizational safety and security culture and how it impacted our effectiveness in delivering our regulatory mission. It was a comprehensive piece of work with imports both from internal sources our staff and external bodies such as the industry we regulate government and other bodies. The results what I would say were quite interesting providing insights into why we as an organization and our people behave the way they do. Internally it was clear that our predominant internal values and culture were found to be driven by a focus on our mission which is ensuring the protection of society. But it also covered our reputation, professionalism and technical competence but also our need as a regulator for independence and being risk averse but also a bias for process. We also focus very much on excellence as an organization and consensual leadership. I think what I would say there those are many factors that you would want to have in a regulatory body and would expect to see in the type of people that we employ as a regulator and the regulatory role that we're asking them to fulfill. But these positive attributes to our culture can also have a negative side. The positives around that commitment behind the mission, the level of expertise we have, ownership in terms of regulatory decisions and sponsorship behind that mission and the influence as a consequence because of the high levels of technical competence that we're able to have with the industry we regulate. But those facets can also hinder learning, hinder learning as an organization. They can also lead to overworking of staff but change and decision making can also be slow and the focus on delivery and process can lead to us being inflexible. In terms of the study there was also not much from our staff on the character of the organization, the character of us as a regulation, the people centric aspects. We were seen as supportive because the review was done after Covid and during Covid, the view was that we've been very supportive of our staff. But not fully living our other desired values of fairness, open-mindedness and accountability, areas that are also important. In terms of external stakeholders, they see us as being trustworthy and a transparent regulator, professional and competent, so aligning some of that internal views. It allowed us to establish good relationships and positively influence the duty holders and the industry. Our enabling approach to regulation was also highly regarded by the industry and we were recognized as robust when more formal actions needed to be taken, so a good balance. Externally though, quite interestingly, we were found to be living all of our desired values about being fair and open-minded and others. These results are extremely useful in informing how we communicate with our staff on notable change initiatives we want to implement. We've also established new approaches such as what we call leading O&R, supporting leaders in consistently role-modelling accountability, open-mindedness, fairness and how to ensure that we empower our people well. We've also revised our leadership development program and adjusted it as a consequence of what's been found through the study. I think what I would highlight is that it is a cultural journey that we are on. It's about leaders and influencers walking the talk and leading by example. A theme highlighted by a number of the NRC Commissioners this week in relation to cultural change, but also aspects highlighted in the documents produced by the NEA. What I would say is that we must all recognize that we each have a role in the culture and lived experience of those we engage and come into contact with, be it the light that we shine or the shadow that we cast. There are tools available that we can use to better inform our reporters, inform how we learn and how we grow. The two NEA reports highlighted today are two documents that provide insights and aspects of good practice. But the theory is just theory unless given life through use by the registry community and the industry. And I commend you to look at them and to look at how they can inform what you do as a community in the nuclear sector. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mark. I walk the walk. I thank you for that. I just in my own personal journey for safety culture and being a leader, that's the one thing I try to do and check myself on frequently and seek feedback. Am I really being the kind of leader that my staff expect, but moreover, how do I present myself in a broader form? Thank you for that very much. Annemiek, the floor is yours. Thank you so much. And I really would like to start with congratulating on such a good report. And especially also DJ Magwood for his leadership in it, talking about leadership. I think this is a very special way of leadership, which really has an impact for all of us. So thank you for that. I think this report is really good because it's for and by practitioners. It's practical, it's usable, and it can guide us and regulate us around the world. And actually for us as the ANVS, it's quite timely. And I'll come back to that later. I think one of the things I really think are important in this report is the explaining of the mutual impact of the regulators and the licensees and how they impact each other and how as a regulator you can really influence safety culture of the regulator, of the licensee, but also have to be open to receive feedback and to be influenced by the licensees as well. So this is, I think, in a very important part of this report. A mature safety culture is really crucial to safety performance, and I'm going to make a point here. I start with some general reflections and then I go to our organization specifically. And this special point is about diversity, as I already also said this morning. I think to them from the gender perspective to safety culture and from safety culture back to gender parity, but also diversity in a broader way. I would like to make the point here that diversity and inclusion is really crucial to safety culture. It's really part of it. It cannot be separated. And there I talk about diversity in a broad way, so age, technical background, cultural background, different competencies and also gender. And gender and those other issues like also the cultural background, you have to strive for balance there not only because you need equal opportunities from a moral way, not only because you need everyone in a very scarce market, not only because it's a moral issue, but really as part of this broader diversity needed for better performance. It is well known that diverse teams perform better. It's important to avoid blind spots, to get the soft signals in the organization, to have trust and also to really have open channels for communication. If you do inclusion in a proper way of diversity, it helps enormously. So I would like to propose an extra enabler on your list. You have a beautiful list of enablers for safety culture. Maybe we should add diversity and inclusion to this list. And there, of course, leadership also kicks in. Leadership on all levels. It's leadership in our own organization and leadership in the role as a regulator to the licensee. And I think it has been mentioned before already as well that leadership and safety culture is really for everyone in the organization on all levels because you need it also for the interface with the licensees, the license holders. And it's something that is really part of your organizational tissue if it's good. However, I think we as senior management, as professional leaders, we have a special role. We really should walk the talk. We should set an example in our organization. And setting the example is not only talking about it, but really doing things. And I think you already, Mark, as well, spoke about that and gave some examples. One of the things we did in the AMVS, now I'm going to go to our organization, is go for an organizational change. I said already this morning as well, we had a great opportunity that we need to get a lot of people on board, but also we needed to do some changes in the organizations to accommodate it and also to open up some structures. And what we did is, and it has a strong relation to safety culture, is put an emphasis on, as we call it, professional autonomy of the staff. So professional autonomy, it's giving responsibility and space to the staff in the organization. But within clear regulatory framework, of course, to guide it and within clear boundaries, you could say. And in order to do so and to make this grow, we developed a leadership program to support this development. Because then for leaders, for the management, it asks for different things. It asks for a different way of interacting with the staff and also to make very clear how the rules are and to open up in a different way for them. And this was a chance also to develop the competencies of the management and become more effective leaders. Open communication is one of the key issues there. And also the message that mistakes can be made, which is usually a very difficult one within the environment of nuclear safety. But mistakes in the organization, they will be made. So it's very important to be open to it and also set an example there. So what I try to do as well, and that's also to walk the talk, I sometimes make mistakes. So I try to be as open as possible about it. And just when we meet with people say, well, you know, this was not a very bright thing that I did, so apologies. And what can we learn from it? So to really have this kind of conversation, and I use also the blogs to do so, sometimes to reflect on these issues. And we really try to put that into the mindset of all the management layers within the organization. So people feel free to give the signals. People feel free to also say when they make mistakes. We also have some challenges in the organization. One is what I mentioned also as an opportunity, that's the growth of the organization. We're growing very fast. So that's also a difficulty for the organizational culture, for the safety culture within the organization. With a lot of new stuff, we do need to train them very well and to make sure that they know what they need to know and they know what they need to do. But we also need to be welcoming, making sure that they, even as newcomers, also will be heard and that people that are sitting there already longer in their jobs won't say just like, OK, I've been here longer than you should first learn or things like that, which happens often in an organization. So another thing that needs to be done. And we need to organize different ways of meeting each other because we are growing from a small organization into a medium-sized organization where not everyone will know each other easily. And we need to do more in writing. So we do have to write down more. And that's really important also if you get a lot of new people to preserve and to improve our safety culture. The second challenge we have is that we do a lot of things regarding to safety culture, but somehow not in a very comprehensive way. We never had a real program or a programmatic way of doing it. And to be honest, we never have made an assessment yet. So these are things on our list to be done. And we even the IRS, when they came to do a review, they said to us, you'd better, you know, organize this a little bit more, make it more comprehensive. So we took that advice and so there it is, this document that is really very timely for us as an organization as well that will really, it has so much practical tools. So thank you again. I think it will help the ANVS. And we will gladly work from that document and learn from our colleagues around the table and elsewhere in the world. So thank you. Thank you very much, Annemiek. I touched on this before, but I just wanted to highlight that your thoughts earlier today on gender equality and how you married those with your thoughts today, I think that's important because it highlights and we'll have a couple of questions related to that here that we're getting. It highlights the need for open communications, but also embracing, listening, hearing people, helping them feeling, knowing that they are included, even if the decision doesn't necessarily go their way or an outcome isn't what they expected. They understand and their thoughts were appreciated. So I really thought that that struck a chord with me and I think I'm sure with others. So thank you. Commissioner Bond, if you'd like to share some thoughts. Yeah, thank you, Chair. I comment on two of the questions you raised. The first one is how can regulatory bodies develop and sustain an accountability-oriented, enabling approach to regulation? And another is how can regulatory bodies build and maintain the trust of the public in the regulatory approach? To be honest, I am not a specialist in safety culture. Then you will wonder why I am chairing this working group. When talking about safety culture, people tend to highlight success stories, not negative stories. I have that kind of impression. Experiencing Fukushima Daija accident, we Japanese are not afraid of talking about negative aspects. So I undertook the role of chair as I thought I would be able to lead honest discussions. So I would like to share my thoughts about implication of these two reports in light of Japan's current situation. The first point is relationship between the regulatory body and licensees in Japan. As the report points out, respect, openness and trust underpin the positive interaction between the regulator and the operator. Based on the lessons from Fukushima Daija accident, the NRA, Nuclear Regulation Authority, updated regulatory requirements and was given authority for backfitting. And this impacted the relationship between the regulatory body and licensees. Licensees thought the NRA is unpredictable and tried to move carefully. But we NRA sometimes frustrated by the licensees in decisive attitudes. The situation is getting better, but still on the way to building respect and trust. So our relationship is not mature enough to shift to the accountability-oriented enabling regulation. So we need to take a responsive approach in the long term, that is my impression. But more serious problem is the relation to the public. Since the accident, Japanese society has had a sense that the regulator should always take a severe attitude to nuclear operators. It is challenging to convince the public that the AER accountability-oriented enabling regulation is the best approach. This is not just a matter of how to explain it. The concept of AER is based on the idea that the regulator and the operator share the same goal but have different roles and work independently. In Japan, people think the safety regulation is a confrontation between the regulator and the operator. It is just like a sheriff and a villain. The fundamental principle for nuclear safety has not prevailed. It is a big challenge because society as a whole has to undergo a paradigm shift. You understand the difficult situation in Japan but I think it may not be a problem specific to Japan. There could be similar situations if the public do not have confidence in the performance of the nuclear sector. The report focused on the relationship between the regulator and the operator but in this context, we need to broaden our perspective to the dynamics in the interconnected system that includes other stakeholders as well. So that is my comment. Thank you. Thank you so much, Commissioner. Very much appreciated. And again, the hard work of you and the working group just is recognized and really is going to pay dividends. Director General Magwood, your comments. Thank you very much. I will try to be brief because I think we are running very short on time here. But a few observations. I want to start with leadership and I appreciate the panel's conversation about leadership and I think most of them reflect that leading by examples is elemental to the job of a leader. I think one complexity that I've observed over the years is that there's still, I guess I would call it, a confusion by many people about the difference between managing and leading. I think that's always been part of the problem because it is relatively easy to assess management. You simply have to make sure that things were accomplished. Things got done on time. Therefore, we have a good manager. Well, you may have a good manager but you may not have a good leader. And if you don't have a way of assessing and understanding leadership, you may not even know that you don't have a good leader. So leading by example is important but it's also important to have some way of assessing leadership. That's one of the things I think about the report on leadership that's so important because it quantifies leadership in nuclear safety organizations in a way that I've not seen before and I think it's very, very instructive. The characteristics we saw on the wheel that was shown on the chart a while back I think are all extremely important and it provides a bit of a roadmap for those in regulatory organizations that want to develop leaders to have a way of assessing the kinds of behaviors and projecting the kinds of behaviors that we would like to see. And maybe in some sense and I'm sure that Marta and Mark and Annemiek and Nobuhitika will think about this, should we be incorporating some of these principles in our human resource policies so that we are actually evaluating people on some of these characteristics, which was different from what normally happens in organizations. But I've seen in too many instances around the world where people who simply accomplished their mission or given plots and given elevation but may have done so in a way that has disenfranchised their staff or ignored comments from staff and outsiders and really done not as good a job as what could have been if the leadership were there. So I think that the helping people assess this is very important because I think several of the panelists said it's also very important that everyone in the system provides some level of leadership at their level and leadership for safety is something that's everybody's responsibility and the more that people understand what the characteristics are the more they can look into themselves to see what am I lacking? What do I need to improve? How do I take steps in myself to become a better leader? So that's very important. And moving on to the other issue of safety culture and I think this concept that you've named Accountability Oriented Enabling Regulation, AER, that's a new acronym we've all learned today, AER is an excellent phrase. I think it captures this concept very well and I've shared with some, I think I've shared with the working group and I won't go into the specifics of this but I've shared with the working group an experience I have when I was at the NRC when I had a licensee, a senior manager who met with me and told me that he thought his staff had presented to him a very important technology that he thought made a significant improvement in safety and I said that was good. He said, but we're not going to use it. And I said, explain that to me. Why would you not use this technology? And he said, because the staff has given us absolutely no credit for the use of this technology and getting credit for this technology will be such an arduous and expensive journey it simply isn't worth it to us. So we're not going to do it. Now I've often thought about this example and of course there's specifics to this that is not a simple story but it does reflect the impact that regulators have on licensees and one could argue that this licensee if they really believed that safety was enhanced with this technology that perhaps they should implement it with or without credit from the regulator if it's that important but they have been trained to not do things like that unless they get approval from the regulator. And again, while there's specifics to these sorts of examples I think it is instructive to think about and I think that regulators have to think about what messages they send through their processes their decision making and I know that staff with the NRC who are here know of multiple examples where the licensees will tell you today that if they'd known how hard it was going to be to do Project X they would never have started it in the first place because it took so long and it cost so much and it was so painful that we don't want to do that even though the outcome would be an improvement for safety. So these are things I think regulators need to think about. In some cases the regulatory, the regulators behavior might be entirely appropriate but in other cases one suspects that different approaches might be taken so I do think it's very important for leaders and regulatory organizations to think about this sort of effect and the kind of messages they're sending through the licensees because we want licensees to be responsible for safety and we want regulators to have accountability-oriented enabling regulation but that doesn't happen just because we say it should happen. It happens on a day-to-day basis at many levels within regulatory organizations and that's something that is very important to observe. So Dave, please. Thank you so much. I really appreciate those thoughts. At this point in the program we've gotten, let me tell you, a rich set of questions from you all. We've got about five minutes and there's a question that I know we've addressed a little bit on the panel and the panel is looking at me as if, okay, who is he going to ask? But what it gets to and I'm going to paraphrase a bit is we heard today from you all that openness and transparency is important. We also talked about the fact that it's not unusual for a regulator to have a difficult conversation with a licensee regarding their performance, be it safety culture or otherwise. I just wondered if you could share some thoughts on how you engage the licensee in a dialogue in a way that perhaps the public can understand the circumstance, the regulatory perspective, and get an effective and fulsome response from the licensee. Perhaps not all licensees want to be as open and transparent in a public forum. Any thoughts on best practices or experiences where you've had a truly engaging dialogue with a licensee talking about a difficult challenge as a means, at least one means of instilling public trust? So for me, the example that I talked about around Sellerfield and the need to be open and transparent about what the situation was and even as a regulator way back two decades ago, we hadn't been open in our own communication about what the situation was, the level of waste, the level of hazard and risk. And what it does is if we are a regulator and willing to be open about what the situation is, the licensee themselves follow. But there's a process there of engagement that has to be had between ourselves as a regulator and the licensee to get an agreed way forward. You can't drag them kicking and screaming. That's a really difficult situation to be in and to manage. I think if you're a proactive regulator willing to listen to the concerns of those that were regulating and actually hear what they're saying and try and steer a clear path through those issues, I think you can actually get an agreed, an acceptable way forward where you can both try and communicate the issues out to the public in what I would call easily understood terms, avoiding the technical jargon. I think that's essential if you want to get the public onside and them to get to understand the issues that are at hand and you're trying to deal with. Because if you're talking in technical babble or regulatory jargon, they will never get to understand it and have to work collectively together to communicate the message to the public and others they call the bodies as well. That's great. Annemiek, you have an additional thought? Yeah, well maybe we are working on publishing the inspection results. And we are not there completely, but what we did in the process is having interaction with the licensees on it and see where their fears were. So we were in a strong interactive process with them also on how to do that. And then as a next step, we involved also a focus group of the public to see if we would publish it in such a way, if that would make sense to them. And then we got back very strong feedback that they didn't want that much detail, that they just want to know from us that it's okay or it's not okay and some more. And then of course you can go deeper, drill deeper into it. So I thought this was really last year a very enriching experience to have both these conversations with the licensees and with the focus group in the public and that helps us in finding a way of giving that openness as well. Thank you for that. I'll just offer, without getting into specifics, I know the NRC has leveraged focus groups and public engagement with the licensees to seek a common understanding, to find regulatory solutions to challenging technical problems but that really pays dividends when we can go about it in that way. We are right at our time, Director General, any final thoughts? Just very quick. First, thank you, David, for chairing this panel and my thanks to this excellent panel. Very important comments were made so I hope everyone had an opportunity to think about these thoughts. But I also wanted to take the opportunity to certainly thank the working groups that put this together. Mark and his team and John, you and your team did an outstanding job. It was three years of work so this is a pretty significant accomplishment that has been created here and I think it is one that really will stand the test of time. So thank you both for the effort and of course I do need to give a lot of recognition to the working group chair, Commissioner Bond, for encouraging and guiding this over the course of these three years and Florence Maher, of course, for her hard work and harassing me over the last couple of weeks to make sure we got this out during time. So Florence, thank you for that. But again, I hope you all have the opportunity to download the report and read it and take some lessons home to your own organizations. Thank you so much, Director General and I am just, again, I was very honored to be the chair of this session and to work with such an august group. The work is amazing. I'm sure it will have lasting impact. A couple of quick thoughts that I had was, Director General, I'm going to push the I believe button on safety culture and I think that that is true in a lot of arenas. So how do you find that? How do we align the safety culture and safety and security? There's a close nexus, they are one and the same. How do we do it? So that is, and I think we heard today from the panelists some practical solutions on how you might go about accomplishing that including some practical elements of both of your reports. Thank you very much. For the folks in the audience, there are, I apologize if we didn't get to your questions, they were very good by the way and we did include opportunities to get in contact with Catherine Thompson if you have any additional questions and we provided her email, we provided QR links for the reports and contact for working group members in case you have any additional questions please do include the session. Thank you all again.