 Section 12 of a Scientific and Practical Treatise on American Football for Schools and Colleges by Henry L. Williams and Amos Alonzo Stagg. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Section 12 Plays with Diagrams, Part 3 47. Running Mass Wedged through the Centre To send FB through the centre on a running mass play directly behind C, the ends and back start forward the instant the ball is snapped. The guards lift their men back and out from the centre, while C endeavours to force his man straight ahead of him. LH and KH dash in and attach themselves behind C on each side of him. FB springs forward at the same moment, and receiving the ball on a pass at X from QB, who slips to one side, dives in directly behind C with head down. At the same instant that FB reaches the line, the ends close in on either side of him directly behind the half-backs. QB throws himself in the rear of FB, and all push forward with the greatest possible force in the solid and tightly formed mass. The vital point in the play is that all strike the line at as nearly as possible the same instant and form a tightly massed wedge, which is driven directly through the line. Note, by drawing the ends in to LE2 and RE2, they may be enabled to strike the line ahead of the half-backs, in which case the latter will attach themselves on either side of FB as he rushes forward. The wedge must never cease pushing until the man with the ball is actually downed and absolutely held. 48. Running mass wedge between guard and center To send the running mass wedge through the line between LG and C, the half-backs draw back slightly before the ball is snapped to LH2 and RH2 in a line with FB, in order to give the ends more time to reach the opening ahead of them, and also to enable themselves to gain greater headway before striking the line. RE also works over slightly to the left to RH2. At the instant the ball is snapped, all the men behind the line dash straight for the opening and the lines indicated. C lifts his man back into the right, and LG forces his man back into the left. LE passes through the opening ahead at an angle and strikes the opposing C with his full force, while RE crossing directly behind him strikes the opposing guard in a similar manner. FN, when the ends find difficulty in reaching the opening ahead, they may follow the half-backs as in the preceding play. At the same moment, FB with his head down and the ball held as before, strikes the opening so made immediately behind the ends with the greatest possible force, the half-backs firmly attaching themselves to his flanks as he receives the ball at X and forcing him through. RT leaves the line as the ball is snapped, as shown for LT in diagram 13, and together with QB, closes in behind FB. All mass firmly together as before and drive directly through the line. LT and RG hold their men and force them out. 49. Running Mass Wedge directly at the guard. To send the Running Mass Wedge into the line directly behind LG, very little changes made from that shown in diagram 47, except that the play is directed at the guard instead of C. C and LT force their men back to the right and left respectively, as the ball is snapped, the half-backs dash forward in the lines indicated and attach themselves to the flanks of LG with the greatest possible force. The end strikes the formation so made at that same instant, and each grasps FB from the side as he rushes in behind LG with his head down, while RT and QB throw their weight in behind FB as shown in diagram 13, and all plunge forward and a mass pressed firmly together. The success of the play depends upon the formation of a compact mass which continues to hold firmly together after it strikes the line, and in which all push with their whole weight. 50. Running Mass Wedge directly at the tackle. To send the Running Mass Wedge into the line behind the tackle, the same principle is carried out as that shown in diagram 49. The instant the ball is snapped, all the men behind the line start for RT in the directions indicated at utmost speed, FB receiving the ball at X on the pass from QB. LH and RH strike the flanks of RT at full speed on either side, while the ends, QB and LT, mass on the sides and rear of FB as he strikes the line, as shown in diagram 47. The mass must continue its closely locked formation and push directly down the field. LE works in slightly to LE2 before the ball is put in play. LT leaves the line the instant the ball is snapped, as if he himself were to run with the ball, follows directly behind FB and overtakes him if possible before he reaches the line in order to push him as he strikes. 51. Free opening play from the center of the field. The men are lined up at the center of the field as shown in the cut, from 5 to 6 feet apart. A signal makes it understood around which end the play is to be made, and each player selects the man on the opposing side, whom it has been prearranged that he shall block. C puts the ball in play by kicking it while still retaining it in his hands, and passes it back to LH in case the play is to be made around the right end. At the same instant, the entire rush lines move diagonally toward the right as one man, and dash into the opposing rushers as they meet midway between the two lines. RH and FB proceed LH to interfere for him as they reach the end, and all sprint at topmost speed. Note, the rushers must see to it that they do not betray their looks before the ball is put in play, the direction in which the run is to be made. 52. Double pass opening play from the center. To make the double pass opening play around the left end, the rushers are placed as indicated. On the center line, about 2 yards apart, leaving an interval of about 10 yards between C and QB, and 5 yards between QB and RG, while the backs are about 3 yards behind the line. In the instance that QB puts the ball in play, C, LG, LT, LE, and LH dash toward the center of the field in lines nearly parallel with the cross lines, serving their distances from one another. QB makes a long pass to LH at X, as he advances toward him on the run. To the right of QB start directly down the field, swinging in slightly toward the center to block the oncoming rushers. QB and FB stand still. LH passes close in front of FB, carries the ball in his right arm, and passes it to FB to take it as he rushes by. FB and QB then instantly start in the opposite direction and sprint at utmost speed to encircle the opposing team which has been drawn in toward the center. Note, from this same formation, QB may pass the ball either to FB or RH for a kick, in which case the rushers will all run straight down the field instead of across in the lines indicated in the cut. 53. Opening play from the center with team divided. The men are arranged as indicated in the diagram on either side of the field. The rushers being about two yards apart and the ends about five yards from the sidelines. FB is placed about two yards and the half backs about three yards behind the center line. QB looks to the one side and then to the other in order to render the opposing team uncertain whether the ball is to be passed to the right or left or to FB for a kick down the field. He then puts the ball in play as shown in diagram 51 and makes a long pass to LH who receives it on the run at X, following it immediately to make the play safe in case of a wild pass. The instant the ball is in play, every player in the field will dash forward in the lines indicated except RE, who stands still in his position or drops flat upon the ground close to the sidelines, unobserved by his opponents as the other three men dash across the field. It is of no consequence if only a small advance is made. All depends upon the quickness of the following play for success. Every man upon the team rushes to his position in the line and without waiting for a signal the ball is immediately snapped and a long pass made by QB straight across the field to RE who catches the ball upon the run and has the entire field before him. Note, this play is only practical when QB can be relied upon for a long and accurate pass and when the wing is not unfavorable. 54. Princeton opening wedge from the center of the field. Footnote, the wedge formation at the center of the field originated at Princeton and a footnote. To send the wedge straight down the field from the center, the men form in the positions shown in the cut as closely and firmly bound together as possible. At the signal, C puts the ball in play by touching it with his foot and passes it back to QB, who is immediately behind him ready to receive it. As the ball is put in play, the entire wedge rushes forward in a compact mass, preserving its formation and endeavors by mere force of weight and momentum to advance the ball as far as possible straight towards the opponent's goal. QB upon receiving the ball places it at his stomach, clasps it tightly with both hands, and charges forward with head down while FB throws in his entire weight from behind. Note, it is a vital point that all the men keep their feet and run in a compact mass, preserving the formation. 55. Yale modification of Princeton wedge. This wedge differs in one very important respect from the proceeding. Instead of being a part of the wedge formation, the guards are placed outside of the wedge directly abreast of C. The instant the ball is put in play, LG and RG spring forward in advance of the wedge and meet the opposing guard in center midway between the wedge and the point from which their opponents start. LG jumps directly into his man and attempts to throw him to the left, while RG, meaning the opposite C in the same manner, attempts to throw him to the right. The wedge advancing immediately behind is thus saved the shock of being struck by the opposing guards under full headway. The wedge may charge thus at an angle slightly to the right or left, the guards taking the opposing C and RG or C and LG as the case may be. Note, as it is highly desirable that the men without the wedge be swift in dashing, it may be found more advantageous to place the tackles or to comparatively light men in these positions while the guards are retained within the wedge itself. 56. Princeton Split Wedge The formation is precisely the same as that shown in Diagram 54. The ball is put in play as before, and the wedge advances straight down the field. As the oncoming rusher strike it, the wedge suddenly opens at some point previously agreed upon and allows QB, who carries the ball, to break through and dart down the field. The opening usually selected is that between guard and tackle, as shown in Cut A. In this case, the guard and tackle separate and force the opponents to the left and right respectively, while QB, with his head down and FB pushing him from behind, forces his way through and breaks clear of the wedge. This opening may be made either to the right or left and at any point desired. 57. Yale Split Wedge The formation is very similar to that of Diagram 56, but the two lines are arranged so that the parallel sides are newer together. The half backs and ends brace themselves well back, at arm's length from the men directly ahead of them, precisely as shown in Diagram 41. QB stands well back between the half backs as shown in the cut. The guards, tackles, and half backs stand with toes pointing straight forward to leave a narrow, unobstructed lane between the two lines, down which the ball is to be rolled on its side. C places the ball on its side between his legs and puts it in play by touching it with his toe, the ball the while firmly held under his hand and rolling it back. At the same moment, the entire wedge surges straight ahead. QB will have had just time to secure the ball, turned toward Rh, when the charging rushers will be upon the apex of the wedge. Rh then instantly turns square to the right and seizing Rh by the arm knocks him directly out of the wedge on the opposite side. Le follows immediately behind Rh, FB attaches himself to Rh and the new wedge, with Rh as its apex, and QB directly in the center with the ball, dashes off at an angle of about 45 degrees to the original direction. C cut A. Note, the wedge may split either to the right or left. It is very important that the second wedge preserves a loose yet firm formation so that all may run at utmost speed. 58, side play from wedge at the center. The formation is precisely as shown in Diagram 54. C puts the ball in play as before and passes it back to QB, and the entire wedge advances with the rush. QB quietly transfers the ball to LH unperceived under cover of the wedge formation, and as the oncoming rushers strike the apex, Le and FB, who has changed his position to FB too, slip by on the side in the lines indicated to block the opposing Rh and Rh, while LH starts suddenly to the left, passing behind Le and FB, and attempts to encircle the end, sprinting at at most speed. Note, the ball may be passed by QB to either of the halfbacks or ends, and the play made as shown. A play is sometimes made closely allied to this, in which QB remains in the wedge until after it has encountered the opposing rushers, and then suddenly darts out from behind, with a single interferer, trusting to his speed and the unexpectedness of his appearance to carry him safely around the opposing team. 59. Hard running wedge with loose formation. The men are formed in a wedge shaped as above, from 3 to 4 feet apart, with the halfbacks in the centre. C puts the ball in play by kicking it and passing it back to one of the halfbacks, and the whole formation dashes forward at at most speed, without messing together, preserving the arrangement as far as possible. Each man in the line dashes directly into the opposing rushers as they meet the wedge, while the halfback with the ball, assisted by his fellow, endeavors to slip through the most favourable opening which the open formation shall offer. The play may be directed straight ahead, or to the right or left. Note, if the entire formation, without changing its arrangement, withdraws 10 yards behind C and comes dashing forward on the run, C putting the ball in play just before it reaches him, the play may be made even more effective. 60. The Harvard flying wedge. QB stands with the ball in the centre of the field. FB stands from 5 to 10 yards behind QB and a little to the right. The remainder of the team is divided into sections. Section number one is composed of the heaviest men in the line, and is drawn up from 20 to 30 yards from the centre, back into the right, facing QB. Section number two is composed of the lighter and swifter men, drawn up 5 or 10 yards back into the left of QB. Section number one has the right of way, the others regulating their play to its speed at a signal from QB. Section number one dashes forward at utmost speed passing close in front of QB. At the same moment, FB and section number two advance, timing their speed to number one. Just before the sections reach the line, QB puts the ball in play, and as they come together in a flying wedge and aim at the opposing RT, or straight down the field, passes to RH and dashes forward with the wedge. A slight opening is left in front of QB to draw in the opposing RT, C small cut. As opposing RT dives into the wedge, LH and QB take him. RE and LE swing out to the left to block opposing RE. At the same moment, RH puts on utmost speed and darts through opening between LH and RE. Note, the arrangement of the men is arbitrary. The wedge may be directed against any point desired. Its strength lies in the fact that the men are under full headway before the ball is put in play. Section number 61, guard drops back and bucks the center. To send RG to buck the center, at a given signal, RG runs back from the line and takes the position at RG2, while RH jumps in and fills temporarily the position of RG. As soon as RG is in his position, the ball is snapped. RG dashes forward, receives it at X, and plunges into the opening to the right of C with his head down, striking the line hard, and opening in the line is made as shown in Diagram 5. RE, FB, LH, LE, and QB all rush in behind RG, starting forward in the lines indicated as the ball is put in play and push as in Diagram 21. LT, LG, and RT play as in Diagram 5. Note, the above play is valuable for a light team if they happen to have a heavy and powerful guard. After RG has been sent at the center once or twice, it will be very effective to have QB pass the ball to LH instead of RG, for a run around the right end, as shown in Diagram 8. RG will then proceed LH as does RH in Diagram 8. 62. Guard through his own opening on the same side. To send RG through his own opening to the right of C, the full back and half backs are placed back as if for a kick, as shown in the cut. FB assumes every appearance of being about to receive and kick the ball. As the ball is snapped, RG jumps slightly back and toward QB, allowing the opposing LG, who is eager to break through and stop the kick, to pass through the line outside of him. QB instantly hands the ball to RG, who plunges back into the line through the opening left vacant by the opposing guard, with QB directly behind him. C endeavors to force his man well to the left as he snaps the ball. A similar play is less successfully attempted at the tackle. The old play of having the end lie well out and receive the ball on a long pass from QB is now almost absolutely discarded. Note, care must be taken by QB not to make a forward pass. 63. Full back feints a kick and runs around the end. To send FB around the end on a feint to kick, RH and LH draw from one to two yards behind their original positions, while FB moves over toward the right to FB too, from two to three yards in the rear of RH. When the ball is put in play, QB passes carefully and accurately to FB, who, with coolness and deliberation, without betraying by the slightest glance or uneasy movement that he is about to run, goes through the preparatory movements of being about to kick. All the men in the line block their opponents as usual, with the exception of RE. The latter allows his man unimpeded progress straight for FB, simply forcing him to run to the inside of him as he passes, or takes the first extra man in the line outside of RT. As the opposing LE is almost upon him, coming forward at full speed, FB suddenly darts to the right in order to dodge LE, which is easily done, and dashes around the right end. The entire success of the play will depend upon the coolness and skill of FB in waiting until the last moment before dodging to the right and in not allowing his ultimate design to be prematurely discovered. In case the opposing tackle succeeds in breaking through the line, RH must take him and force him to the inside. 64. Full back feints a kick and half back darts through the line. To send RH through the line on a feint to kick, LH and FB drop back. RH remains in nearly his original position, while FB assumes every appearance of being about to receive and kick the ball. Just before the ball is snapped, RH draws in slightly nearer to RH2. Upon receiving the ball, QB instantly passes it to RT, who is close to the line and plunges directly through the opening between C and RG with head down, and the ball held as shown in diagram 5. The opposing guards and center are all intent upon breaking through and stopping the kick, and are entirely unprepared for a dash into the line. As the ball is put in play, RG throws his man suddenly and violently to the right, while C throws his man in a similar manner to the left, and RH darts through the opening so made without assistance or interference. Note, this play is also frequently mage between guard and tackle. 65. Chris Crossplay from the sideline. To perform the Chris Crossplay when the ball is out of bounds at the sideline, C places one foot well within the field, keeping the other out of bounds, and faces the opponent's goal with the ball in his hands, ready to put it in play by touching it to the ground and passing it back between his legs to QB. RG stands as near the sideline as possible, directly behind C, out of the way of QB. FB stands about 2 yards behind QB, while LH occupies a position 3 or 4 yards behind the line, and from 10 to 15 yards from the side of the field. The remainder of the men stand closely and solidly together in the line. When the ball is put in play, QB passes quickly to FB, and both start at utmost speed for the center of the field in the lines indicated. FB runs close in front of LH and gives him the ball as he passes, upon which LH instantly starts back in the opposite direction. Just before FB reaches LH, the guards and center swing around to the side and sweep their opponent's a yard or two into the field, leaving a narrow lane by the sideline down which LH may pass, as shown in cut A. The play can be made with equal success when the ball is down within a yard or two of the sidelines. Note, LH must take the greatest care not to step over the boundary line as he runs. 66. Harvard Line Wedge To form the line wedge upon the right side, at the given signal RH, RE, LH and LE dash toward the right and form a wedge directly behind RT, occupying the positions RH2, RE2, LH2 and LE2, and taking a formation similar to that shown for LE, LH, RE and RH in diagram 41. C puts the ball in play the instant the men reach their positions, and QB passes to FB, who receives the ball at X on the run. LT leaves his position the instant the ball is snapped and follows directly behind FB. Upon receiving the ball, FB dashes in behind the wedge with head down and all plunge forward, preserving a compact mess. LG blocks his man hard, while C and LG block their men and endeavor to force them to the left. As soon as QB has passed the ball, he should dash forward to throw his entire weight behind the wedge. See note, diagram 68, 67, left end between guard and center from the line wedge. This plays a modification of the one shown in diagram 66. When the wedge has been sent forward several times in succession for short gains of from two to five yards, and the opposing LG has found the way to dive into it low down between RT and LH to stop it at the signal for the play. RG allows his opponent to break through to the right as the ball is snapped without resistance and then forces him farther to the right. C blocks his man and forces him hard to the left. QB then instantly passes the ball to LE, instead of FB, who immediately darts through the opening between RG and C, followed by FB and LT. QB helps C block his man and force him to the left. The rest of the wedge plunges in behind RT when the ball is snapped, as before. See note on diagram 68. Faint wedge and full back between left guard and center. After the play shown in diagram 66 and diagram 67 have been worked a few times in succession, RG and RT on the opposing side may find that they can accomplish nothing, as the wedge is upon the other side of the center and run around in order to help block it. In that case the wedge will form at the signal and immediately dash in behind RT as before. QB passes FB the ball the instant it is snapped, but FB instead of plunging in with the ball behind the wedge, as shown in diagram 66, darts through the line between C and LG. C lifts his man back into the right. LG forces the next opponent in the line to the left. QB follows directly behind FB. Note, in case the opposing LG runs around to block the wedge, FB should pass through between LG and C. If RT goes or RT into QB, he should pass between LG and LT. Note, a strong sequence of movement in the series is as follows. 1. Play as in diagram 66. 2. If LH, RH, and QB mass in front of the wedge, play as in diagram 67. 3. If they mass close in behind the center, play as shown in diagram 69. 4. If the opposing RG or RT runs around to block the wedge, play as in diagram 68. 5. At all other times, play as shown in diagram 66. 69. Faint wedge and tackle around the end. At the signal, the wedge is instantly formed as shown in diagram 66, and as the men reach their formation, C snaps the ball. As the ball comes back, FB dashes in behind the wedge in the same manner as shown in diagram 66. When carrying the ball, the entire formation plunges forward behind RT. LT leaves his position in the line the instance the ball is put in play, receives the ball at X from QB as he passes, but instead of following behind FB, as in diagram 66, swings slightly out around the wedge and the line indicated at utmost speed. The opposing LE may very likely be deceived into thinking the play shown in diagram 66 is being attempted and dive into the wedge where he may be repinned by RH. If the opposing LE does not dive into the wedge, RH and RE should dash away to the right ahead of LT the instant he reaches them to interfere. RH should run directly for the opposing LE, while RE takes the first free man outside of RT. C note, diagram 68. End of section 12. Section 13 of a Scientific and Practical Treatise on American Football for Schools and Colleges by Henry L. Williams and Amos Alonzo Stagg. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Section 13. Index of Plays. First Series. 1. Number 1 and Number 2. Halfback between guard and center on his own side. 2. Number 3 and Number 4. Halfback between guard and tackle on his own side. 3. Number 5 and Number 6. Halfback between tackle and end on his own side. 4. Number 7 and Number 8. Halfback around his own end. Second Series. 5. Number 1 and Number 2. Halfback between guard and center on the opposite side. 6. Number 3 and Number 4. Halfback between guard and tackle on the opposite side. 7. Number 5 and Number 6. Halfback between tackle and end on the opposite side. 8. Number 7 and Number 8. Halfback around the opposite end. Third Series. 9. Number 1 and Number 2. Fullback through the line between center and guard. 10. Number 3 and Number 4. Fullback between the guard and tackle. 11. Number 5 and Number 6. Fullback between the tackle and end. 12. Number 7 and Number 8. Fullback around the end. Fourth Series. 13. Number 1 and Number 2. End between center and opposite guard. 14. Number 3 and Number 4. End between the opposite guard and tackle. 15. Number 5 and Number 6. End between the opposite end and tackle. 16. Number 7 and Number 8. End around the opposite end. Fifth Series. 17. Number 1 and Number 2. Tackle between center and opposite guard. 18. Number 3 and Number 4. Tackle between the opposite guard and tackle. 19. Number 5 and Number 6. Tackle between the opposite tackle and end. 20. Number 7 and Number 8. Tackle around the opposite end. Sixth Series. 21. Number 1 and Number 2. Guard between the opposite guard and center. 22. Number 3 and Number 4. Guard between the opposite guard and tackle. 23. Number 5 and Number 6. Guard between the opposite tackle and end. 24. Number 7 and Number 8. Guard around the opposite end. Seventh Series. 25. Number 1 and Number 2. Criss-cross half-back play around the end. 26. Number 3 and Number 4. Ends criss-cross with half-back and play around the end. 27. Number 5 and Number 6. Tackle criss-cross with half-back and play around the end. 28. Number 7 and Number 8. Guard criss-cross with half-back and play around the end. Eighth Series. 29. Number 1 and Number 2. Half-back criss-cross with the end and play around the opposite end. 30. Number 3 and Number 4. Full back criss-cross with the end and play around the opposite end. 31. Number 5 and Number 6. Ends criss-cross and play around the end. 32. Number 7 and Number 8. Tackle criss-cross with the end and play around the opposite end. 33. Number 9 and Number 10. Guard criss-cross with the end and play around the opposite end. 34. Number 11 and Number 12. Tackle criss-cross with the tackle and play around the opposite end. Ninth Series. 35. Number 1 and Number 2. Double pass from end to full back and play around the end. 36. Number 3 and Number 4. Double pass from tackle to full back and play around the end. 37. Number 5 and Number 6. Double pass from guard to half back and play around the end. 10th Series. 38. Number 1. Slow mass wedge from a down. 39. Number 2 and Number 3. Faint run around the end from wedge in the line. 40. Number 4 and Number 5. Revolving wedge from a down. 11th Series. 41. Number 2. Lifting wedge through the center. 42. Number 3 and Number 4. Wedge from the center around the tackle. 43. Number 5 and Number 6. Quarterback around the end from behind the wedge. 44. Number 7 and Number 8. Faint play from the wedge. 45. 49 and Number 10. Wedge at the end of the line. 46. Number 11 and Number 12. Play around the opposite end from the wedge at the end. 12th Series. 47. Number 1. Running mass wedge through the center. 48. Number 2 and Number 3. Running mass wedge between guard and center. 49. Number 4 and Number 5. Running mass wedge directly at the guard. 50. Number 6 and Number 7. Running mass wedge directly at the tackle. 13th Series. 51. Number 1 and Number 2. Free opening play from the center. 52. Number 3 and Number 4. Double pass opening play from the center. 53. Number 5 and Number 6. Opening play from the center with team divided. 14th Series. 54. Number 1. Princeton opening wedge from the center of the field. 55. Number 2. Yale modification of Princeton wedge. 56. Number 3. Princeton split wedge. 57. Number 4. Yale split wedge. 58. Number 5 and Number 6. Side play from wedge at center. Miscellaneous. 59. Number 1. Hard running wedge with loose formation. 60. Number 2. Harvard flying wedge. 61. Number 3. Guard drops back and bucks the center. 62. Number 4. Guard through his opening on the same side. 63. Number 5. Full back feints a kick and runs around the end. 64. Number 6. Full back feints a kick and half back darts through the line. 65. Number 7. Chris cross play from the sideline. 15th Series. 66. Number 1 and Number 2. Harvard line wedge. 67. Number 3 and Number 4. Faint wedge and end between guard and center. 68. Number 5 and Number 6. Faint wedge and full back between opposite guard and center. 69. Number 7 and Number 8. Faint wedge and tackle around the end. End of section 13. Section 14 of a scientific and practical treatise on American football for schools and colleges by Henry L. Williams and almost Alonzo Stag. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Section 14. Team play. American football is preeminently a game for the practice and display of what is known as team play. No other game can compare with it in this particular. Not that the individual element and skill and physical capacities and strategy and head work are overlooked. But these are made subservient to the intent of the particular play in hand and so adjusted to that play as shall best contribute to its success. To get eleven men to use their individual strength, agility and speed, their wit, judgment and courage. First an individual capacity, then working with one or two companion players, then as eleven men working as one. It is a magnificent feat in organization and general ship. The individual element, perhaps, is most prominently set forth in defensive play, although there is abundant opportunity in offensive play also for it to show itself. But individual and team play are so closely joined as a rule that the beauty of the latter is heightened as the individual efforts of each player are perceived. In defensive work the players have more reason to feel their individuality because they are often compelled to combat alone one or more opponents before they can get an opportunity to tackle the runner. The defensive system, however, gives a splendid chance for clever team play in the placing of the players. In the general and particular understanding that certain men shall nearly always go through to tackle behind the line, that certain others shall wait to see where the attack will be made and there hurl themselves against it, that others shall go through the line, or not, just as it seems wisest at the time, and that still others shall never involve themselves in the scrimmage but act only when the play has been carried into their territory. Furthermore, there is constant opportunity for the exercise of team play in the working together of certain players of the rush line in defense, and also in the working together of any two or three players at special times. For example, when one or two men sacrifice themselves to clearing away the interferers so that a companion can tackle the runner, when one follows hard after the runner to overtake him, if possible, even after having missed the tackle, or helps check him from further advance when tackled, or endeavors to secure the ball. In the rush line, the center and guards work together in defense, having an understanding with each other and with the player hovering in their rear, whenever it seems best to try to let him through on the opposing quarterback or fullback, or whenever a special defense for certain plays seems best. Likewise, the ends and tackles are closely joined in team play, and that they are the players relied on to stop the end plays and those between tackle and end. The most perfect adjustment and teamwork is needed in doing this, for they play into each other's hands while, at the same time, they seek to tackle the runner. Similarly, but less closely, do the guards and tackles work together in defense against certain plays. It is an essential point in the working out of this team play between the different parts of the rush line, that the players study most carefully the positions they should occupy to meet the different kinds of play, how far from each other they should stand for this play, how far for that. In doing this, they must have regard for their own freedom to attack, not allowing themselves to take a position where they can easily be tangled up, nor one in which they can give their opponents an advantage in blocking them. Except on wedge and mass plays, the players in defense should draw their opponents apart sufficiently to give themselves space to break through on either side. The backs supplement the work of the rushers in defensive play. Arranging themselves behind the rush line at such distances from each other and from the forwards, I shall give the strongest defense. In that degree in which they make their work strong in team play, will they give the rushers encouragement and support in going through the line. The forwards will thus be enabled to play as a unit because they know that there is a reserve force directly behind them to lend them assistance and make their play safe. The backs work together in special defense on a kick, arranging themselves, either one or both, in front of the catcher to protect and encourage him and to secure the ball if must, or one stands behind to make the play safe or to receive the ball on a pass from the catcher for a run or kick. The ends sometimes come back with their opponents at such times to bother them all they can and to be in a position to interfere for the catcher if he runs. The backs also sometimes have a chance to help one another out by blocking off opponents while one of their number makes sure of a rolling ball which, perhaps, has been kicked over the goal line or into touch. When one side has the ball, it is often possible for the opponents to guess in which direction it will be carried, by the way the half-backs or quarter-backs stand, by their unconscious glances in the direction they will take, by certain anticipated movements of the muscles, by false starts before the ball is put into play. Further information is often given by the rushers themselves, often by the rusher who is to carry the ball. Frequently the players who are to make the opening indicate by the way they stand, by shifting their positions after the signal is given, or by certain actions peculiar to them at such times, the general direction of the play, and, perhaps, the exact plays at which it is aimed. All this is most valuable information and ought to be imparted to the rest of the team whenever sufficiently positive to be of service. Indeed, the team play of the future will not be considered satisfactory without a set of signals being used to spread just such information. At the same time that it is possible to gather much information of this character from the side with the ball, it must be remembered that shrewd players, knowing how they are watched for these telltale signs, have cultivated certain false motions, and are using them as points and strategy to deceive their opponents into expecting a different play from the one which is actually made. From the foregoing, one draws the lesson to hide the intended play. At least, the play must not be indicated by any of these signs which the green player, and too often the experienced player, shows. Thoughtful self-control in every particular is what each player must cultivate if he would do the greatest service for his team. Now and then, also, in offensive play, the maneuver resolves itself into a test of individual skill, speed, endurance, and headwork, but this is nearly always the outcome of team play in the first part of the movement. Occasionally, a mishap furnishes a player a chance to make a run wholly through his own unaided efforts. The history of the evolution of the hundred and more plays in American football is the history of the development of a team game. The perfecting of this has largely increased the number of combinations now possible, and has given a wideness in variety of play, and at the same time a definiteness of action for each play, which makes it possible for every member of the eleven to assist powerfully in its execution. In fact, the execution of the play depends on every player doing his particular work for that play. Hence, the interdependence of the players is very close from the moment the ball is down until the run is made, or until a fair catch or a down by the opponents declares that the ball has been released. It is therefore exceedingly important that the adjustment of every factor in the play be made with perfect skill and an exact sequence from the beginning till the end. It is most important, however, that the starting of the play be well made, for no amount of cleverness afterward can atone for a bungling start. Team play from a scrimmage should begin the instant the centre receives the ball from the hands of the runner, which should be immediately after he is stopped. Every rusher and back should be in position for the next play, and the signal be given before the runner has had hardly time to rise from the ground. The delay of one man in taking his place might be sufficient to spoil the play, whether that man be a rusher or a player behind the line. As soon as the ball is in play, the rushers must give their united support to the quarterback and the runner, blocking their opponents if necessary, long enough for the quarter to pass the ball and the runner to get well started. The centre and guards especially must work together to protect the quarter while receiving the ball and passing it, and then all or part of them may move elsewhere to help out in the play, or may stay in their positions to make an opening for the runner. There must be the most united work in these preliminaries to the run, a regular snapping of the ball, either in direction or in speed, which causes the quarter to fumble or to be delayed in getting it to the runner. A poor pass from the quarter, a maf or fumble by the runner, the letting of an opponent through too soon, are usually sufficient to spoil the play. The rushers will do well in the preliminaries if the runner succeeds in getting up to the line without encountering an opponent, or in the end plays if he is able to get under good headway. They perhaps need only to make a strong blockade in those parts of the line where the particular play is in greatest danger of being checked, but in order to do this well, they must regard each other's position as well as their own, touching elbows when necessary, or separating according to the line tactics deemed most effective at the time. The work of a part of the rushers consists in proceeding the runner whenever possible, working together by strategy and combination to make an opening for him and his interferers to go through. The others follow closely from behind to render what assistance they are able. This work compromises the hardest part of the whole play, for it must be executed in the face of the strongest part of the resistance. The rushers can block their men for a second or two, but to block them from three to six seconds is impossible against good players. It is here that the interferers come into a special prominence and value, for they are to clear the way of these free opponents. It is in anticipating the probable positions of the opponents in the vital stage of every maneuver and in providing the cleverest team play to meet each contingency that a team excels in advancing the ball by running. Several things are especially necessary to produce skillful team play. First, there should be a wise selection of players and they should be placed in their final positions as early in the season as possible. There should also be such judgment in the arrangement of these players for each position as will produce the least friction in working out the plays, and that arrangement will usually be most effective in which there is the least delay and ill-adjustment in making the plays quickly. There should be hard, systematic daily practice backed by a close study of every play by each player in his particular position. The same players should be used together as much as possible so that they can become thoroughly acquainted with each other's style of play and know each other's weak and strong points, in this way only can define adjustments and combinations which go to make up team play be brought about. Team play and interference can only be the result of a carefully planned system in which every player studies the general directions laid down for each play with a view to perfecting his particular work, varying his position on the field whenever necessary, starting like a flash in this play and delaying somewhat in that, blocking his man in one game perhaps in a certain way, and in the next in one entirely different, because his opponent plays differently, sometimes taking another opponent instead of his own, when he sees that he can be of more assistance by so doing, and in fact doing whatever will most conduce to the furtherance of the particular play in hand. In most plays the part which each player shall take in the interference can be laid out very definitely, but in the end play, and plays between end and tackle, only part of the interferers are to take particular men. The rest block off whatever opponents come in their path. It is in this free running that there are frequent chances for the display of fine team play in interference in striking the opponent at the nick of time, in pocketing him, in forcing him in or out as it seems best on the instant, the runner being on the watch for either, and in the runner sometimes slowing up to let an interferer who is close behind go ahead to take the man. Very often the reason that a play is not successful is because the interferer is too far in advance of the runner to be of any service to him. Interference must be timely to be effective. It must be the projecting of a helper at the moment a point of difficulty arises, the swinging into line of a series of helpers in timely sequence as the runner advances, nor must the runner be delayed by the interferers except perhaps when the guard comes around on an end play where it is necessary to slow up a little at a certain point to let the guard in ahead. The execution of nearly all the plays depends for its success on each player doing his duty at the right moment. Here and there in certain parts of the play, one or more players must delay a particular work as much as possible. Otherwise their action would be immature and so valueless, but for the most part the movements of each player should be quick and definite, and those plays are most effectively made in which every player does his duty quickly. Naturally the end plays and the plays between end and tackle require more delicate adjustment of the players in the interference than do the center plays. In the latter, the interference nearly always must be done after the line has been reached and penetrated. Here the extra men, who rush to the opening as soon as they see where it is, will be encountered, while in the end runs an opponent is likely to show himself here and there and everywhere before the runner reaches the line. In all mass and wedge plays where the pressure is brought to bear on one point in the line, the team play is not nearly so delicate and skillful. The virtue in the wedge play, be it quick or slow, lies in the power to project great weight and strength on a given point, while at the same time closely protecting the runner. Every play should be made as safe as possible by having at least one player always in a position to get a fumbled ball, or in case an opponent secured the ball, to prevent him from making a run. Where there are so many parts to every play in snapping, handling, passing and catching the ball, there is constant danger of a slip. The value of having one or more players behind the runner is frequently demonstrated also. When, by the aid of a timely push, the runner is able to break loose from the grasp of some tackler who has not secured a strong hold on him, and so adds several yards to his run. In running down the field on a kick, the rushers should run in parallel lines, two or three yards apart, for most of the distance, converging as they approach the man with the ball, in order to pocket him. The ends approach the catcher in such a way that he will be forced to run in towards the approaching rushers, if he runs at all. All must be on the watch to thwart a pass to another man. There is a nice point in judgment to be considered by the rushers in going down on a kick. The end men being so far away from where the full back will stand when about to kick, can start instantly down the field, leaving the halfbacks to block off their men if they come through too fast, for the end's first duty is to be under the ball when it falls. Occasionally, when kicking from near the sideline, it may be necessary for the end next the sideline to block his man or to push him back as he breaks through to go down the field. What the ends will do in this case, the tackler should do nearly every time that a kick is made. Both tacklers should feel it their bound in duty to support the ends by going hard after them the instant they judge their opponents cannot reach the full back in time to interfere with his kick. Hence, any tactics which they can put into practice, which will enable them to block their opponents and, at the same time, not delay them in going down the field, are the ones to be used. The tackles must bear in mind that the distance from their positions to the full back is not very great, especially on the side of which the full back kicks. But while this makes the duty of blocking on that side greater, the other tackle can afford to take an extra fraction of a second from blocking his opponent and use it in a quicker start. On the guards and center rests the greatest burden in blocking their opponents on a kick. For while there is not that openness in the line, as at the tackle and end, which will let an opponent through quickly, the distance to the full back is here the shortest and it is usually here that tricks are worked by which one or two men are let through, one usually being the quarterback. They must, therefore, be very careful not to be overhurried in going down the field, remembering that it is their first duty to block, following the tackles and ends as soon as possible. If the guards and center are very skillful, there need be no great delay in doing this, for it is necessary to check their opponents only long enough to enable the full back to punch over their heads. Whenever it is possible for the guards and center to carry their men before them for a few feet, it is generally safe to leave them and go down the field at full speed. It is comparatively easy for the center to do this at the instant that he snaps the ball. Generally, there is too much blocking done and too little following the ball. In this connection, as a help to the rushers, several points must be borne in mind by the full back in kicking. It is not enough for him to kick the ball as hard as he can each time it is sent back for that purpose. That would be a poor performance of his duties. He must kick for his team's advantage always and therefore must regulate the distance and direct his kick with the utmost skill. Even long and puzzling kicks are dangerous unless closely followed up by the rushers, for let a good dodging half back get free with one or two interferers in a broken field of opponents and he will be almost sure of a long run. The full back must take into account the ability of the rushers to get down the field in time to prevent a run or a return kick and punt accordingly. He may find it necessary to elevate the angle of his kick so that it will give his men time to get under it or he may find it best to direct the ball straight ahead in order to give his rushers the shortest distance to run and at the same time be able to advance in the best formation for checking a run. At least he must punt the ball where it shall be difficult for the backs to reach it quickly and so give the rushers the advantage of a longer time to get under it. Especially must he be very careful not to kick the ball diagonally across the field without weighing well the risk involved in comparison with the chances for increased advantage for the risks are unusually large in such a kick. It would be well for the full back to give the rushers a signal as to the direction he meant to kick. This should always be done when he intends to kick off to one side of the field or when he purposes making a high kick or one outside of bound in order to put his men on side by running forward. The rushers would be able to work some splendid team play on such occasions. The question of when to make a fair catch and when to run is well worth the consideration of the backs who are the ones almost always called upon to exercise their judgment on this point. It was formerly judged best in handling a kicked ball to make a fair catch on all occasions. Today there is a division of opinion, some adhering to the old way, while others prefer to run whenever they get a chance. There are two points to be considered in deciding this question. First, whether it is possible to kick a goal from the place where the ball will fall or whether a punch from that point would be desirable. Second, whether it will add much to the risk of not catching the ball if the attempt is made to run. It is clear that when near enough to the opponent's goal to try a place kick, every effort should be made to secure a fair catch. When a goal from the field would be impossible, it is almost invariably best to run with the ball, unless this would add greatly to the danger of muffing it. Catching the ball necessitates a positive loss of ground before again putting it in play, and it is doubtful whether this loss is compensated by the advantage of putting it in play unmolested by opponents and behind the whole team under slight headway. In attempting to run, the player will at the worst be forced to make a down, which would furnish only slightly less advantage than a fair catch, while on the other hand it presents opportunities for gain. End of section 14. Section 15 of a Scientific and Practical Treatise on American Football for Schools and Colleges by Henry L. Williams and Amos Alonzo Stagg. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Section 15. Field Tactics Clever tactics on the football field depend, first of all, on the captain's possessing and accurate knowledge of the strength and weaknesses of his team, both in individual play and in team play. This can all be acquired during practice by carefully noting every play which is made, and giving thought to the strength of the individual men and the value of the play and its relation to the others. Both in regard to the perfection of execution and an intrinsic merit from a strategic point of view. It also depends upon the captain's observing as soon as he enters the field and throughout the game, the incidence of the day, the direction and force of the wind, the position of the sun, and the condition of every part of the field. All these points are of great importance in good generalship. Lastly, it depends upon the study which he makes of the way the opponents arrange themselves on the defense, as well as the style of their play when in possession of the ball. He must also seek to find out by trial which of his plays can be used most effectively. Having the knowledge of the first and second requisites for good generalship, the captain must immediately proceed to find out the weakness and strength of the opponent's defense. Not by trying each play in turn and just noting its success, but by using the best tactics, the occasion demands, and closely observing the result on each play. Every play known to be strong because of the ability to concentrate or mass the players at some part of the line, or for any other reason, should be tried at least two or three times early in the game in order to give it a fair test, that the captain may know which will be his most effective plays. It is a mistake to keep pounding away on two or three plays which give an advance of a few yards just on that account until after other reliable plays have been given a fair trial. In making this trial, the time should be well chosen both as to position on the field and as to the number of the down and the previous loss or gain if it is the second or third down. It often happens that a powerful play is discarded because in one or two trials it did not work well. The difficulty may have been in its imperfect execution, or in a neglect of duty on the part of one man even, or it might result from the inability of one player to do his work because of circumstances or tactics on the part of his opponents which he could not overcome, but which, later on, he would discover a way to meet. By confining the tactics to a few plays which have proved successful for more or less gain, the captain limits his play very decidedly and clearly indicates his policy, thereby giving his opponents a knowledge which is invaluable in thwarting him. The result will be that all the available players upon the opposing team will be called from the appointed positions where they had been placed in order to meet the most varied style of plays and stationed where they can render these particular plays most ineffective. The knowledge that the play will probably be one of a few also gives every player on the defense a certainty of action which will make his opposition very much stronger. The uncertainty which comes from combating a variety of tactics weakens each man's defense considerably and puts him at his wit's end to discover what the play will be and how to meet it. It also makes him more liable to be blocked off and pocketed. Sometimes, to be sure, it is fine strategy to keep pounding away at some particular point or points in the line in order to draw the attention wholly to this place and to draw the men away from other parts of the line in order to weaken it for a sudden attack. But this is quite different from the limited style of play so often used and really, if well done, is a mark of clever generalship. The captain sometimes uses all his plays in succession simply because he has been accustomed to run through them in practice. This is poor tactics. If it has once been clearly proven that a certain play cannot for any reason be made, every clearheaded captain will realize that it is very poor policy to waste downs in the effort. A similar mistake sometimes grows out of giving the signals in practice. If the captain or quarterback in giving the signal is not careful, he will get into the way of unconsciously arranging the plays according to the law of association of ideas. One play following another in unvarying sequence. The principle of sequence in plays would not be fatal and indeed would sometimes be very effective if the plays are well selected. But account should be taken of the physical capacity of the players, the duties which they have just been called on to perform and the right time and place on the field in reference to the sidelines and nearness to the goal. The great advantage to be gained lies in having the sequence come in the form of a series which is perfectly learned so that play after play shall be made in rapid succession. The series, however, should not consist of more than from four to six plays as contingencies often arise which seriously injure their effectiveness. In any case, the series ought to be stopped if for any reason it is unwise to make the next play or if the conditions allow a much better move. A simple signal will indicate that the series is to be stopped. The great virtue in series plays lies in the fact that a certain signal starts the series and each play can be made in the quickest manner because the players all know what is coming next and already the instant the ball is in the center rushers hands. Series plays are especially effective against the team which is slow in lining up. They are very valuable also in their moral effect because of the rapidity and enthusiasm with which the plays are made. Under a varied style of play where many movements are well executed, the opposing team must exercise the greatest head work and caution in its defense. If the other team has not already indicated its policy by clearly defining its plays, everyone on the opposing eleven will be conscious of so much uncertainty as to what the play will be, that his attack through the line is likely to be cautious and therefore not strong, or else it is likely to be sufficiently daring to give the opponents a decided advantage in making their plays. When undue caution is exercised on the defense, its effect often is to make the players hesitating. This, when extending throughout the rush line, is fatal to a strong defensive game. A daring, reckless defense is far more effective than the cautious defense which makes a rush line hesitate because of the moral effect on the other team if for no other reason. And this leads us to consider the moral effect of search and tactics. The three most effective styles of plays when successfully used are a kicking game when there are weak catchers behind the opposing line or when the latter are poorly positioned and plays and dashes through the centre in mass or quick wedge plays. These three plays, in the order named, have the most disheartening effect on the opposing team when the side having the ball has a long, accurate and scientific kicker who is able to place his punch well and also to regulate the height and twist which the ball shall take. Every football player knows the chances for a fatal misplay which hang on a kicked ball. First, because of the difficulty of judging it accurately if it be twisting in certain ways. Second, because of its exceeding susceptibility to currents of error which makes its gyrations and deviations excessively perplexing. Third, because of the nicety of final judgement required, even when the player is well under the ball, since its shape and elasticity make it necessary to allow for its full length and its smallest dimension at the same time, also for a quick rebound from the arm or hands. The catcher must attend to all this in the face of a fierce line of rushers coming down on him at full speed, eager to tackle him or to seize the ball if he muffs or fumbles it. The moral effect of having uncertain catchers behind the line is very telling on the team. If all the hard, wearying work of the rushers and half-backs to advance the ball 40 or 50 yards is to be spoiled over and over by muffed punts, even though the ball is not lost to the other side as it is likely sometimes to be in such cases, there is sure to be a diminution in effort in a short time on the part of the whole team. This comes imperceptibly at first, but comes just as surely, and Air Long evinces itself in the more determined and successful efforts of the other team. Almost equally disheartening, if not fully so, is it to have runs made repeatedly around the ends, because the runs in that locality, if successful, are usually for long gains often resulting in touchdowns, and they arouse the greatest fears in the minds of all the players from a feeling of inability to stop them. The result is that every effort is centred on anticipating these end plays and the rushers instead of going through the line, wait to see if it is an end play, in which case they run out to the side to stop it. That very moment in which there is a hesitancy on the part of the guards and tackles in going through the line is a moment of triumph for the team with the ball, for it immediately gives them a decided advantage in that, while perhaps unable before to make progress through the centre part of the line, they will now have two strong points of attack. The chances now are that the defense will grow weaker and weaker as the game advances, for unless the end runs are well stopped the players will decrease their efforts somewhat and the tackling will become less and less daring and effective. It is hard to say which of these two styles of play really has the more discouraging effect on the opposite team. If the eleven which has the poor catchers back of their forwards are successful in making advance by rushing the ball, they have a vast deal to encourage them, even though now and then they lose it all through the muffing of their backs. The period in which they have the ball is one in which their minds are not conscious of the weakness of their own defense, but are completely taken up with the good work they are doing and they are unanimous and buoyant in it. That period of success does much to keep up their spirits during the time when the other side has the ball and their fears are so all powerful. When a team is able to make frequent runs around the opponent's end, there is perhaps less to actually dishearten them than in the preceding case, for there is less fear of losing the ball. It can be gotten only through a failure to advance the five yards in its three trials, through a fumble, through a penalty imposed by the Empire or through a kick. The latter will be tried probably only under extreme conditions where there has been a loss of yards, while in the kicking game mentioned above, the side not in possession of the ball always has the hope of securing it. That captain is not a good general who follows out the same tactics in each game, who, having perhaps worked out a system of plays which his men could best execute, attempts to apply this system in every game, regardless of the composition of the opposing 11 and their systems of defense and offense. The captain, in truth, has learned a good deal when he has learned what plays his team can best execute, and he has most valuable, though far from complete, information for conducting a wise campaign against the opposing 11. He still has much need to exercise his generalship as to whether this point of attack should be assailed three or fifteen times, this place a few times, and this place not at all, or perhaps only once or twice for the sake of trial or strategy. Oftentimes, the rusher can give invaluable information to the captain as to his own ability to handle his opponent, where, for example, the opponent so places himself constantly as to render it an easy matter to get him out of the way for searching plays, although it is impossible to move him on other plays. This is especially true in handling a large man who stands constantly in the same way, as, for instance, well over to the side of his opponent. It would be comparatively easy to block such a man for opening up a hole in one direction, but almost impossible to shove him in the opposite way. Such information would furnish the captain valuable data on which to base search and tactics, and would inform him that he could doubtless make plays to one side of this man and sell them, if ever, on the other side. It would be foolish, even if it were possible, to lay down a complete system of tactics which should be followed in a game. Indeed, the wonderful part of football is that it is a game which cannot be worked out by rule and learned by note. One play does not follow another in sequence, but only as the captain or commander of the day directs. What makes the game preeminently one requiring science and brains is that to be well played, the captain must use the utmost wisdom and strategy in directing the plays, and the players to a man must do their duty in executing them. Very many points of advantage and disadvantage must constantly be borne in mind, or else the best generalship and results cannot follow. It is far from true to say that the captain must simply take into account the strong and weak points of his opponent's play, together with the incidents of the day and field, such as the direction of the sun and the condition of the grounds in each particular part of the field. He must also have regard for his men, selecting his plays with such wisdom as to secure the greatest economy of physical energy with the greatest result, so that no man nor man shall be overworked at any time of the game and thus be incapacitated. No captain is the good general who does not know the limitations and strength of his ground-gainers and who does not take this into account in directing the play. Men differ greatly in their power to repeat a performance quickly, essentially then, in their powers of endurance. Some men can do effective work only when in first-class condition, that is, when they have had a certain length of time to recover after each effort, they can be relied on for a good gain, if not a brilliant run. Then there is a vast difference in the kind of play as to the drain on a man's strength, and runs, and runs in which a considerable distance is covered, or runs in which there is a good deal of dodging and struggling to get loose from tacklers, are the most taxing on the wind and strength. Most men can stand two or more dashes through the line in quick succession, or two or more massened wedge plays where the runner does not run fast for a long distance before being tackled. But when a run has been made which has called for a vast deal of energy, the captain should not fail to notice it, and in calling the next two or three plays, choose such as do not ask for too much strength from this player. The star runner, as a rule, is the one who suffers most from overwork through injudicious leadership. This does not preclude the fact that there are occasions in the game when some player or players must be forced to draw heavily on a reserve fund of energy in order to secure a permanent advantage or to prevent disaster. It sometimes seems necessary when nearing the opponent's goal that some player be put to his supreme test of strength in order to secure points, and likewise, when it is necessary to carry the ball away from one's own goal. There is only one man who is sure to meet the crisis, but these are in truth critical periods and are exceptions not to be mentioned in this connection. We know that it is sometimes considered clever tactics when there are strong substitute players for certain positions to work men in these positions to their utmost limit of service and then have them get hurt in order to substitute a fresh man or man. If this be shrewd, it is at least not honest tactics. If a team is not capable of playing an uphill game, or is one which is strongly affected by success in repulse, or if the opposing 11 is one which is similarly influenced, the tactic should be those most likely produced the exultation of success on the one hand and the feeling of discouragement on the other. The play should be those which can be executed quickly and which have a certainty of gain with little risk of loss, which combine the efforts of every man in the 11 sufficiently to make him feel that he has an important part in them, which bring the energies of the opposing 11, particularly the rushers, to the severest test, taxing especially the wind in courage. It must always be remembered, as a point in tactics, that the side in possession of the ball has a great advantage, especially if the other side is weak in defensive play, and that it requires a greater outlay and strength and win to check plays than it does to make them. It is likewise true that the courage of a team may be measured by its promptness and determination in defense. If a team repeatedly and continuously comes up to the scrimmage after being outwitted and outplayed, it has the true courage, the courage which would probably enable them to win if possessed of an equal degree of skill in team play. What style of game shall a team play? That depends on many contingencies, setting aside for the time the incidents of the day, such as wind, rain and sunlight, the soft, slippery and rough places in the grounds, the up and down grades, not even taking into account the strength and weakness of the opponents, and the contingencies which arise, let us consider solely the composition of the team, and see if we can deduce any style of play which applies to teams made up of certain types of men. Without defining the makeup of the team, except on general terms, we see that when the rush line is strong and heavy, the chances are that they will be able to handle their opponents and make good openings for the dashes through the line. Plunges through the central part of the line will probably be the most effective if the center guards and tackles are large and strong men. If the backs are slow and heavy also, a center game will probably be the only kind they can play with success, and the result is that this will be the style of game adopted, not perhaps because the captain has analyzed the reasons for the ability of the backs to make advance in that place and their inability to circle the ends, for example, but just because that is the part of the line in which they can make their gains every time. Perhaps it will occur to him that those same backs can be so quickened in starting and running, and then so well guarded, that they will be able now and then to try an end play, or a tackle and end play successfully, and by so doing, strengthen that very center play. The chance for making a successful end play is increased where a center game is being played, because the ends will be likely to draw in somewhat to help the center. When the center men of the line are rather light, if the backs are heavy and slow, the advantage will still be in attacking the openings between the center and guards and between the guards and tackles, for if the backs and ends mass on these places as they can do quickly and powerfully, they can still force a few yards at a time, and now and then break through for considerable gain. When well massed, this can be played even against the strongest centers, all that the rush line will need to do is to hold their men momentarily until the backs get under head way, and the combination of so much weight and power will be sure to make advance when well directed. If it be remembered that the advantage is always with the side which has the ball, and if the players, though checked now and then, go into each play with undaunted courage, advance will surely be made. As the general rule, when a team has light swift runners behind the line, they should lay the emphasis on plays around the end and between the ends and tackles, not that they should confine themselves to those points of attack, but it would be foolish for a team composed of such material not to perfect the plays in these parts of the line, because of the ability of the backs to move quickly to these remote places. Such men, too, are not so well built for the hard, plunging work in the center, and will probably stand less of it and be less effective than have your backs. This, of course, depends in part on the build of the men, but in general it is true. But even if the backs are equally good in plunging into the line, it would be better policy to keep the line spread out, for no runner can make much gain through a close line. Swift drives through the line can be made frequently, and are usually very telling when the line, being spread out, is opened up for these little backs to come darting through. But if the backs and the central part of the rush line are both light, while those of the opponents are heavy, the end style of play must of necessity be depended on, or the opposing rushers will be able to resist the plunges. Furthermore, it will be exceedingly hard to make holes through the line, and in fact, even to hold their opponents long enough for the backs to get up to the line. The question of what shall be the proportion of end plays and plays between the ends and tackle to the plays through the other four openings in the line depends, of course, very largely on the backs. The composition of the rush line as to strengthen skill, especially the center, guards, and tackles, also affects the proportion. On the ordinary college and preparatory school team, the relative effectiveness of an end game to a center game would be much smaller than where the teams are better trained, simply because the risks are larger, for while the defense against well-executed interference would be much weaker, the attack is also much weaker. Every end play and play between the tackles and end is attempted with a much greater risk from actual loss of ground or with a loss of a down with no gain, then are the plays in the center. The reason is that the rushers are given time to break through the line while the runner is moving out to the point of attack, and unless well protected, he will not reach the opening. Further, this movement for a considerable distance is almost entirely sideways before an advance can be made, while in the plays in the central part of the line the rushes are made nearly straightforward except when the rushers take the ball and the runner is scarcely ever failed to reach the line. The times when there is no gain whatever and when there is an actual loss are comparatively few. For the runner, catching the ball at full speed is up to the line in an instant, and then it becomes a question how far he can advance beyond that point. Taking these elements of risk into account it would seem that the proportion of plays at the end to plays through the line should not be larger than one to three, and often times less, even where a team is able to use both styles effectively. The only occasion for a larger use of end plays than this would be when the runner seldom fails to reach the line and is usually good for a gain. In that event, the large element of risk has been taken away and the proportion of use should then depend on the relative amount of gain which the trials have shown can be secured from each with the least expenditure of energy. Right here it might be well to add that it requires more skillful generalship to know when to use an end play than when to make a play through the center. It is only occasionally that the ball is down so close to the sidelines that all four openings in the center are not available on account of running outside the line, while it is frequently the case that the ball is down near enough to the sideline to limit the end play to one side, that is, to two openings. Nor is this enlarged space on one side of the field sufficient compensation for the loss of the two points of attack, but it adds to the science of the game as it requires more varied tactics and maneuvers. It is poor tactics to keep trying end plays when it has been clearly proven that it is not possible to make them and that there is a likelihood of a loss in the trial. If it seems best to try the end for the sake of keeping the opposing line spread out so that the center plays can be made more successfully, the most propitious times should be selected. It should never be on the second or third down because the risk of losing the ball by failure to gain the requisite five yards would be entirely too great. There are times when an end play should not be used at all, or very rarely, on account of the risk involved, as, for example, when the ball is being carried out from under the goal where it has been forced by the opponents, anywhere within the 15 or 20 yard line, it is much better to trust to bringing it slowly out a few yards or feet at a time, sufficient perhaps, to secure only the requisite five yards in three trials. Beyond the 20 yard line and up to the 35 yard an end play should be tried only on the first down or in rare instances on the second down unless the risk of losing ground and subsequently the ball is worth taking. In such cases the possession of a powerful punter behind the line who could place the ball well out of dangerous territory if necessary might be a sufficient reason for attempting a long kick down the field. It does not seem, however, that it is necessary to run any risk of losing the ball if there is good reason for not playing a kicking game for there will be ample chance to try an end play on the first down. Mistakes in generalship are frequently made right along this line in nearly every game which is played, an end run being sometimes tried on the third down when there is less than a yard to gain, better gain the yard or two by the surest ground gaining play and then try an end run on the very next. When inside the opponent's 25 yard line the greatest skill must also be used and the aim should be to get the requisite 5 yards by the most reliable tactics. Plays which risk the loss of ground and the ball should be sparingly used and every caution and strategy be exercised to place the ball across the line nor should there be less prudence because a team has a good drop kicker. The proportion of goals secured from drop kicks is not more than one in every four or five attempts with the best kickers in America and the most certain way to score will be to strain every nerve to place the ball across the line by steadfastly holding the ball and using the drop kick only as a last resource. Every now and then a point is lost unnecessarily when the ball is in the position of a team under its own goal. It is judged not wise to kick. Perhaps the wind is strong in the opposite direction and there is no reliable punter or perhaps it would simply give the opponent a fair catch from which to make a try for goal of kicked. The captain also realizes that if the opponent secured the ball they will force it over. Two downs may already have been used up and ground lost in vain attempts to advance the ball by running. There seems to be no other alternative and so another trial is made but without avail whereupon the ball goes to the other side. Under these circumstances it would be well for the captain to remember that by making a safety touchdown and allowing the opponents to score two he could have brought the ball out to the 25 yard line and prevented a probable six points. The mistake is often made of frequently using end plays when the ground is slippery and soft from rain. Nothing can be more foolish unless the aim is to get the ball on former ground for with insecure footing it is impossible to start quickly, run fast, or turn and dodge quickly. This makes it easy also for the opposing 11 to stop the runner and nearly always with a loss of ground. The same is true in a measure when the ground is soft or very sandy. It is comparatively hard to make end plays even when there are no unfavorable conditions when the ground is firm and level. He is a wise general therefore who notes the field carefully knowing where all the soft and slippery and rough places are as well as where the good ground is and then keeps them in mind throughout the game and makes his moves wisely in reference to them. Few captains take the field sufficiently into account in directing the plays so that the greatest advantage can be secured by avoiding the hindrances as much as possible. Again and again unsuccessful trials to advance have been made in muddy places when, with one well planned move, the ball could have been placed on solid ground with little or no sacrifice and a vast advantage secured. It is usually worth a loss of 2 or 3 yards and oftentimes more to make an end play in order to give a better footing to the backs and the rushers for putting the ball into play for handling it, for making holes and for starting, running and dodging. When the ground is very slippery all plays which cause the runner to move a considerable distance sideways and across the field before turning to advance and all plays requiring a sudden change in direction whether one under strong headway or not are hard to gain ground on and therefore must be used with great judgement. Equally hard to make are the plays in which the tackle and guard and end carry the ball around for a run through one of the openings on the opposite side of the line. There is not, however, the chance for so much loss of ground in these plays, as usually played, that there is in a run out to the end by the half backs because the former run closer to the line and the play is not so quickly perceived. It naturally follows then from what has been said that those plays which send the runner directly forward, those in which the impetus from the start is more forward than sideways, those in which the runner does not have far to run before he strikes the opening and those in which he can get the greatest protection and assistance quickly are the plays to be relied on whether the ground is soft, sandy or slippery. In bringing the ball in from the sidelines the privilege is given of having it down anywhere from 5 to 15 yards from that line. This option of 10 yards should be valuable in determining the tactics to be used next. Too often is it the habit for the captain to shout out bring it in 15, whether the 15 would carry them into a mud hole or whether there was a positive advantage in operating from a nearer point to the sideline by avoiding the usual custom of an end run and sending the runner through on the other side. Generally the 15 yard point is the best place to have the ball down but not always. The 10 yard point has decided advantages in making certain sideline plays because the opponents will reason that the chances are in favor of an end play being attempted and will draw one or two men away to strengthen their defense in that quarter. These they will feel that they can well spare from that side without very apparently weakening the defense because they are protected from long runs by the sideline. The sideline does not enter into the consideration and field tactics as much as it should. As a rule it is considered a misfortune when the ball is down within less than 10 yards of this boundary line because it gives the opponents a good chance to anticipate the play which is likely to be a run around the other end. The free men who are behind the rushers nearest the sideline rarely fail to move over as far as the center rusher. This leaves the defense of that part wholly to the rushers supported by the sidelines and is the best situation possible for making certain plays. Long runs however will not be expected and the captain must be contented to work steadily up the field by short gains. After several dashes into the line of this kind an end run suddenly carried into execution may have considerable chance for success. This suggests the thought that it is possible to use the sideline helpfully when the ball is down very near it and when it is impossible to make plays because of the limitations which must be met in such a situation. At such a time instead of attempting to make a run out towards the end or tackle which will be expected the play should often be straightforward or on the side toward the boundary line until the runner is finally pushed over the line and has the privilege of bringing the ball into a more favorable position from which to operate. Furthermore the position near the sideline can be made more useful in working tricks than a point nearer the center of the field for reasons which are evident. There is no question that kicking the ball has not entered into the tactics of football as largely as its possibilities would warrant. There are many reasons for this. First there is only here and there a team which has a reliable kicker. Punching and drop kicking are practiced for the most part not intelligently and successfully. It is a science with several points of skill to be acquired. Second many teams have an uncertain punter who does not himself know exactly where the ball will go whether far down the field or just over the rush line along the ground or to one side and so place such little confidence in the value of kicking under so great a risk that they will really trust to a run. Even on the third down if the distance which they have to gain is not too great. Third, in all but a few leading colleges when the teams are evenly matched the question of points is largely a question of which side has the ball. The offensive game is much better developed than the defensive game and it is not infrequent for one team to carry the ball from one end of the field to the other without losing it. Under these circumstances the necessity for kicking is seldom felt and they would rather take the risk of not gaining the requisite number of yards than release their right to the ball by an uncertain kick. Fourth, it is a fact that most punters cannot kick accurately if forced to punt quickly. They are therefore compelled to stand so far back of the rush line that the value is increased by several yards or else they run the risk both of a poor punt and of having it stopped by the opposing rushers who break through the line. No better proof of the value of a good punter behind the line is needed than to see a game in which one side is visibly weaker than the other in its power to advance the ball by running but which, possessing a strong punter is able to keep its opponents in check. Frequent punts are doubly effective when the opposite side is without a good kicker or is not accustomed to a kicking game. The worth of an accurate kicker is magnified very much when there is a wind in his favour. Comparatively few games are played without a wind to help or interfere according as it is favourable to one side or the other. When the wind is in the favour of one side, they should be able to use it to the greatest advantage. The captain should be alive to its value and make it a powerful factor in his tactics. It would then be a question whether it would not be wise to kick the ball just as soon as it was secured, provided of course it was not so near the opponent's goal that it would be wiser to hold the ball and attempt to rush it over. Certain it is that a side should never fail to kick on the third down except on account of the liability of kicking the ball over the goal line when inside of the 25-yard line or because so close to the goal line that it is worth taking the risk of losing the ball and making a supreme effort to get it over. When there is danger of the ball being kicked across the goal line a clever punter will usually aim to kick the ball across the side line into the touch as near the goal line as possible. This is intentional and is quite different from the juvenile efforts which do not take the wind or position into account when punting from near the side line and send the ball outside only a few yards away. It is sometimes good tactics on the third down when there is considerable doubt whether the required advance can be made to have the full back kick the ball across the side line with no intent perhaps of a gaining ground while giving the opposing team technically an equal chance. It is wholly with the purpose of having the end rusher secure the ball which will be upon the first down. The kick must be well placed of course and must not be so much forward that there will be great risk of the opponent securing the ball and also not so far ahead that the full back cannot put his man on side easily. The end man on that side must also know of the full back's intention and place himself well over toward the side line. Such a kick cannot be attempted safely when the full back is not able to place his punts with great accuracy. The occasions when the use of such tactics would be wise might be when the side and possession of the ball was able to make good advances by running but had lost ground perhaps through a misplay or when they had the ball inside their opponent's 25 yard line and were not in a good position to try a drop kick or when the risk of making the required gain by running would be too great. Right here would come in the question of a drop kick on the third down when inside the 25 yard line and in fair position to make the trial. It is safe to say that in general on the third down this should be the play called for. It is for the captain to decide whether the trial is worth the making, whether the nearness and angle to the goal, and the quickness and skill of the kicker warrant a drop kick and preference of making a further advance by running. If a run is attempted without gain the ball will be down where it is for the other side. When the kick is made on the other hand there will be a possibility of having the ball stopped by the opposing rushers and a run made up the field or if the goal is missed the opposing team will be allowed to bring the ball out to the 25 yard line. The captain must weigh all these possibilities before making his decision. The great advantage in the wind does not consist alone in the increased distance the ball can be propelled but also in the increased likelihood that someone upon the side which kicked will again secure the ball on a muff or fumble. The wind has added to the problem of the player who attempts to catch the ball these points of difficulty. Greater distance covered by the ball in increased speed and probability that the ball will suddenly veer to one side or the other from the line of direction. The increased advantage of a favoring wind is indirect proportion to the strength of the wind. If the wind is very strong the side which does not have its assistance is severely handicapped and for the time is not able to do any effective kicking. Even with the best punters it is impossible to drive the ball far in the face of a strong wind and then the kick must be low or the wind is likely to blow its back near the spot from which it was kicked. On the other hand, when kicking for distance with the wind it is usually better to kick the ball high in order that the wind may affect it more powerfully during the larger interval of time and rising and falling. There is also an economic reason for kicking the ball whenever it can be wisely done. It is a good way to rest the backs in order to save them for the supreme effort of carrying the ball across the line for, if the ball has been carried for a considerable distance, they will be likely to be somewhat fatigued as they approach the goal line and they will be weakest where and when the opposing side always puts in their most determined and desperate resistance. It is a severe test of a team's courage to bear up against a kicking game in the face of a strong wind for, even if they are able to make good gains in return by running, the players are constantly fearing a slip or fumble which will give the ball back to the other side only to have it returned with all the chances of a misplay, if not a gain in ground. The effect of the wind also is to make the side against it think they are reaching very much harder than their opponents just to hold their own. There is no question as to the value of having every member of the team able to run with the ball when it is possible and wise. The more varied the style of play, provided it is strong or is likely to be successful because on looked for, the more powerful would be the plan of attack and the less effective the defense. This is true for two reasons. First, it keeps the opposing team constantly guessing as to what the play will be and enables the side with the ball to secure advantages through the variety of its play. Second, it distributes the labour and secures the advantage of fresh strength, while it rests the main ground gainers. For these reasons then, it is well worth the while to run the guards, tackles and ends. Although these are not in the most advantageous positions for gaining ground, as are the half backs and full back. The most valuable of the three rush line positions for ground gaining is the tackle. Because from that position, the runner can get under sufficient speed to carry him forward against opposition, and he can also secure the most protection and help. The run also can be made in the quickest time and without being immediately noticed. When the end plays behind the line and near the tackle, comes next in value of the line positions for running with the ball because of the large number of interferers ahead. If rightly played by a fast runner, the end will be able to make good advances between the tackle and the end, and even around the end on the other side. The guard is in the hardest rush line position for advancing the ball, because it is impossible for him to get under speed when making a quick turn around the quarterback. And on the other hand, he cannot afford to run out to the end because he would be sure to be tackled whether he ran close to the line with little interference or ran farther back with better interference, but with greater risk of lost ground. End of section 15