 Question 128 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of fortitude. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of fortitude. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 128 of The Parts of Fortitude We must now consider the parts of fortitude. First, we shall consider what are the parts of fortitude. And secondly, we shall treat of each part. The article. Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned. Objection 1. It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned. For Tali, in On the Art of Rhetoric II, assigns four parts to fortitude. Namely, magnificence, confidence, patience and perseverance. Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality, since both are concerned about money, and a magnificent man must needs be liberal, as the philosopher observes in Ethics 4.2. But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above in Question 117, Article 5. Therefore, magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. Objection 2. Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore, confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. Objection 3. Further, fortitude makes a man behave a right in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore, they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude. Objection 4. Further, according to Tali, in On the Art of Rhetoric II, patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude. Therefore, patience is the same as fortitude, and not a part thereof. Objection 5. Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required in every virtue, for it is written in Matthew 24-13. He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved. Therefore, perseverance should not be accounted a part of fortitude. Objection 6. Further, Macrobius reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability. Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence. Therefore, it seems that Tali's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete. Objection 7. Further, Aristotle in Ethics III reckons five parts of fortitude. The first is civic fortitude, which produces brave deeds through fear of dishonor or punishment. The second is military fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of war-like art or experience. The third is the fortitude, which produces brave deeds resulting from passion, especially anger. The fourth is the fortitude, which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome. The fifth is the fortitude, which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore, these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting. I answer that, as stated above in Question 48. A virtue can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter. However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it. Integral parts, with regard to those things, the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude. And potential parts, because what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor hardships, and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principle virtue. As stated above in Question 123, Articles 3 and 6, the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. In this respect, Tully mentions confidence, of which he says in the art of rhetoric 2 that, with this, the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings. The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect, Tully mentions magnificence, which he describes as being the discussion and administration, that is, accomplishment of great and lofty undertakings with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind, so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly, if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them there can be no fortitude, whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed there too as secondary virtues to principle. Thus, magnificence is referred by the philosopher in Ethics 4 to great expenses, and magnanimity, which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, notably endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow and fall away from its greatness by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this respect, he mentions patience, which he describes as the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit. The other is that, by the prolonged suffering of hardships, man be not worried so as to lose courage, according to Hebrews 12-3, that you not be worried fainting in your minds. In this respect, he mentions perseverance, which accordingly he describes as the fixed and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose. If these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof. But if they be referred to any kind of hardship, they will be virtues distinct from fortitude, yet annexed there too as secondary to principle. Reply to Objection 1. Magnificence, in the matter of liberality, adds a certain greatness. This is connected with the notion of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude. And to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs. Reply to Objection 2. Hope, whereby one confides in God, is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above, in Question 17, Article 5, and in the Paris Prima Secundae, Question 62, Article 3. But by confidence, which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hoops in himself, yet under God with all. Reply to Objection 3. To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore, although magnificence and confidence are referred to, the accomplishment of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger. Reply to Objection 4. Patience injures not only dangers of death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. In this respect, it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude. But as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part thereof. Reply to Objection 5. Perseverance, as denoting persistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the article. Reply to Objection 6. Macrobius reckons the fore, a foresaid mentioned by Tully, namely confidence, magnificence, forbearance, which he puts in the place of patience, and firmness, which he substitutes for perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely magnanimity and security, are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration, because confidence denotes a man's hope for great things, and hope for anything presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above in the Pars Prima Secundae, Article 2, that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for. A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of hope, while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope as stated above in the Pars Prima Secundae, Question 40, Article 4, first reply. Hence Macrobius adds security which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind, for this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles. Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions perseverance and magnificence, and with Macrobius magnanimity. Strength of will is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be endured. That is, good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as strength of soul and the accomplishment of its purpose. Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says that manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue. Besides magnificence he mentions andragathia, that is manly goodness which we may render strenuousness. For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to andragathia, strenuousness, wherefore he says that andragathia is the virtue of a man whereby he thinks out profitable works. Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four presentable parts mentioned by Tully. Reply to Objection 7. The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, they differ as demotive as stated above in Question 123 Article 1, Second Reply. Wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude. End of Question 128. Read by Michael Shane Greg Lambert, LC. Question 129 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triities on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of fortitude. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triities on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of fortitude. By St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 129 of Magnanimity in 8 Articles. Translators Note Magnanimity is not used in the ordinary restricted sense but as explained by the author. We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including however the other parts under those mentioned by Tully with the exception of confidence for which we shall substitute magnanimity of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider 1. Magnanimity 2. Magnificence 3. Patience 4. Perseverance As regards the first we shall treat of 1. Magnanimity 2. Of its contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry. First, whether magnanimity is about honors. Second, whether magnanimity is only about great honors. Third, whether it is a virtue. Fourth, whether it is a special virtue. Fifth, whether it is a part of fortitude. Sixth, of its relation to confidence. Seventh, of its relation to assurance. Eighth, of its relation to goods of fortune. First article. Whether magnanimity is about honors. Objection one. It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty as its very name shows since magnanimity signifies greatness of mind. And mind denotes the irascible part as appears from De Anima 342 where the philosopher says that in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind. That is the concupisable and irascible parts. But honor is a concupisable good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity is not about honors. Objection two further. Since magnanimity is a moral virtue it must needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations for then it would be a part of justice whence it follows that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors. Objection three further. The nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance. For a man is said to be magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors. On the contrary the philosopher says in Ethics 4.3 that magnanimity is about honor and dishonor. I answer that magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two things. First to the matter about which is the field of its activity. Secondly to its proper act which consists in the right use of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways in one way proportionately in another absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately even if it consists in the use of some small or ordinary thing if for instance one make a very good use of it. But an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing. The things which come into man's use are external things and among these honor is the greatest simply both because it is the most akin to virtue since it is an attestation to a person's virtue as stated above in question 103 articles 1 and 2 and because it is offered to God and to the best and again because in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and simply just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about honors. Reply to Objection 1 Good and evil absolutely considered regard the concupisable faculty but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added they belong to the irrational. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor in as much to it as honor has the aspect of something great or difficult. Reply to Objection 2 Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation yet it is the object of a passion namely hope which tends to a difficult good where for magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope and immediately about honor as the object of hope. Even so we have stated in question 123 articles 4 and 5 with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring. Reply to Objection 3 Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them nor have too great a desire for them. If however one were to despise honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor this would be deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man. Second article Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors Objection 1 It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors for the proper matter of magnanimity is honor as stated above in article 1 but great and little are accidental to honor therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors Objection 2 Further just as magnanimity is about honor so is meekness about anger but it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or little anger therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honor Objection 3 Further small honor is less aloof from great honor than is dishonor but magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor and consequently in relation to small honors also therefore it is not only about great honors On the contrary the philosopher says in Ethics 2.7 that magnanimity is about great honors I answer that according to the philosopher in Physics 7, 17 and 18 virtue is a perfection and by this we are to understand the perfection of a power and that it regards the extreme limit of that power as stated in On the Heavens 1.116 Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power but in such operations as are great or difficult for every power however imperfect can extend to ordinary and trifling operations hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good as stated in Ethics 2.3 Now the difficult and the good which amount to the same in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view first from the point of view of reason insofar as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular matter and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues and also of justice The other difficulty is on the part of the matter which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason which moderation has to be applied there too and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues which are about the passions because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states in On the Divine Names 4.4 Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves and in others from the things that are the objects of the passions The passions themselves have no great power of resistance unless they be violent because the sensitive appetite which is the seat of the passions is naturally subject to reason Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only that which is great in such passions Thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring Temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures and likewise meekness about the greatest anger On the other hand some passions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those passions such are the love or desire of money or of honour and for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in those passions but also about that which is ordinary or little because things external though they be little are very desirable as being necessary for human life Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues one about ordinary or little sums of money namely liberality and another about large sums of money namely magnificence in like manner there are two virtues about honours one about ordinary honours this virtue has no name but is denominated by its extremes which are philotemia that is love of honour and afilotemia that is without love of honour for sometimes a man is commended for loving honour and sometimes for not caring about it and so far to wit as both these things may be done in moderation but with regard to great honours there is magnanimity where for we must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is great honour and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honour reply to objection one great and little are accidental to honour considered in itself but they make a great difference in their relation to reason the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honour for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honours reply to objection two in anger and other matters that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty and about this alone is there any need of a virtue it is different with riches and honours which are things existing outside the soul reply to objection three he that makes good use of great things is much more able to make good use of little things accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honours as a thing of which he is worthy or even little honours as something he deserves because to wit man cannot sufficiently honour virtue which deserves to be honoured by God hence he is not uplifted by great honours because he does not deem them above him rather does he despise them and much more such as are ordinary or little in like manner he is not cast down by dishonour but despises it since he recognises that he does not deserve it third article whether magnanimity is a virtue objection one it seems that magnanimity is not a virtue for every moral virtue observes the mean but magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater extreme because the magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the greatest things according to ethics four-three therefore magnanimity is not a virtue objection two further he that has one virtue has them all as stated above in the parse-prima secunde question sixty-five article one but one may have a virtue without having magnanimity since the philosopher says in ethics four-three that whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate but he is not magnanimous therefore magnanimity is not a virtue objection three further virtue is a good quality of the mind as stated above in the parse-prima secunde question fifty-five article four but magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the body for the philosopher says in ethics four-three of a magnanimous man that his gate is slow his voice deep and his utterance calm therefore magnanimity is not a virtue objection four further no virtue is opposed to another virtue but magnanimity is opposed to humility since the magnanimous deems himself worthy of great things and despises others according to ethics four-three therefore magnanimity is not a virtue objection five further the properties of every virtue are praise worthy but magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame for in the first place the magnanimous is unmindful of favors secondly he is remiss and slow of action thirdly he employs irony towards many fourthly he is unable to associate with others fifthly because he holds to the barren things rather than to those that are fruitful therefore magnanimity is not a virtue on the contrary it is written in praise of certain men in second Maccabees fifteen eighteen Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas companions and the greatness of courage anime magnitudinem with which they fought for their country was afraid to try the matter by the sword now only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise therefore magnanimity which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue I answer that the essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs for this is man's proper good now among external human things honors take precedence of all others as stated above in article one therefore magnanimity which observes the motive reason in great honors is a virtue reply to objection one as the philosopher again says in ethics four three the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes insofar as he tends to what is greatest but in the matter of becomingness he follows the mean because he tends to the greatest things according to reason for he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth as is stated in ethics four three since his aims do not surpass his desserts reply to objection two the mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to their acts as though everyone were competent to practice the acts of all the virtues where for the act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man but only to great men on the other hand as regards the principles of virtue namely prudence and grace all virtues are connected together since their habits reside together in the soul either in act or by way of approximate disposition there too thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent to have the habit of magnanimity whereby he is disposed to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his state reply to objection three the movements of the body are differentiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul and so it happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements for quickness of movement results from a man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things these are few and require great attention wherefore they call for slow movement likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about anything and this becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about great things and just as these dispositions of bodily movements are competent to magnanimous man according to the mode of his emotions so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found naturally reply to objection four there is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of God and something defective which accrues to him through the weakness of nature accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue and the same is to be said of the use of any other good such as science or external fortune on the other hand humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency and magnanimity makes him despise others insofar as they fall away from God's gifts since he does not think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their sake yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than ourselves insofar as we see some of God's gifts in them hence it is written of the just man in Psalm 14 verse 4 in his sight a vile person is contempt which indicates the contempt of magnanimity but he honoreth them that fear the Lord which points to the reverential bearing of humility it is therefore evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another although they seem to tend in contrary directions because they proceed according to different considerations reply to objection 5 these properties insofar as they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame but for a very great praise for in the first place when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has received favors this points to the fact that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repaid them with yet greater favor this belongs to the perfection of gratitude in the act of which he wishes to excel even as in the acts of other virtues again in the second place it is said that he is remiss and slow of action not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of work but only with great works such are becoming to him he is also said in third place to employ irony not as opposed to truth and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not true or deny of himself great things that are true but because he does not disclose all his greatness especially to the large number of those who are beneath him since as also the philosopher says in ethics 4-3 it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence and unassuming towards the middle class in the fourth place it is said that he cannot associate with others this means that he is not at home with others than his friends because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy which belong to littleness of mind but he associates with all both great and little according as he ought as stated above in the first reply it is also said fifthly that he prefers to have barren things not indeed any but good that is virtuous for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful as being greater since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity fourth article whether magnanimity is a special virtue objection one it seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue for no special virtue is operative in every virtue but the philosopher states in ethics 4-3 that whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue objection two further the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any special virtue but the acts of different virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man for it is stated in ethics 4-3 that it belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof which is an act of prudence nor to act unjustly which is an act of justice that he is ready to do favors which is an act of charity that he gives his services readily which is an act of liberality that he is truthful which is an act of truthfulness and that he is not given to complaining which is an act of patience therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue objection three further every virtue is a special ornament of the soul according to the saying of Isaiah 61-10 he hath clothed me with the garments of salvation and afterwards he adds and as a bride adorned with her jewels but magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues as stated in ethics 4 therefore magnanimity is a general virtue on the contrary the philosopher in ethics 2-7 distinguishes it from the other virtues I answer that as stated above in question 123 article 2 it belongs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter namely honors as stated above in articles 1 and 2 and honor considered in itself is a special good and accordingly magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue since however honor is the reward of every virtue as stated above in question 103 article 1 second reply it follows that by reason of its matter it regards all the virtues reply to objection 1 magnanimity is not about any kind of honor but great honor now as honor is due to virtue so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue in so far to wit as he tends to what is worthy of great honors reply to objection 2 since the magnanimous tends to great things it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence and shuns those that imply defect now it savors of excellence that a man is beneficent generous and grateful wherefore he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind but not as acts of the other virtues on the other hand it is a proof of defect that a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils that for their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever again all concealment of the truth indicates a defect since it seems to be the outcome of fear also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect because by doing so the mind seems to give way to external evils wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect in as much as they are contrary to his excellence or greatness reply to objection 3 every virtue derives from its species a certain luster or adornment which is property each virtue but further adornment results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed through magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in ethics 4.3 fifth article whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude objection 1 it seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude for a thing is not a part of itself but magnanimity appears to be the same as fortitude for Seneca says if magnanimity which is also called fortitude be in thy soul thou shalt live in great assurance and Tali says if a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous truth loving and far removed from deception therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude objection 2 further philosopher in ethics 4.3 says that a magnanimous man is not Philokindinos that is a lover of danger but it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof objection 3 further magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or dared but good is of more import than evil therefore magnanimity is a more important virtue than fortitude therefore it is not a part thereof on the contrary Macrobius and Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude I answer that as stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde question 61 article 3 a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a principal matter now one of the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind because a firm standing is necessary in every virtue according to ethics 2 and this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult in which it is most difficult to preserve firmness where for the more difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death wherein fortitude confirms the mind than in hoping for or obtaining the greatest goods wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity for as a man loves his life above all things so does he fly from dangers of death more than of any others accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter but it falls short thereof in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude because it is annexed there too as secondary to principal reply to objection 1 as the philosopher says in ethics 5 1 and 3 to lack evil is looked upon as a good where for not to be overcome by a grievous evil such as the danger of death is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good the former belonging to fortitude and the latter to magnanimity in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be considered as identical since however there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid it follows that properly speaking magnanimity according to the philosopher in ethics 2 7 is a distinct virtue from fortitude reply to objection 2 a man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers which seems to be the mark of one who thinks many the same as great this is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great but for things that are truly great a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to danger since he does something great in the act of fortitude even as in the acts of the other virtues hence the philosopher says in ethics 2 7 that the magnanimous man is not micro kindinos that is endangering himself for small things but megalokindinos that is endangering himself for great things and Seneca says thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man nor fearst them like a coward for nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life reply to objection 3 evil as such is to be avoided and that one has to withstand it is accidental insofar to wit as one has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good but a good as such is to be desired and that one avoids it is only accidental insofar to wit as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires it now that which is so essentially is always of more account than that which is so accidentally where for the difficult in evil things is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity for though good is simply of more import than evil evil is of more import in this particular respect 6th article whether confidence belongs to magnanimity objection 1 it seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity for a man may have assurance not only in himself but also in another according to 2 Corinthians 3 verses 4 and 5 such confidence we have through Christ towards God not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves but this seems inconsistent with the idea of magnanimity therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity objection 2 further confidence seems to be opposed to fear according to Isaiah 12 2 I will deal confidently and will not fear but to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity objection 3 further reward is not due except a virtue but a reward is due to confidence according to Hebrews 3 6 where it is said that we are the house of Christ if we hold fast to the confidence and glory of hope unto the end therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with magnanimity on the contrary Tully seems to substitute confidence for magnanimity as stated above in the preceding question in the sixth reply and in the prologue to this I answer that confidence takes its name from Fides faith and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody but confidence belongs to hope according to Job 11 18 thou shalt have confidence hope being set before thee where for confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who promises to help him since however faith signifies also a strong opinion and since one may come to have a strong opinion about something not only on account of another statement but also on account of something we observe and another it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something which hope we conceive through observing something either in oneself for instance through observing that he is healthy a man is confident that he will live long or in another for instance through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful a man is confident that he will receive help from him now it has been stated above in article one second reply that magnanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult where for since confidence denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity reply to objection one as the philosopher says in ethics 4 3 it belongs to the magnanimous to need nothing for need is a mark of the deficient but this is to be understood according to the mode of a man hence he adds or scarcely anything for it surpasses man to need nothing at all for every man needs first the divine assistance secondly even human assistance since man is naturally a social animal for he is not sufficient by himself to provide for his own life accordingly in so far as he needs others it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of service to him and in so far as his own ability goes it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself reply to objection two as stated above in the paris prima secunde question 23 article 2 as well as in question 40 article 4 when we were treating of the passions hope is directly opposed to despair because the latter is about the same object namely good but as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear because the latter's object is evil now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope where for it is opposed to fear even as hope is since however fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of evil and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of a good it follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude yet because hope causes daring which belongs to fortitude it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude reply to objection three confidence as stated above denotes a certain mode of hope for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion now the mode applied to any affection may call for commendation of the act so that it becomes meritorious yet it is not this that draws it to a species of virtue but its matter hence properly speaking confidence cannot denote a virtue though it may denote the conditions of a virtue for this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude not as an annexed virtue except as identified with magnanimity by Tully but as an integral part as stated in the preceding question seventh article whether security belongs to magnanimity objection one it seems that security does not belong to magnanimity for security as stated above in question 128 sixth reply denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear but fortitude does this most effectively where for security is seemingly the same as fortitude but fortitude does not belong to magnanimity rather the reverse is the case neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity objection two further Isidore says in his etymologies 10 that a man is said to be secure because he is without care but this seems to be contrary to virtue which has a care for honorable things according to 2 Timothy 2 15 carefully studied to present thyself approved unto God therefore security does not belong to magnanimity which does great things in all the virtues objection three further virtue is not its own reward but security is accounted the reward of virtue according to Job 11 verses 14 and 18 if thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand being buried thou shalt sleep secure therefore security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue as a part thereof on the contrary Tully says under the heading magnanimity consists of two things that it belongs to magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind nor to a man nor to fortune but a man security consists in this therefore security belongs to magnanimity I answer that as the philosopher says in rhetoric 2 5 fear makes a man take counsel because to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears now security takes its name from the removal of this care of which fear is the cause where for security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear just as confidence denotes strength of hope now as hope directly belongs to magnanimity so fear directly regards fortitude where for as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity so security belongs immediately to fortitude it must be observed however that as hope is the cause of daring so is fear the cause of despair as stated above when we were treating of the passion question 45 article 2 where for as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude insofar as it makes use of daring so security belongs indirectly to magnanimity insofar as it banishes despair reply to objection 1 fortitude is chiefly commended not because it banishes fear which belongs to security but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the passion where for security is not the same as fortitude but is a condition thereof reply to objection 2 not all security is worthy of praise only when one puts care aside as one ought and in things when one should not fear in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity reply to objection 3 there is in the virtues a certain likeness to and participation of future happiness as stated above in the paris primas akundi question 5 articles 3 and 7 hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of virtue although perfect security belongs to virtues reward 8 article whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity objection 1 it seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity for according to Seneca in on anger 1 virtue suffices for itself now magnanimity makes every virtue great as stated above in article 4 3 reply therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity objection 2 further no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him but the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune 4 tally says under the heading magnanimity consists of two things that a great soul is commended for despising external things therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune objection 3 further tally adds that it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome has no wise to depart from his natural estate or from the dignity of a wise man and Aristotle says in ethics 4 3 that a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune for everyone grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics 4 3 that good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity I answer that as stated above in article 1 magnanimity regards two things honour as its matter and the accomplishment of something great as its end now goods of fortune conduce to both these things for since honour is conferred on the virtuous not only by the wise but also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem the result is that they show great honour to those who possess goods of fortune likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity reply to objection 1 virtue is said to be sufficient for itself because it can be without even these external goods yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously reply to objection 2 the magnanimous man despises external goods in as much as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake yet he does not despise them but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds reply to objection 3 if a man does not think much of a thing he is neither very joyful at obtaining it nor very grieved at losing it therefore since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods that is goods of fortune he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them nor much cast down by their loss End of question 129 Read by Michael Shane Greg Lambert, LC Question 130 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Treaties on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Treaties on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 130 of presumption in two articles We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity and in the first place those that are opposed there too by excess These are three, namely presumption, ambition, and venglory Secondly, we shall consider pusil animity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency Under the first head there are two points of inquiry First, whether presumption is a sin Second, whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess First article Whether presumption is a sin Objection one It seems that presumption is not a sin For the apostle says For getting the things that are behind I stretch forth myself to those that are before But it seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself Therefore presumption is not a sin Objection two further The philosopher says in Ethics 1.7 We should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we are men or mortal things because we are mortal but we should relish those that make us immortal And in metaphysics one he says that man should pursue divine things as far as possible Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far above man Since then presumption consists essentially intending to what is above oneself It seems that presumption is something praiseworthy rather than a sin Objection three further The apostle says in 2 Corinthians 3.5 Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves If then presumption by which one strives at that for which one is not sufficient be as in it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of anything good which is absurd Therefore presumption is not a sin On the contrary It is written in Ecclesiasticus 37.3 O wicked presumption whence cameest thou And a gloss answers From a creature's evil will Now all that comes of the root of an evil will is a sin Therefore presumption is a sin I answer that Since whatever is according to nature is ordered by the divine reason which human reason ought to imitate Whatever is done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful Now it is established throughout all natural things that every action is commensurate with the power of the agent nor does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability Hence it is vicious and sinful as being contrary to the natural order that any one should assume to do what is above his power and this is what is meant by presumption as its very name shows Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a sin Reply to Objection 1 A thing may be above the active power of a natural thing and yet not above the passive power of that same thing Thus the error is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire which surpass the active power of air Thus too it would be sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect virtue But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to advance towards a perfect virtue In this way the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things that were before him namely continually advancing forward Reply to Objection 2 Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the order of nature Yet man is possessed of a natural power namely the intellect whereby he can be united to immortal and divine things In this respect the philosopher says that man ought to pursue immortal and divine things not that he should do what it becomes God to do but that he should be united to him in intellect and will Reply to Objection 3 As the philosopher says in Ethics 3 What we can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense Hence since we can think and do good by the help of God this is not altogether above our ability Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed But it would be presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in God's assistance Second Article Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess Objection 1 It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by excess For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost as stated above in Question 14 Article 2 and in Question 21 Article 1 But the sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity Objection 2 Further it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself worthy of great things But a man is said to be presumptuous even if he deem himself worthy of small things if they surpass his ability Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity Objection 3 further The magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little things Now according to the philosopher in Ethics 4-3 On account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others because they deem external goods as something great Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity not by excess but only by deficiency On the contrary the philosopher says in Ethics 2-7 and 4-3 that the vain man, that is a vaporer or windbag which with us denotes a presumptuous man is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess I answer that as stated above in Question 129 Article 3 Magnanimity observes the means not as regards the quantity of that to which it tends but in proportion to our own ability for it does not tend to anything greater than is becoming to us Now the presumptuous man as regards that to which he tends does not exceed the magnanimous but sometimes falls short of him but he does exceed in proportion to his own ability whereas the magnanimous man does not exceed his It is in this way that presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess Reply to Objection 1 It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost but that by which one condemns the divine justice through inordinate confidence in the divine mercy the latter kind of presumption by reason of its matter inasmuch to wit as it implies contempt of something divine is opposed to charity or rather to the gift of fear whereby we revere God Nevertheless, insofar as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability it can be opposed to magnanimity Reply to Objection 2 presumption like magnanimity seems to tend to something great for we are not as a rule want to call a man presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small If however such a man be called presumptuous this kind of presumption is not opposed to magnanimity but to that virtue which is about ordinary honour as stated above in Question 129 Article 2 Reply to Objection 3 No one attempts what is above his ability except insofar as he deems his ability greater than it is and this one may err in two ways First, only as regards quantity as when a man thinks he has greater virtue or knowledge or the like than he has Secondly, as regards the kind of thing as when he thinks himself great and worthy of great things by reason of something that does not make him so for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune For as the philosopher says in Ethics 4-3 those who have these things without virtue neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things nor are rightly called magnanimous Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his ability is sometimes in very truth something great simply as in the case of Peter whose intent was to suffer for Christ which has exceeded his power Well sometimes it is something great not simply but only in the opinion of fools such as wearing costly clothes despising and wronging others this savers of an excess of magnanimity not in any truth but in people's opinion hence Seneca says that when magnanimity exceeds its measure it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty, restless and bent on excelling in all things whether in words or in deeds without any considerations of virtue Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality although in appearance he surpasses him End of question 130 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert L.C. Question 131 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 131 of Ambition in two articles We must now consider Ambition and under this head there are two points of inquiry First, whether it is a sin Second, whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess First article Whether Ambition is a sin Objection 1 It would seem that Ambition is not a sin for Ambition denotes the desire of honor Now honor is in itself a good thing and the greatest of external goods where for those who care not for honor are approved Therefore Ambition is not a sin Rather it is something deserving of praise insofar as a good is laudably desired Objection 2 further Anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him as a reward Now honor is the reward of virtue as the philosopher states in Ethics 1, 12, 4, 3 and 8, 14 Therefore Ambition of honor is not a sin Objection 3 further That which heartens a man to do good and disheartens him from doing evil is not a sin Now honor heartens men to do good and to avoid evil Thus the philosopher says in Ethics 3, 8 that with the bravest men cowards are held in dishonor and the brave in honor and Tully says that honor fosters the arts Therefore Ambition is not a sin On the contrary, it is written in 1 Corinthians 13.5 that charity is not ambitious Seeketh not her own Now nothing is contrary to charity except sin Therefore Ambition is a sin I answer that as stated above in question 103 articles 1 and 2 Honor denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence Now two things have to be considered with regard to a man's honor The first is that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels for this is as it were something divine in him Therefore on this count honor is due principally not to him but to God The second point that calls for observation is that the thing in which man excels is given to him by God that he may profit others thereby Wherefore a man ought so far to be pleased that others bear witness to his excellence and this enables him to profit others Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways First, when a man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not this is to desire more than his share of honor Secondly, when a man desires honor for himself without referring it to God Thirdly, when a man's appetite rests in honor itself without referring it to the profit of others Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor it is evident that it is always a sin Reply to Objection 1 The desire for good should be regulated according to reason and if it exceeds this rule it will be sinful In this way it is sinful to desire honor in disagree with the order of reason Now those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reasons dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor Reply to Objection 2 Honor is not the reward of virtue as regards the virtuous man in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward since the reward he seeks is happiness which is the end of virtue But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others who have nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous which honor derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to virtue Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward as stated in Ethics 4.3 Reply to Objection 3 Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened from doing evil by the desire of honor if this be desired in due measure So if it be desired inordinately it may become to man an occasion of doing many evil things when a man cares not by what means he obtains honor Wherefore Salest says that the good as well as the wicked covet honors for themselves but the one that is the good go about it in the right way whereas the other that is the wicked through lack of the good arts make use of deceit and falsehood Yet they who merely for the sake of honor either do good or avoid evil are not virtuous according to the philosopher in Ethics 3.8 where he says that they who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave Second article whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess Objection 1 it seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by excess for one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the other side now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above in question 130 article 2 therefore ambition is not opposed to it by excess Objection 2 further Magnanimity is about honors whereas ambition seems to regard positions of dignity for it is written in 2 Maccabees 4.7 that Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity Objection 3 further Ambition seems to regard outward show for it is written in Acts 25.27 that Agrippa and Baranis with great pomp Ambitione had entered into the hall of audience and in 2 Chronicles 16.14 that when Asa died they burned spices and ointments over his body with very great pomp Ambitione but magnanimity is not about outward show therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity on the contrary Tully says that the more a man exceeds in magnanimity the more he desires himself alone to dominate others but this pertains to ambition therefore ambition denotes an excess of magnanimity I answer that as stated above in article 1 Ambition signifies inordinate love of honor now magnanimity is about honors and makes use of them in a becoming manner therefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered reply to Objection 1 Magnanimity regards two things it regards one as its end so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man attempts in proportion to his ability in this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess because the presumptuous man attempts great deeds beyond his ability the other thing that magnanimity regards is its matter notably honor of which it makes right use and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects reply to Objection 2 honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity on account of a certain excellence of their estate and accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition for if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity not for the sake of honor but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding his ability he would not be ambitious but presumptuous reply to Objection 3 the very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of honor where for in such cases honor is want to be shown is signified by the words of James 2 verses 2 and 3 if there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring in fine apparel and you shall say to him sit thou here well etc where for ambition does not regard outward worship except insofar as this is a kind of honor End of question 131 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC