 Thank you very much everyone for coming. I'm Michael Green from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. On March 11th, I'm sure everyone in this room watched the television with absolute horror as the earthquake tsunami and then nuclear disaster hit Tohoku. I lived for a time in Iwate and had been to the coast to many of the places that were hardest hit when the tsunami came through. I think for everyone who knew Japan and many who didn't, it showed some of the real strengths of Japanese society. People talk about Japanese youth of this generation being lost and yet tens of thousands of people left their jobs in homes and went north to help with the recovery. There have been obituaries written for the U.S.-Japan Alliance and yet through Operation Tomodachi, the U.S. and Japan engaged in unprecedented levels of complex operations to rescue people and save lives. The outpouring of private assistance from the United States, but not just the United States around the world, Korea raised more money in the month after 311 through the Korean Red Cross than ever before in its history. It was just a remarkable demonstration of how much people care about Japan, not only because of respect for the Japanese people and Japan's role in the world, but because Japan matters an awful lot to all of us. We at CSIS, like a lot of people in this town wanted to do what we could to show support, to help and we understood that in the recovery and reconstruction process, the Japanese people, the Japanese government, industry, civil society would lead, but we thought it would be possibly helpful both in substance and in solidarity to offer our ideas on what the United States could do in all sectors to stand with Japan after March 11th to bring our own experiences from Three Mile Island or Katrina or other disasters we have either managed or mismanaged to help Japan think this through, and very, I think, importantly to recommend ways that the flowering of cooperation between civil society, between our militaries, between our governments and business, how we could sustain that beyond the recovery period through the reconstruction and really revitalize the U.S.-Japan alliance and partnership in the, not only the weeks and months, but the years ahead. On April 11th, we announced Task Force, the partnership for recovery and a stronger future. John Hamry, our CEO who's in Japan right now, called Jim McInerney, the CEO of Boeing, who very quickly and enthusiastically agreed to help by chairing the meeting and volunteering Stanley Roth to serve on the Task Force. Other corporation CEOs, senior civil society leaders joined as well. We have a long-standing relationship with Kedan Ren, the Japanese Business Federation, and Yone Kurosan, the chairman, also said we'd like to help. He wanted this to be an American vision and an American Task Force, but he gave us Kiyoaki Abaraki to help run the project and was very generous in helping set up meetings for us in Tohoku and in Tokyo as we did research. So today, we're ready to present to you our findings and our recommendations. We'll have a panel in just a moment, but we are very privileged first to hear from two of the individuals who were right at the center of this responding to the crisis and building all the connections that had to happen between the U.S. and Japan in the immediate response and in building for recovery and reconstruction. My good friend, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, and Japan's distinguished ambassador, Ichiro Fujisaki, this was an independent task force of private citizens, but the government of Japan and the U.S. government were very helpful in listening to our ideas and telling us what they were already planning on doing so we didn't replicate it and in joining in the discussion. So we're very pleased today to first invite Kurt Campbell to help put this in perspective from the U.S. government perspective. Thanks, Kurt. Thank you very much, Mike, and distinguished friends, Ambassador Fujisaki, all the players who were involved in this important effort. On behalf of the U.S. government and the U.S. Japan Alliance, I want to thank you for an extraordinarily important endeavor. Government is a series of hold your breath moments, challenges that you're not really sure how you're going to cope with. I've had my share over about two decades in government by an order of magnitude. The most frightening, concerning periods of my life in government were during the nuclear crisis, the immediate aftermath of this, and it was felt by so many of us on many levels, personal and emotional. I, like many of the people who work in Asia, have come to love Asia. I love Japan. I love working with Japan. I love the colleagues and the friendships that I've developed there, but more than anything else, I love the feel of what it feels like to walk through a quiet Japanese street or find a quiet, beautiful place and experience the almost sublime majesty of Japan. And frankly, during that period, during the days and hours after the initial crisis, we were uncertain about that very future. And I have to say that we went weeks without very much sleep, and we're working around the clock. And I cannot say enough about what it was like to work with my colleagues, both in the U.S. government, but in the Japanese embassy, our colleagues in the Gaima Show, in the Prime Minister's office, and in the military. Many people talk about the burden of the military, the U.S. military, in Japan or the burden or the unnaturalness of stationing foreign troops on another shore. And there is truth in that. And in fact, many Japanese friends really, I think, had forgotten some of the potential purposes of U.S. forces in a crisis. And what's wonderful about this experience was for a very clear example of how we working together with our Japanese counterparts and colleagues could respond to this incredible challenge. And to date, we've done a number of things in response to challenges like this in the Asian Pacific region. The recent flooding in Thailand, the tragedies in Ache, but nothing has compared with the rapidity, the dexterity, and the intensity of the American response. Again, working with Japanese colleagues on this. And I'm proud to say that I played a very small role here in the United States, working principally with my dear friend, Ichiro Fujisaki, the ambassador, who was tireless and determined, no matter what, to do what was best for Japan, to do what was best for Japan. So in the future, I will always be able to look back on this experience with some great pride and a real sense of achievement. I'd just like to say two couple of quick things about this overall effort. First is what's interesting about a crisis like this is who it calls on to serve, how people decide they want to serve. One of the most impressive examples was a good friend, Rusty Deming, a tremendous diplomat, a person who had earned a well-deserved retirement. And when this happened, he basically said, you can count on me. And for months, he was the person that was at his desk, the longest, who had helped us and me personally, still learning about certain aspects of the State Department, how to navigate through very complex waters. I think the Alliance will owe him and others just an enormous debt of gratitude for stepping in in its time of need. But principally for our event today, the person that I want to thank the most is Mike Green. I think he recognized immediately thereafter, after the initial week or so, that not only would we need as a partnership and alliance and as a nation to respond in the immediate aftermath of this tragedy, but that we would need a long-term strategy working with the Japanese government and the Japanese people to redevelop, to rebuild, and to think about a whole host of issues ranging from energy to the kind of economy and the linkages between Japan and the global economy as a whole. And the person who had thought about the most, who is most seized with this, was Mike Green, and absolutely determined to put together this extraordinary task force that brings together key players in Japan and the United States on the corporate, finance, and government level to consider how best we can work together to deal with the long-term challenges that Japan will face in this part of its beautiful country. You will find a list of highly innovative suggestions and ideas for how our two countries can work together. And the overarching message fundamentally is that Japan is open for business and that it is essential for the business communities, not only the United States and Japan, but of Korea and other countries around Asia to understand the potential for investment and engagement in the time ahead. I have to say, I think as you all know that there is some extensive talk currently in Japan about the Trans-Pacific Partnership. We are encouraged, even excited by those discussions. This is obviously a matter for Japan to decide on its way forward, but nevertheless we were following it closely and we look forward to working with Japanese colleagues as they make decisions on very consequential matters. But I can simply say that we welcome opportunities for deeper strategic interaction, not just diplomatically, not just politically, but at the root of what makes our two highly innovative, industrious countries move in the economic realm. Secretary Clinton had a chance to meet and talk with some of the people on this effort. I think as you all know, her mother passed away. Recently, Deputy Secretary Nides is thrilled to be engaged in this effort. We'll be with you as well. I just want to say that we in the U.S. government working with this team and others are determined not to let this moment pass. We recognize that the immediate challenges of Tamadachi and the nuclear crisis have passed, but there are urgent steps that need to be taken. There's more work that needs to be done. There are still people that struggle, and there is enormous work of relevance for the U.S.-Japan relationship that we are committed to doing. I know of no report of any kind on any subject that offers more poignant, effective observations about how to channel that cooperation in useful ways, guided by previous experience, guided by wisdom of what has worked previously in U.S.-Japan relationship, and as importantly, what hasn't. I just want to thank Mike Green. I want to thank John Hammery and all of the players in the K-Don Renn on the Japanese side and on the American side for taking time out of busy schedules to work on something that we all cherish, which is the U.S.-Japan relationship and principally the wonderful people of Japan. Mike, I thank you very much for this. I urge all of you to look at it closely to consider its conclusions, but as importantly, as individuals, think what you can do as well to support this important effort. Thank you all very much. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen, for being here. As I have said time and again, we are coming back now, but not only by ourselves. Your assistance really made the difference. That meant a lot. We'll never forget that. You stood with us at our most difficult moment. The Japanese people cherished your friendship and solidarity. Your rescue team, your forces were out there for search and rescue. Your government, nuclear experts were there to give us technical and expert advices. Your government in Washington, the core was Kurt Campbell and his team. I knew the word 24-7 before, but I really have seen that and they have worked as if this disaster was theirs and that was really moving and touching to see that. Thank you very much, Kurt and your team, including Russ Deming, who Kurt Campbell grabbed from his retirement, twisted arm. I don't know how he did it, but really you made the difference. Your people really helped us, including the kids, made a huge contribution and that helped us a lot financially as well as mentally. Representing Japan, I would like to extend our gratitude. Now we are seeing a new assistance in terms of intellectual and strategic advice, the report. I think the report has civil characteristics for, if I may say one, this is the result of top pundits of this country. Second, covering broad range of issues. If you look at it, you'll know that it covers for energy, health, IT, disaster relief, you cover everything. Third, it's forward looking, future oriented and mid and long term. Fourthly, it's objective at the same time, very friendly, partner like report, if I may say. I think this will be an excellent reference for continuing elaboration of reconstruction strategy. I would call this a book of wisdom in a nutshell, I would say. CSIS, my green, they've done it again. So thank you very much. And all of you here, thank you very much for being here to show the gratitude. This is a little token of gratitude, but I prepared this wristband. However, this says gratitude, friendship and bond. But coming out here, I asked my embassy staff, I'm going to distribute this here. And they said, you are too generous and you are giving out everything, so we don't have any more. However, however, I'm ordering it now. So those who have signed up to this meeting, and you'll get it later. But thank you very much again. Thank you. Thank you for your generous comments. Thank you for your participation, your staff's participation. Thank you for tolerating the unsolicited views of experts in the private sector, civil society and think tanks. We're going to hear a message from the chairman of the task force, Jim McInerney of Boeing. So please direct your attention to the screens. Mr. McInerney signed on right away to help. And because of that, we were able to attract some leading corporate and civil society leaders in the United States. And we're grateful for that. I am Jim McInerney from the Boeing Company. And I have the honor of chairing the CSIS task force, the partnership for recovery and a stronger future. Today, I am pleased to be participating in the release of the task force report. I am sorry that I cannot be there with you for the culmination of our work. Last March, my heart and the hearts of millions of people worldwide went out to the people of Japan in the wake of the enormous destruction that was caused by the earthquake and tsunami in Tohoku. Many of us wanted to help in any way we could. So when CSIS President John Hamry invited me to chair this task force, I immediately said yes. And it has been my honor to work with such a dedicated group of leaders. First, I want to thank Kadanren Chairman Hiromaso Yonekura for his leadership and commitment to strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance. Chairman Yonekura and the entire Kadanren have been vital leaders and valued partners in this project. I also want to thank the task force directors, Michael J. Green, in Kyuaki Aburaki, as well as the six working group leaders and all the task force participants for the leadership and expertise they have contributed to this important project. The report we are unveiling today is a prime example of the deep spirit of partnership that exists between Japan and the United States. From the beginning, it was my hope that our work would properly honor this abiding relationship. Our mission was critical to make recommendations aimed at enabling the long-term economic recovery of Japan in the context of a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance. We all believed that the task forces work would send a clear signal to the Japanese people that they would not be alone on the long path to recovery and reconstruction. Our work was inspired by a shared sense of responsibility among the participating Japanese and American experts, starting with the Kadanren. This report's recommendations were developed in close collaboration with a range of sectors in Japan, including private industry, civil society, academia, and government and political leaders. Many of these recommendations call for joint Japanese U.S. actions that will further strengthen the alliance while addressing the challenges at hand. During a recent visit to Japan, I was encouraged to learn from my discussions there that government leaders are already considering policies that would, among other things, strengthen the private sector's ability to respond more effectively. This is also a key recommendation of the Task Force report. Japan has already taken enormous strides toward cleaning up the stricken region and addressing the immediate needs of its people. As the Japanese government begins to deal with longer-term reconstruction, I hope that the task forces recommendations informed by the experiences of both nations, after other large-scale disasters, will be of value to decision-makers. Thank you again for your partnership and for being here today as we unveil this important report. I understand Secretary Campbell has to leave. I want to ask the press to please let him make his escape. We're going to move now. Thank you, Kurt, to a panel of the Task Force working group leaders. If you could join me up here, colleagues, to highlight some of the recommendations from the report. If I can invite Stacey, Stanley, Jane, Steve, and Tim. When we formed the Task Force, we understood that we would be working on this over the course of about six months and that during that time, the Japanese government, Kedanren, Keisai Doyukai, or the organizations in Japan would be drawing up detailed blueprints to deal with the cleanup, the recovery, the disaster. So we did not try to create a blueprint so much as a framework for thinking about the medium and longer-term challenges, bringing to bear our experiences. As I said, not all good. We learned a lot about what not to do in Three Mile Island, Katrina, and from that, hopefully some wisdom. And to think about ways that we could build on the partnerships between civil societies and private sector that came out of 311 and sustained that to stand with Japan as it goes through recovery and to a reconstruction and a stronger future and to strengthen our alliance. We divided our Task Force into six working groups to try to have a more in-depth examination of each of these areas. And we were very pleased that some well-recognized experts agreed to take charge of these working groups in each area. The six groups are represented here except for two. But let me briefly introduce them. Tim Adams, the former Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, well known to any of you who follow International Economic Affairs and now the principal at the Lindsay Group, agreed to take on the working group that would look at fiscal questions, macroeconomic questions, and the economic policy dimension. Steve Morrison, who leads the global health work here at CSIS, had already been working in partnership with some Japanese Health and Public Policy Institutes and agreed to take on an examination of the longer-term health implications, challenges, and opportunities for working together. He worked with Brian Biles and other experts here at CSIS and elsewhere in the United States. Stacey White, together with Joey Booth and others, Joey leads the Disaster Management Institute at LSU, lots of experience with Katrina. And Stacey is an expert on disaster relief globally and led that Task Force. Jane Nakano and David Pumphrey and Mike Wallace and others here at CSIS led on the energy task force looking at the nuclear piece and also long-term energy supply and demand and strategy questions. We had two other working groups not represented here. I may briefly summarize the findings at the end. Saks Dakota and Rich Armitage took the lead in the security policy working group which examined the lessons learned from Operation Tomodachi and Randy Martin, senior official in Mercy Corps, the highly respected international NGO, led a group that focused on how to build civil society cooperation. And in fact, he is actually, he's not here because he's following his own recommendation. And Mercy Corps has made him the president of their Asia operations based in Japan, which is why he can't be with us today. And then we're going to hear from each of the working group leaders the highlights of their work. And then Stanley Roth from Boeing who helped us throughout on behalf of Mr. McInerney and Keoha Baraki who was the co-director with me, will have some brief comments and then we'll open it for Q&A and try to answer what questions we can. And you all have the report in front of you. But let me turn it over first to Tim. Thanks. Thank you, Mike. It's it's an honor to be on the panel and the dice today and have served with such a distinguished group of scholars and looking at a country which is very dear to my heart. I've spent most of my professional life traveling to Japan. I have many good friends there. I have clients there. And it is a place that I have observed up close and a place I have enormous respect. And you know, I remember I was in Singapore on March 11th at the airport waiting to fly back to the United States and watching the devastating of events that day. And it's still seared into my memory. It's also an honor pleasure to be talking about something other than the Greek debt crisis today. So it's a nice respite from Europe's travails. The challenge for Japan is that prior to March 11th, the country faced enormous economic challenges. We had seen decades of subpar growth, high levels of sovereign data debt to GDP ratio of 200 percent, deflationary pressures, anemic consumption, a whole host of ills which had challenged the political system for years. In fact, there's a USA Today article today that says, you know, could it happen here talking about the events in Japan? And are we the US suffering from similar maladies? And are we are we prone to make the same mistakes and and have a similar history? And then of course add to this the horrific events of March 11th that slammed the Japanese economy through a disruption to the supply chains and then brought into question the issue of sustainable and cost effective supply of energy, which others energy experts here will talk about. And it was it was a hit to the economy that was felt around the world. Obviously, it had a global macro effect. Even US officials, including Ben Bernanke and others use that is one of the rationales for why the US economy has suffered so much over the last couple quarters. So it wasn't just a Japan centered event. It was a global economic event on top of an already fragile economic trajectory. Now, despite these conditions, despite these challenges, the political system, which often seemingly paralyzed to make big decisions, was able to rise the occasion. We have seen a fairly robust response. We've had a number of supplementary budgets. There do appear to be guidelines put in place on how reconstruction will be undertaken. And there is some agreement on how reconstruction will be paid for, which again is very important given the debt to GDP ratio and and and the the weak anemic growth. The response to the crisis has really two levels. One is a micro level and one is a broader macro level at a micro level. And you can see from the recommendations made in the report. We look at and make make recommendations about about implementing an economic zone by picking some and there's a variety of different ways to do this. And there is no one right method but finding a certain geographic region and putting in place a series of incentives to drive capital to that to that geographic region. You know, there's an old adage that capital is a coward. It goes where it's treated well and it flees where it's treated badly. So the concept is find the area and treat capital well and do it in a way that incentivizes you allow me to use it as a verb incentivizes capital to flow in whether it's domestic capital or foreign capital. It doesn't really matter. And then also a company that with a change in regulations which promotes labor force participation. And again, business startups and risk taking. So that's at the micro level. We do appear we it does appear that the Japanese government is embracing the concept and we just need to see what the details look like. But I'm optimistic. At a macro level. Change also has to come because well change the micro level is a necessary condition. It's not sufficient. Macro economic conditions need to improve as well. And here in the report we've offered a number of suggestions. No surprises. I think the the prescription for change in Japan is well known. So whether it's the IMF's article four or other assessments of Japan. This is quite similar actually. But some of them we noted to rethink the tax code in a way that again gives incentive to growth in capital formation and labor force participation. Now in myriad with the fiscal policy that that certainly looks at the budgetary needs of Japan over the medium and long term and the need to deal with sovereign debt. So look for ways to offset expenditures with other expenditure cuts. But put in place a tax system that is incredibly efficient that is pro growth that is very supportive of the corporate sector. And again promotes labor force participation given Japan's demographic challenges. It's important to see a higher level of labor force participation. And then as I mentioned earlier there is an energy component. One of the one of the concerns we heard repeatedly from Japanese industry is a concern about the reliability and sustainability and the cost effectiveness of energy. And obviously there is an enormous debate raging in Japan is there are in other countries about the future of nuclear power. And if not nuclear then what is thermal energy a cost effective replacement. But there's real concern among Japanese industry that if Japan moves to a different energy source and it is less cost effective then that will force Japanese industry to move jobs to other platforms around the world that offer a much cheaper manufacturing input profile. And then trade policy. Ambassador Kirk Campbell mentioned that TPP is on is on the radar screen. I don't have any inside details about where the current Japanese government is thinking. I know we do have APEC about 10 days from now. I'm encouraged by what little I have heard about the way in which Japan is thinking about embracing TPP. I think it's absolutely the right policy but that is for Japan to decide. But irrespective of whether it's this particular policy or some broader policy Japan would certainly benefit by more openness on the trade front. Japan has some of the greatest exporting companies in the world. But that same sense of prowess and efficiency and effectiveness that they deploy around the world could also be realized at the domestic level by simply opening up and revolutionizing the service sector. So in a sense Japan can still benefit enormously from opening up and engaging the global trading system. And I hope that next week we will see that. I'll stop there because I want to make sure that the the other participants have plenty of time. But I think the main takeaway is that there were enormous macro challenges. This crisis exacerbated those challenges. The government has responded much more needs to be done at the micro level. But the old macro challenges that were there before are still there and only so much can be done at the micro level until the macro issues are taking taking on. And this government appears to be serious and sober in its assessment of these challenges and is endeavoring to take them on. Thank you. Thank you and good afternoon. First a note of thanks to Mike Green for organizing this and Keo Abaraki and Tachi Yamada the former president of global health the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation kindly agreed to chair the health working group and was very integral to that. He can't be with us today. But since his regards I also want to express my gratitude to my partner in pulling this together Brian Biles from GW University who's been very integral and to the Health and Global Policy Institute in Tokyo. We will be doing an event in fact in Fukushima City jointly a CSIS and HGPI event on Friday November 11th in Fukushima City on this very report with a focus on the Mike will be there and focus on the broad recommendations and a focus on the health which I'll get to in just a moment. We have three recommendations. I'll hit those in a moment. Let me first say that in terms of core findings I think probably the most important core finding of of this chapter on health has to do with low dose long term radiation exposure and the health implications in the Fukushima prefecture and the other eight prefectures affected by this. The experiences that Japan is having have an import that extends well beyond Japan. Clearly those experiences in terms of trying to wrestle with the uncertainties over the scientific standards for safety over wrestling with how preparedness for crises can be improved in the future and how to communicate to a frightened and distrustful public. Those challenges that are that are being addressed today in in Japan have import obviously for the Japanese society but they have very strong import for the many many other countries that are home to the 450 plus nuclear power plants today. Many of which are aging and many of which are in situations that are far less well managed than than in Japan and the other countries that are building the current 60 plants that are under construction. This is low dose long term radiation is an under recognized and a very important global health challenge and how we understand the lessons coming out of this will have great importance. Many promising U.S. Japan health initiatives have advanced in this period. People in both Japan and the United States did not wait around for direction before they launched these. The GE Health Initiative is detailed. Project hopes work in Iwate in partnership with Iwate authorities. Columbia University Professor Homa's initiative with the Fukushima Medical University focused on mental health issues. These are very important trailblazing initiatives that we should recognize and build upon. 2012 is going to be a year of decision. A lot of key decisions have not yet been determined and we're going to need to be very patient and watchful in looking at how Tohoku copes with the 30% of the health infrastructure that was destroyed, how it's rebuilt, how it deals with a very large, elderly, dislocated, traumatized population, what kind of services and how it deals with a continued radiation exposure. U.S. initiatives will be important, but they're going to have to align very closely with Japanese policy as it evolves and they'll have to be aligned with important independent Japanese partners. Our first recommendation is around low dose long term radiation. I think I've already indicated that we don't really have a clear sense of the scientific standards for safety, nor do we understand particularly well the questions around adequate preparedness for crises and how to communicate and sustain public trust in the midst of a crisis. We're proposing that there be an independent international study of these issues that draws together Japanese American and other key experts. We think this is very important. We think that the Institute of Medicine here in the United States would be a very good vehicle for that, but we're not making an exclusive recommendation. We simply cite this as one very worthy prospect to do this. We think that there is a serious trust and credibility problem and that an independent entity of this kind, if it were something that were welcomed by the Japanese government, could advance and carry forward its work in 18 to 24 months and greatly advance our knowledge on those key areas where I've said we do not have answers at hand today. The second recommendation is around reconstructing health services and the health infrastructure in Tohoku, and what we recommend is that a high level consortium of American interest partner with Japanese organizations at the national and prefecture and community levels in trying to build back better to create regional pilots that can have broader national significance to bring about more efficient and integrated health systems and to bring about information technology and electronic records, which have been highly problematic in this period revealed to be so during the crisis when many people who were dependent on records for their access to medications were deprived of those because they were paper and they were destroyed. Third is around mental health services for the vulnerable populations and we're proposing that there be strong strengthened twinning arrangements over the next three to five years between US and Japanese medical institutions. We believe that these clinical services will continue to be very, very important. As I said earlier, Columbia University, Dr. Homa has already been pioneering some very important work in this area with Fukushima Medical University in the Fukushima Prefecture. These are very promising and I think that there's ample opportunity and expertise for building those relationships. Thank you so much. Hello. I also wanted to thank Mike Green and everyone at the Japan chair for pulling this together and also to extend thanks to those persons who participated in the disaster recovery and preparedness working group. We met twice over the summer and people were very thoughtful and very generous with their time. One of the first things we wanted to do post 311 was to do recommendations that were really not just oratory, not just the laundry list of recommendations after a disaster of what should be done. We wanted to focus on things that were doable. We wanted to focus on things that could capitalize on the US, Japan experiences in Kobe and Katrina and use those together to look at the situation in Tohoku. There was a pretty immediate acknowledgement amongst the group that immediate relief activities had been competently dealt with by Japanese authorities. There's a continued as many of you know issue of housing and land available for housing. And there is a small number of persons who are still living in evacuation shelters. But we considered that given the legislative and the political issues involved in that and that the Japanese government was on top of it, we wanted to move on from immediate relief issues to look more specifically at transition from relief to recovery and learning that could be shared around preparedness and mitigation efforts. Because the recovery in Tohoku almost immediately implicit in the recovery is really a reconceptualization of Tohoku, there were many similarities with what was going on in New Orleans. And many challenges that the government has to deal with, which were very similar to what US federal and state governments in Louisiana and city officials in New Orleans had to deal with as well. There's a balance that has to be made in recovery between return to normalcy for people so that they can get on with their lives and their livelihoods. But you also have to leave room for change and economic reinvention in the region. There's also the tension between a speed of recovery moving quickly so that pathologies don't arise, whether they're health, whether they're economic, whether they're social. But being delivered in your actions and consulting effective populations. A third tension we talked about was the collective relocation of communities versus small scale residential district improvements. So how do you determine whether you move people en masse and what are the implications for that in terms of economic revival, community ties and long term prosperity. All of this involves a very careful effort by the government to convey a predictable process for recovery that will restore confidence. So to this end our recommendations focused on the localization of recovery decision making not just the execution of reconstruction but the actual decision making bringing that to the Tohoku region. Also on the participation of effective communities which is a science in and of itself and on the building of networks direct networks between local government officials, businesses and community members so that there are entry points for them to share challenges and to share best practices between cities and municipalities directly affected. In addition to our look at transition to recover we also looked at learning opportunities around preparedness and mitigation. There was an acknowledgement by the group that Japanese leadership in this area is you know second to none in the world. And also an appreciation of many of the adjustments that have already already been made by some of the technical institutions in Japan to the early warning tools since March 11. So our concentration was really on the combination of physical mitigation methods and how you combine cost effective me see walls, ducks, evacuation towers etc that can work together to actually improve the ability of people to survive in a situation like this. The other thing we looked at is the soft infrastructure or the human behavior. There's been a lot of talk since 311 about the evacuation and some of the decision making that individuals were confronted with whether they went back to check on loved ones whether they had the means to get elderly people out of their homes whether they you know knew exactly where to go and had the means to get there. So this is something that also came up in Katrina and it's something that I think cross-cultural analysis could actually bear something important after excuse me. Let me regain my. So this is the kind of thing where in Katrina and in Tohoku where we could share some best practices from those two two experiences. So I want to just go over a couple of the recommendations. One of the things we called on was localizing the decision making of the Cabinet Office's reconstruction headquarters. This is something that they did in Indonesia post 2004 tsunami and this is something that they did in Pakistan after the Kashmir earthquake. And in both cases it was considered very effective in terms of keeping the politics out of some of the reconstruction process minimizing corruption and also building confidence among the local people. Another thing that I want to talk about and I won't go over all of the recommendations since we don't have that much time but one thing I've been been pushing and been a strong supporter of is the opportunity to build a bilateral laboratory for risk reduction and recovery. In Asia there are many different fora for disaster risk reduction and management learning but they usually involve many different countries and they're just three day conferences. The Indonesians and the Australians have put together facility in Jakarta that actually is a laboratory where engineers, urban planners, tsunami experts meet together and they work on a day to day basis and this is really where I think you're going to see tools that are directly applicable and employable by local officials. And I think the shared identity of U.S. and Japan as two of the five biggest humanitarian donors in the world and also our shared risks around the Pacific Rim. It would be interesting to explore I think this kind of facility. I think it's something that could be useful. Thank you very much. On behalf of the energy working group I'd also like to thank Mike Green for his leadership and I'd like to thank everyone that participated in the energy working group meeting in summer and throughout the course of the work. So our energy work focused on nuclear energy, natural gas, renewable energy and power sector and here are many recommendations but I'd like to focus on just the some of them, the key recommendations. So the first one is the U.S. Japan Joint Commission on Fukushima. So we're essentially recommending a bilateral public-private commission that would not only streamline synergetic efforts by the U.S. and Japanese private sector that's already happening in Japan but also provide both countries with more of a systematic or structured way of digesting and implementing lessons learned from Fukushima. There's actually precedence for this type of bilateral effort. In the aftermath of Three Mile Island in 1979, a Japanese group of Japanese companies and research institutes actually provided some direct funding to a DOE-led effort, mainly R&D efforts, to look at the decommissioning and decontamination as well as some of the post-accident reactor situations and such. And this was quite beneficial for both sides. I mean, I think the Japanese side recognized that this would give them lots of insights and then data that would be used to enhance the safe operation of its nuclear power plants. But then for both parties to really contribute to the safe operation around the world. And so here we're recommending something similar yet perhaps more robust. And then we're also recommending a bilateral energy forum that would highlight key trends in the global energy market but then also facilitate better understanding of energy policies in each country to Japan and the U.S. For example, natural gas comes to mind as some of the most immediate topics under this forum. As the Japanese reliance on natural gas is expected to increase in the coming years. And interestingly enough, coincides with the North American interest in exploring markets overseas. And as some of you are aware of, the current market price differential between the Asia Pacific market and the North American market makes the trade whether direct or otherwise quite attractive. It could be a very much win-win situation. And one of the actually specific issues that could be brought taken up under this forum may be how participation in the trans-Pacific partnership TPP may enhance Japan's energy security through a greater access to North American natural gas. And we can certainly talk a little more about it during a Q&A if there is interest. And lastly, there are a few issues related to the power sector that are right for bilateral discussions and enhanced cooperation. The greater resiliency of the sector, the interconnectivity of the grids and integration of renewable energy sources will help a country, whether Japan or the U.S. or any other country, become better prepared not only for the future demand growth, but against any supply disruptions, whether it's from another earthquake or from active terrorism. We believe that to allow for greater efficiency and flexibility in the energy marketplace that would fully accommodate some of the potentials that the renewable energies and other diversified sources and players may be able to contribute, the current market structure in Japan may merit close examination. Additionally, we lay out in the energy chapter recommendations pertaining to the Tohoku region become a testbed or a hub for some of the energy efficient or clean energy technologies that are being pursued by both the Japanese and American entities. So that's it from me. I see that the deputy secretary has already arrived and so that he not wait too long, I'm going to limit myself to one point. And that point is just reinforcing the message that Jim McNerney made in the video about the key role of the private sector. When you have a chance to read the report you'll really see that that theme is in almost every chapter. It's not only about industry, it's also about NGOs and civil society and the roles that they can play in the recovery and the reconstruction. When some of us from the task force visited Japan, went to the region, we received impassioned pleas for investment. And it was for Japanese investment, but we were foreign groups, it was for U.S. and foreign direct investment in general. And obviously everybody is very sympathetic to the tragedy, the question is are the conditions there that make the investments attractive and workable. And so I want to just reinforce the points that Tim made in his presentation that there are steps that the Japanese government is already working on very hard and has to take and I think will take to make this region more attractive, that includes the special economic zones that were discussed, possible reforms or changes in tax regulatory policy, trade liberalization and of course reliable energy supply. Thank you very much. I'm Kiyo Aburaki and I really appreciate these opportunities. And what Kedarnalien share is that closely related to Kedarnalien's point, I mean that the few strengths in the U.S.-Japan relations, the strengths of Japan's future based on vitality of the private sector. And Kedarnalien set the kind of goal, it is that 3% economic growth in nominal term, 2% economic growth in the real terms. We think this is possible if the strengths of the private sector fully utilized under the strengths of international linkages, under the strengths of the partnership with other countries. For us, the most important partnership with the United States. And the people in Kedarnalien, CEO by Chairman Kedarnalien, really appreciate the opportunity next week, November 9th, we are going to have a this, you know, intensive discussion in Kedarnalien, Tokyo with Kedarnalien as a representative of John Hamre, Steve Moulton, and Mike Green. And they are really looking forward to kind of a discussion. Thank you. Thank you all. When we, when I say we, all of us on the stage, John Hamry, Jim McNurney and other members of the task force, decided to do this, everybody had a lot on their plate and everyone up on stage here made a lot of room on their plate to vote, not a day or two, but basically six months of sustained attention to prepare this task force and by implication to keep working on this with colleagues in Japan as we go forward. There were two other working groups, not represented here because the working group leaders are on travel. Sax Kota and Rich Armitage, Chip Gregson and others led a working group on the security relationship, the implications for the alliance. And the bottom line there is that Operation Tomodachi, 100,000 self-defense forces, over 20,000 US personnel, was the most complex joint and combined operation we had ever done together. And we did it quickly, did it particularly for some of the self-defense forces at personal risk. Some of these operations were dangerous, sent a very strong reassuring signal to the Japanese people and frankly a very important signal to the region about how strong our alliance was. But as we looked at this, those of us who work on security never look on the upside. We always look on the downside and considered what if this had been a more even more complex crisis? A crisis not responding to a natural disaster, but one where there was somebody on the other side intending you harm. And many of the operations were coordinated through open emails. Many of the US initiatives were led by very senior three and four stars coming out of Hawaii, the kind of things that would be very hard to do in a security crisis. And so we gamed through and made some recommendations, as I know both governments are, about thinking through the lessons learned from this very successful operation in terms of other things we might face together. Because these are, after all, the Japan self-defense forces and the nation's defense is their first mission. On the civil society side, I think we sent a group to Tohoku. We spent time with civil society groups there and in Tokyo. Japan's civil society sector is small. But man, are they active? They were very, very dynamic. But they filled niche areas, we found, and don't have the kind of scale or experience or capacity of some of the larger NGOs based in the United States like Mercy Corps, or save the children or others. And so Randy Martin led a group and made some recommendations on how the governments, the private sector, and American civil society groups can partner with Japanese NGOs to help them build on this experience, to help them learn some important things that American NGOs are good at like fundraising, but also to take their experience together abroad and use that to be more effective at responding to crises and disasters in the region where Japanese NGOs like Peacewinds and others are very active. So those were the other two working groups. If the Deputy Secretary will indulge us, we might take a few questions. Deputy Secretary Tom Nides, of course, leads the, he's the point man on this entire effort for the US government. His staff has been active and enthusiastic participants in our work. Maya Seiden, a special assistant is basically Japanese. She grew up in Japan and Tom has been very helpful. We'll hear from him in a moment, I suppose, our closing benediction for the day. But first, with your indulgence, I think we can take some questions if you have them for the panel on the briefings you just heard on the working group on next steps. The floor is open for a few moments, a few minutes if people want to ask questions. Yes. Thanks. Mr. Morrison, you had mentioned a quote, serious trust and credibility problem. Unquote. I'm just a little unsure of exactly what that's focused on and what you're addressing specifically. So if you could give some details about what exactly has that problem, that'd be great. Thank you. Before I do that, I neglected to thank Nick Sengenji and Suzanne Brundage for the work that they contributed to this. Nick coordinated all the different pieces and Suzanne was absolutely integral on our side on the health piece. We were, Mike referenced the visit in June. We were in Tohoku and then had the occasion to, I had the occasion with HGPI staff to circulate in the three prefectures for several days after that. And what we experienced there was a very dramatic expression of anger, frustration, and bewilderment with respect to the, in the Fukushima area with respect to radiation. I think there are several, and we outline in the report there are several root causes to this, one of which is the lack of clear standards. Another was the withholding of data at critical moments. Another was the confusing policy positions that were taken at different points. And then there was the revelation that in fact the releases were quite a bit larger than what had been originally estimated. And then blown inland and then over time, over the subsequent months, you've had the discovery of the hot spots scattered across now. I think there are about 170 communities that are in the process of being decontaminated. In July, in mid July, we hosted an HGPI delegation here. We had a forum in this space of five prominent Japanese health experts from very diverse backgrounds. And that was videotaped and broadcasted on our website. It was a very dramatic expression of the degree to which, particularly mothers in fear of their children's status in the affected areas had begun to very quietly mobilize quite a strong bit of migration out of the affected areas by mothers and children in particular. So we heard this. We saw the evidence and the proof of this in several areas. The last point I would make is that we were, there was a very broad diversity of folks both inside government and outside government who appealed to us with respect to the idea of an independent expert committee that could attempt to try and resolve some of these issues. And that's reflected in the recommendation. Thank you very much. In the back there. Yes, thanks. I'm Harlan Allman. The question I have is, what were your recommendations to deal with used nuclear fuel, not just in the Fukushima region, but throughout Japan? Did you comment on your ideas there? The used fuel, not so. I mean, the Japanese government does have a plan and institutional setup to process, I mean, regardless, I mean, since before Fukushima, but I'm not sure if, I mean, they do have an organization called NUMO, which is, which looks at both the reprocessing, which looks at the underground repository option. I mean, so there is a process in place, but specific to Fukushima or any fuels at places that have sustained a degree, a severe degree of damage. I think, you know, there are lots of things that are being looked at by both the Japanese but then U.S. national lab type experts. You know, the timing of it. I mean, most recently, like the decommissioning efforts, it was determined it will take about, I mean, a couple of decades. I mean, if you look at the TMI incident, it did take a couple of decades as well. So it does require very deliberate, very comprehensive plan, strategy as opposed to ad hoc, you know, day by day or, you know, sort of a, you know, sort of a reactionary approach. I mean, not that I'm not saying that there is such, but so that's still a part of what we can certainly contribute to the Japanese side. One of the other aspects of the energy report, I think worth highlighting again, is that the nuclear industry in Japan obviously is under a lot of siege right now and there's great debate and anxiety, understandably. And as Tim and others pointed out, not only in Japan and many countries, we tried to, in our report, while remaining sensitive to that and focusing in particular on the long-term low-dose radiation challenge, we tried to help frame some of the other implications, not only of moving quickly out of nuclear power for Japan's economic growth and there are studies that we cite on the impact that would have on growth figures, but also thinking about Japan's role in the international nonproliferation and nuclear safety regimes. Our concern was that if Japan, from an international perspective, if Japan pulled out rapidly of the nuclear power sector, if Japan stopped implementing plans to get into nuclear exports, it would significantly weaken Japan's voice in nonproliferation and in efforts to have international safety standards at a time when there are going to be hundreds of nuclear power plants built around the world over the coming decades. Many of them built by or operated by countries with a, shall we say, less rigorous safety or transparency record than Japan has. So, we thought it was important to highlight in the middle of this debate in Japan, the international dimension and the very important positive role Japan plays and will play as a leading voice on nonproliferation and nuclear safety and standards around the world. Any last questions? Yes, sure, David. David Bowling with the Mike Mansfield Foundation. Mike, we've heard a lot about how well the self-defense forces and the US military worked together in Operation Tomodachi. Could you share with us one story that really illustrates that in your mind? There are many and I have to say we heard the most impressive ones when we were in Tohoku, as some of you may have as well. Operation Soul Train, where the US Air Force and Marine Corps working with the self-defense force reopened the Sendai Airport. Basically in, I think it was 48 hours, we have it in our report, it was in about two days. You couldn't land in the airport, so the initial operation involved power drops. And within two days, they had that airport operating and Australian C-17 came in with supplies. And it was an amazing thing because it was so fast and it probably saved lives by allowing these large transport aircraft to come in. But also it's an extremely complex operation and demonstrated, not just capability, what it demonstrated was trust, that there wasn't a whole lot of bureaucratic red tape between US and Japanese forces, US and Japanese government to do this. I think that was important in terms of saving lines, important in terms of showing quick response. But again, as I said, it was a useful signal to the entire region that in spite of difficulties or distances or differences we may have had over 10 or other issues, this is an alliance that actually functions. I think it showed it functions in ways people hadn't fully appreciated in terms of its effectiveness. There are other stories I've heard that SAC should tell and would tell if he were here, but he going through the US embassy bumped into somebody he knew, State Department officer, who was there working around the clock on Operation Tomodachi and SAC asked him, aren't you working in Iraq? Because he was supposed to be in Iraq. And this guy took his leave. He had served in Japan before. He was on leave from Iraq and he left his vacation and volunteered to go into the embassy. There were a lot of stories like that for US forces and State Department and other AID officials that were quite impressive. Thank you and thank you to the working group chiefs. And Steve mentioned Nick Sanchini, the deputy director of the Japan chair. He was the coordinator for this project. He made this entire thing happen. Pulled the entire thing together and we all owe him an enormous set of thanks and we're gonna keep working on this. Steve mentioned the conference we're doing in Fukushima in about a week. John Hamry is actually there in Japan now. He's doing a dialogue on nuclear safety, learning from 311. We will be hosting an early December meeting here with Japanese counterparts on nuclear crisis management. We'll be doing other things in these different spaces, civil society, energy and our respective programs to try to sustain this cooperation. And please don't hesitate to let us know if you'd like to participate in any of these dialogues. We are very privileged and fortunate that first of all the Tom Nides cares about Japan so much. If you look at his resume you'll say he's worked in the Hill and the private sector at USTR, spent a lot of time on Japan. And as I understand the secretary essentially put him on point to help the two governments work together and build a larger framework for cooperation. And he has in a very busy day because the secretary has gone as I understand it, volunteered to come and offer some closing thoughts on the way forward in our alliance. So thanks very much. Thank you very much and good afternoon. This demonstrates, this event demonstrates a remarkable extent of the cooperation that we have with Japan after the devastating disasters on 311. Quite frankly I'm honored to play a very small part in the recovery and I had the opportunity actually to review the report earlier today. And as I like to say this report is smart, comprehensive and it's a roadmap for supporting reconstruction and the long-term recovery of Japan. And I wanna thank you guys, like in particular for the leadership that you've shown to put this together and all of you who have taken your time to do this. This is not only important to the State Department and the Japanese people, but it's what we do and we do it quite well. And I wanna also thank my friend, Ambassador Fujisaki who's here. I want you to know during the crisis I would bet you the good ambassador probably was at our office three or four times a day. He would go to a meeting, he would go back to the embassy and come back and ask for more. And there's no better friend that we have in the United States than the ambassador but quite frankly there's no better representative than the Japanese people have in the United States than the ambassador. So thank you, I'm honored that you're here. When I visited Japan with Secretary Clinton with Tom Donahue of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce about a month after the tsunami, there was unspeakable devastation as you all know. But even then we saw the resilience and the unbroken spirit of the Japanese people. And we saw the friendship between our countries go deeper, I'm in the wreckage of those early days. The Japanese self-defense forces and the American military worked in the close complement to distribute much needed supplies as you've just heard. They stood side by side to dig through the rubble in Sendai, nuclear experts, rescue workers and civilian engineers from the United States immediately boarded planes to help our Japanese colleagues. When it mattered most, Americans stepped up across the board and quite frankly we're very proud of that. But there's no doubt in my mind that Japan would have done the same thing for us because they have. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina and Rita the Japanese were among the first responders on the scene. New Yorkers still remember the Japanese rescue workers at ground zero at 9-11. Our countries do not hesitate to lean on each other in crisis because we have invested our relationship for more than six decades. And we now know we stand up to the height, indeed informs the cornerstone of our commitment to the Asia Pacific region. And each time we are tested, our nations emerge stronger, better prepared and closer than ever. This CIS task force proved that again. CSIS was not just an academic exercise. It was, I'd like to say, a labor of love. A reflection of our intention to stand by Japan through the rebuilding and beyond. And as a recovering businessman myself, I think that one of the best ways we can do that is by spreading the message that Japan is open for business. To that end we launched the partnership for reconstruction in April to unite the public and private sectors in both countries in support. The outpouring of support since then has been outstanding and quite frankly inspiring. American corporations have donated almost $300 million for relief efforts, but that is just the tip of the iceberg. We've been working with the government of Japan, the US Japan Council and the private sector to empower Japan's young leaders and entrepreneurs to participate in the reconstruction. This November, Secretary Clinton will chair the high level dialogue at APEC to promote public and private partnerships as a way to build resilience in our business communities. These efforts stem from our unwavering commitment to the Japanese people and are in faith in their ability to rebound. We're thinking creatively about how to overcome similar experiences in the future. Japan's experience should be a lesson to all of us, and this task force has helped transform those lessons into real action plans. We do not want just to put things back the way they were, we want to rebuild for the future and for the next generation. There's much more we can do to help those affected in 311. The United States is ready to support Japan however we can by promoting the public-private cooperation by supporting Japan's long-term economic renewal and by continuing to strengthen the connections between our societies at every level. And even in the most tragic crises, there are opportunities for renewal and growth, and our nations are up to the challenge. Thank you very much. Thank you for what you've done. Thank all of you very much. Secretary Nides, thank you. Thank you for your leadership at the department on this. Thank all of you for coming. We hope you find the report useful. As you read it and go through it, keep in mind this is the beginning of, not the end of this process for us. We want to keep working in these areas and we hope you'll be able to join with us. Thank you all very much.