 I think that we can proceed gently into the banking union. Always when legal issues arise, I think there are two pressures. The first comes from the people who regard lawyers as perhaps an unnecessary inconvenience or obstacle that has to be overcome, and others who are willing to find a legal basis for anything. Recently the Financial Times Innovation Awards for Lawyers awarded a prize to a German lawyer's firm that was credited with having an aggressive interpretation of some new banking law in Germany. Now an aggressive interpretation and lawyer speak is a hairy interpretation in colloquialism. I think what we're looking at here in the context of banking union is that the best is the enemy of necessity. There is a solid legal basis in the treaty for the pillars of a banking union. The two that perhaps have excited the most controversy are the SSM and the SRM and of those two it is the SRM that has given rise to the most legal difficulty in people's eyes or in many people's eyes. But when looking at the legal objections one also has to look at the perspective from which people are approaching this. There are some writers on the recent European developments, Roland Waubel, the economist and a member of Alternativa für Deutschland suggests that the Europe has in the last six years abandoned the rule of law. And he says that all of the innovations that were introduced to deal with the financial crisis including the six pack actually have no legal basis, that's one perspective. And the other perspective as I said are the people who think that the treaty provides an endless menu for what is desirable at a particular point. Neither of those viewpoints are valid, one looks at the legal basis in the treaty and adherence to the rule of law is ultimately essential if the European Union is to have the legitimacy which is essential to its future development. But when looking at the legal basis you are entitled to take into account how the European Court of Justice will interpret the treaty provisions. And indeed its decision in the Pringle case has given us a very considerable insight and useful insight into how it's approaching this job of interpretation. Some academics have described the ECJ as validating crisis management and moving away from what the treaty structure might have initially envisaged being crisis prevention. And it has in truth done so on what I think are very justifiable interpretations of treaty articles that had within them a certain perhaps lack of clarity and ambiguity. But of course it's fundamental to any constitutional document that it should not be too prescriptive in terms of detail. And these provisions introduced in Maastricht perhaps never envisaged the use to which they would be put but that is true of many constitutions. But they had a certain flexibility and thankfully the authors of those treaty provisions had perhaps a certain foresight that created provisions that did have an ability to be interpreted in the context of the requirement of the requirements and crisis which the European Union has had to meet at a particular time. The European Treaty like perhaps most constitutional documents is a living document. It's not confined an aspect to be interpreted as perhaps might have been envisaged in 55 or at the time of the Maastricht and indeed the whole pedigree of the European Court has been to introduce interpretations that have supported the European Union. And while you can analyse in various ways as has been done in many learned legal articles the justifications for the interpretation given to treaty provisions and in particular the no bailout clause by the ECJ, it is true to say that their interpretation has a sound legal basis though of course people are free to differ with its interpretation. It identified one very important constitutional principle that was nowhere written into the treaty and that is the constitutional principle of conditionality, of financial conditionality. That where bailouts are being given or they don't use the words bailouts but where support is being given it is subject to strict financial conditionality. And on that basis it was enabled to interpret the treaty provisions in a way that supported the ESM and the measures taken in connection therewith. And it highlighted one other matter that's of importance. People talk about treaty amendment as if this is the panacea for all of the difficulties. But you've only to look at Pringle to see that where there was treaty amendment which many people said was necessary to enable article 136 to be utilised or to enable the member states more legally correctly to provide support and that they weren't prevented by anything in the treaty. The very treaty amendment gave rise to legal controversy so it doesn't necessarily bring legal certainty. And then if you go back to the legal basis for the SSM and the SRM I think Governor Ben Bernanke in a conference in 2013, May 2013 organised by the Federal Reserve Bank said it's reasonable to ask whether systemic risk can be easily identified in advance given that his Federal Reserve and many economists did not predict it. And he went on to highlight the difference between the triggers of a financial crisis and the vulnerabilities on which the financial crisis impacts. And if you step back for a moment what the SSM and the SRM are seeking to do is to actually identify in advance those vulnerabilities to correct the vulnerabilities on which a financial crisis will impact and ultimately to provide the foundation for a banking or for a monetary union that is in truth essential and has not been explicitly provided for in the treaty. But that approach and what Vice President Constatio said today, what Minister Noonan said, what so many others have said, we are looking at measures that in truth are designed to foster the better integration of the single market, the single market that comprises the fundamental freedoms of the European Union and in this context in particular banking services. And the SSM achieves that but it thankfully has an explicit treaty based on Article 1276. Some people say well this creates a conflict with the other tasks of the ECB. But the truth of the matter is the treaty has allowed for that potential conflict because it has prescribed that the ECB can have this supervisory role. And it was ffarsighted to do so because a supervisory role by the ECB as patented others have explained is in truth critical to the maintenance of the financial system which in turn is essential for any real monetary union. More difficult is the SRM, there is no explicit treaty basis but Article 114 which enables measures to be introduced that achieve the objectives of Article 6 of the TFEU which is to foster the integration of the single market in my view provides a clear treaty basis. You have only to look at what has been said in the last two years as to the need for an SRM, an SSM in the context of achieving better financial integration. Even this morning Minister Noonan spoke of the fragmentation of the single market that has arisen because of this lack of cohesion. And the SRM is critical to the SSM, they cannot be separated and the explanatory memoranda which have been produced by the commission actually distill the wisdom of so many experts as to its necessity. Perhaps of interest to Ireland is the remark that saving banks in one country helping to achieve a resolution in one country has significant advantages for banks in other countries enhances their financial stability and their security and that is the justification for having this tax on banks or levy on banks to pay for the SRM. So I believe that is the basis you can argue about the structure and say that certain aspects of the structure perhaps are unwieldy. That's inevitable when you don't have it configured in the treaty and when you're working within the confines of the treaty you can say that you can have arguments about certain aspects of how it's done. I believe those arguments can be overcome. The council has presented a very, in my view, incisive legal paper on the issues and how they might be identified or how they might be corrected any lingering issues. And it's important not to confuse legal objection as I say with the perspective of various people. One of the reasons for German objections of course is because of their concern about their own constitutional constraints and in particular the fundamental law that there cannot be an absence of democratic legitimacy for measures that are introduced at a European level. But in the context of the EU treaty, I believe the problems can be overcome and have been or will be addressed in the present measures. And just one final point, John, if there is an amendment of the treaty I don't believe at present the simplified procedure can be used because in essence it amounts to conferring additional capability on the union. That doesn't permit the simplified procedure. If the amendments were of a very narrow nature in terms of internal structures you could use the simplified procedure but not if it's a broad-based amendment. And that does pose issues for individual member states as to how they achieve that amendment within their own legal system. So in shorter, perhaps too long John, I think there is a sound legal basis. I don't think it requires an aggressive interpretation. I think it requires a sensible interpretation well based on the treaty provisions and on the approach that the ECJ has taken in this crisis.