 Thank you everyone for coming. Before I get started I have this disclaimer that I don't necessarily have to read out loud but I do have to highlight. Basically if you have any questions about this paper you should direct them to myself or Tad Howe. Don't ask any of the commissioners they haven't read it. Okay so we have various business models in the content creation market and in this paper we're going to classify these business models into three broad categories. The first category that we're thinking about is discovery mode so this is going to be exemplified by platforms like Facebook, YouTube, Instagram or Twitter. The main function the way these platforms add value is by facilitating content discovery and then they make money by generating ad revenue. The next category that we're thinking about is membership platforms or membership mode and so this would be platforms like Patreon, Subbable or Substack and there's some argument as to whether this really has cross-grid network externalities but I'm going to use the term platform because changing terms is difficult and I'm lazy. So these membership platforms are providing infrastructure for creators to directly monetize viewers so you can think of it as kind of like Shopify for content creators so they are making it easy for consumers to give direct donations to content creators which is the model of Patreon and then they make money by taking a commission on that revenue and importantly these two modes are not mutually exclusive so our third category is hybrid mode which would be exemplified by platforms like Twitch or TikTok so these both have both a discovery component where they're helping consumers find content creators and a membership component where they're facilitating this direct value transfer and one of the reasons that this hybrid mode is important is that a lot of platforms are switching toward operating in hybrid mode so examples of platforms that are going from discovery mode to hybrid mode would be YouTube which launched channel membership in 2018 Facebook which launched what they call creator membership and in 2021 Twitter introduced something that they call super follows which is basically just the same idea as channel membership or creator membership where you're paying a monthly fee to get extra content and some of the reasoning behind this is that they felt they were in danger of becoming a promotional tool for substack writers and clubhouse creators so they were aware of the role they were playing facilitating content discovery but they wanted some ability to capture some of the direct value transfer from consumers to creators and then there are also some examples of platforms that have gone from membership mode to hybrid mode so teachable playbook and also only fans have started to include some discovery components in their platforms and so our questions for this paper are what are the tradeoffs between these three platform business models what are the implications for content design decisions by creators and how do the tradeoffs change when there are multiple platforms and in particular this shift towards operating in hybrid mode is not universal so patreon has specifically not shifted towards hybrid mode and so we want to explore what is driving this coexistence of different business modes quick preview of results so for our monopoly platform benchmark we compare peer discovery versus hybrid and we find that that leads to more platform profit and more production of niche content peer membership versus hybrid has a ambiguous effect on profit and content design and it's really going to depend on the amount of advertising revenue that is available to a monopoly platform they get a lot of revenue then it's going to give different results than if you have very little work and then our main result that I'm going to highlight here for having multiple platforms is that in equilibrium you end up with strategic business model differentiation in order to avoid direct competition so again starting with our monopoly benchmark we have a monopoly platform a continuum of content creators and a continuum of consumers each with unit demand and while I'm describing the content creators and consumers I'm going to suppose that the platform is inactive because this is going to form the outside option for consumers and creators and their decision making with the platform active is going to be roughly similar so for consumers consumers engage in willensky style sequential search for creators where each search costs s zero and so if consumer j inspects creator i there's going to be a probability lambda i that there is a match in taste between that creator and that consumer in which case consumers utility from becoming a viewer of that creator is going to be a consumer specific utility for public content and with probability beta j they are also going to like that creators exclusive content and so the exclusive content has a value vi and then the creator charges a price pi to access that exclusive content and if pi is greater than vi then consumers are never going to buy importantly this beta is price independent so you can think of this as just the probability that i like the exclusive content given the price and with one probability one minus lambda there's going to be a mismatch in tastes in which case the utility from becoming a viewer is zero this b sub j and beta j are going to be independently realized and we're going to denote by beta not the expectation of beta j creators are going to be anti symmetric each creator is going to choose a design which is this lambda probability the likelihood for match and taste and importantly the consumer's willingness to pay for exclusive content the is going to be a function of lambda which is a decreasing and differentiable function so the interpretation here is that a higher lambda is a broader design so you're going to have consumers more likely to like that content but the amount that they like that content if they like it is going to be less this is in the spirit of johnson and my it's a broad niche trade off and it's important to remember this this is going to be one of the fundamental trade-offs in the paper for content design creator eyes per viewer revenue is going to be a not which is the ad or sponsorship revenue that a creator is able to get on their own plus any intrinsic utility that they get from creating content plus their expected exclusive content revenue now allowing the platform to be active the platform can operate one or both of the following so if they operate a discovery portal this is going to be facilitating content discovery it's going to lower consumer search cost to s and if each step of consumer search it's going to recommend a creator to consumers and the way we're modeling this recommendation process is as a telecontest so the probability that creator i is recommended is lambda i this match probability taken to the power r divided by the sum of all of the match probabilities on the discovery portal also taken to the power r and our here is the recommendation sensitivity of the platform so if our increases then it becomes more sensitive to the broadness of the content it's going to be more likely to recommend a creator with a higher lambda and as our decreases that gets closer to becoming random matching a discovery portal is going to generate per viewer ad revenue a for the platform so capital a and it's going to raise creators ad revenue to a bar which is going to be greater than a not and the reason that these two are separate is that the creators ad revenue might be separate and untaxable but from from the point of view of the platform so this could be something like a third party sponsorship deals a membership portal is going to increase the average likelihood that each consumer is interested in accessing exclusive content to beta bar so you can think of this as the membership portal is making it easier for content creators to distribute exclusive content it's going to provide a set framework for distributing exclusive content it's going to make it easier for consumers to like exclusive content and then it's going to charge a transaction commission tau on creators exclusive content written and it's going to take a moment to highlight why we're thinking about the recommendations as a contest so creators often complain of having to chase the algorithm so we know recommendation algorithms generally prioritize content which maximizes engagement which means that there's going to be a indirect competition in content design but the chance of succeeding at that contest to get a recommendation is going to be stochastic from point of view of creators because the design of the algorithm is otherwise pretty opaque so we have this effort dedicated to winning a prize this recommendation plus a stochastic victory probability which sounded a lot to us like a contest and then if you're working with a contest uh till it contests are tractable the timing of the model starts with the platform choosing its modes of operation uh sorry mode of operation um it only chooses one at a time uh p sets its recommendation design r if it is operates a discovery portal its transaction commission tau if it operates a membership portal or both if it's operating in hybrid mode uh creators are going to make unbundled participation decisions so unbundled here means that if you have a hybrid platform they can participate in the discovery portal or the membership portal or both or neither if they want um and they're going to choose their content design and set the exclusive content price consumers are going to observe the platform's decisions but they're not going to observe the decisions of individual creators and then they're going to just choose whether to search and whether to search on a discovery portal if it's being operated or on their own and the solution concept we're going for is perfect Bayesian equilibrium with symmetric strategies by creators so for the consumer creator sub game we're going to focus on hybrid mode because the sub game with a peer discovery platform or a peer membership platform is going to be equivalent with either the commission or uh the uh recommendation sensitivity determined exogenously uh so it's just going to change some of the parameters uh so in the equilibrium of the uh hybrid uh mode platform each creator i is going to join the platform they're going to set their design to maximize this function and they're going to set their exclusive content price equal to the value of their exclusive content uh each consumer is going to believe that creators are adopting this symmetric strategy and they're going to initiate search if their utility for public content times the probability they like it is greater than the cost of a search uh and optimally they're going to follow the platform's recommendation at every step uh because they are being led towards content they're more likely to like and they're going to search through the platform until they find a positive match and given this condition the mass of searchers is going to be the probability that the utility for exclusive content is greater than s divided by lambda which for notational convenience we're going to denote by g of lambda over s the reasoning for this equilibrium is that each creator's profit is going to be proportional to creator of consumer participation times the probability of being recommended times the probability of a taste match times their margin and because each creator is part of a continuum uh they can't affect this denominator or consumer participation so their design is going to be equivalent to maximizing this times this times this which is this function and then v is homogenous across consumers which is going to imply full value extraction or ph equal to v uh so with the hybrid mode we're going to end up with a design that is uh maximize the argument maximizing this function and this massive searchers if we compare that to a peer discovery platform uh the main difference when it comes to design is going to be the fact that creators are having to monetize exclusive content on their own so rather than having a uh commission a revenue uh with some tax by the platform they have uh beta not uh and this is going to determine creators participation constraint on the platform and because we have this participation constraint they're going to get at least a weekly higher exclusive content revenue and then there's also going to be change in design because the argument that maximizes this is not necessarily equal to the argument that maximizes this and if we hold our constant uh in fact we are going to have more niche content or creators are going to decrease the broadness of their content design with a hybrid platform and so we're going to end up with fewer consumers visiting the platform because lambda h is going to be lower than lambda dot d uh in terms of comparing profit uh a peer discovery platform has more consumers visiting so uh this g here is greater than g here but a hybrid platform has this additional revenue source uh that they get by taking the commission on exclusive content revenue uh which uh would seem to be ambiguous however our first main result is that operating in hybrid mode is always more profitable for a platform than operating in peer discovery mode and you're always going to get uh well weekly niche or content uh than a peer discovery platform um and so the the main uh argument here is profit replication uh argument so the platform can always set tau equal to one minus beta naught over beta in which case the creators are getting the same expected revenue from exclusive content than they would that they would uh on their own and that's going to induce the same design uh and so you have the same participation in that case plus this additional revenue so you get greater profit can i can ask a quick question um so i'm probably missing something but isn't that the case that you always want to uh make the constraint binding uh not necessarily um so remember you have this trade off where you are decreasing consumer participation but you're also increasing this margin so by by charging by increasing your fee tau uh what is the impact on consumers uh increasing tau is going to lead to broader content oh sorry um increasing tau is going to lead to broader content okay which means that you increase participation but remember that v is decreasing uh and so that's how tau plays affects the the kind of content and that's why you may not want to yes okay thanks um yeah and in fact uh yeah sorry um so the fact that we get uh more niche content or less broad content is uh partly the fact that consumers are um getting more exclusive content revenue and partly due to the fact that the uh platform is also going to set a weekly less sensitive recommendations uh system so there are is going to be lower than the are that a peer discovery platform would set uh if we compare a peer membership platform to a hybrid platform the main differences are in terms of design are going to be the fact that uh the design is going to be maximizing a function that has less advertising revenue um but also no competition for creators and a peer membership center case so um going from peer membership to hybrid is going to induce this competition for recommendation it's going to lead to higher ad revenue uh and for searchers it's also going to decrease search costs so even if uh content design were unchanged you would have an increase in consumer participation uh this is these factors are going to lead creators to increase the broadness of their content design you're so you're going to have less niche content design for a constant tau um so overall you're going to have more consumer participation because of uh increase in lambda and a decrease in the search cost the profit comparison here is not necessarily uh going to go in favor of one or the other however so you have this increased participation and you have this advertising revenue but again you're decreasing v so you're decreasing this margin uh for any given tau so our second main result is that a hybrid platform is going to be more profitable than a monopoly peer membership platform if this advertising revenue is greater than some threshold and the reasoning here is what we're calling a distraction effect so because creators are going to choose broader design for any given tau due to the recommendation competition for recommendation and they're increased in ad revenue the platform might not be able to induce its desired content design and so adding a discovery portable portal can be unprofitable if a here is fairly small so if the platform is not relying heavily on its transaction commission you can actually hurt more than it helps uh and there's a real really nice real world example of this so in 2019 patreon published a uh blog post labeled why isn't patreon a discovery platform and they argued that adding a discovery component would force creators to design content to appeal to whatever discovery algorithm they would introduce which they described as getting in between creators and patrons uh and then they went on to focus how on how they want their business to focus on high value relationships with small audiences as opposed to having a very large audience with many low value viewers and this is actually exactly the tradeoff being described by our model and so if a platform's revenue is transaction focused then adding this discovery portal can actually hurt more than it helps uh so going from uh pair membership to a uh hybrid platform can also have an ambiguous effect on content design so again if the commission were fixed then you would have broader content with a hybrid platform but a hybrid platform could theoretically choose a lower commission partly because of the increased ad revenue meaning that for any given commission this is higher and the platform might want lower content design but also because you're going to have increased consumer participation regardless uh and this lower tau means that you might end up having more niche content uh with a hybrid platform and the hybrid platform is going to want niche design if a is sufficiently small because it doesn't need to work as hard to encourage consumer participation uh and it wants to maximize that membership revenue so our result on content design here is that uh you're going to get broader content with a hybrid platform if this capital a is greater than some threshold uh and then for all three modes the content the broadness of content is going to at least weekly decrease as consumer search costs decrease which sounds reminiscent of the bar isocadal search results in AER but in our setup search costs don't actually have a direct effect on creators design what we have is this uh fact this factor that was described in the core you have lower search costs meaning more visiting consumers um for any given design and the platform is going to choose its recommendation scheme and commission to induce more niche content design because they don't have to encourage consumers to visit as much right so that's the monopoly benchmark what happens if you have multiple platforms uh so we start with a model where we have two homogenous platforms each content creator is going to make a single content design decision but they are going to be able to mix and match in participation decisions so as a content creator I could participate on the discovery portal of one platform and the membership portal of a different platform freely and you can also consumers and creators can also freely multi-home the timing of the model is going to start with platforms acting simultaneously so similar to the monopoly benchmark it starts with choosing mode of operation which the platforms are going to do simultaneously and then they are also going to make their decisions for recommendation sensitivity and commissions simultaneously in the equilibrium of the consumer creator sub game creators are going to join both discovery portals essentially because it's costless to do so they're going to join the membership portal that has the lowest commission and consumers are going to search on the discovery portal that is most sensitive to broad content and they're going to join the membership portal of their matched creator uh so our main result here is that when a competing platform strategy includes a membership portal it is never a best response to operate a competing membership portal so if we compare this to the monopoly case going from pure discovery to hybrid is actually unprofitable it's not just uh weekly unprofitable it's strictly unprofitable if the opponent operates a membership portal and the reason here is that because we have homogenous membership portals we have a lot of competition and therefore a low exclusive content commission so platforms are going to be relying mostly on ad revenue and this competition in commission is going to lead to a negative spillover to ad revenue and the mechanism is you have a low commission which leads to creators choosing a more niche design which means you're going to have fewer visiting consumers and therefore lower total ad revenue than you would if you just had a say a pure membership and a pure discovery portal then for other main results in the multiple platform section uh suppose operating a discovery portal involves a fixed cost c which is actually something that we have been assuming throughout the entire paper it just didn't make much of a substantial difference until now uh so in the overall equilibrium with this fixed cost there's going to be a threshold such that if a is less than this threshold in equilibrium you have one platform operating in pure discovery mode and one platform operating in pure membership mode and if a is greater than that threshold uh you have one platform operating in pure discovery mode and one platform operating in hybrid mode now this is not actually going to be due to the distraction effect um so we can think of this distraction effect as being absent or in another sense it's kind of always there because we have a pure discovery portal no matter what there's always going to be a recommendation system that has some sensitivity to content creators design and content creators advertising revenue is always going to be higher than a not um and so whether uh this platform over on the right here decides to include a discovery portal doesn't change content creators design it's really comparing this fixed cost to the ad revenue they would get in equilibrium so if capital a divided by two it's greater than c uh a platform might as well add a discovery portal uh so we also have a few extensions that we've gone through the main one where we have some results changing is with horizontally differentiated platforms so if you have horizontally differentiated membership portals then you can actually end up with multiple membership portals in equilibrium but a lot of our main intuition survives this extension um if we allow for asymmetric creators and black elastic creator participation our results survive essentially unchanged and then uh as a work in progress we're working on endogenizing advertising revenue for both creators and the platform there is a pretty nice related literature here so there's a robust literature on media platforms um most of this literature uh is relating to platforms that are intermediating between consumers and advertisers for this paper we're mainly focusing on intermediation between content creators and advertisers sorry content creators and consumers um and content creators are essentially users so this obviously means that we have a relationship to the user-generated content literature um most of this literature is focused on the behavior of users who are generating content um our focus here is more on the business models of a platform and this idea of direct monetization of users so pay and mazlin for example are thinking about a advertiser-funded influencer and of course this business model focus means that we're related to the literature that's looking at business models of media platform including this excellent paper right here our focus difference different is different from most of this literature because we're interested in this membership component of the platform so most of this literature has focused on pay tv versus ad supported tv uh and uh there's some other papers that are related particularly uh some interest uh interesting relationship to the crowdfunding literature uh so in conclusion uh didn't get uh as many clarifying questions as I built in time for so tonight I guess you have a little extra time um we create a model that is looking at the implications of business model decisions by platforms for the content creation market and we build a model that has endogenous content designed by creators along a broad niche axis uh we allow our platform to form a recommendation scheme set a commission and it receives ad revenue going from pure discovery mode to hybrid mode is always profitable for monopoly platform it's going to be unprofitable if an undifferentiated rival membership portal exists because of this negative spillover effect on advertising revenue and it's going to make equilibrium content design more niche than you would have with a pure discovery portal going from pure membership mode to hybrid mode is going to create a distraction effect that means it may be unprofitable for a monopoly platform to operate a membership portal sorry a discovery portal but this distraction effect is going to be irrelevant if a rival discovery portal exists and because of the distraction effect the effect on equilibrium content design is also going to be somewhat ambiguous and then if we have multiple platforms that can lead to strategic differentiation in business models uh in order to avoid direct competition uh thank you right thanks Ben um can you unshare your screen please and now Pina Il diem will discuss the paper all right well thank you so much next for including me in the program and and thanks to Ben and Pat for writing and sharing this very interesting thought provoking paper um I thought that I would try to put this paper in the intuition or the way that I would uh I would think about the the problem and I actually have worked on related problems so I'm just going to think about or try to explain the paper in the way that I understand um and the way that I think about this paper is looking at a very close literature which actually leads to goes back to the media bias literature in this particular literature we think about media bias or the extent of extremism that media platforms might choose is a way of differentiation especially in a competing market and um looking at for instance will I not finish life or paper from 2005 to the AER paper this is uh this paper is thinking about a newspaper competition where the media outlets can choose political bias as a form of differentiation and consumers desire some degree of confirmation bias in its market and then the newspapers only make revenue from subscription that is a push for differentiation right it's uh something that increases willingness to to pay of the consumer if you can differentiate your content and it's x as a force of maximum differentiation in this market now in a follow-up paper actually we thought about with my co-authors um how the the product differentiation and uh competition in this market would change if newspapers were to make revenues from advertising as opposed to subscription or if there was a combination of the two and that you can see already that the the motivation to differentiate will look very different especially in a market where advertisers are looking for eyeballs what you want to deliver to advertisers is simply broader methods larger audiences right compared to the previous force of trying to extract surplus through the increasingly willingness to pay of the consumer when you're operating in a subscription market or with subscription advertiser with revenues with advertisers you have the the opposite effect bigger leadership can command higher advertising revenues as a result you're going to differentiate differentiate less and you're going to simply reduce media bias in this market with you will end up with lower subscription fees and that's also in turn going to reflect on to your advertising revenues as you're trying to deliver simply larger masses and reduce differentiation and end up you know changing your your subscription fees in turn you also have to adjust your advertising fees but um you know long story short by looking already at the media bias and media differentiation literature and comparing subscription and advertising revenues we know that there are two forces in place one is trying to to maximize the willingness to pay of the consumer through subscription when you are operating under subscription you want to do that when you have advertising and when you're delivering eyeballs to advertisers as opposed to other forms of advertising you want to maximize readership and that means differentiation reducing differentiation so I think about this paper or the three modes of operation as a you know having a lot of parallels to this earlier literature discovery platforms in this case are simply to me advertising revenue generating platforms so as a result these platforms will want to generate broader content right to generate more recommendations more eyeballs and higher revenue as a result membership platforms on the other hand operate more like a subscription revenue platform and for them the objective is to deliver higher willingness to pay of the consumer or provide products that are closer to their preferences and a hybrid will be a combination of advertising and subscription and of course it might be you know profitable or not quickly now I think what's interesting about this paper are a few things first it's adding to this existing literature the idea of recommendation systems right or how do recommendation systems could potentially alter your revenues from advertising and subscription it's also thinking about these this asymmetric movements from subscription to hybrid or advertising revenue type and just to put the the intuition the way that I understand it thinking about adding subscription revenues to a platform that already operates under advertising now it actually is changing from the platform's perspective it relaxes the competition to make recommendations or it actually you know being able to generate revenues from subscription simply allows you to also may also recommend content that's not broad because broad content is for advertisers now I can also I have an incentive to recommend niche creators and niche content so this is almost a source of additional revenue as a result they find that the hybrid profits are higher than just operating under advertising but this is not necessarily the case if you look at the movement from the asymmetric side right just having subscription and adding advertising revenue on top of it doesn't necessarily mean higher profits in this case you can think of the two effects that are happening right first from the content provider's perspective when you add give them advertising the opportunities to earn advertising revenue on top of subscription now they have an incentive to create broader content but at the same time you know this broader content reduces the ability to extract the fees from a subscription prices from the consumer so one positive one negative effect overall the the profit the effect on the profit is ambiguous so and the relative benefits of one advertising versus subscription is actually to some extent under the control of the the platform as it sets its commissions the tau commission rates as well as are but ultimately it seems like all of the benefits are actually defined by some of these assumptions that are set by the authors with respect to how as you go from advertising to subscription to hybrids the advertising revenue the potential for additional advertising revenue or the potential for additional subscription revenue which actually is captured by the beta are changed so these these assumptions drive better you can make more money from one versus the other and i think it also is another additional interesting finding looking at the the competitive case and showing that of course you know in a competitive case if you only operate through a subscription you are now going to to reduce your ability to extract surplus because your tau you have to set tau competitively at the same time if you're competing under just advertising profits you're going to have to compete for creators and that's also going to reduce or limit your ability to to earn revenues from advertising but in a symmetric competition of the two where one platform is differentiating in business model and operating under subscription and the other one under advertising might actually become more profitable and i think this is one of the fairly you know new and more interesting findings of this paper so i think i briefly mentioned what's novel to me what's novel about this paper compared to the existing comparisons of advertising subscription business models is a recommendation plot engine or recommendation platform and i think this can be pushed further i will talk about that a little bit the choice of revenue sources under competition right this asymmetric choice and the fact that there could be different incentives to move from you know your existing business model advertising or subscription to hybrid you know movement is not necessarily profitable for both they there's some asymmetry with regards to whether it's profitable now a couple recommendations or couple sort of thoughts on the paper i thought that's actually the recommendation links are fairly interesting and that's an under looked area how the revenue model of a firm of a platform might be influencing its recommendations the content of the recommendations and i thought a simple example of this could be newspapers right some newspapers operate under advertising revenue and others operate under subscription revenue and they almost always make recommendations for consumers to to consume additional other content just like in in wall street journal and maybe you know the content of these recommendations might be a lot a lot broader subjects or a lot more niche subjects depending on the revenue and i don't know if this is true if there's any empirical support of it but the findings or the the paper that Ben and Pan has written would suggest that there should be some differences in the content of what's recommended based on the business model and i think this can be pushed further i don't think that the paper is currently doing enough to push this and this would be a very interesting extension even a paper on its own a second thing to think about is advertising revenue in this paper as well as you know in my some of my recent papers as well advertising revenue was captured simply serving eyeballs to the advertisers but that's actually just a very small perhaps an increasing sort of declining share of the market more of the examples that we see today are of course targeted advertising and targeted advertising acts closer to subscription revenue than advertising revenue because you're not delivering eyeballs you're delivering a niche audience in that sense you know if you think of targeted advertising this is not going to have the same effect it's not going to the platforms that are paid for targeted advertising are not going to show the same effect in fact uh you know advertising and subscription revenue might act in exactly the same direction um unlike what has been shown here and it's going to have a very different effect in terms of competition for the creators as well um a second third thought perhaps a multi-homing of the the creators and consumers now multi-homing is mentioned in a few places on the paper but it hasn't really been implemented in the model from what I can see because a the creators can independently right they actually choose between the modes they don't necessarily make a decision thinking about a combination of the modes they they could for instance make less advertising revenue in in order to get more subscription revenue but they don't do that a second thing is consumers are only paying to one platform what I know from my own papers this figure comes from that earlier paper that I mentioned the multi-homing choice or loving multi-homing could change results drastically and I think this is going to be the case here this is just an idea for thought for further exploration thinking about how loving the creators or consumers to my home would change the results and one final thing perhaps a small detail I found in the and I know this is a working paper so you'll be changing the paper quite a bit I imagine but I found that in many parts of the the model the assumptions regarding the parameters for instance the G the D they were not necessarily tied to the remaining parameters of the model they were changing in ways but you couldn't link exactly how they were changing regarding the the parameters such as tau and and V or alpha beta and so on and I would like to see how they actually change together because if some of these things are endogenized competition especially when these parameters are endogenized it gets very quickly very messy and being able to study this asymmetric revenue model might become either infeasible or it might actually generate different results I believe so that was one other thing to think about overall though I thought that this paper was quite interesting it allowed me to think about new ideas and I look forward to seeing the complete version thank you