 Thank you very much the organizers for the invitation and Antonia for a nice presentation of the project in general. It's been a it was a pleasure to work with my quarter longstanding and with all Experts as you said economists and political scientists and here I present a paper Which is titled no taxation without state assigned property rights so We all know where we started that the property rights affect development and the taxation positively affects development Antonia just told you about the taxation governance benefits and the Other benefits and we also our paper alludes to a very the title of our paper alludes to a very famous Slogan of the American Revolution right no taxation without representation and we also know that property rights is the key since Douglas north and Ronald Cole's work that property rights are also key to Development, but the link between property rights and taxation is understudied and this is both relevant for the individual level studies and cross-political cross-country or other political studies so while Motivation our research question was does difference in property rights regimes affect taxation and with this question in mind we straight away focused on the Sub-Saharan Africa region because Here we observed a very clear difference between Property rights regimes I Want to say that property rights allocation and How they are located and how they are held is a very complex story Do not take me wrong can be made a reference to a lot of research that points to it However, it's also could be for the sake of the argument categorized into two broad types and which was Based on research by Catherine Boone who did a lot of research on land in Africa So this status property rights regimes where central state is the land allocator and dispute adjudicator and new customers are called new customary rights regimes where state-backed local leaders exercise authority over land allocations and land dispute adjudication so if you look at the Situation empirically in Sub-Saharan Africa you can see that The average share of land governed by the traditional authorities is about 60% This is based on the also the quite reputable data by at least Island Wiley and colleagues who work a lot in Africa land situation and the what is good for Statistical analysis right that there is a lot of variation in this data from 96% in Somalia to only 2% in Rwanda And I'm taking this for the last date that we have in our data set which is 2015 so the question is that more specifically research question that drives our research is Does it make a difference for taxation? what type of authority assigns and uphold property rights on land and again We straight away switch to land and I can I can talk more about why land and in NQA, but I mean if it our scope conditions straight away was Sub-Saharan Africa and the different types of authorities that manage property rights and the Land came into kind of question Naturally So our argument very simple. It does make a difference. So within the social kind of contract framework we Argument that why would individuals pay taxes to the state? When they depend on the traditional authorities to sustain their property rights So therefore where property rights are signed and upheld by the state individuals are more likely to Ascent to pay taxes to support the authority upon which their property rights depend Property rights bring people into contact with the state. They make the state more legitimate in the eyes of the citizens and also the Tax tax demands that the state solicits from citizens also makes sense to the to the to the individuals in such a situation So therefore our hypothesis that we have tested that to where the extent of the state formalization of Individual property rights on land is greater than citizens more really readily ascent to pay taxes to government and we test this hypothesis using two Data one in individual level data and then cross-country Analysis and the empirical setting is Sub-Saharan African countries So I will start with the country-level analysis although in the paper we go the other way around but I think for the sake of the presentation It's actually a better. So just to show you the like kind of associational right association between the extent to which the State assigned property rights associated with the taxation. So we use our own data set that we Developed and then this is an extent and quality of cadastre as a measure of state land formalization of individual property rights And our dependent variable is share of tax and individual As a share in GDP Or income tax again You would argue or why it is not lent tax and I can answer this in the in the Q&A but I will tell you straight away that the variation and so the first of all the Collection from land and property taxes in these countries is so low and the variation is not a non-existent So it's unfortunately due to the data limitation that we couldn't run this test meaningfully Yes, and we run several kind of specifications, but our main specification. We only use Country fix effects and time fix effects and the up to four Lugs of dependent variable. So but first of all what is cadastre because this is assumption that we find it interesting that the Kind of the the the good grasp of the general public is not there on on cadastre. So cadastre is a public record containing information on First land asset it's a real estate assets and second is the Party that holds Interests over this asset. So it has to have three three pieces of information who what and which rights or obligations if there are different varieties of public records of on land and And this should be in all in one kind of database if you wish in one the these two elements there are different varieties of Land registration systems and not all of them have all these three elements and therefore it is not cadastre So we have we have quite high requirement for what cadastre is and then we ask a question Where there was this where was there a state administered cadastre? Was the cadastre narrative or cartographic and how much of the country's territory was covered by the cadastre and then we for each country in the In this case sub-Saharan country for each year Which is our period is determined also by the availability of data on the dependent variable But our original data set runs over 1,000 years and 160 countries and We compute the cadastre indicator for every country year by multiplying these three score components by one another so by design customary lands or neocaster and lands are not included and we for the specific data set we excluded cadastrified state land So that is the work that we did additionally compared to our original data set. So we excluded because We talk about individuals and they are incentive. So it would be strange to Use the state the land that state uses so this is a Example for you, although it's by the way from Ethiopia where most of the land is state land But this is a difference between narrative cadastre and cartographic cadastre narrative cadastre is just a description of the land parcel runs from that big rock to that big tree or it is a cartographic representation with some relevant information like the quality of land and Etc. So this is just to show you a quick kind of pooled Bivariate association. So you can see that there where We have a great extent of cadastre. There is also higher share of revenue on income tax and this the the slope for the near customary Property rights as a percentage of land is even stronger the relationship So then we run a relation the regression analysis This is as I said, there are several specification I show you one with four lakhs of dependent variable And so what we find that the transition from no cadastre to full cadastre leads to about half percent percentage points increase of revenue from In this tax individual taxes, and we also calculate long 2.28 percent So as you can it is not super strong the magnitude, but here we go so we find a positive association and But we in with this data we are not able to test the postulated mechanism, right? So that the property rights Increases consent to taxation and then it leads to increase in tax revenue. For example That would be enough for the paper by Matthias one home, right? So just that the this is a great informational capacity by the state not necessarily that it is and impacts kind of Individual calculations of people to consent or not to the consent to pay tax so Therefore we use individual data From the seven route of after the after a barometer It's 42,000 individuals for third from 32 sub-Saharan African countries and our dependent variable is the ascent to pay tax And the our independent variable is the question How likely is that that if the respondent went to the government offices to find out who owns a piece of land in their community? So we call it assessed information on land We argued that you can only find information who owns land from a government office if government has these records, right? So that is a little bit of a Assumption here and we use Ordered probate probate regression. So this is a distribution of Assess access to informational on land variable the lighter colors represent high access These countries these two countries are excluded because we look at the sub-Saharan countries But this is all countries from the Afro barometer And then here is our results. So just to say so that if you are very likely to find Information from the government about the ownership in their communities You're also more likely to agree with the statement that the government has the right to pay to make people to pay taxes. So I Think this is at least preliminary support to argument that the type of public authority who assigns and upholds property rights matter for for the strengths of the fiscal contract and the State assigned property rights they incentivize citizens to respond to the state's tax demands as this supports the authority underpinning their property rights and We find evidence both in the cross-country and individual data as I said the magnitude of our estimates suggest that the state led formalization of property rights perhaps not the most potent answer to the Fiscal problems in the region and the even full electrification At the as it stands at the moment would not allow an immediate sub-Saharan African country to address the need of about 19% of GDP to finance Sustainable development goals and this is based on the data from 2015. I think that the now gap is even larger Right as I understand and therefore the so that that is not the most potent answer To the question. I mean probably with if we take That the catastrophization improves also land and the property taxation. This the results will be a little bit more Rosie, but I still think this is kind of not the the silver bullet to the question So this is some kind of limitations for the research for example Fabra for a barometer for unknown reasons to me doesn't have measure that Measures this property rights situation of the respondents assumption that we should do and Yes and more work needed on the different types of traditional authorities and different levels of state authorities and also what happens when They are no customary rights, but they are also Recognized by the state. So it's like two tiers situation We also need to consider this because this is increasingly the case for example in Kenya Communal rights, right? Community rights have been Catastrophied to certain extent. This is the country that I know better, but I know also that in other countries this similar work Goes on. Yes. I don't have any channels. Thank you so much and I would be happy to take questions