 Hi, I'm Peter Bergen. Thanks for attending this event. We're lucky to have Candace Rondo, who's Senior Director for Future Frontlines and Planetary Politics at New America. Author of a forthcoming book on the Wagner Group, published by Public Affairs, also a professor of practice at Arizona State and part of the Center of the Future of War at ASU. And also Ben Dalton, who's a program manager of Future Frontlines, previously worked at BuzzFeed and the International Crisis Group. So let's just dive straight in. I guess it seems that Progosian has landed in Belarus according to some news reports. So Candace, is he going to get a warm reception? Is he going to get put in jail? What's going to happen? Candace, I think you're on mute. Sorry. He seems to have slipped the news this time. You know, warm reception is debatable. I think we don't really know yet exactly what circumstances he's being held under. He seems to be more or less free to operate in Minsk. We assume he's in Minsk, but again we don't know that either. As you know, Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus, is an extremely, you know, a man who's very tight with facts and has managed to keep a lid on the news environment, the information environment in Belarus for the better part of 20 years. I mean, basically he's kind of a lesser twin brother of Vladimir Putin in the sense that he's, you know, the dictator next door. And so we don't know actually a lot about the circumstances there, but we do know that Progosian released a statement saying essentially Wagner would be operating from Belarusian territory, which seems to say and signal that it doesn't really matter what happened with the mutiny that happened over the weekend. And in fact, he will not be punished. He might even be rewarded for everything that occurred that seems to have shaken the foundations of Russia's society. In another context, Churchill said it's not the beginning of the end is the end of the beginning. Is this the end of the beginning for Putin, or, you know, or is he, you know, he's done such a good job of washing any kind of dissent that he is. No one knows including Putin, but what's your take candidates about like what have this is done for him personally. Yeah, I mean the response from Putin has been so weak. And I think everybody kind of will universally say that they would have expected an iron fist from Putin. And instead what we saw was just kind of non action inertia, almost a kind of paralysis that seemed to occur. And then, you know, after the fact, this very weak statement that he gave it was very short little speech that he gave was saying well, you know, that was a terrible thing that happened but you know we're going to drop the charges anyway. It's it was a really confusing message and I think the one thing we can say about Vladimir Putin is that he's been pretty on message for the better part of his 24 year reign right so I've never really seen a moment where you know Vladimir Putin hasn't controlled the narrative fully. He is definitely not writing this chapter of Russia's history right now. He's either fascinated by the Ben or kind of something. To the extent that you can have polling in Russia, which is kosher, which seems to be there is some possibility the war has been pretty popular and as far as I can tell. You know, what, what is, what is state TV what is, you know, what, what, what is the Russian propaganda saying about all this because it seems like it would have to perform quite a lot of interesting moves to kind of make sense of all this. Yeah, listen, I mean, I know Ben's been tracking this I want to hear from him for sure but I think it's really weird to watch these like kind of state backed outlets like Sputnik and RT. I mean we saw some really strange stories about like a man who happened to share the name pregosin saying that he was going to take his, I guess his mother's maiden name, and because he was so embarrassed to be associated with the name pregosin. It was like the weirdest spin I have ever seen. I mean, it seems like like the state TV apparatus is in no way like coordinated with what's going on online. It's just, it's completely busted apart the entire state backed propaganda machine right Ben I think. I've seen these anchors perform these just bizarre, like 180s right where a week ago they were singing the praises of Wagner and pregosin as being like the most effective fighting force that Russia has in Ukraine and so forth and then on Saturday, all of a sudden they're traitors. And now they're somewhere in between. It's a very strange situation and yeah for the for the state backed TV. They're just, they're just turning on a dime and, you know, whatever impression that gives they seem not to mind. And the second stream of Russian media which a lot of that actually happens on the social media platform telegram, where people are sort of equally confused and taken aback by this series of events. One thing I noticed is so pregosin communicates a lot through these voice memos that he releases on his personal telegram channels, and the voice memo that he released on Saturday announcing that his column is going to turn around. That's something like 400,000 500,000 other like clown emojis, which is actually a very negative response. Yeah. I think that was super hilarious. I saw one comment. I'm sorry, it's, it's, it's weird to think this is comical but there are these comical elements to this very dark story. Somebody in like one of the comments said, you know, the clowns have left, but the circus goes on. Right. It was like the most, you know, apt, I think description of exactly what's going on in these last couple weeks I mean, because the headquarters of the MOD in Rostov is apparently located right across the street from the literal Rostov circus. Oh, fantastic. So one, one question is about Putin himself I mean, my understanding is that he doesn't really understand. He obviously understands TV because that's the kind of propaganda. I mean that's that's the media he grew up with, but he doesn't seem to really understand social media and he may not have understood. You know, kind of the environment around progression and the Wagner group and the extent to which progression was able to communicate and bypass him and what can you reflect a little bit about about that issue. Yeah, and Putin's understanding of social media and how to be, you know, I don't know if I fully agree with that I think certainly he, he does, he does seem like in this kind of split screen reality where he's forced to do the things that he grew up doing right like he saw, of course he grew up seeing, you know, Khrushchev and, you know, later Gorbachev on TV, making these, you know, big sort of almost like robotic, you know, statements and these kind of, you know, big scenes and tableaus as it were. And of course he's used that to a great effect I think to kind of sort of sense, you know, give the sense that I am the state it's very imperial and almost czarist in nature. Yeah that doesn't really play so well on social media that's just I think the reality is, you know, there are certain types of political ideologies that play well on social media and some that don't right and that's one of the things that he failed at is understanding how to flip the script and that's why he relied on pregosin so much pregosin did understand that there was this whole emergent kind of super conservative Christian Orthodox base that he could play to and frankly he had the backing of you know several very important oligarchs like Konstantin Malafa is of course one of the best examples of that head of Marshall Capital, one of the biggest backers of some of the contingents that were sent into Crimea back in 2014. You know, I mean, so I think, you know, Putin in a way was sort of outsourcing a lot of that work to pregosin, and that was his great utility. Let me ask you, how have the sort of the liberal opposition to Putin reacted to all this because it must put them in a bit of a bind, because obviously they're opposed to Putin but pregosin is, you know, hardly a liberal Democrat in his sort of impulses and worldview. Yeah, then what do you think I mean you've seen this kind of play out to. Yeah, I mean, they have not been major players in this drama. Pregosin speaks to, as Candace just said this enormous, not a majority I don't think but a very large minority of the Russian population that has these sort of ultra conservative oftentimes ultra Orthodox views. That group of people is very, very angry about what they see as sort of speckless, ineffective prosecution of this war in Ukraine, and pregosin for months now has been giving them a scapegoat it's not, you know, the Russian fighting forces it's not bureaucrats just sit at the top of the Ministry of Defense, specifically Shuegu and Grasimov but the implications that the entire sort of top of MOD is kind of rotten. That resonates because probably it's, to some extent true. Because yeah, I mean, I think Putin has kind of hinted at this for many, you know, many years as part of his career is that you know what comes after him is not going to be some like nice Western facing liberal in all likely that it's going to be somebody who is even more sort of militaristic and hardline. We mentioned a Grasimov, you know, I mean, because if we let's rewind the tape five years you know Grasimov was supposed to be this brilliant guy and he had this sort of like new approach to warfare and sort of the gray zone and stuff that Candace has been working on for a long time so he seems to have been strangely absent from a lot of this what what is the deal with him. Is he, you know, where is he now is he damaged. Yeah, that's very interesting question actually he has been way off camera. It's really interesting just in the last, you know, 24 hours that we've seen, whatever that strange footage was with Sergei Shogu like flying in a plane over over some battlefield it looked very contrived and possibly even like some old footage we don't really know yet. It is, it is interesting that we don't see the same effort being made to kind of show that Valery Grasimov is like on the scene ready to go. You know, doing the thing. On the other hand, that never really was his role he was always kind of I think I always think of him as the, as the kind of pen version of, you know, the Russian way of war, whereas Shogu was a little bit more the camera version. That's kind of, I don't know Ben what do you think about that. Yeah, well Shogu is fascinating he's such a survivor he's, I believe the longest serving Russian official in close proximity to Putin in, you know, one of the very few who's been in power since like that way back in the 90s. And Grasimov clearly does prefer to operate a little bit behind the scenes. Sorry to interrupt but I'll just say the chief difference between them is Grasimov is a military guy genuinely a military guy. Shogu is not right like he did not serve he did not come up in rank. He only has like a civilian equivalent in terms of rank and title. So I think that's another contrast sorry to interrupt you. And you know there's been a lot of speculation as to whether this is the end of Shogu but as of today he was just appearing in a meeting with Putin, there was some rumor about him getting another award so that trend of Shogu not getting else did and staying close to power seems to be continuing. We're getting some questions coming in so anybody in the audience just put put the questions in slide over and I'll ask Candice and Dan to. So first question is, could the Wagner group rebellion be applied to get an army into Belarus. For a invasion of Ukraine north from Bill Petraca. That's a great question. It's important to remember that one of the kind of unseen ties between the Wagner group and the official military is the Vede Bay airborne assault forces, which actually have been based, you know, in Belarus for, you know, since basically even the Soviet times, there's always been that connection there. Vitebsk is actually like a really important operating base. And Minsk of course is another kind of key logistical hub for the transfer of weapons and goods that are moving into Ukraine. We, for instance, you know, you might remember at the beginning of the invasion last year, we had these two symbols appearing on, you know, tanks and like infantry fighting vehicles. One was Z, which of course has now been, you know, the very famous symbol of the Russian special operation. And then the other was Vostok, right, so V. And that V was for direction from Belarus into so moving east into in sweeping around into Kiev. And, you know, I was given to understand that actually Wagner forces came through that line through an airdrop basically at the outset of the war. I know that there were also we also have written about this the presence of some of these detachments like Rusic that are related, or part of kind of the Wagner sort of umbrella I guess is the best way to describe it. And they inserted in the northeast in Kharkiv. So there were probably a few different places, but Belarus was extremely important for the opening of this war and it probably will be very important for the closing of it too. One thing I would just add to that also is, there's like a weird dimension of having like presumably a very significant part of the Wagner Corps relocated and based in Belarus, which is, you know, Lukashenko gave an address today where he basically said, Don't worry, these guys are not going to do to me what they just, you know, maybe came close to doing in Russia, we know how to keep them under control they're going to be training our soldiers, which is such a strange turn so as recently as 2020 three years ago, Lukashenko was so paranoid of these guys that when 33 of them turned up in Minsk as part of this extremely elaborate Ukrainian intelligence operation. And that they have been sent by Putin to depose him and now he's, he's in three years, not his way to like, being so comfortable with them that he's going willing to host a much, much larger presence. It's so weird. I mean, because I would I also think is weird is the way Lukashenko was like, Oh yeah, I've known precaution for like 30 years, which I think is probably not wrong is probably true that like Lukashenko has been to many a state dinner, or even like some sort of shuttle diplomacy where he has rocked up in Moscow or St. Petersburg, and had dinner with Putin or somebody, you know, very normal, right. That the, you know, the chief caterer for the Kremlin would be present for something like that. But did he know him know him that seems a little bit of a stretch I think right. What is his background Lukashenko I mean is he just a sort of old style party boss who sort of kind of survived or what. Yeah, I mean, I mean, I think that's the basic story. I mean he, he is a survivor in the same way as as Putin, they're kind of contemporaries, you know, part of the services, but I would categorize him as perhaps much less manufactured he's really the manufacturer of the Kremlin, more than the manufacturer of minst although I'm sure there's a little bit of a mix there. They still have a KGB, which could tell you a lot about the system of government there. Yeah. So in terms of the Ukrainian counter offensive it seems, you know, obviously it's early days but it seems to haven't been particularly effective. I mean, as I mean if Wagner is sort of off the field to some degree or I don't even know if that's the case but I mean, is there, you know, that's a pretty large element of, I mean, and what do you, I've seen numbers of 25,000 that I had somebody else sort of using to figure 8000 I mean is there, is there a reasonable number. I mean we've seen 2500 I mean we've seen all kinds of numbers honestly, you saw that the other day I mean it was really, look the numbers are all over the map I would not judge from the numbers like the full effect of what may occur or what it means in terms of where then the Ukrainian offensive counter offensive stands. This will sound a little controversial to those who are a little bit more dug in on the kind of military technical aspects of examining the war the tactical pieces. From my perspective, the Ukrainians have played the psychological warfare violin with kind of a virtuoso expertise here. I really think we have probably seen the insertion of a lot of interesting information that is intercepted, you know, dropped in different places, leaks hacks, all kinds of stuff that has been extremely important to undercutting pregosions and his ability to control the narrative. And that is, that's not insignificant, I mean, yes, trench warfare, totally get it yes bullets yes ammunition yes artillery, but honestly, the Ukrainians have absolutely mastered I think on some psychological warfare aspects. And here this is, you know, Madonna course who is the head the chief of military intelligence for Ukraine. I think there are a lot of credit goes to him in some ways for not getting in the way of, you know, pregosions kind of self inflicted wounds. Napoleon famously said, never interrupt your enemy when he's making a mistake. One thing I might just quickly add to sort of the implications for the war in Ukraine. So, as far as we, we know, Wagner had already withdrawn from the front lines after they had essentially captured the city of Bachmuth, which, you know, was incredibly costly for them. They had withdrawn to their rear operating bases to recover a bit. And progression was talking about returning some point later in the summer. I think that's all now very much in doubt. And one thing that I keep thinking about is, you know, the Wagner guys shot down something like seven aircrafts Russian military aircraft and killed something like 15 Russian servicemen. It seems to be currently willing to just sort of like put that in the past but I would be surprised if regular Russian soldiers are going to be quite as easy to forgive the fact that these guys know how Russian blood in their hands. So it's a huge open question to me how they're going to like effectively fight because you know they're they're not facing this decision, whether to basically go into exile. They're not going to be able to sign a petition in Belarus or to sign a contract that would effectively incorporate them into the Russian command structure. How are they going to fight together, how are they going to, how is, how are those hostilities that have to be there how is that going to play out. Yeah, I agree with that completely and I really think that the factionalism cannot be overstated like the impact of that. Last time we saw something like this. It was a factionalism but honestly, the end of the Afghan regime, just two years ago, really was a lot about the factionalism within the army within the intelligence services, you know, it was inter ethnic in the case of Afghanistan. In the case of Russia and sort of I guess the former Sayuz as we say, it's a little bit more about kind of like inter inter mafia kind of clan tribal violence basically it's, that's the best way I would describe it. And, and this has been like a tradition and sort of Russian military culture for a really long time. Well predates, you know, Putin, it goes all the way back to the boy or as an, you know the czar and so forth right like so. I mean Catherine the great and her great lover, you know I mean just you name it like there's just so many stories about this so I guess, from my perspective like that. That factionalism that Ben was just describing, you know, and the effect on morale, right, and then the hard choices these guys are going to have to make. Things kind of get hard in the winter time. I don't envy any of the commanders on any side, but I definitely don't envy the commanders who, you know, are on the frontline of contact with Ukrainian forces right now and fighting for for Kremlin the Kremlin I just, I think they really are walking into a wall. You know on Saturday, Putin invoked the 1917 revolution and kind of rewrote history a little bit about a stab in the back and you didn't really explain that but you know that must have been what was on his mind and the 1917 revolution of course was prompted by Russia, essentially losing level one and leading to soldiers mutiny. So that, and of course, Putin is a student of Russian history, even if he often expresses views that make no sense. Like Ukraine has never had been an independent part of never had any independence, but it must be playing heavily on his mind you mentioned the Afghan Afghanistan canvas. In 1989, the Soviets pull out, you know, the Berlin Wall falls down falls, the Soviet Union implodes within two years. 19, you know, the Romanovs lose the Russia Japanese War of 1905 they also lose World War One and they're put in front of firing squad in 1918. So all that must be playing on his on his mind. What do you think, Canvas, he knows that he's got a big problem. I mean, he's not winning the Ukraine war. He may well be losing it. What can you do to reverse this big problem he has which he's got a losing war or war he's not winning. He's got this, you know, the Wagner group and he's shown to be weak. And the security server you mentioned when we're talking earlier before the program you suggested that there may have been some degree of collusion with other parts of the security establishment, because he just cruise to Moscow so quickly. So what what does Putin have to do to reestablish his control. Well, you know, Peter it's interesting that you mentioned the Bolshevik Revolution, I will say that, again, just keeping in mind that he's a St. Petersburg right like so he grew up in that city. And in his mind, there's lots of stories in St. Petersburg, obviously the siege during World War Two is like, you know, it's kind of the weave of his psychology because his father and his mother suffered so greatly from it right. And we all know that kind of story about him but one of the things. And this is like real narrow, you know, deep cuts Russian history stuff. But for most people who've ever lived in St. Petersburg, they will know that the Cronstadt rebellion of 1921 was kind of a major flashpoint in the evolution of the Bolshevik parties kind of rise to power. Exactly as you say it was, it was actually the way in which Russia was prosecuting the war against the white Russians that was the matchstick there that lit that tinderbox. And, you know, these sailors in Cronstadt and in the Gulf of Finland, just a little bit north of St. Petersburg, basically, you know, rebelled and and held forth. And what he probably was flashing back to was that moment to be honest with you I'm pretty confident that that's what was going through his mind, because any I think any good student of Russian history will know that that was extremely important. In terms of the reversal, you know, there's nothing he can do at this stage I mean, there's no there's no you can't, you know, unwind the clock can't turn it back there's for him, you know, politically, he is beyond the lame duck right like he is just politically dead. I don't see, you know, him. Yeah, he could remain in power, right because it's useful for him. But it's it's pretty clear that there are other factions, both in the oligarchy, and in the military and the secret services right that are kind of instrumentalizing him and the presidency. He's saying that he's not directing things that's of course he's clearly directing things, but it he seems to be buffeted right by these, these intrafactional forces. And we saw this movie, you know, in, as you say, we saw it in 1905 we saw it in 1917. We saw it again in 1991 and 1993. The four major points some people would argue Chechnya. I would just say that in terms of just the Russian on Russian clash. Pure and simple. Those are the four points where there was just no, no returning. And I think we're kind of there. Right Ben. Yeah, yeah. So we typically try to avoid engaging in this kind of like speculation as to Putin's personal psychology because it's an extremely limited value, but if I may just once we know that for years. Putin's great fear has been to wind up like Gaddafi in Libya wind up like Saddam Hussein in Iraq. And what happened when you know this military, this mutiny came within roughly 100 200 miles of Moscow, everybody fled. And all of the people that that Putin was relying on to sort of keep him safe, you know they all got in their planes and ran off to Turkey or St. Petersburg or various other locations. And I think he's just in a tailspin right now he doesn't he doesn't know what to do he feels paralyzed. That's why you get these weird things like yesterday they're announcing. You know this is going to be the speech that will determine the future of Russia and then Putin pops out talks for five minutes and then leaves. And the other thing I just want to mention, we're already kind of moving on from this but there was one very strange moment on Saturday, where progression had just taken over the city of Rostov and the Ministry of Defense Building, and he releases a video of himself sitting with two guys one of them was Alexei, there's the deputy head of the Russian GRU military intelligence. He basically says you want to take him, his boss right you know that's that's how deep these these factions are now running in the Russian military which is I think incredibly dangerous and this is what he said I don't see how he puts that back together. Well, who left. Because that that is because you saw these reports about planes leaving but I mean who, who, who significance left. I don't know if we know yet. I mean I will say that the signs that this is the real deal will be if you know the likes of, you know, Nikolai Trochev or, you know, some of these other folks that have been really close to him we've been talking a little bit about who goes into Kuznetsov, who goes by the call sign, Ratibor, one of the chief commanders and actually filmed many times on camera in Bakhmut has become kind of a weird secondary folk folk hero, along with another guy named Anatoly Yelizanov, who is also a friend of mine, Lotus. He, he has been front and center, along with Trochev, along with Kuznetsov on camera much more this year, and I ever would have predicted or expected. And so if we start seeing them appear somewhere in Belarus, then we know essentially that this is basically a kind of a sweetheart deal. And we should expect to see, I think personally, a changing of the guard in the Kremlin pretty shortly thereafter. That's my own feeling. We have half an hour left and a lot of questions so I'm going to get to those. Let me start with this one from Daria. Thomas, do you think this will be an excuse to shut down the internet the prosecutor's office was on it removing Wagner from media online online platforms, etc. during the mutiny. Yeah, I love that question. Thank you Daria. It was really funny that there was like this announcement I think we stumbled across it when we were looking at Telegram maybe, and there was some announcement that all of you have getting progosians, patriot media outlets have been, you know, crushed and taken offline. And it did appear that they were taking some things down so you know a few of the contact your groups that we had been following seem to be stripped away. The empire is so huge. It's, it's kind of hard. It's, it's kind of hard to quantify like what's there right then I think, ultimately, sure there's this stuff that we know he owns through known shell companies, and then there's a bunch of stuff that we don't know about at all there's like random websites. There's stuff even on.su like the old Soviet, you know, registry domain registry, where, you know, they talk to each other and all that stuff happened so I honestly think, you know, perhaps they pretty quickly realize that it was a bit of a futile act, and you just can't be able to pull it off. And sure, shutting off the internet, totally possible but then like how do you communicate. How do you, you know, right like the problem for them is the problem that any country would have if they were in the middle of an emergency and then you shut off the internet like, hmm, you know, you just don't know what you're cutting off, and then you can't communicate during the crisis. Yeah, the laws on pre expression on the internet are already pretty severe. You hear all these stories of like some poor random person who likely criticizes the war and end up with a contender sentence. So there's plenty of tools in their toolbox already. It was yeah as Candace said they they took down a bunch of contactive groups that we had been following for a while some big ones but there's still a bunch of others that are still up because it's like playing whack-a-mole there's so many of them. Many of them sort of organically spring up unclear what their their actual relationship if any to the to the existing Wagner core. And also, you had the spectacle of, you know, so all across Russia they have essentially recruiting advertisements on billboards on walls, and on Saturday they took them all down, and on Sunday they put them all back up. Like recruitment appears to be continuing it's speak to this incredibly strange situation where one of the most this this military formation that has been valorized extensively in Russia. And it's around and potentially comes close to overthrowing the government. It puts you in this very like almost schizophrenic state. Another question from Daria. What does the coup mean for Wagner operations in the Middle East and Africa, which are obviously extensive and Candace you've dug into those very extensive for yourself. So first of all, I think I would call this a mutiny before I would call it a coup, because, you know, we don't know yet who, as we said, you know, allowed these forces unopposed to move forward so it's, it's pregosions mutiny and somebody else's coup. That's, I think the first thing to point out. Yeah, I mean for for Africa and like all these operations in the Middle East. Again, I would just sort of say that Belarus has always been a really important hub basically since the pandemic, when it became kind of complicated to move around. And Minsk was a really important hub for for operations. And, you know, maybe, because, look, it's not an open book Belarus like it's not so easy to peer into what's happening. I mean, I think there are a lot of journalists and I'm certain a lot of Russian analysts and investigators are kind of trying to dig in there. And I will personally say I'm finding it challenging to figure out what's happening because the information environment is so locked down. We've been looking and looking and looking and. But I think, you know, in a few months time, you know, it will become pretty evident that they're still relying very heavily on the smuggling that takes place in in CR in Sudan. And we know that weapons are kind of like flowing back and forth now. And that that will be very key for resupply for whatever they plan to do, potentially sort of in Western Ukraine, or, you know, around the key of region. And we also know that it will be extremely important in terms of just continuing to build hard currency flows vis a vis the gold smuggling that's been going on and the gem smuggling that's been going on for a long time but Ben you've also been looking at this. Yeah, and like the immediate just last couple of days, it seems mostly as though things have been operating as usual. I think on Sunday, maybe yesterday, somebody spotted on, you know, an Emmercom this government ministry that has a long and deeply intertwined history with Wagner. One of their planes landed in Mali and you know deposited more Wagner guys so things in the very short term seem to be operating more continuity than change. But for me this is one of the biggest medium to long term questions because the Wagner forces across Africa and elsewhere are, you know, they're a major part of Russia's foreign policy. It's an open question to me whether progression, or, you know, an entity that is known as Wagner will be permitted to hold on to that. I think that's a huge huge open question and has potentially sweeping ramifications for the country is where they operate. A question from Matt was interesting one which is, you know, related to the spilling of Russian blood he's he's asking, to what extent is Wagner ethnically Russian, or is it, is that a factor at all. I mean, so. So I think that we can't know all the things but I think it's predominantly Russian. We know this. It's, you know, 1000% you know Russian speaking. Yes, there are some Ukrainians for sure. And we've of course we've looked at again this is based on some of the social media data that we've examined, and some of the claims, these users who follow the Wagner group make about who they are what they like, you know, their past histories and so forth. And we've seen, you know, so Russia is the most prevalent, you know, and then Ukraine. We also have seen intimations that there might be some Germans or might be some Serbians, but largely this is a Russian and Russian speaking for us and that's really all that really matters. But it's so in, in fact, a widely group based on what you're saying Canada's is probably more ethnically homogenous than the ordinary Russian military which does seem to be made up of a lot of different ethnic groups particularly the ones that are fighting in Ukraine is that correct. Yeah, I guess I kind of think that more as linguistically unifying, I guess is kind of more how I think about it like Russian is the main for most of the people who are in Wagner whereas you could think of like parts of some of the forces that are being drawn from like central Russia around Siberia, you know, or even, you know, parts of Chechnya, right like they got a second language they can, you know, so that you know that I guess is the distinguishing factor. But these are folks who are, you know, kind of all about Russia as the mother tongue, which has its own sort of weird social resonance that's a little bit like how the French think about language, not to be too brutal about it but it's, there's a bit of a purist streak going on there. So we hear a lot about Wagner but my impression is, is that there are other private, private military contractors like Gazprom apparently has its own contracting other other groups like Wagner in the Russian military system. And do I mean, do they have any kind of ability to operate independently or, you know, is, although is there a Wagner one, Wagner two that will start hearing about in the near future or medium term. So we definitely could see like a totally different brand come, you know, move forward right like you could just be like Wagner is gone. You know, we don't know when that's going to happen but it's I think we've long thought that that's a possibility that that's served something because it's, it's, you know, the brand Wagner as as expendable as pregosin himself in some ways politically right and so, and the evidence of this is simply that we know that there are these other PMCs, like, PMC reduced which is basically attached to the Army Division, you know, they've been operating in Ukraine for a very long time in and out of Ukraine they've been they were in Syria to and they're, they're pretty serious they're they're a little bit of a different animal, and they have kind of a longer history, and they represent a particular faction, but they do have worked for Gazprom they've worked for straight trans gas. So, I kind of think I've always thought of this as the so gas army writ large, and so gas is the largest insurer for Russia that happens to have been a subsidiary of gas prom. It's one of these strange, you know, kind of things. And so, you know, I know people have been talking about oh there's now a gas prom army but that's more, that's, that's just propaganda, frankly, like there's always been a gas prom army. And, you know, since at least 2007 when there was a law in the books, allowing gas prom Ross naft Ross tech to stand up their own security divisions. But because these are state enterprises, and literally I just want to emphasize this point that's really important. The CEO of gas prom is presidentially appointed. I mean, you know, it's not blackwater guys it's just not the president of the United States does not like a point. You know, the CEO of Exxon mobile, and then have him raise his own army it's just not an equivalent so I think it's really important to make that distinction. Yeah, so just a quick little add on to that. One of the interesting things that has come out of the events of the last couple of days is basically all pretense of Wagner as a non state sort of run entity have been dropped today Putin literally came out and said that they have funded it to the tune of something like a $100. And then the man I mentioned earlier like say of on Friday night when Wagner was marching towards Rostov released a video. Basically like pleading with progression, you know, you and I we've been coordinating for so long again this is the deputy head of Russia's military intelligence. You know so just all pretense of just how close this relationship with the Russian state is has seemingly been dropped. Certainly complicates Putin any, I mean, potential war crimes trial against Putin, I mean his own statements about how much support he gave the Wagner group presumably would be pretty useful for prosecutors. I mean what's very interesting is, I just sort of you know these little voice memos and like you know all the filming of the, you know, the different people that he's associating with and trying to cajole and convince. It says that there's no thought to the prospect that in fact like he's he's really writing the script for the prosecutors who are looking at him. And that's largely a function I think of the fact that they, they could not operate without social media now right like that, because it's it's a social movement we've said that all along that one of the, I guess sort of magic tricks that Precision has performed with some help right with the help of Constantine Malafeya with the help of, you know, brought a die who of course is a member of the Duma, one of these really extremes with ultra conservatives, you know, even gherkin even though they don't, they obviously clash and they don't get along and you know there's a big kind of separation there. The magic trick that Precision has performed is that he has created an identifiable symbol right we've got the skull we've got the, you know sledgehammer got the masked guys we've got the gray zone so all that stuff is it's a little bit like McDonald's it's literally like he's the Ronald McDonald of this war, and he has created this thing that people can get behind and be like I want my big Mac of, you know, Russian aggression. And you know it's it's really like so that magic trick is extremely important and I think that basically they wouldn't be able to survive without that and so they're in this strange catch 22 that they may not understand but they probably will if they're ever bought brought to justice in the tribunal. Any lessons for President Chinese President she Hmm. Think twice before you hire Russia to develop your paramilitary force, I guess. One thing we've talked about in the past canisters I mean, the Chinese have, you know, even though they could afford to really haven't engaged in proxy warfare and the way we understand it I mean in terms of having these private military contractors carry out state, you know, kind of aims. I mean it. Do you think Putin. When you look at let's say the Assad regime there were multiple intelligence agencies because when you're a dictator, the one thing you fear most is a military coup so they're all sort of spying on each other and presumably this is part of the way that Putin is operated but do you think there's a world in which he would say well that didn't work out very well. I'm going to, you know, sort of reform things. I mean I guess this July 1st. The M.O.D. order to put Wagner inside the Russian military was an attempt, presumably Putin must have ordered that ultimately right or not. I think Putin acquiesced to it I don't think he ordered to ordered it I think he acquiesced to the pressure and basically you know because, you know, it's been years that these guys have been off the chain and unleashed and, you know, it wasn't until in the Khmut that really it became a problem for Shoigu, right, and it was kind of a problem in Syria but not really it wasn't a big problem. Lots of people have theories about that 2018, you know, clash between US forces and and Wagner forces, but there's a lot behind that story that doesn't quite fit with many of the theories out there. And on China, a couple little two finger things I guess I would just say, quite a few Russian contractors actually work for Chinese companies. You know, if you're, if you're a pretty adept Russian operator, you could make some pretty good money, and you can make it by, you know, doing this Belt and Road Initiative protection services and we, you know, they're present in Pakistan. And that's kind of one of the reasons that they're in Afghanistan. So there's a relationship there. I'll just point that out and there's actually been some pretty good scholarship on this by a few folks actually. So that's something to point out and I guess from a just a kind of grand strategy perspective, you know, in China. There's no redo here like it's, it's, if she knows his business, which I feel like he does. He's going to see that this is a militarily weakened force and maybe more season opportunity to kind of exert some more influence over the Far East which of course has been growing for years now. People kind of call parts of Khabarovsk and, you know, Vladivostok kind of like Manchu, the new Manchu quo practically right so I don't know Ben what do you think about the Chinese factor. Yeah, I think China is is looking at Russia right now and is is seeing a much more brittle state than I think they thought, you know, a week ago, which has all kinds of potential strategic ramifications for them. I mean, one of them is so China has long had some pretty serious security concerns about Central Asia and it's, you know, Xinjiang region it's been quite afraid of sort of spillover from Afghanistan and so forth. At the same time it's relied on Russia to be the security security guarantor for the region while it has invested more in economic measures. Maybe they're rethinking that there's all kinds of pieces like that, because the relationship between China and Russia is so complicated and extensive. I mean, if there is a rethinking though I'll just, you know, just a slight nuance there. It's not like rethink throw away because it's not an option for that right because Tajikistan right there's so many bordering areas where all that belt and road investment and just this long standing set of relationships economically. When they, when they're talking about rethink or when we're talking about that we're not saying is boom, you know, Putin's gone. Well, I guess we just, you know, we'll replace him, you know, and that will be fine. It'll be much more subtle. It'll be a lot more about sort of, you know, potentially exchanges of intelligence and information and kind of listening stations potentially in these border areas that are extremely important to China's interests. I suspect that will be kind of the subtle tweaking that happens in light of what's just occurred. Both of you have spent a long time many years investigating the Wagner group and working on Putin and what do you think the media is kind of missing right now, although, you know, the kind of the narratives that we've we've heard. Are they mostly correct. Is there some kind of element of this that you think is misunderstood. Well, look, I mean there's a distinction to be made between the Russian media and then like the English language press and the international media, I would say sort of the Western press as it were. Let me just say first of all hats off to Medusa. Okay, just 100% insider project Medusa. These guys are pounding on a daily basis, and the sourcing is fantastic if you're not reading that. And you want if you care about Russia, you want to know what's happening next please read those that's really important. They're just so well sourced and they're so incentivized because obviously it's their country and many of them have been forced into exile. And, and so they're really running and gunning and I think it's important to pay attention to them. I also want to just say also OCC RP I'm going to give a shout out to them because actually they to have been really kind of ahead of the game in terms of in the grand picture, and on the kind of more traditional either legacy press I guess in the West. I think what they've really struggled with is the private part of the private army conceptualization. And I think they're, you know, in varying degrees, they're just really behind the curve on that to be honest with you. I keep repeatedly sort of hearing, you know, but isn't it like black water I don't know how many times I've answered that over the last several years I know Ben to I mean it's just it's a frustration because an actual fact. The comparison is just so wrong. And it just it doesn't injustice. And more importantly, what I think is fascinating is watching how there are some media outlets. I think one of the examples New York Times Washington Post. They have really invested right in and BBC to I just recognize them. They've really invested in covering, not just this war but covering Russia. Right, they're just they never let go of that tradition that grand tradition, they kept it up, despite the fact that like it, nobody gave, you know, anything about it. And, you know, in the middle of Iraq and Afghanistan, and that has served them well, right we've seen fantastic reporting from Catherine Belton, Carlotta Gaul or old colleague from Afghanistan. You know try enough ski, right like some really fantastic reporting, because they're on the ground doing the stuff and they get it. However, I would like to see them breaking through and starting to ask some of these hard questions about these commanders because, frankly, you can spend all your time focused on pre Gosian, right. And you'll, and you will completely miss the forest for the trees if you're not looking at these kind of mid level commanders or up a level commanders that are just below him. And also I think you need to start reading the tea leaves when it comes to the many many dissidents activists out there, Russians, who are 100%. They're lightning years ahead on on this story and I'll just name here Vladimir Osiechkin in particular, who on Galagu.net has been narrating this before anybody else could have some of the best sourcing out there. And there's two quick things also that I think have really been missed in the English language media about this. One is the extent to which this was I think pretty clearly pre planned, likely for months. There's all kinds of tidbits that are beginning to come out and I think we're going to learn a lot more about that in the coming weeks. But yeah, this was not a spur of the moment decision. And some of the people who who actually seem to have taken part in this who are posting on Telegram are talking about how they had drawn up plans to occupy various like ministry buildings in Moscow and you know there was this whole sort of sequence of events that got short. And the second thing is just like the extent to which this is not over. I think there's a tendency to like, you know, everyone trying to like wash their hands and look at this retrospect I think this is a story that is still happening. And the next shoot to drop, maybe weeks from now might be months from now but it's probably not years from now. This is more more to come. Yeah, and of course there was the reporting, including by your American fellow Shane Harris that US spies learned in mid June that percussion was planning armed action in Russia. So, that I think sort of helps buttress what you just said Ben. Yeah, I'm a little bit worried about that narrative. I feel like that's a little convenient. But that's okay. It's I think I certainly get the sense that, you know, inside the US government inside the Biden administration. The lights are on people are paying attention. There's there's real effort being thrown at this in ways that you know it hadn't happened in previous administrations. I think saw Biden come out and say the United States had no role in it. I get what they're trying to do. But if you're a conspiracy theorist, I just merely confirms that the US. But it is interesting that Putin hasn't really, has he gone down the route of blaming. He talked about the stab in the back and he's talked about I mean, has he said anything that would implicate the last or is he sort of staring away steering away from that for the moment. It's so garbled and like really just off. I mean I think even for Russians like it sounds like nails on a chalkboard when he says US Nazis garbled Bandera. It's, you know, Bandera being Stephen Bandera, the Ukrainian, of course, who has been like the boogeyman of Russians forever but also since the start of this this war. I don't, I'm not familiar with his name. Oh boy, I, you know what, I feel like if I, if I try and do that, I might be hearing from a lot of Ukrainian colleagues so I think I'll just say he's an important historical figure during World War two, who was involved in trying to resist all kinds of things that were happening on Ukrainian territory. I think I'll leave it there. This is a little bit of like an Israel Palestine thing so I think I'll just stop. Okay. But yeah, so Putin's he's gone gone to the neo Nazi well. Is there any other well that he's that he's gone to a lot since Saturday to try to kind of explain. But the neo Nazi piece is so weird because they actually are neo Nazis. And so, you know, because there's a lot of this symbology that the Wagner group uses they, you know, of course you know famously like, Dimitri Utkin we see the photos of him, whether that's really him I guess that's him I don't know. People say it's him, and he has like you know the SS symbols on his neck and like, you know, creepy stuff, basically. It's a strange, but that's, that's the bizarro world of, you know, Vladimir Putin's through the looking glass universe right so you just don't know. Well yeah Nazi does not mean what it means here in Russia in Russia it means anti Russian, right, exactly defeated the Nazis, therefore, definitely they cannot be Nazis, even though a significant chunk of their armed forces have as kind of just said neo Nazi affiliations. We have three minutes left to stop Candace and then can you any kind of final thoughts before we wrap it up. Yeah, look, I mean, I think we all, at least on our team, you know we've been looking at the Wagner group and how they fit into the grand strategy for for several years now and I would just say, I think I sense that this summer was going to be a pretty important moment for pre Gosian and large part because once Bachmoot was done, his political capital was going to be kind of fungible and and and look at it. You know I'm not saying that I have ESP I really don't necessarily but I do think that you can kind of read some of the tea leaves and some things I would really start to expect to see that's I think we should just keep our eye on. If we're starting to see more mentions of a guy named Alexander Dewman, who is largely being talked about as a potential successor for for Putin and has been for many years now. He's the governor of Tula, and you know people have been chattering about the idea that maybe he's behind this in some way. If we start to see that narrative pickup. I would just my own wager is more acceleration on that that narrative is, you know, more likely action against the Kremlin that results in Putin in some way being sidelined or eliminated. We don't know how it's going to turn out but I think that's one thing to watch. Yeah, I think exactly on the same page as Candice with that. I know sort of the question everybody's mind is this the beginning of the end for Putin. And I think, you know, never prognosticate, but I think it is. I think this is the beginning of the end of the Putin, and whether it takes months or years to play out I think in retrospect will. This will be really the invasion of 2022 is that was the beginning of the ends but this is like a major inflection point. I guess I'd say this, it's episode 12 in like a 14 episode season. Yeah, of course the 1917 revolution played out in two parts so I mean, yeah, but I mean, I'm taking away that this is not over yet from both of you. Not over by stretch. Well, thank you. We know this has been a very busy several days for both of you so thank you for taking the time to share your expertise with our audience and thank you very much, Candice. Thank you very much, Ben. Thank you.