 So, thanks, Richard, and I should say I have a rather lengthy PowerPoint, so if you are interested after my presentation, you could read more, but I will only use, in the interest of time, two slides from the presentation. I must say, when looking at the conference programme, that wider developed for us, one clearly gets another impression of the fact that global challenges are multiplying, global challenges are worsening, and apparently at present we are not very good at really addressing and dealing effectively with global challenges. So this idea came to me some time ago, and I decided to do something which was very painful in many ways, to look at the literature that has been published since the 1970s, using the term international public good, global public good, transnational public good, whatever, because most of the global challenges we are facing and also addressing here at the conference do have properties of a public good and can be called a global public good. So when I was doing this literature survey, I noticed something, and that is that in large measure, most of us, we have not yet come around to updating our concepts and our theories. We are using theories that were developed in the 50s, 60s, and whatnot in order to look at today's realities, and I think to wake you up completely, that one can say that academic failure in large measure justifies, hides, even excuses state failure in the provisioning of global public good. And of course, state failure again creates room for market failure, but at the beginning of the chain of all these failures is in large measure academic failure that we look with old analytical lenses at today's realities and then jump to conclusions in terms of institutional change and so on. So one could say a lot about these failures, but I will only give four examples of issue areas where we would need to rethink, priorities to rethink. And once you see the need for rethinking, immediately one also sees new ways of possible institutional reform that could probably make a difference in providing public goods and doing it more effectively and efficiently, equitably, so that we all come on board. The question area number one is we are totally confused when it comes to the term global. I did a Google search and you find that global is being used as meaning international or transnational or worldwide or something, but even most scholars who use the term global link it to international level. But as a result, we have today a continuation of a social science organization and related studies where public economists look down into the country, international economists look out, international relations people look beyond the national borders, then many people just look at a partial aspect of what is indeed a phenomenon that is global in the sense that it is worldwide, transnational, even cutting across generations, reaching into countries, reaching out of countries. This globality of our challenges has not yet been captured in our analytical frameworks and in our series. Here you see the spaghetti bowl of what it all would be implied in the provisioning of a global public good that follows a summation pass and most global public goods follow such a summation pass. So as scholars, we pick here a corner and talk then about interactions among states in a global public good area, but we really don't talk about the governance and the governance requirements of the good. We talk about relations between states or we talk about what is happening at the national level like Eleanor Ostrom does in relation to a global public good or we talk about the private sector in relation to a global public good, but we never look in an integrated systematic manner at the overall provision pass of the global public good in question and therefore you also find that in the literature somehow it's very rare to find a hard-nosed discussion on subsidiarity, what really has to be done at the international level, let's say at the UN level, because when you really then go to the more natural science on technical literature on global public goods, you'll find that more than 90% of what is required to be done actually has to be done nationally. But many scholars say global public good, that means we have to do something more at the international level. No, not necessarily. So once you recognize the need for definition of global in the sense of comprehensive going from the national local level to the international and back down again, then one of course would come to the first institutional implications in our governance systems, it's still rare to have a unit at the international level or national level really dealing with global challenges in this global framework, yeah we have global affairs but that is also a new type of international relations often or a tiny unit of global health in a ministry of health but there are two people and the health in the main is still looked at nationally. So my suggestion is that maybe we have to include in governance systems nationally and internationally global issue management as a new organizational criterion and function and then in order to facilitate this global issue analysis and management it would be of course good for various global public goods to do integrated comprehensive provision pass analysis this at least in a rough way must not be like the IPCC reports that are so detailed and very excellent but one can also do it in a more rough way and then since each and every good follows quite a unique provision pass, would we not be well advised and should we not explore whether we should have global issue managers or facilitators create networks of global issue managers at the national and international level and then see whether we all do just one thing and ignore other parts of the provision of the good such a facilitator could keep an eye on where things are happening where shortfalls occur. So all of this we are in large measure lacking at present but you also see the grass sprouting some changes are coming up you know the UN Secretary General has special issue representatives you know you have more and more global reports so the beginnings are there and basically one would have to facilitate the breakthrough by institutionalizing global issue management in governance systems nationally and internationally. My second example is how to address the state and market failure that occurs in the presence of global public goods and I come back to our academic failure at the end because yeah most scholars recognize that states when they appear internationally like in the UN or in any other multilateral forum they are individual particular actors and just like none of you has ever probably paid for traffic light or street light out of your own money. So the states are all here for leaving no one behind you know as the agenda 2030 tells us but when it comes to putting the money where the mouse is then we lean back and something may happen or may not happen. So many scholars looking at this behavior of states say I have had a course way back in public economics and public goods theory and of course read the textbooks which all say when you have a public good you know being a rational actors an assumption that is also increasingly queried but still maintained in most studies a rational actor would free right on a public good. That applied nationally because after all the state had coercive power could tax and then provide the state the good neveless in many cases but internationally we have only a collection of states without coercive powers. So many of my colleagues in the global public good arena then say where do we get someone with coercive powers. And the conclusion is oh yeah we have Hedgeman or the EU and the US together they can step forward and provide the good and then either come out with tiny carrots to entice people to come along or trade sanctions sticks and so on. But as a result you have a huge array of literature saying oh adequate global public goods provision needs because of free riding needs a leadership and we are stabilizing and continuing to justify hegemonic power and so on. So my question is free riding really the problem because when you then go in detail to what is happening in various international negotiations you see that states developing countries in particular are leaning back because they try to avoid getting settled with top down power politics with advice that is affecting for their country. So it's not free riding it's trying to avoid getting settled with the ill effects of power politics or in the case of China and other newly emerging markets they say we can also speak for ourselves we have other preferences we want to bring them in but we don't see that we have a voice so therefore they renege step back and do their own stuff. So it is hasty and wrong to say that the reluctance of state to act in the presence of global public goods is always free riding and that we need a leader when someone who pushes the other states into coming along in issue areas that interests the hegemon or the other powerful states because who can step forward you need money if you want to bribe someone or pay carrots or come with sticks you need huge markets or a lot of money. The other question related to it is we have to think through what international cooperation what type of activities these are because I can observe in these international negotiations that a lot of so-called international cooperation is really an exchange or trade activity a quid pro quo political exchanges or you will reduce CO2 and I pay you for it so could it be that we would be much better advised to look at international cooperation as a political market and then conclude that this political market at present has all the problems that we don't like anymore in the economic markets there is the tired but still present hegemon which resembles a monopole of power if you put the EU together with the US we have an oligopol you know their information asymmetries and everything makes international this inter international political markets fail that we know also from the economic markets so would it not be better to look at international negotiations at least in large measure also through the lens of markets and say is this market embedded have we really an institutional framework for the political market or is arm twisting user we just all kinds of things that we don't tell a rate in economic markets are still permissible in the political markets so let me show you one more slide because I think empirically one could also argue that if a global public good is very public in consumption like the the international financial regulation you know is very public in consumption of financial crisis occurs because the regulation was in not very very good then the whole world as we heard in the morning and before is suffering potentially they have to consume it but they are not consuming positive utility but disutility however then we also say that many more and more countries have to contribute to strengthening like it's bar that's three year implement battle three strengthening financial regulation but why would they do it if they don't have a say look think of this little cozy club the financial stability board you know it's it's very much influence of few regulator influenced heavily by the industry so you have very great strong publicness in consumption strong publicness in provision but very deficient publicness in decision-making and then we shouldn't be surprised that as a result we find that there is a very uneven distribution of publicness in utility so actually when you think of international financial regulation the inner dotted circle applies and what would be interesting for follow-up research is to say does the assumption underlying this graph actually hold that when you have strong publicness in consumption strong publicness in provision that it would be advisable to also have a strong publicness in decision-making so that all concerned stakeholders and parties can argue for how they want this regulation to be organized so that publicness of utility results my third point quickly is a concept that I call systemic integrity requirements of global public goods because intriguing is to look at the hundred and something indicators that rank national state behavior in terms of what states do for the environment or for this or for that other global public good but we always rank those who move slowly on these issues among themselves so even though Sweden often comes out as number one still they don't do enough for the atmosphere in terms of what the atmosphere requires yeah I see the colors coming towards me so I my suggestion is it's fine that that some of us go faster than other countries but we have to ask what does the ocean actually require in terms of change so that acidification is being stopped what does the atmosphere require for the atmosphere IPCC thanks to them we know quite a lot what the atmosphere requires but we could also know what financial stability requires what it would be required in order to address global inequity or so so today these things yeah we know them but what we go by our state's interest and therefore the following institutional recommendation what we are really lacking is probably only one more institution maybe in under the umbrella of the UN and that would be an independent small global stewardship council let's say 15 people or so independent personalities where one of them would be the representative of the atmosphere Mr. or Mrs. atmosphere the other one Mr. or Mrs. Ocean the other one global equity the other one global disease control and the states could because they're also a system they could probably form three groups and also have three seats at the table but this body could then nudge states into closing the gap between the systemic integrity requirements and what they would be doing if they are only guided by state interest so I think that is a critically missing element in our current institutional framework now my fourth point is global public goods theory needs a lot of updating as you can gather from these few hasty remarks here but of course it's only part of global public policy finance economics whatever you want to call it and some people have started asking what questions would we have to address in order to move towards global public finance or global public economics I refer in the presentation to some work by Tony Atkinson and Sanmo but all I want to say here to save time is that a lot of rethinking is required in order to see how to shape multilateralism and global governance differently at the very end Richard before I get the zero from you let me say let me say that of course I have said the state fails here the state fails in this respect and the state fails in that respect so but most of the changes states would have to promote and decide so what would it take to get the state why is the state not acting more proactively and implementing some of the very feasible changes I propose I think that today we have a state with whose hands are tied because of the dependence primarily on financial actors and financial markets and other big market actors too so we have to I think a priority before you think about what is possible in terms of global governance we really have to tackle what Martin Wolf cause the Siamese relationship between financial markets and and and the state and have to find ways of enabling the state again to actually have a regulatory role to have a policy shaping role which they don't have at present so I find without making this change we will go on meeting meeting meeting which is fine because many of us are friends but I think we need more honesty in our discussions and pinpoint the real problems and maybe we can also have a fine time of discussing today or tomorrow a favorite topic of mine helicopter money because I think that could really make a difference if states where to get from central banks a little helping hand in that respect to free themselves from the dependence on financial markets so here's the good research agenda wider can re invite us to discuss our studies on that and thanks for your attention