 Thank you, Rachel. I basically have 10 minutes, or perhaps slightly less, to talk to you about the subject of measuring the middle class, which is quite a daunting task, given the fact that it took us almost about six months of work to work on this paper. And then I'll leave Nara and Jan to speak for another 10 minutes on the results. OK, without wasting much time, why do we want to study the middle class? And why, in the Arab region in particular, well, anybody who was in Tahrir Square a couple of years ago, like myself, looking around us, especially in the first week, would be able to discern, obviously, that it was a middle class revolution. Now, of course, that doesn't say too much because there are so many different perspectives, sociological, political, economic, on how to define the middle class. Our paper is really more on the economic side, so that's just to situate the intellectual orientation of our paper. But anyways, the uprisings have really put forward this question of really urgently trying to address the role of the middle class in economic and political participation, particularly as the region is going through so many changes. But even if that weren't the case, it's surprising that the definitions that we have and analytical methodologies to measure the middle class are really very poor compared to, for example, poverty and other areas, even though the middle class play a very vital role, as we all know, in economic development. So who are the middle class? Well, as I said, there are so many competing perspectives. You can almost find a debate illustrated in this picture right in front of you that it can be quite misleading to focus on one perspective rather than another. What we try to do is to, in the papers, first of all, review the spectrum of definitions out there, the economic ones. And of course, those of you who are familiar know that a lot of them are absolute in the sense that they tend to look at individuals between a minimum and an upper threshold. Usually these would be like $2 to $20 if you're in one region, or 10 to 100 for the global, six to 10 for others. So again, there isn't a consensus on either the minimum or the upper threshold for measuring the middle class. Now, the lower threshold would typically try to measure a poverty line. So again, the discussion on the middle class has to be closely tied to how you define the poor, because that sets your basis for the lower threshold, while the upper threshold also has to answer the question of who do you think are the affluent? Forget about the rich because they're usually outside the tail of this whole discussion, but those two questions are essential for the economic perspective. In relative measures, others have focused on more on the inequality side of the definition to look at people, for example, between the second, third, and fourth quantiles or whose incomes lie between the 75 to 125% of the median income. Others have used a combination of both, like for example, Bertso. She's used a combination of both the absolute and relative measures. So that's basically what we have, and as you can see, there's quite a variety of perspectives out there, economic perspectives, which it's not surprising, would give you very different results. Now, typically you would expect that poorer countries would have lower upper and lower thresholds and middle income countries would have a medium range and so forth, and all of this is measured in purchasing power, parity terms, which is another set of complications, and it poses all kinds of other complications. But as I said, you try to make sense of going back to our basic question, who are the middle class and you use these methodologies for the Arab region and this is the kind of picture you get. It ranges between 1% and 77%. So clearly there are little use to decision makers. We just can't use the bulk of these, and if you have to pick one of them, then you have to have a good justification. If we use, for example, the measure of 10 to 100 to try to estimate the size of the Arab middle class or the global middle class, you're looking at around 1.9 billion people, of which the Arab region is about 5%. I'm not gonna dwell too much on the problems. There are so many methodological problems with relying on the fixed poverty lines, for example, or any fixed line for a lower threshold. There are even more fundamental problems with fixing the upper threshold of the middle class, but let's say that it's essentially a problem of arbitrary choice, and it's a problem related to the choice of how you define somebody who's not a middle class. When do you stop becoming part of the middle class and you become an affluent person? That is really at the heart of the issue here. And of course there are issues related to the purchasing power parities, which we are all familiar with. Others like Deaton and Sanjay Reddy and others have shown that the purchasing power parity rule doesn't hold for many countries. In other words, the 125 doesn't really buy you the same value of, I mean, the amount of purchasing power in Sierra Leone is very different than Egypt or Turkey for that matter. So what we try to do in our alternative approach is to start with a different conceptual framework and really go back and ask the question, when do you cease to become a middle class and graduate to become an affluent person? Here we try to go back to literature on economic sociology. People like Thorsen and Veblen, in my opinion, give you a nice, simple definition and going back to his theory of conspicuous consumption. I think that plays an important part in our definition of somebody who or an individual who's not a middle class. When an individual basically starts consuming conspicuously, that is a qualitative aspect of an individual's consumption pattern that does not inherently belong to our sociological or economic definition of the middle class. So that's basically the premise, the intellectual premise that we're using here. But there's also a quantitative basis for it, which is basically to go back to what the poverty economists have been doing and to just drop the whole international measures and go back to the national poverty surveys and household surveys and try to fix the thresholds using these surveys. So this is essentially what we've tried to do and in following our conviction that middle class is both an economic and a sociological phenomenon, we basically started off by answering two questions. One of them is of course the economic definition, as I said, the definition is basically that an individual is a middle class when his income or her income or the family income is above a appropriately defined poverty line, but below a level of expenditure on non-essential goods, which is less than a value of that poverty line. That's an important distinction because you need to even, you know, if you say that somebody's expenditure or is conspicuous or how do you measure that? What's the cut off? Where's the threshold at which you can say that it is becoming too much? Here we're using the anchor as the value of the poverty line itself. So if a family, as we've translated it in this figure, if a family's expenditure is above point Z star here, which is the value of the upper poverty line, which I'm assuming we're all familiar with, it's typically the poverty line used by the World Bank and the UN to estimate a higher threshold for measuring the poverty. So if your income is above that point, but your income on non-essentials is below the value of the lower poverty line, that is basically how we define the middle class. So that's the economic definition and then there's also a sociological definition. So what we've tried to do is to come up with two definitions and then see what the interaction is between the families that fall into both groups and the sociological definition is closer to the heart of the economic sociology who basically defines the middle class as people who are employed in formal sectors and who have a certain high degree of scale in occupational categories. So that's basically what I, I know it's rather difficult to go through these issues in such a short period of time, but I hope that I've tried to give you the gist of the argument. I'm leaving my colleague, Niranjan, to go through the results and show you what happens when we apply this methodology. And of course I'll be willing to answer questions on any more specific questions on the methodology later on in the Q and A session, so. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks, Khalid, for the first part of the presentation. I think with that I'll straight move to three things that we'll try to come up with by applying this methodology. I would like to highlight that this research is for policy and we are presenting you some of the findings basically which we are using for a larger report. And I'm going to say three things on one and why, how this methodology is impacting on the size of the middle class in the Arab region for which we have data on nine countries we are using household survey data to estimate the middle class size. I'm going to tell what is happening to them in terms of jobs, because we also looked at the profile of the middle class using this methodology. And again, lastly, how they are, I mean, doing against other population classes. So touching upon the inequality aspect that the first presentation highlighted a bit also. Okay, here are the nine countries and I'm using here the latest surveys, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Oman. You can see that for some countries, the surveys are as earlier as 2006, for example, for Yemen, 2007 for Iraq, 2007 for Syria. And you know, these countries are facing difficult times and they're in crisis in Syria and Yemen particularly. But that factor keeping aside and using the latest household expenditure surveys are available. You could see that in the lower income countries, the middle class size varies between 30 to 43%. The classification belongs to the World Economic and Social Prospects Service. And you see in the middle income and the upper middle income countries which ranges from Egypt to Tunisia, you could see that middle class size is quite, they are the majority group in the population classes. Of course, Egypt is a little bit of a variation because Egypt has gone through the retardation of the middle class during 2005 and 2011. I'll come back to it later. So there is a pattern which emerges by applying this method that lower income countries, middle income countries, and in the higher income countries for which we have one country in the sample which is Oman, it shows the affluent class are a majority which is kind of expected. And I would like to highlight that the slide which showed Ravallian's method or global middle class method, those measurement approaches if you take it doesn't, I mean they don't tally with the results that we are finding. We have explained it why on the analytical factors in the report but for the sake of showing the results I'll move to the next slide and through the regional picture. If we compare two period of time and we have only six household surveys, we could see that nearly 50% of the Arab world are middle class, comparing to 73% in Ravallian's method or 1% in the global middle class measurement methodology method. Let alone the impact of crisis but if you look at 2011 it's like 45%. So more or less they have remained stable between 2000 and 2011. The slight decline is due to Egypt as it has a higher population weight and in Egypt poverty has increased between 2005 and 11 actually from 16% to 21% and that resulted in the regional aggregate in which poverty is increasing from 18% to 21% to 21.8% and reduction in middle class size from 47% to 45%. Moving on, well this shows middle class are more capable which is in line with other global literature also because of increasing educational levels and we try to calculate an index of what is the situation of human poverty or deprivation to standard of living. They also show more or less standard picture where middle class, middle class, they are increasing their capability by increasing the level of education and also improving their standard of living in terms of different housing and other indicators. What is interesting is in this slide in the Arab world, what is the major sectors that contribute to the economy? It is the mining and utilities or it is services sector. Now you could see here clearly that during 2000 and 2011, the workforce has moved quite significantly from agriculture to services. These slides show the change, percentage change in the middle class population shared by economic sectors. But, I mean of course, industry is a couple of places but industry is not a major contributor given the fact that manufacturing contributes only 12% of the GDP in the Arab world. But if one looks at it in detail, then within the services sector, the majority of the workforce are in the other services category. Other services, they are tend to be low value added. They are not in, I mean something like construction, I mean construction or in services such as hotels and restaurants, but not in trade or transport which are high value added sectors. You will not find that much increase in services. And in this figure, it shows that particularly for the new entrants into the labor market, there is a huge concentration of jobs in the services sector. And look at those countries where we have two points of time, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Jordan. In Egypt, the share of other services increased from 19% to about 35%. In Syria, it also shows an increase and so also in Tunisia and Jordan. So they point to the fact that there is some in formalization going on, although the workforce is moving from agricultural services, but they are not high value added sectors and that adds to the sufferings and problems. And just touching on the professionals that Khaled mentioned, these people are the sociological middle class and they are a minority and they are the highest in women with 15% only, 12% in Egypt and as low as 5.8% in Yemen. They also show that they are also mainly concentrated in the service sector and within the service sector, majority of them are in the other services category which are again low value added kind of work. And moving on quickly, we looked at the share of professionals within each population class, poor, vulnerable, the middle class and affluent. Of course, it is expected that in the affluent class the professional share have increased, but the critical factor is within the poor and the vulnerable class, the share of professionals also have increased over time. Why that has increased? Partly one should look at what is happening to the OHS because these are the people who are employed in the white collar jobs and some evidence show that recently there has been a decline in the yellow age. For example, in Egypt, there is a decline of about 12%. So this also shows that there is a drop in the operation of the professionals during this period. And lastly, touching upon the inequality in the Arab world. Can I take two more minutes please? One more minute? Okay, in the Arab world, generally it's the conventional wisdom is that inequality is low and it has been contested of course, but we try to do some exploratory exercise by looking at the household service expenditure and the national household final consumption expenditure. Look at the gap between the total and there is a huge gap between the two and since my time is running out, I'll just show this slide and then I'll conclude. In the exploratory analysis, we tried to estimate the reach, the main income of the reach as a ratio to the main income of the different population classes. And to estimate the reach, we use the same variation of the household consumption expenditure mean and we applied it to the national household final consumption expenditure from the national accounts. Once we estimated the mean of the top from the national accounts, we took the ratio to the main income of the different population classes from the household consumption expenditure. And from this slide, you can clearly see that over time, inequality is increasing. In conclusion, I think this methodology is giving results, some way it is realistic, some way it is interesting also. Between 2000 and 2011, middle class share among the Arab population has remained largely stable, but of course if we take into account the impact of the crisis, it has significantly reduced. Professionals remained a minority, those who are in the white color jobs, their size increased moderately though. There has been a shift from agriculture to services sector for the middle class, but they are highly concentrated in the other services category, even among professionals. The evidence on increase in the share of professionals shows the preparation of the professionals. Economic growth has not proportionately benefited the poor and the middle classes in some countries, particularly in Egypt. Lastly, increase in inequality between the top bracket of the population and the other population classes during 2000 and 2011 shows that the growth is not non-inclusive. And this also validates to some extent the first presentation which is presented at the top, there is a huge inequality. And how to look at this bracket whether to 5% to 40% or 1% to 40% or look at the affluent and the poorest. So this is something which I would like to conclude with two here from you. Thank you very much.