 After Paris, I must say, I got a little tired with all the patience you need. So I was going back and said now, okay, you need to implement the Paris Agreement. And as Europe, we said we want to do at least 40% emission reductions by the year 2030. And of course, that is not like mana falling from heaven. You really have to get the legislation for that. So what I will talk today about is what are the economy-wide climate initiatives we are taking. And there's really three pillars of that. One is the emissions trading system covering about 40% of Europe's emissions. Then we have the, what is called the effort sharing. And I will explain to you why it's called effort sharing. And then also the land use. And the effort sharing covers around 60% of European emissions. So this is the kind of the top layer. Well, we need to accomplish emission reductions in different sectors. So we also have EU-wide policies at sectoral level. And particularly in the energy sector and in the transport sector. Energy accounts for about 80% of European emissions. So that is really key to be addressed. And there is legislation we came put out in November last year on renewables, energy efficiency, electricity market design governance, and then transport this year waste we have and also fluorinated gases. So if I were to tell you all that today, then probably we'll be sitting here for quite a number of hours. So I will have to be selective. Despite the fact that I have many slides, I will focus on number two. I will then maybe talk a little bit about renewables and energy efficiency. And the rest I will leave aside for today. Should there be questions later in the from the audience, then I'm too happy to speak also to the other subjects. What I will also talk about is what is we call in Europe the enabling environment. But that is kind of the a few sentence at the end. So let's get started. Where are we in terms of the objectives? And of course, when we talk climate, when we talk Paris, we all talk about emission reductions, greenhouse gases, we talk about adaptation. But in Europe, I think we have taken the view that we need to look broader because there is so many policy objectives. In terms of the highest at the moment in Europe is growth employment because we have so many problems in different economies. So that is something we will have to address. When it comes to the energy, we have looked at what is called the energy union. So these are five big pillars we need to look at. And that is not only the greenhouse gas emissions. So the decarbonization of the economy, which is one important element in that. But we also talk about energy security. We talk about solidarity, that we have affordable energy for all citizens in Europe, that we have a fully integrated internal energy market. Energy efficiency is a specific objective here, but it also covers innovation. It covers research and competitiveness. So these are things we need to take into consideration when we think about climate policies. Where are we in terms of our emissions? And if you look back to 1990, where more or less climate negotiations internationally started, our GDP has grown by about 50% in Europe. And our greenhouse gas emissions have gone down to minus 22% in the year 2015. And this is a very important slide, and it was very important in the international negotiations. Because we could show that in one way or the other, we will be able to decouple economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions when it comes to the production we have in Europe. And that was important because if you look at the international negotiations, one of the arguments that was always put forward is that you can either save the climate or you can grow your emissions. We don't think in Europe that that is right. We can find different solutions to that. But if you look at the different sectors, the picture is very different. We have steep reductions in the industry sector. We have quite some reductions in the energy sector. One sector that is straddling behind is the transport sector. That is the top curve, the light blue curve. So this is something where we will have to do more in future. But many other sectors, we can see emission reductions that have been happening over the past. If you look at the moment, what we have in legislation is our 2020 targets. Minus 20% in greenhouse gas emissions, 20% renewable energy, and 20% improvement in energy efficiency. And the way we count in Europe energy efficiency is not an efficiency indicator. It's the amount of energy we consume, so against a baseline. So when we say 20% improvement, it's against that baseline, that improvement of energy efficiency. What it means is that demand for energy is going to fall until 2020. And we see that happening at the moment. One other area that is important is interconnections. So that is the electricity market that we integrate the different parts of Europe for the year 2030 and that is Paris relevant. Our offer internationally was to have at least minus 40% emission reductions on the greenhouse gas side. When it comes to renewables, get up to 27% energy efficiency improvement by 30% in the year 2030. So these are the kind of headline targets we are looking at in our climate and energy policy. If you look at what does that mean for the longer term, you can see here the long term roadmap we have been putting out in Europe. Current policy means our 2020 policies, so they would have led to reductions of something like minus 40% in the year 2050. Now with the new policies that are being proposed, we would go along the curve which is shown and indicated there by the power sector, so we would get to 80% emission reductions in the year 2050. So that's the kind of long term thinking behind the current plans. Again, the structure of the policy is that we have the emissions trading, covering power and energy sector, industry and aviation. That is aviation within Europe. We have the non ETS sector where we have the effort sharing, the ESR, it's called here which includes households, road transport, buildings, waste, agriculture, non CO2 emissions and then we have Lulu CF. Up to now, these are pillars that stand on their own and there is no interconnection. The new thing with the current proposals on the table that are being discussed is that for the first time we start linking these pillars up. So there is a flexibility that is proposed to move from the emissions trading to the non ETS sectors. There's a group of member states that will be able to use about 100 million tons instead of giving that as an allocation to the energy sector. They could use it in order to cover emissions from households or from transport or agriculture. And also from the other side, the land use side. For the first time, we could have credits that could come into the effort sharing. For instance, to cover or to substitute with reductions that you would normally expect from agriculture and non CO2 emissions and that could come from the credits that you generate under the land use system. So that's the first step on further integration and that is something that is very different to what we had in the past. Let me now come to the emissions trading. It's a cap and trade system and that cap is set on a declining trajectory. At the present point in time, every year it goes down by 1.74%. The new proposal until 2030 is 2.2%. And in the parliament there's even discussions to ramp that up to 2.4%. The coverage is about 12,000 energy intensive installations. And as I said already covers around 40% of CO2 emissions. The problem we have seen in the emissions or in the carbon market is that over the last years we have relatively limited carbon prices. So they are hovering around five euros per tonne of carbon dioxide. And that of course has given a huge debate on how effective is the emissions trading system really in order to bring down emissions. Why are we having such a low price? One of the reasons is that we had the economic crisis in Europe and production levels were falling. So the amount of allocation was higher than what was really required. And that led to an overhang in terms of the certificates that were distributed. Plus, we allowed in the last phase still the import of emission reduction credits from developing countries, the so called CDM projects. And the companies brought in about 1.5 gigatons of those credits over the past years and that led to the overhang. Over the last two, three years we have been discussing ways on how we can reduce that surplus in the market. And we have come up with what is called a market stability reserve. So if there is too many allowances above a certain threshold in the market, they will be moved into that market stability reserve. So that the liquidity in the market is being reduced and we should gradually see an increase in price. And that is also something that is very vividly discussed at the present point in time between Parliament and the European Council. These are the co-legislators in Europe. They want to make the system even tougher. They want to cancel certificates that are stuck in the market stability reserve. And that would help building up the market. Apart from that, in the new system we will also try to earmark a certain amount of funding, particularly for innovation. So 450 million allowances are going to be set aside in order to create an innovation fund and that should help in research and technology development in the energy sector and also in the industrial sector. So the two sectors that have obligations under the emissions trading system. And then there's a specific fund that is being proposed and that is for the lower income member states, so central and eastern Europe, who still have to make major steps in transitioning their energy sectors to help them to modernize their sectors. So in that way, also the revenue that is being generated by the emissions trading system is being used to help the transition that transformation. One particular aspect which is always coming up from the industry is the issue of competitiveness. And it's particularly for industry that is subject to international trade. So steel industry, ceramics, and these companies do not have to participate in the auctioning. They get their allowances under the system for free in order to shelter them from that international competitiveness pressure. And we will maintain that also until the year 2030 because we don't think that the commitments taken under the Paris Agreement are going to give that level playing field to all those industries. This is again how the credits that will be handed out will be given for free and auctioned. You see the upper part is the auctioning part that is going to reduce and also the free allocation to the industry is going to reduce until the year 2030. Now we come to the effort sharing. And that is the sectors that are outside the emissions trading system. And here we do not have a kind of a unified system among all the member states. But what we do is we allocate targets to all the individual member states. So, and that we will have to do in a way that it is fair to the member states that it allows for environmental integrity. And it's also cost efficient. And what do I mean when I say fair here? If you look at the now still 28 member states in future, 27 member states of the EU, they are economically at very different stages. The poorest country, Bulgaria, faces a very different situation compared to Luxembourg, which is the richest country. So the capacity to make transformations in those sectors is very different. And that is something that needs to be recognized when you hand out targets to the individual member states. You will have to look at their financial capability of doing things. So what is being done is that first of all, we have a range of targets and that is kept at 0 and 40%. They will add up to minus 30% compared to 2005. And the targets for individual member states are set on the basis of the GDP per capita of those member states in the year 2013. With some little correction for the higher member states at the upper end, but that is maybe not that important. Here you can see how steep these targets are going to be for the individual member states. And you can clearly see here on the left hand side is the richest member state, Luxembourg, but also Sweden, who have targets up to minus 40%. And on the right hand side here you see Bulgaria, Romania, and Latvia, who are the poorest member states, who can maintain the emissions where they were in the year 2005. So that is the architecture in order to assign those targets. But what we also have in the legislation is a possibility, because if you want to be cost efficient, are flexibilities. And that flexibility means that we do not expect Luxembourg necessarily to accomplish all the reductions in Luxembourg. Oops, stand for network registration it says. Oops, no, I can't bring that back. Maybe I continue, okay, good, thank you. The risk with allocating targets on the basis of GDP per capita is that you will not end up with a cost efficient solution. Because what we see at the same time is that the countries with a lower income per capita are the economies where you can have a higher mitigation potential at lower cost. So if you give those countries a lower target and you are not going to realize those emission reductions, you will not end up with a cost efficient solution for all of them at the end of the day. So in order to allow for a cost efficient solution, we have a possibility of trading between the member states. So member states who are rich on this side, like Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, they could do investments in countries like Bulgaria or Poland potentially reduce emissions there, get credited for it and in that way achieve their emission reduction target. So the architecture allows for a cost efficient achievement of the overall target of minus 30%. It's quite interesting the discussion that is taking place in the member states because many of the member states do not really make use of that kind of flexibility. And there's a whole discussion on going on whether taxpayers' money should be spent in a neighboring country, yes or no. So that is kind of a discussion that is happening. So you see many countries who try to accomplish their targets, even if they will have to pay per ton of CO2 much more than what you would have to pay if you would do these emission reductions in the other countries. That might work at the moment, but it will go increasingly more difficult in the coming years. So I believe that this flexibility is probably going to be used in future much more, particularly if you will ask finance ministers on how to deal with that. That brings me to the end of these two pieces of legislation. I'm not going to talk about land use today. I said I wanted to come to energy and particularly the renewables. At the present point in time in renewables, we have nationally binding targets for individual member states. When we were preparing for the new legislation in 2030, many member states were against having these kind of binding targets also in the future. But despite the fact that the renewables policies in Europe were very effective. As you can see in the lower graph on how fast renewable energy was growing in the portfolio in Europe and that I think all member states are on track to meet their targets. Still implementing these targets is something that is for member states to be done. So you will find 28 very different renewables policies in Europe because every member state does it in a different way. The Germans use what is called feed-in tariffs. The Swedes are using what is called green certificates. And I think there were studies done in the past also by the OACD looking at okay, you might be effective in terms of accomplishing your target, but how efficient are you in accomplishing your target? And there were a lot of backlashes over the last years, particularly with the economic recession in Europe, because some of the member states they thought we can use the public budgets in order to implement the renewables policies by dishing out sufficient subsidies or tax credits in our countries. But some countries were unable to pay those things like Spain for instance and they had to roll back their policy completely. And of course that upsets all private investors and all private investment in those countries. And even in Germany, one of the richest economies in Europe, you have a huge discussion on why is it so expensive to roll out the renewables. Because the feed-in tariff guarantees a price for every kilowatt hour you put into the grid or even if you don't put it into the grid you are paid for it. And that creates a huge liability for the next 20 years. From the commission side we have started looking into these things because we think it's a wasteful use of public money or a wasteful use of consumers money. And we have said we need to get some more market orientation into it. So the first thing we did from the competition side to say, you need to get out with tenders for the renewables if you want to achieve those targets. In the beginning of course there was member states were shouting at the commission, how is that possible and can we really do it? And in how far are we meeting our technology objectives we have? But over the last years it has shown that yes indeed prices were coming down in these tenders, in these public tenders that have been done. And it's now I think accepted across Europe that tendering, so proper public procurement is going to help to reduce the cost of the renewable roll out for the consumers. So also now in the face until the year 2030, we will not have national targets any longer, we'll have an EU wide target. And member states have to propose what they are going to do and then we'll see whether it is going to end up at the end of the day. So that is what is happening on the renewable side and the discussion we have in Europe. Energy efficiency, again you can see here in terms of how energy efficiency was improving, we have a headline target on energy efficiency but then we have a plethora of legislation in order to really improve energy efficiency. And that includes echo design. So that is what you do with your white goods, setting standards for washing machines, TV sets, hoovers and so on. But also when it comes to the transport sector, the CO2 and cars is an efficiency standard in order to get that down. The challenges ahead are that we have still a huge untapped potential. And we have a very difficult sector in order to improve the energy efficiency and that's the building sector. Those of you who have traveled to Europe will know that we have many old buildings in Europe, many old houses that still need to be renovated. We have a renovation rate about 1% per year. So it will take us 100 years to have a total turnover. But that is not going to be good enough for the future. So the proposal that is out there to improve energy efficiency by 30% also has a proposal for buildings and renovation rates. And the objective is to try to decarbonize completely the building sector by the year 2050. So that is the quadrupling of the annual rate that you require in order to get there and that is a really tough target. In particular, if you talk to house owners who own these old houses and we shall see how this is going to be discussed in the council and also in the European Parliament. So that is another very challenging area. And again, it relies very much on the action at the end of the day, at the level of each of the member state. Now I wanted to say a final few words about the, I will keep out the transport sector and the fuels policy and the fluorinated gases and the waste. But we are doing things in all of that. What we found very important is that you also look around in other major policy areas what you need to do in order to push forward climate policies. And just give you two examples here. One is the skills agenda on the right hand side where we talk about how is our workforce needing to change over the coming years. For instance, if you want to have the energy efficient houses that you are looking for, then it means you will have to train your workers. So that is something we are trying to bring through the skills agenda into our climate policy. Another area is what is called here the Capital Markets Union, which really started out as after the last recession and the financial crisis in the banking sector. How we can keep our banks alive and also for the future not to make the same mistakes as in the past. There is question here around carbon disclosure. So reporting of what is your asset that you administer? And that's particularly important for big insurance companies or companies that handle the pension funds. So that is something that is being looked at in that context. And the other thing which is a novelty and very successful in the financial market is the so-called green bonds. But nobody knows are they dark green or half green or light green or brown green or black green or whatever. So there is an advisory board that is thinking of can we set some kind of standards there or some kind of rating on how good these green bonds are. They have been helping raising a lot of money over the last couple of years, particularly for projects in the area of renewables and energy efficiency. So what I want to say here is that if you want to do climate policies, you need to look at all the different sectors across the economy. It's not only one which is climate and energy only, but it also affects the others. And you need to look at many other pieces and that includes also the public budget. But I'm not going to talk about that today. One other thing just to keep in mind, we are also thinking in Europe about adaptation. So I'm not going to look into that right now. But just to say that is what we are looking at. Little outlook at the end, we will, with our commitments that we have taken under Paris, see a further significant reduction of our greenhouse gases. We will become probably the most efficient or greenhouse gas efficient major economy. You see here on the right-hand side the graph at the top, the EU 28, in terms of the efficiency of the economy, which is for us also important as an overall objective when it comes to our growth and jobs agenda to become productive and more productive in the future. Internationally, we know the job is unfinished. Even with our minus 40% target at least, there is a lot more that will have to be done. So I'm just going to say that we are fully aware of that. Now with the stance taken by the new administration, that's probably going to be much harder. But still, we'll have to do a lot more together internationally in the future. And with that, I want to conclude my talk. So thank you, Arthur, for such a great overview. Stage that here and for also finishing ahead of schedule. So we have a bit more time than normal for questions. Any questions? Usually we start with the students who usually sit in the back. Any student questions? No student questions? There we go. Oh, wow. The student is actually sitting in the front. Has a price floor been considered for the carbon trade market in the European Union? Yes, kind of, you have a price floor even in one of the member states. That is the UK. They have administered that, but as you all know, your textbooks very well. It's totally ineffective if you work in a larger market because you might reduce your emissions in the UK, but overall in Europe, it would not have any kind of major impact. It makes it just cheaper for Poland in order to cover their emissions from the coal plants. We have not, let's say we have been considering whether we should have a floor price in Europe as well. And we are against that because what we really want to accomplish is the reduction of the emissions, so the quantities. So therefore, we would rather take more action as you have tried to explain on the market stability reserve where you take out certificates out of the market instead of playing around with a price corridor. We rather think that it's the market who should find the price and then we will see is that price efficient to guide innovation and if not, then we will have to do something about the amount of certificates in the market. Yes, ma'am. Since then, 1990 was the baseline for emissions reduction, the 40% etc. What's the baseline here for energy efficiency? For energy efficiency, there is no baseline. Or let's say the baseline there is a baseline curve which shows in the year, I think it was made in the year 2007 where our energy consumption would go. So that was a business as usual curve and from that we are subtracting. So it's an imaginary curve from which we are subtracting and then we get to this. But what it means in real terms is that we will have to see a reduction of energy consumption in Europe and that is what is actually happening. Okay, we have one here and two over there. Yes, ma'am. What policies are being used to increase energy efficient retrofits in buildings? What policies? Energy efficient something in buildings? In buildings, retrofitting buildings. Oh, retrofits. Again, this is not something that is being dealt with at the level of the EU. This is being implemented by individual member states and what they do is, for instance, having tax credits helping owners to renovate. But then also you have building codes that are being set at the national level which means you have to have double glazing in certain parts of Europe but it's very much determined by each of the individual member states and the reason is very simple. The situation for a building in Spain is very different from one in Northern Finland and it's the governments of those countries who are best placed to make then these very individual standards when it comes to renovation. The other thing that is being used is support programs so interest rate reductions for mortgages for renovations. So this is also a tool that is being used in quite a number of member states. Over on the left-hand side, we had a couple of markers. How is current EU climate policy accounting for possibly the desertification of southern, of some parts of southern Europe? Again, the... So the climate policy, how is it accounting for the possible desertification? Desertification, yeah. Okay, that is the adaptation question. Again, when it comes to adaptation that is a very local issue. So the ones who are governing on that is the member states and then when it comes to adaptation even the regional governments. And they are at very different stages. The graph or the map I could have shown is how many national adaptation plans are in place. What we see is around the Mediterranean Sea, I think all the member states by now have adaptation strategies and plans in place because desertification is going to be a major issue. If you look at countries like Spain, if you look at southern Italy, even southern France, if you look at the Balkans, Bulgaria, Romania, where you will have major problems in terms of desertification. I think we have one more back here. Maybe just to say from the European side the support comes through regional funds which are there to improve the cohesion of the living standards of the Europeans so member states can use those funds to assist in adapting to climate change. Could you maybe briefly talk about the agricultural changes you hope to see and how different or how you think that different nations will tackle those issues? The agricultural challenges are very different again in Europe. What you will see is in the Mediterranean area, so Spain, which is at the moment highly productive agriculturally when it comes to the production of vegetables for the North, particular during the winter season because they will have much greater water shortages. So that is something they will have to deal with. How can they improve their irrigation systems, make them even more productive than in the past? We will have the middle part in Europe like Germany and Poland where you will get warmer winters and at the same time probably have wetter summers. So that is going to change the crop production pattern a little bit so you will have to adapt the varieties that you are growing in those areas. And then if you go further North, Finland, Sweden, there you will see a prolongation of the agricultural season. So they probably will have gains in terms of productivity in the short and medium term. In the longer term, we'll have to see on which direction it is actually going to go. Overall, in terms of the total adding up to all the things, I think Europe is not going to benefit or Europe's agriculture is not going to benefit from climate change because many of the very productive regions in the South and also in France are going to be affected negatively. I think we had one in the center here, way in the back and then over here on the other. Yes sir, way in the back. So given the fact that in years to come, it's mostly developing nations and contributing to total climate emissions more than Europe or even the US, what do you think the role of the EU system is like on the global stage? Is like the ETS, like other policies, are they supposed to inspire other countries to pursue similar policies? Other things that EU is trying to do to spread its policies to other parts of the world? What do you think is role is? No, I think the role is as the Indian negotiator was once mentioning to me, he said what we want from Europe is the power of the example. You need to show that it can work and only then we will embark on what we will have to do and I think that has been happening over the last 15 to 20 years. We have seen the technologies coming out of the labs, getting into practice, getting scaled up. Just look at the story around wind and solar. Prices for those technologies have come down so they also now become affordable for many developing countries. Look at India's plan to really roll out solar in a big way, the same with China. So it's the role of the Europeans is to still show what can be done. I think that's also the role of the United States. Yeah, usually, yeah. On the aisle and then... So I was curious about the balance between reductions under the market mechanism versus effort sharing. Given the track record of ETS so far, there seems to be a very heavy reliance on the ETS. Like here in California, we've put most of our eggs in other baskets around complementary policies. Can you explain some of the thinking behind that reliance and if there are any insurance mechanisms in case problems continue to crop up? Yes, and maybe I didn't explain when the graph was on the screen. What we expect the ETS to deliver until 2030 is minus 43%. Emission reduction is compared to 2005 while the sectors outside the ETS are supposed to do 30%. So the question now is why should the ETS do more? The reason is that when we looked into the mitigation potential in the energy sector and also the industrial sector and the cost of it, it's still higher than in the sectors outside the ETS. So therefore we expect the ETS sectors to deliver more. What is the insurance here? If you exceed your emission cap, you will have to pay 100 euros per tonne of carbon dioxide. And that is quite a big incentive for companies to make sure that they stay under the cap. And that is what we have seen. We have released the latest emission figures for the ETS only about a week ago. And what you will see is that companies have met the cap, so they are below the cap. And we have seen even some interesting developments like quite a reduction in emissions from coal again, which there was a little kind of ditch and it was going up a little bit and people were already starting to wonder, is there a renaissance of coal in the electricity generation in Europe? The year 2016, definitely it was going the other way. Minus 12%, I think it was for greenhouse gas emissions from coal under the ETS. And the reason for that is that prices, the price differential between gas and coal has become much, much, much closer over the last 12 to 15 months. General and Spiers. Is there any discussion currently around kind of a border adjustment tax or are there any particular countries that are more or less in favor? We have a huge number of academics who discuss border adjustment tax, definitely and that for a long time. It's still very vivid in the discussions in France, in particular, that is something that is being looked at. We also had recently, in the whole discussions in the parliament, there was a kind of border tax mechanism coming up again, particularly for the cement industry in Europe, but even the cement industry came running and said, no, no, no, we don't want that. At the end of the day, kind of from, at least from the European Commission side, we are not in favor of border adjustment taxes, despite the fact that you have an article in the ETS directive that speaks about border tax adjustment. We have one in the middle back here and then John. Yeah, all these numbers you're talking about are very much like what's admitted within the EU. Do you talk at all about like using consumption-based emissions and also taking account of the industries, the stuff we buy from outside the EU? No, the way, of course, we are looking at this is on how we have negotiated it internationally and how we have made our commitments. And that is based on your national territory and what the production is and what the emissions that come out of that. Consumption-based approaches that has been discussed and is being discussed constantly. And we also support research in order to better understand does it really lead to relocation of production from Europe? Because that's also an argument that's been used by industry saying you put up the price for carbon in Europe but what is going to happen is we will just move into other areas where environmental standards might even lower. We haven't observed any of that at the present point in time and I don't think that internationally we will be moving to consumption-based metrics. And just give you a little anecdote. A few years ago I was on a panel with a Chinese colleague talking about climate policies in Washington, Stuart Eisenstadt was inviting us for that. And he was going on in his presentation on how China is the workbench of the rest of the world and that 30% of China's emissions are really due to the consumption in the industrialized countries. And my only response is okay, if we decide internationally we do consumption-based, I would be the happiest man under the sun. But you also will have to give me the responsibility and the regulatory responsibility to deal with that because I will give you the emissions trading system tomorrow. And that was the end of the argument. John, John Masters. Couple questions. You talked about the difference of country policies on buildings and so forth. So question one was do any of the countries have net zero of rules for new houses either in progress? Second one is what sort of progress is there towards electric vehicles and that? And the third one is, since you mentioned gas cold prices, can you address the geopolitical issues with Russian gas? We'll give you some easy questions. Yes, and they are all going into the same direction. Okay, on the new houses we have EU legislation which says that at a certain point in time we will only allow passive houses. And that is going to be 2025 if I'm not mistaken. So that is relatively soon. But that is not going to solve our problem when it comes to emissions from the housing sector because we have all these old houses that are standing there. Many of them are really beautiful but in terms of energy efficiency they are wasteful. So that is something that we really have to tackle now. The second question was on transport electric vehicles. If you talk to a producer of vehicles in Europe they all say, yes we have them already and they are in the showroom and nobody wants to buy them. So we still have a huge price differential as here in the US. So it is again member states who start with incentive programs where they give a big tax rebate like 5,000 euros if you buy an electric vehicle. But even that the uptake is relatively limited. So at the present point in time as part of the whole overhaul of the European legislation for Paris we are also looking at what should be the efficiency standards or the CO2 standards for cars after 2021. In 2021 they should be at 95 grams per kilometer which is somewhere around 55 or so miles per gallon something or 65 miles per gallon. And how steep do we have to go in order to push electric vehicles into the market? So is a question we are assessing at the moment in our impact assessments and also what type of policy design should we use? Is it sufficient to have just a single CO2 standard or do we need like California has a sales mandate for electric vehicles, yes or no? So these are questions that we are looking at at the present point in time. The Russian gas issue, what is important for Europe is diversification when it comes to the gas market. And I think this is happening in terms of the investments we have seen of the last 15 years in LNG terminals around in Europe that has changed the picture completely. All the new investments that have been done in the links to North Africa, to Algeria for instance. This is something that is working. And then I think the amount of gas that has come to the market internationally that has helped to reduce the dependence from Russian gas. A big question still is gas from going to be able to get into the European market. That's a very political question. They try to buy certain gas distributors in Europe. So this is something where we are very cautious. The whole issue about pipelines and what are the conditions on how to operate those pipelines. This is something you will have read that just now our competition department is likely to have a deal with gas problems so that they have to take quite a number of the conditions out of their contracts so they can no longer command Bulgaria to only import the Russian gas but not be able to resell it to their neighbors. So all these kind of restrictions should fall over time. Well, I see we're out of time. I'd like to thank Arthur one more time for giving such a big, inspiring and hopeful talk in these trying times. Arthur, thank you. Thank you.