 Good afternoon, a very warm welcome to all of you. My name is Joyce O'Connor. I chaired the digital group here at the IIEA. I hope you are keeping well and staying safe. I'm delighted to welcome our keynote speaker, Dr Bruno Lindebauer, founder and director general of the Centre on Regulation in Europe and chair of the EU Observatory on the online platform Economy, who will speak on a very timely and important topic, regulating the online economy towards a global digital deal. You are very welcome, Bruno, and we're really pleased that you're taking time to be with us today. Thank you very much. Bruno will speak to us for about 20 to 25 minutes or so, and then we'll go to your audience for our questions. You can join us in discussion using the Q&A function at the right hand of your screen. Please send your questions in during Bruno's presentation, and I'd really appreciate it if you give your name and affiliation when you're asking questions. Thank you so much for doing that. Please join us on Twitter at twitterhandle.iea. As you know, the presentation and the Q&A are on the record. It goes without saying that digital technologies are impacting on our lives on a daily basis. Technology can and does help us redefine problems, create solution, and helps us reinvent the future. But governance are increasingly scrutinizing tech companies that become critical infrastructure for billions of people and businesses to communicate, shop, and learn about the world. Could the result be that technology sector behaves more like banking, telecommunications, and healthcare industries of such size and importance that they are subject to more government regulation and supervision? Will 2021 be the year of regulation for the tech joints? Bruno's presentation is timely. He will discuss the possible features of a global digital deal involving industry, governments, and regulatory authorities, outlining the rights and obligations of all parties. He will place these issues in the context of an assessment of the online platform economy and of the recent landmark purine scheme commission regulatory proposals such as the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Service Act. Dr Bruno Liederberg has a distinguished career to date. He started his career early on in the European Commission with the WTO negotiations before joining the private office of the former European Commission, or Jacques Delors. He was also president and vice president of the Scientific Council of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies from 2012 to 2017. He was professor at the Salve Business School of Economics and Management for many years. Bruno is currently chair of the EU Observatory on Online Platform Economy, which was established to advise the European Commission on policymaking. He is the founder and director general of the Center on Regulation in Europe, a think tank which brings together regulators, corporations, and university research centers in order to promote better regulation in Europe. Bruno, you're very welcome and we look forward to your presentation. Thank you. Thank you very much, Joyce. Good afternoon to you. Good afternoon to your viewers. I'm very happy for this invitation to talk to the Institute for International and European Affairs. I think it's a honor for me to talk on the platform of your prestigious institution. I'm talking about this afternoon on a topic which, as you mentioned, Joyce, has been a front-page topic for some time now. I see many reasons for that. The first one you mentioned is that the internet and the online economy in particular have transformed our lives the way we interact, the way we work, the way we shop, we get educated, we get entertained, and many other aspects. Digitalization has also radically transformed our economies, and the pandemic has in the last 12 months led to an additional quantum leap in our society's digitalizations. I'm convinced, however, that the reason why newspapers talk every day about the role of the online platforms and about regulating the online economy is also because of a number of fundamental issues which are related to the activities of the so-called big tech. That's why in my comments this afternoon I'd like to discuss first what are the issues, second what should, but also what could be done to address them in an appropriate way, and because many of the online platforms are present in a large majority of countries in the world, and because issues around the internet are global issues that have even acquired a geopolitical dimension. I would also like to discuss in the third part of my comments whether global regulatory solutions could be envisaged, whether a global digital deal would be desirable, and if so, on what conditions, and what could be the features of such a deal. Before I start, I'll just make a disclaimer. You rightly mentioned, Joyce, that in addition to my position at CER, I'm the chair of the expert group for the EU observatory on the online platform economy. That is correct. I will, however, be talking this afternoon in my own name, and my statements will not commit either the European Commission or the EU observatory or the observatories expert group. So let's start with a few remarks on what are, from my perspective, the main benefits and challenges of the online platform economy for consumers, for business users, for citizens. You know, the platforms are pervasive in people's lives, and they are a hot topic because their impact is tangible for each of us, and it's communicable with real-life examples. That is why, to organize my remarks on the benefits and challenges, I thought of a spaghetti western film directed by Sergio Leone in the mid-60s. You've clearly seen the movies, Joyce, so you'll remember it. It was called The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly. And in the online platform economy, the good is about the platform's role in innovation, convenience, accessibility. We hear too often, at least to my taste, that platforms threaten innovation. On the contrary, platforms have been playing and continue to play a crucial role in generating innovative services, benefiting billions of users all over the globe. And perhaps the most universal among these benefits are the convenience and accessibility which platforms provide. Their services have opened up a world of convenience for consumers with connectivity and digitalized access to goods and services from any place the user finds her or himself. In addition, the online platforms have massively expanded opportunities for SMEs, publishers, and others to reach new audiences and markets, which, by the way, can be both good and bad. And finally, let's also acknowledge the important fact that digital services have allowed the economy and the wider society to keep functioning throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Turning that to The Bad, if we just look at economic regulation and competition law-related issues, The Bad would encompass abuse of market power, lack of contestability, unlevel playing field, lack of transparency, killer acquisitions, and differentiated treatment. And I think it would include, we could also include their issues related to data sharing, portability, and the relationship between data and targeted advertising. And now we come to The Ugly. And in this category, I would include, first, the fact that some platforms have not ensured that they use as data are properly handled, that they are too often a conduit for illegal and harmful content, whether it is disinformation, hate speech, political propaganda, or even in due meddling in elections. And I could also refer, for instance, to the unfortunate events in the capital. I'm referring to the riots just a few months ago. And I'd add an element which somehow limits the benefits of the innovative character of the platform services. And that is their role in users' addiction to their services. And this is essentially triggered by their fight for or attention, which is one of the major characteristics of many platforms' business models. And I could also include their broader issues, such as tax and labor relations and conditions of what is being referred to as the gig economy. But to encapsulate all that, I would say that in a nutshell, the concerns of citizens, business users, and governments about platforms are fundamentally related to their distress of the platform's activities, to their perception, sometimes diffuse, sometimes explicit, of a loss of autonomy. And third to the unfairness of the situation they feel they are being faced with in their relation with the platforms. And this leads us to wonder then, you know, to have questions such as, what do platforms do with my personal data? Why do I get some messages and not others? And even more fundamentally, are platforms gradually governing the public space. So against that background, let's move to the second part of my comments. And these are about the question, what's driving? What is the regulatory drive around online platforms? And I think that part of the answer lies in the needs to provide clarity for businesses, for the courts, etc. And also to assign clear mandates and clear responsibilities. But more fundamentally, following up what I just developed, I'd say that regulation of online platforms is driven by the needs felt in many parts of our societies to take back control and to restore trust, autonomy, and also fairness. And in addition, it's clear that it's also a concrete way for democratically elected politicians to address their citizens' concerns. And as such, these drivers bring opportunities, clarity of objective and messaging around why regulation is being introduced. But they also do generate risks. I would mention the risk to fall in the trap of announcement politics, but also the risk to regulate for the sake of regulating without sufficiently thinking through unintended consequences. Before discussing the various regulatory proposals and actions which are developing in the EU, or at least some of those proposals in the EU and elsewhere, I'd just like to remind you that the platforms are not a cohesive, homogeneous category. I mean, when you compare, for instance, marketplaces, e-commerce websites to social media, it's clear that they're not the same. And clearly this has and should have significant implications, both in terms of the nature, but also the level of regulatory issues to be addressed. And the lack of cohesiveness of the platforms is, I think, also illustrated by the fact that until now, the GAFA, as they called, had largely been united in their opposition to most forms of regulation. And now we see that that unity is splintering. And regulation is gradually becoming part of the competitive process, as it is the case in other industries. And I'd even go further and say that the heterogeneity of the platform economy is highlighted by the conflict and the rather strong words, which have been recently exchanged via the media between the CEOs of Apple and Facebook. And I think that their conflict is very significant precisely because it spotlights something broader than just the fights between competitors. I think that what is really at stake are fundamentally different visions of the internet and of the future of the internet. If you take on the one hand Facebook and perhaps to a large extent also Google, the business model is about capturing and monetizing users' attention on every possible device and platform. Now, if you look at the Apple's model, it's very different. It's to draw users to its own hardware-centric universe. And then if you see that, you understand why Apple can emphasize its privacy focus and highlights the opposition of that model with the vision of, shall I say, more radical openness, where privacy protection would not anymore be a social norm because that's basically what was the starting point of some of the big platform's users, if I think of Facebook. And this is the rationale for free services supported by targeted advertising. So coming back to the regulatory response, there are three main broad series of issues which are addressed by governments and regulators. The first one is everything around competitive markets reform. And there the objective is to ensure fair and open digital markets which are kept contestable. And by that I mean which allow entry to existing new and emerging players. Then you have a second category which are the rules on e-commerce and online content and more broadly on the regulation of the platform's conduct until now it's a fact that we have largely relied upon self-regulation by the platforms themselves to do this. And we've come to the conclusion that this may not necessarily be the answer. And this is why regulators come up with rules to secure, just to take an example, online platform's responsibility in content governance. And by that we mean that they quickly and proactively detect, remove, and prevent the reappearance of illegal and to some extent also harmful content online. And then you have a third category of issues which are being regulated. And I would say that these fall within the category of consumer protection regulation. And this is designed to protect users who interact with dominant platform and privacy legislation is part of that category. It aims ensuring that the platforms guarantee confidentiality and security for the huge amounts of users' data that they have access to. And the platform to business regulation pursues similar objectives, but in this case to protect SMEs. So regulators are circling, they're circling all over the world. And the EU is in the lead because of, I would say, sensitivities around the technology's impact on fundamental values. And building on the digital single market rules, the centerpiece offerings from the Karen Commission College are two proposals which have been published last December and they deal with on the one hand a digital, they consist in a digital markets act and on the other hand a digital services act. But both pieces are driven by the same rationale which Executive Vice President Margaret Westiger clearly outlines. With size and power comes responsibility, she said. And I think this is fundamental. Both sets of proposals aim to ensure that platforms behave fairly and create a competitive and safe environment for their consumer and business customers. And I'll just say a few words on each of the two proposals. The DMA in particular represents, say, a new way of regulating in the digital sector as it looks to level the playing field with the next anti-approach or regulating in anticipation of any further issues, basically. And with this, the commission is reacting to a rather long-standing concern that the competition-low framework is too slow to keep up with the fast pace of innovation in the online economy. And then you have the DSA. And the DSA proposal focuses on plugging in legal gaps to provide certainty across the e-commerce and contents part of the platform economy. The commission believes a common set of rules on intermediaries obligations and accountability across the single market will open up new opportunities to provide digital services across borders while ensuring a high level of protection to all users, no matter where they live in the EU. And protection encompasses questions of security, quality, safety, trust, as well as fair competition. So basically, we could say that the DSA aims at enhancing platforms' liability and also rebalancing relations between users and platforms in favor of users. Personally, I believe in making things simple, what is illegal offline should also be illegal online. And I would add that clearly, to find appropriate solution to all the issues at stake, this will require a determined will and determined action on behalf of all parties involved, and we may come back to that. I said we have the, and we have also other initiatives on data governance, democracy, audiovisual media services, which complete the two pieces that I mentioned. And all these proposals aim to further embed a coherent value-based approach to the platform economy. So that's for the EU. And I said it's certainly in the lead for now, but member states are pushing in the unions back through autonomous action. You see that in France, you see that in Germany, and clearly this is something which the Commission has to take care of to make sure that all those different initiatives will clearly fit in the EU framework. But Europe is not the only one. The other countries are catching up, and they're catching up fast. The UK has got its own approach, and I could come back to it if people want in the Q&A. I would say a few words though on the US. In the US, you have investigations going on by 48 state attorney generals, by the Federal Trade Commission, by the Justice Department. You have, in addition, more than 20 proposals to update Section 230, which has surfaced on the hill originated from both sides of the EU. Section 230 is the law that protects online platforms from being held liable for things users say on them. And it touches on everything from election integrity to online social media bias, etc. In Australia, we also see action taking place. Australia is now vocalizing what it sees as a lacuna in not having the copyright regime. Europe put it place with its digital single market reforms, and it's finalizing a specific news media bargaining code to address level playing field issues between platforms and publishers. And again, if there is an interest to comment more on what's going on there, I'll be happy to do so in the Q&A. And finally, China. China is an important digital player. China is the second home of Big Tech, and they have opened an antitrust investigation on Alibaba on suspicion of monopolistic practices, and they're clearly willing to control the ambitions of the local Big Tech groups. And I could go on like that. In India, there's a big privacy push from the Modi administration, etc. But I'd like to come against that background to the third and last part of my comments. And this is a question of a global digital deal. I think it is worse while addressing that. Because like some of the main challenges faced at global level, climates, inequalities, the platforms are also global, with perhaps a special case for China. And I think it's important to talk about the global digital deal also because the needs to restore trust, autonomy, and fairness is commonly shared in many parts of the world. I'm personally convinced that it would be beneficial to all parties to engage in a discussion to address jointly these common issues. And this goes beyond the fact that collective action is required because many countries cannot win individually. Such discussion should include defining roles, rights, and obligations for each set of parties. And I'm equally convinced that because of their central role, the platforms have a key part to play in that conversation. We need them around the table. We need them to engage. And at the same time, public authorities must ultimately remain the orchestrator of different actors, different systems, because only they are in charge of maximizing the general interest. And the new global regulatory order that I'm calling for must be shaped in a way that it does not jeopardize either innovation or convenience or connectivity access. But on the contrary, that it enhances these further for the common interest of all. And we need a deal, by the way, both on rules and on enforcement of the rules. Now, you could challenge me and say, well, Bruno, you need two for tango and probably a much larger number for Bamba that is for a multilateral agreement. And you could also note that what I'm proposing would require that all partners who should ideally be involved be like minded, at least on values, if not on policies as well. And that at this stage, you know, we are far from it and you'd probably be not be wrong in challenging me on that. Because if you look, for instance, US versus EU, the US privileged freedom of enterprise that is short term efficiency while the EU is more concerned with contestability of markets, that is longer term competition. The EU is also less skeptical about regulation in general, and perhaps more skeptical about markets. Freedom of speech is the number one value in the US. While for the EU, it's one of the values to be privileged, but not at the expense of the expenses of other values, preventing harm, for instance, which are equally important. And what about China's value when you compare China with EU or the US? You know, President Macron rightly pointed out recently that China is for the EU and probably also for the US. At the same time, a global partner, it's a global partner on climate. It's a competitor, it's a trade competitor, but it's also fundamentally a systemic rival with very different sets of views on democracy and human rights. Now, could those differences between the EU and its global partners prevent any progress towards a global digital deal? I don't think so. Of course, if the objective is to achieve one single super digital treaty within the framework of the UN or even just the G20, yes, this could legitimately be considered as a rather remote and even unrealistic objective. But in my view, making a number of gradual steps towards increasing bilateral and multilateral cooperation on specific aspects of the digital agenda is not unrealistic. And let me explain why. Even if the EU and the US values are not similarly weight, the commonality of concerns and challenges should not prevent both parties and the companies based on both sides of the pond from moving forward with, for instance, the Commission's recent proposal on a transatlantic technology and trade council. This forum could be the right place to discuss a common approach to areas like AI regulation, platforms responsibility, or even as recently suggested by a major US based tech player, the promotion of global data flows. On taxation, which is another important item of the global agenda, it's in the platform's interest that the ongoing discussions on a digital task tax within the OECD framework eventually leads to an agreement on a unified system. Can you imagine the nightmare it would be for them if they were having to face the myriad of national situations, which in the absence of an OECD agreement are bound to emerge? Similarly, on several economic and non-economic regulation related issues, such as limits to the market power of platforms, to the liability, to content moderation, to transparency of algorithms, and probably many other sensitive topics, is it unreasonable to think that the consensus around common principles could ultimately be identified at multilateral level? And perhaps the final word on data, international cooperation on data protection is key to establish a virtual circle of trust in the digital age. There is a way to have protection of individuals coincide with the protection of corporate interest. We need to encourage legal regimes that facilitate data transfers instead of fragmentation and digital protectionism, such as forced data localization requirements. It is in citizens' interests to have information circulate across frontiers, and it is in the interest of businesses to have cross-border data flows. And this requires data protection laws and traditional data privacy debates to evolve around the number of shared principles. And I know that progress on that front has already been achieved at international level. I would just mention the Convention 108, which is the Council of Europe's Global Data Protection Convention. This is something which covers 55 countries, so much broader than Europe, with Latin American, African, and Asian countries. It's a legally binding instrument that aims at creating a common global legal space for data protection in the digital age. And I could also mention here the negotiations on digital trade at the WTO level, and their conclusions in the near future, should enhance data flows provided, of course, that full compliance with the EU data protection framework can be guaranteed. To conclude, if we want to identify and then implement the most adequate policy and regulatory framework to make digital markets competitive, safe, fair, and innovative, and avoid the risk of having a splinter net, there is a need for a deep and constructive dialogue on a global basis. That dialogue should involve all stakeholders, governments, regulators, platforms, business users, citizens. It should be based on a robust analytical framework. It should overcome the traditional silo approach in our policy development and regulatory processes. It should acknowledge the regulatory implications of the variety of business models in the online economy. And it should be setting clearly each parties respective rights and obligations. And I think that in a realistic scenario, a global digital deal could take the form of a series of issue specific bilateral and multilateral agreements between the EU, third country partners, and the economic agency involved. And this will necessarily be a gradual process, but it has to be initiated now. And I'm convinced that my proposals should contribute to implement Europe's determination to acquire strategic autonomy, which this commission has been rightly advocating in the last year. Europe has often been a role model in regulation. That's the so-called Brussels effect. A number of regulatory developments originated in the EU have paved the way to similar rules elsewhere in the world. The example of GDPR is well known. Now, one of the features of our approach of the EU approach to regulation is its coherence and its value-based dimension. In Europe, regulation is an essential pillar of our democratic architecture. It's a tool to safeguard the fundamental rights of European citizens. The explicit emphasis on the human-centric approach in the regulation of AI provides another illustration of this. Therefore, the sooner the EU will achieve a unified internal view on the regulatory proposals to address the platform economy challenges, and I'm referring here, in particular, to the DMA and the DSA, the sooner it will have the leadership necessary to shape global conduct and move closer to its strategic digital autonomy objectives. And as it is the case with climate change, a lot of the risks is in global action being too slow and too late. So let's not waste time and let's respond to the needs of urgent solutions. Thank you very much. Thank you so much, Bruno, for that inspirational presentation. I think it was very insightful and extremely clear because you're able to cover such complex issues, but giving a framework to work through them. I think this goes back maybe to your work in the London School of Economics in terms of your industry relations. Many years ago. Many years ago, but taking a graduate approach. I think it's very interesting and we're honoured to have you actually present this idea within this framework for a global deal here. We've lots of questions coming in as you can imagine. And one of the first ones actually is from Peter McLoone, who was involved in industry relations, but is an board member at the IIEA. And he's looking, you've mentioned it about the current struggle between big tech companies and the Australian government. Do you see that as part of the process, part of defining the issues? The Australian developments are very interesting and they're very interesting for several reasons. I think we should first clarify that what is taking place was originally a fight between Facebook and Google on the one hand and Rupert Murdoch's group on the other hand. And Mr. Murdoch's group owns more than two-thirds of the Australian daily newspapers market. And then the conflict was relayed by the government. Now, apart from that, it's clear that there is another issue. And that issue is about having the platforms paying for the content which has been created by traditional media companies. Now, we've been through that in the EU and sometimes we still face similar issues. But in the EU, the law mandates payment for use of press contents. And this is obviously fundamental because access to quality news is critical to the well-functioning of our democracies. And perhaps a third remark I would make on that is that when we look at that from the Australian situation from a global perspective, the fight between the Australian government and Facebook, Google, etc. is equally important because it forces to wonder whether small or medium-sized countries like Australia be able to impose their rules on the global platforms. Will the platforms simply be able to boycott smaller nations? And this is a key issue. And this is why I'm obviously a militant of EU-wide and also broader action. Let's be clear, Joyce Luxemburg would never be able to regulate the tech giants itself because they would simply leave if they didn't like the rules. Just thinking of an additional point, the situation may be the same with other EU member states with a high dependency on big tax revenues. They may prefer the EC to regulate on their behalf. And I suppose I don't need to mention any example here. Exactly. Thank you. Thanks Bruno. We've got a question from Emily Binchie. And she asks, how would you quantify the success of the GDPR in terms of giving back control of personal data to the user? It is often difficult for platform users to identify its tangible benefits. That's a good question. I would make a difference between the legislation itself and the way it's being enforced. Because I think we have a great legislation and we have clearly been pioneered in developing it. And as I said, we've been role models. California has been following us, et cetera, and other parts of the world. But the question about GDPR raises our attention to the issue of enforcement. We could do better in terms of enforcement. When we look at the records of enforcement, EU versus the US, in the area of privacy, we see that the enforcement focus of the US is much more convincing, even if they're not the first in the class in terms of developing the appropriate legislation. I've seen recently figures showing that the FTC, the Federal Trade Commission, has had since 2018 imposed almost 6 billion dollars in privacy fines, including heavy penalties on some of the largest tech players. Now, do you know that during the same period, despite the fact that we are the pioneers with GDPR, we have just collected less than 300 million euros on privacy fines. Now, to be honest, it is not clear to me that the US record has led to more significant changes in the conduct of the firms that have been fined. But this is why, in Ser, with my colleagues, we have proposals and assessment on the DMA and the DSA. We have made a number of recommendations on oversight, on an ecosystem of oversight. Perhaps I could mention a number of common principles, because I think this is the key part. We came up with, in our recommendations, with oversight being defined by effectiveness, proportionality, openness, new process, respect of fundamental rights, innovation friendliness, and also the fact that the regulators must experiment. We are on moving sense, so regulators must have the possibility to experiment, and this should be, of course, implemented by independent regulators. In my country, for instance, today, there are still a number of issues around the independence and the accountability of the privacy regulators. And I think this is something where, as I said, we must make progress. Well, Bruno, do you think that the DMA and SNA proposals give that framework? Are you suggesting that that's what's lacking? We think that it's a good start. We see a number of good proposals in the DMA and the DSA, but on implementation, as well as on other aspects of the DMA or the DSA, we say it's a good start, but it's not the end of the process. And I'm sure that within the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, these proposals will still or can still be improved and amended to address those issues. Yeah, within the the normal trial process, the classical trial process. We've got a question here from Nicholas Suzuki from the Trade Advisor at the International Trade Intelligence and Associated Researcher at the Jacques Delors Institute, and he asked the question, what prospect do you see for the WTO joint statement initiative in electronic commerce becoming the global digital deal that you envisage? I don't know the details of what your view is asking, but I would say that that what I've been advocating is clearly is not going to be the result of, as I said, one initiative. It's a number of initiatives which will gradually converge. And if that initiative mentioned by my distinguished colleague from the Jacques Delors Institute, well, maybe. You mentioned the UK. Could you briefly outline some differentiation features of the EU and the UK approaches to regulation on the online economy? Yeah, this is interesting because, you know, the the UK has long said that it's determined and Prime Minister has said that that he wanted the UK to be, I quote, the safest place in the world to be online. And simultaneously hot on the heels of Brexit, the UK, as we know, emphasized that it's open for business. So there's an additional element that UK consumers have been early adopters of new digital innovations in Europe. That is a reality. And I think it is therefore not surprising that the UK's approach for keeping digital markets contestable looks sets to focus on high level principles. And I must say that I share the views of several colleagues of mine who see the UK approach as more nimble because less prescriptive than the DMA. Because of this approach based on high level principles. And I'm also encouraged and seduced to some extent by the UK vision on enforcement because they propose the and I think it is confirmed now that they're going to create a new digital markets unit. While as I said, the issue of enforcement by the commission of the DMA is still something clear, which which is not too clear, where, for instance, the 80 or some people who are going to be put in a new unit to deal with this, are they going to be taken from? I don't want to enter into into details, but there are a number of questions there. I'm not saying criticism, but question. But do you think as you've come back to this a number of times, do you think that this issue of enforcement can be addressed in the future through these various acts? Yeah, because I think I think it's it's it's both an issue of institutional design, okay, in making sure that things are being dealt with at the right level, and then of political will. Because of course, if you decide that you want a member state of medium size to be the regulator of a large platform for all its operations in the EU, and that at the same time, you don't provide that regulator with the resources, financial, but human and skill resources to do that, you appreciate that that's an issue. And we've a question from Mark Dempsey. How do you see the structure of the digital services coordinators as proposed in the Digital Services Act legislation for each member state? Can you repeat the question? How do you foresee the structure of the digital services coordinators as proposed in the Digital Service Act legislation for each member state? Very specific. As I said, for the moment, the commission is should become in the proposals a kind of EU FTC. And the question is about whether they're going to be sufficient resources, independence, accountability. I don't have any problem with regard to independence, if it's in the commission. I don't have any problem regarding accountability, because we live in a system of accountability to both the parliament and the court. I may have questions about resources, as I said. Now, there is also an internal question about the synergies with different powers, in particular, the antitrust and the DSA. Is this going to be sufficiently clear and predictable? Is there going to be a joint task force within the commission services with the various services involved? Connect, come, grow question. We see also, and this is something we've discussed, instead, that there seem to be, in the commission proposal, a relatively limited role for national authorities in the digital markets advisory committee. We think that these things have to be addressed at a national level, but within a coordinated manner. But you cannot expect a central body to deal with everything. But therefore, if there is a kind of federalization, this is not the word I should use, decentralization, sorry, these are things that I could say 40 years ago, but I can't anymore. Decentralization, then you must ensure that there will be a number of, there will be common ways of putting up a complaint, putting up measures, what kind of measures, what kind of remedies, what kind of monitoring. So clearly, this digital markets advisory committee is the place for that to be developed, but not at the expenses of the national authorities actual responsibilities for dealing with cases. Thanks, Bruno. Now moving on to another area from Seamus Allen and the IIEA, what are your thoughts on the role of mandatory data sharing requirements as a tool to promote competition? It's a complicated issue. I think that we have to make the difference between personal data and industrial data. You hear some time in Brussels, people saying we lost the fights around personal data, but we must win the one on industrial data. And I think on industrial data, the vision of the commission today, the initiative of Thierry Breton, among others, is very clear. We must be the leaders, and it's clear that having that free flow of data is something but in a responsible and controlled way is essential for Europe to acquire its strategic autonomy. Now, does that mean that with regard to personal data, the fight is lost? I don't know, and I cannot accept that. I don't know if you may have heard and your viewers may have heard about a vision of personal data sovereignty, which is being promoted by Sir Tim Berners-Lee. You know, Berners-Lee is the founder of the internet, and he's advocating for a situation where every citizen would be given a secure data store to serve as the home for their personal data with the ability to determine who has access to data within it and when. I find this very attractive. Now, is it just a utopia for the moment? I don't know, but it's clear that we need to move closer to the fact that we can decide when and to whom we are prepared to give our personal data, and this is what we expect and should be expected from regulation to provide for. Bruno, I think this is a good note to end on. Unfortunately, time has caught up on us, but I think, as I said, you've presented a vision, maybe a framework to look at a global digital deal and the complexity of it, but as you said, you like things simple, that it will be possible through gradual steps, through that digital agenda, and I suppose what's really encouraging now are the number of questions that can be asked, and there's a framework in which to work through them, and the vision of Europe itself as a leader of making Europe digitally fit for purpose, for having the view of involving citizens, question equality, the rights and individuals, yet balancing that with platforms, with business, with other vested interests. So I thank you for raising those issues in a way that easily understandable, but also giving us a pathway to look at this issue, which I think, as you say, this global digital deal is on the agenda now, whether we like it or not, regulation has been discussed, and we have a way with people like you with that leadership of helping us work through those issues within Europe and within the broader international community. So thank you very much, and I'd like on your behalf to thank our audience for their active participation, very interested with lots of other questions, but unfortunately we won't be able to get there, and to thank Locke and Mullally from the production team, the IIEE, and Seamus Allen, our digital policy researcher. But really Bruno, it's been a tour de force, a great privilege, as I said to have you here, and thank you very much, and we look forward and we look forward to welcoming you again, and maybe another time in Ireland this year. So thank you very much, and goodbye to everybody, and keep well and stay safe. Thank you very much.