 Thank you for rousing yourself out of bed so early and making it down here on a Monday morning. We appreciate you coming along. I'm sure there will be a few people drifting in as we get going, but I thought we'd try and make a start now. We have plenty of time for discussion. My name is Richard Downey. I'm Deputy Director of the Africa Programme here at CSIS. I'm really grateful this morning for our panellist and a chance really to tackle the Sudan referendum. probably being Monday morning we get first crack at discussing the referendum which began over the weekend. So, as we sit here and discuss the Sudan this morning, the people of southern Sudan are in the middle of making a historic decision, as you know. Voting began yesterday in the referendum on their future, whether to remain part of Sudan or to succeed and form their own nation. Millions of people appear to have taken that opportunity so far in the first day and half of voting. Many of them lining up outside polling stations hours before they opened, patiently awaiting their chance to play their part in settling the future direction of southern Sudan. A few months ago it seemed unlikely we were even going to get to this point, at least on time. But we've seen a big push in recent weeks by the international community to get the arrangements on track. And of course the Sudanese people themselves have taken the lead, channeling their energies into making this process work. So the results in recent weeks, we've also seen public statements by politicians both north and south that have helped to reduce tensions and create an environment where we can be more confident that the process will go smoothly and the outcome will accurately reflect the will of the people who take part in it. So this is a momentous time and I'd like to acknowledge the presence of our representatives from the government of Sudan and southern Sudan as well, who in getting to this point today have travelled a long way through decades of civil war of course, the peace agreement in 2005, and the subsequent six year long process of trying to make this deal work. So we're glad they can join us and we looked forward to perhaps hearing them speak as well this morning. But today we're going to reflect a little bit about upon how Sudan has arrived at this moment. But mainly we're going to look forward and think about the upcoming challenges as well. Because while those who've worked on the referendum of course deserve a great deal of credit for the fact that it's taking place on time, and so far at least in a relatively orderly fashion, the referendum isn't the end of the road. Asal Vaqir himself said yesterday as he cast his vote in Cuba, it's premature to say a job done in many ways the real challenges lie ahead, particularly in the six month long period following the referendum. If the vote comes out in favour of secession, this will be the time when the tough negotiations really begin in earnest on all the issues which will help determine relations between north and south for years to come. And of course the fate of Abye remains undecided. People there have been denied their chance to vote in a separate referendum on whether to remain part of the north or join the south. And we've had worrying reports of violence there during the past few days. So our speakers are going to discuss some of these big issues today and perhaps say something about the role of the international community, the role they can play going forward. The United States, Sudan's neighbours and the African Union as well. So we're very pleased this morning to be joined by two experienced analysts from International Crisis Group, an organisation whose thoughtful analysis and well researched reports that we always find useful here on the Africa programme. On my immediate left we have ICG's new Africa programme director, Comfort Arrow. Comfort Overseas, four different projects in Africa covering central, southern, west and the Horn of Africa. Twenty countries in all within these regions. Comfort was previously director of the South Africa office and deputy director of the Africa programme at the International Centre for Transitional Justice, I apologise. And we're delighted also to have with us Fuad Hikmat, whose ICG's African Union and Sudan special adviser. Fuad takes part in the management of all of ICG's work in relation to Sudan and the AU and his professional background includes management of humanitarian and post conflict programming. He's literally just touched down in DC this morning from Sudan as well so he can give us really the up to the minute perspective on what's going on in Sudan now. No pressure there as well. So I'm going to hand over to Comfort first of all. He's going to give us an overview of ICG's work and the situation before passing over to Fuad and then we'll have plenty of time for questions and comments from all of you as well, hopefully. Thanks very much. Comfort. Thank you very much and I'd like to start by wishing you all a happy new year but also thank you in CICS especially Jennifer and Richard and the staff of the Centre for Hosting International Crisis Group on the day after the start of the important referendum. I also think it's quite telling that the very first job for the new Africa director for ICG is to come to Washington and to speak to the gathering here and that shows you also the importance of Washington in the question of the future of a new Sudan and the future of North Sudan as well. So it's a pleasure and an honour that we've been asked to come this morning, very cold morning but this morning in Washington to talk about a new dawn in Africa as well. Just briefly as Richard was saying I would start off by just introducing the International Crisis Group to all of you, some of you who don't know it. We are generally recognised as an independent, non-partisan organisation that services or provides analysis to governments and international governmental bodies like the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank and we work quite closely with a number of organisations like the CICS here in Washington. We were founded about 15 years ago in 1995 as an independent non-governmental organisation on an initiative by a number of transatlantic figures who disbared over the international community's failure back in the 1990s on strategies such as Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia and even at that time Sudan as well. And we are quite well known for the reports that we publish. It wavers between 80 and 90 reports that we do and even in the Sudan programme, the Sudan team for YD&Z could, if they were given a lot of leeway, write 80 reports in the space of three months in Sudan because of the nature of the situation there. We also produce what we call the crisis watch bulletin which provides a monthly snapshot of what we consider to be the conflict alert countries at that moment in the month. We have several advocacy offices and most of you may know our Washington office. We also have an office in Brussels and in New York as well and the headquarters for the Africa programme is strategically located in Nairobi which is a critical hub for us. And as Richard has already said, as the Africa director, we operate in 20 different countries across the continent. And before I joined ICG, I was at ICTJ but also the United Nations mission in Liberia as well. Specifically on Sudan, my colleague Fawad will go into more deeper details on Sudan. But I also just want to acknowledge that this is a momentous moment in the history of the continent. When you're looking for key moments, key dates on the continent, make reference to 1957. Ghana is the first independent country on the continent after the end of decolonisation. We'll also note the freedom of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and the end of apartheid in 1994. This is another historical moment on the continent. The birth of a new nation and the key concern for us is how that is going to unfold. The voting for the referendum, as Richard pointed out, started yesterday on the question of self-determination which may result in the independence of the South. Two decades of war have come to an end in Sudan in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. But now we are at a stage where the delicate peace is going to be tested. While securing the referendum has been an international priority, the long-term stability of the region lies in the ability of the North and South to forge a post-CPA relationship. The situation, if it goes well, will see the smooth outcome of the referendum. If the results are respected by the cartoon government, then we should see some significant progress being made. This will provide a perfect platform for negotiations for post-referendum arrangements to go successfully. But should the vote go poorly, we might also witness a recognition of conflict in between the North and the South, and also an escalation of the violence in Darfur, which Fawrard will talk about. Again, also the impact on the region will also be quite grave. At this point, the situation is quite fluid and it's quite uncertain how things are going to go. The situation is quite tricky in creating a new and independent Southern Sudan, which already is being dubbed as a pre-felled state. The borders remain undecided, and meanwhile in Juba, the nascent capital, institutions and services, which urgently need to be regenerated and rebuilt, this is still a fundamental issue at State for the new South Sudan. The future arrangements on citizenship, on nationality, on national resources, on wealth sharing, on management of oil and water, currency, assets and the liabilities, security and international treaties must be negotiated regardless of the referenced outcome. These are issues that we pointed out in our update briefing that we produced in December towards the end of last year. And of course the question of the future of Abye needs to be addressed, as well as the popular consultations in Cordefan and the Blue Nile. Of course we must congratulate UNIMID and UNIFAS and for their work in the last few weeks in bringing out the voter registration process. There will be a need for a cohesive statement from relevant actors, in particular in this instance, we call upon the Africa Union and key leading states on the continent, Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia and Egypt also to make the necessary statement, positive statement in relation to Sudan. And of course the Secretary General's monitoring panel for the referendum on Sudan needs to take a more public leading role in the pronouncements made over the next three weeks. And there must be a careful monitoring and communication over these next three weeks, which we judge to be a tense period for Sudan. The real challenge, the real issue that we need to avoid in this next three weeks is disinformation, is rumours and these themselves are real triggers for instability. And of course here in Washington we can't forget the role of the United States government. The US incentives have been very helpful, however ultimately limited given that cartoon is politically savvy enough to understand that it's the US Congress and not the executive that makes many key decisions on the table. The absence of a basic blueprint for the post 2011 referendum between the north and south contributes to the uncertainties about the political and economic future of each and risks the referendum being viewed as a zero sum game that sustains fears and smooths the conduct of the exercise and acceptance of the result. Added to this is the deterioration situation in Darfur and concerns about ensuring a more credible and serious negotiation process ongoing in Doha, Qatar. Ensuring stability in the south and improved relations between the north and the south in the post referendum climate will be critical to solving the Darfur problem. This is the critical time for Sudan but also for Africa. Getting the situation right in Sudan will be a significant and game changing moment for the continent but also for the international community also. We therefore welcome this opportunity today to engage in a debate with you all here on the future and how to guarantee stability in the north and south and a new north while we concentrate heavily on the future of South Sudan. We mustn't forget also that the future of the north is at stake as well. So I'll turn back to Richard who will introduce Fouad. Thank you. Thanks very much for that overview comfort. I'll pass straight over to Fouad. Thanks very much. Good morning and protocol observed. I want to say that my director impressed me very much. She's saying she's new but her speech doesn't sound like she's new. Because I think she did half what I'm supposed to do. She already did half of my briefing which made things easier to me. But I would like to start by saying thank you so much for the CIS to invite us for this event. It is a difficult moment for me as the Sudanese and if I remove my hat from the ICG at the end I am Sudanese and this is about human relations. As far as I am very very happy for South Sudanese to go and vote for this historical moment and to get their country and if I am on that side I will be happy and jubilating for a lot of reasons and I am happy for that. But also as a Sudanese to see the map that we knew it from the primary school that we draw it now by heart, the map of Sudan. I don't know how we are going to draw it in six months time. The South's borders it will be very difficult to draw. It's a very very sad moment for us. But for me it is not a surprise that Sudan is going to succeed. Because before going to talk about the challenges I think one of the main reasons that underpinning the current context is that the two parties simply failed to implement the comprehensive peace agreement. It is the mistake of the two in their fail to implement the comprehensive peace agreement. I don't hold the two parties only on the cessation of South Sudan because they couldn't maintain the unit. I think if we want to do that we can go up to the, from the first government that they took control of Sudan after independence the responsibility goes from there and I think all the government failed. But focusing on the CPA, the CPA it had got two important principles. One is democratic transition and including in that is the reconciliation process and secondly that if the democratic transition happened, reconciliation happened that will foster the second principle which is the self-determination that it makes unity attractive for the southern arts. Those two principles did not happen for a lot of political reasons and as we know that a benchmark in the democratic transformation was the elections that were supposed to happen in the half of the interim period, the third, fourth year of the interim period to leave another three years of the second half of the interim period to foster the constitutional and legal arrangements being done in the first half and then to work in these three years to make sure that unity is going to make attractive. Elections didn't happen in the third or fourth year. It happened six or eight months just before the end of the interim period. So three years being shortened to eight months for a lot of reasons and both of course they wanted to augment their influence of control, their power to remain in power and that's why I think they didn't want the elections to happen on time. So both I think failed in these three principles, the democratic transformation if I consider reconciliation as another principle, but the only success is that they reach their referendum. So for me then when I look into the comprehensive peace agreement all what I can describe it from comprehensive peace agreement that it became a grant ceasefire for six years. There is a six fire in six years and now after six years that the question here is can we maintain that ceasefire? And the other reason is also and I want here to draw specifically on the Slammists when they took power in 1989 they had their own vision for Sudan and unfortunately that vision could not accommodate their preference because they saw the preference as marginal, ours as minority groups rather than groups of their own right and they wanted to maintain power so the CPA which reduced their power from 100% to 52% well it gave the SPLM 28% and the other political parties the remaining they saw that in these six years how they can continue to maintain the power rather than looking into inclusivity and pluralism and that is I think one of the problems that made the CPA to fail. So separation is a logical outcome and I don't think unity is going to be an outcome because this will be magic and I don't think there is happy magic in Sudan but there is a sadness always and I hope that one day that this turns into some of happiness. So the challenges are immense and let me focus on few things. The post referendum issues of course we will come to that but the referendum itself is a procedure, it's a procedure but it is happening in an environment where there is serious tension there is serious nervousness and volatility that is where this procedure is happening and at the same time there is no full agreement on any of the post referendum issues none and also there is a military build up along the borders and there is an economic embargo on the south. So if we see in the last weeks the government or let's maybe say President Bashir it's not the government of national unity made this decision let's make a distinction here sometimes when President Bashir talks on behalf of the government of national unity it's not actually talking on behalf of the SPLM because still this is the government of national unity and he made a decision that 20% of the southerners on the civil service they are going to go home after cessation and refuse to give these Sudanese people citizenship only if there is a political arrangement to be dealt as foreigners to give you an example that there is 24,000 southern Sudanese students in the universities in Khartoum what is going to happen to these 24,000 if you send them home and at the same time we know that there is a lot of people going back now to south Sudan over 100,000 that they are really in a very dire situation where there is no humanitarian assistance, no shelter and so on and I question that question from the NCP it is an NCP rather than a government of national unity decision so recently for example that there are the commercial transactions or vital goods transfer of vital goods the south Sudanese are blocked the serial marketing obey it for the sorghum and so on they got the message that not to transfer a lot of Syria to the south Sudan the transfer of oil is becoming very big problem now in Juba the barrel of oil shot from 350 to 750 Sudanese so over 100% prices short of 30 to 40% in south Sudan these are policies are not favourable for a mutual and good relationship between the north and south so this sort of direction it will reflect negatively on the communities who live along the borders of 1956 especially the Bagara because if the SPLM reciprocates such policies by blocking for example the nomads who have like 11.5 million heads of cattle that they spent nine months along the borders of 1956 or south of the borders of 1956 that is their livelihoods for the last 200, 300, 500 years if the south SPLM reciprocated by blocking that that will be very serious for the Bagara and they are very serious constituency of Sudan and these communities along the borders are highly militarized as we know that in Abye, Dengogdinka are highly militarized but also the Bagara are highly militarized they have been abused during the last wars through malicious popular defence forces and they were like the front line of the regime in the last 20 years in the fighting the war against the souths highly militarized so this kind of policies in the last weeks met some people and analysts in Sudan to describe like this kind of policy direction from the NCP rather than from the government it is sort of like a software or the first steps to sort of an ethnic cleansing and now it is debatable because that's a legal term but when you deny your own citizens the right which is actually the constitution of Sudan Article 7 between brackets 4, 7-4 it says that Sudan allows dual citizenship Sudanese can have citizenship of other countries and even the president does not have the right to remove the citizenship of a person by bears or even by nationalization and international laws also doesn't accept that so what I think it is important now for the north and south is to secure a strategic relationship to mitigate these consequences of the political separation it is a political separation so they need to focus on the economic and financial unity and looking into the common market but as I said on the contrary NCP direction the approach appears to be a very, very difficult one talking about a state based on ethnic and religious hegemony and this raises the nervousness of those who are living in southern Curdwfan and Blue Nile because yet their situation is not yet resolved and they are part of the north therefore the challenge I think one of the main challenges in the coming six months is that how to avoid the conditions that could lead to confrontation military confrontation along the borders unfortunately as I said that both parties and particularly in the north are creating the conditions that could aggravate the situation along the borders they are actively mobilizing tribes along the borders to rejoin the PDF, the popular defence forces and on the pretext that they are going to lose their interests is going to be jeopardized by the cessation of South Sudan so if this referendum doesn't go well and the results is not accepted it means that the separation will not go smoothly the transitional period will be full of violence in my opinion and the aggravation of relationship between the communities along the borders will aggravate the situation in Abye and Abye can trigger a war between communities that it will drag the Saf, the Sudan Armed Forces and the SPLM into wider conflict that could derail the whole process and it will be very difficult for the two parties to conclude the CPA so as I said then that in the last six months they failed to find solutions to the post referendum issues although that there is a framework presented by the African Union High Implementation Panel which includes principles but no solutions and I think what is important now is to discuss the issue of the citizenship and economic relationship that it affects day to day lives of the people along the borders if the issue of the citizenship is resolved in the interest of both I think it could open the space for political dialogue reaching an agreement on the post referendum issues the kind of a border and so on I think that is an entry for the post referendum and then there is no need for this huge military build up that we see now along the borders north of the borders and south of the borders a very serious one and the second challenge which I want to draw the panel here the attention to which people that are not aware of it is Southern Cordewan and the Blue Nile these two have got forces inside South Sudan and also along the borders of 1956 these are military forces that they fought with the SPLM all the last years they fought for their rights they have a protocol it's called the Southern Cordewan Comprehensive Peace Agreement for the resolution of the conflict in Southern Cordewan and Blue Nile it is a protocol that's supposed to go through a public consultation based on that there is a democratic elections and then to negotiate with the center and once they agree then the protocol becomes a final binding peace agreement of Southern Cordewan and Blue Nile at the moment it is not yet a final binding comprehensive peace agreement for Southern Cordewan and Blue Nile they have to go through the public consultation now they recently the government or again the national congress party asked the SPLM to withdraw these forces out of 1956 and disarm and they cannot come over the 1956 borders with arms and for the SAF to deploy to redeploy up to the borders of 1956 in a way to cut the strategic depths between these forces and Southern Sudan South Cordewan and Blue Nile they refused and they are going to refuse disarmament because they know that the public consultation in the context now of the referendum in a sort of a constitutional vacuum it is not going to bring the final solution that it is acceptable to the people in Southern Cordewan and the Blue Nile because as we know that it was supposed to be happening in the context of half a year of the entering period there was a democratic elections and then people who are elected in a fair free elections and then there is the public consultation is still premised on the framework of the CPA now in this transition after the South Cede that's a sort of a vacuum of a framework so you can imagine that if the public consultation is going to bring any lasting solution that's why they want to keep their arms they want to keep their forces because they know that there is a future challenge meeting them and I think this is a very big challenge recently Salfa Keir agreed with President Bashir to delay the redeployment of SAF up to the borders of 19 and I think it is an important but the risk here is that NCP could disagree or change their mind from here until then what happens if they try to move their forces up to the borders of 1956 with not recognizing this specificity of Southern Cordewan and Blue Nile that I think is one of the serious risk there is the ceasefire agreement of Geneva 2002 which is incorporated into comprehensive peace agreement for Southern Cordewan if you remember the Geneva ceasefire there for Southern Cordewan it is still valid it might be debatable if it is valid or not but there is an agreement but the CPA did not actually stipulate anything for this kind of a situation for the forces in Southern Cordewan and Blue Nile so I think one of the challenge now is that the two parties they need to renew the ceasefire agreement in Southern Cordewan and looking in how to maintain a ceasefire in Blue Nile I think this is one of the very big challenges in the coming period and that's the role of the international community is very important and to look into that the public consultation cannot happen in a political in a constitutional vacuum because the constitution of Sudan is going to end in July 2011 after that what is the constitution and at the moment if the public consultation is going to work on what so that's why a lot of people argue that the constitution arrangement have to be debated before the public consultation and therefore until this happens a ceasefire need to be maintained in Southern Cordewan and Blue Nile and I think this is one of the high risk that people are not aware because people focus on ABA and they don't see this point as we know that all the time NCP wants it to weaken its partner because it's important they see it as a strategic to negotiate with a weakened SPLM but now with the referendum going I think this is now subsiding because even the southerners who are opposing the SPLM now at the moment they can't go against the current referendum is going a new country so even the opposition parties in South Sudan they need to be careful so at the moment there is no leverage to use and so on and SPLM is becoming more stronger but they might get weaker along the line and as we are going to talk about it in the challenges of South Sudan so in general instability in South Sudan is not good for the NCP but the political stable South Sudan cannot happen unless that there is a stable North Sudan unless there is a stable and vice versa if the south hurts the north in one area the north will be able to hurt it and vice versa so it is important that there is stability in both and if people want stability in the south to progress they have to seek stability in the north and I think pluralism is the direction for both South Sudan and north given the diversity of cultures and regional interest so it seems to me that the SPLM is aware of this they had the South South all parties consensus conference they agreed on a framework it is still on paper it needs to be implemented after the referendum and the hangover of the referendum and the party is over so that then they move towards pluralism but the problem in the north even if that President Bashir recently said that he is calling for a government of national unity it's a calling but looking into the last 20 years and the six years can we imagine that you had our 100% CPA took 28% our 48% of that and now there is a possibility to go to 100% we're going to go for a national government to reduce your power to what and that's a very big question and it's going to create the reasons for continuous struggle in the north of Sudan and this of course an approach like this will narrow the options for the opposition will narrow the options for Darfur peace, dialogue as we see Abuja, Doha Cairo agreement, Djibouti agreement all the agreements I mean Sudan now is governed by how many agreements Abuja, East Sudan, Cairo, Djibouti all these agreements where are they, I mean about 7 or 8 of them they didn't go anywhere including CPA which became a ceasefire so the options is very clear the Darfurians they picked it up earlier now Doha is not going anywhere and I think they if people lose the opportunity to go to the boxes to change the situation they will go for the boxes of the ammunition rather than the boxes of the elections to change the situation so now at the moment the south Sudan secession is a reality is I think is a foregone and the government will not oppose it and the acceptance of the north of the referendum and the result hopefully that it will reflect positively in the relationship between the north and the south and then the south will start to deal positively with the north and the north to try to deal reasonably and calmly with the pending issues but of course that will be jeopardised if one or within one of the two take a different approach so if people use the secession of south Sudan as the first step or the first stage for a regime change may some political forces think so including people from outside that is very dangerous force to them I think people need to be thinking very seriously about this and it shouldn't be a step for a regime change and a lot of people argue that in the recent America the international community managed to twist the arm of the NCP to accept the referendum and the results and this perhaps encouraged the opposition parties there are four rebel groups to say that now it is the time since the bull started to fall it is time to take out the knife and kill the bull and I think that is very dangerous for Sudan and stability not just only for Sudan and for the region because the savannah belt is highly mobilised and the slammist is highly mobilised and it will not be easy for them to let go so I think what is really important here is that to forge a strategic cooperation relationship between the north and south to look into the constitutional arrangement that I talked about it and how can the north and the south address this issue of pluralism but also for the north if there is no discussion about the constitutional arrangement the public consultation will not be resolved the conflict in Darfur is not going to be resolved as we know that Doha I don't know where it is if somebody could tell me where is Doha now but there is an agreement but that agreement if there is a genuine solution to Darfur then people have to address the cardinal issue in Sudan governance the issue of the centre and as I said that will not be easily issue that the NCP will accommodate that's why it is very difficult to go for a vice president for a region, for a regional government with legislative and executive and so on because also the Arabic tribes in Darfur are seriously coopted seriously coopted and they don't want a region on the contrary people want more localities more districts even more states in southern Darfur now we know that there is three people are arguing for another three extra because the thinking of the division and so on that actually led to the conflict in Darfur during the beginning of the Salvation Regime when they were trying to put that Arabic Islamic civilization and the decentralization and the federalism dividing Darfur into the districts and the borders between the Haqour and the land ownership of the tribe were divided between others with so many districts everybody started wanted to have the control of that district which then led to the tribal differences and that was the beginning of the conflict in Darfur it started from the beginning of the 90s not the first beginning of course there is the historical reasons but that was the key point so I agree with many people that Darfur need to be resolved from the bottom up definitely the Darfur-Darfur dialogue is extremely important it was there in Abuja and now the African Union panel on Darfur they talked about the Darfur forum and now the government came out with a new strategy for Darfur saying that let's find the solution in Doha but at the end we bring it to Darfur forum in principle in Syria it is good but if we unpack it conceptually it is very questionable and I don't think it is a strategy that it will bring a lasting peace in Darfur because if it is supposed to bring lasting peace in Darfur then the elections should have been a fair elections where the representative and the legislative council of the three states are the true representatives now it is a strategy put by the government to be discussed by the legislative states by the legislative council of the three states which is actually the government by the three governments which is actually the government by the tribal leaders who are co-opted by the government so this is the government so it is the government with the government with the government I don't know where is the rebel groups and the rest of the Darfur people and I think the African Union high implementation panel where now they are advocating for let's go since Doha is not going and I think maybe the Americans have got this also approach that we go for the Darfur forum I think that is a very great mistake it will deepen the crisis in Darfur and so just let me make it short and just to go over very quickly on the on South Sudan before I go further for South Sudan the issues the challenges are immense and as we know that now the party will continue in couple of days until July lines July where then they become independent then even the party will become more stronger, hungover finish maybe at the end of the year so there is one year of party jubilation and so on but they need to look into the political stability the SPLA is not a stable is not a professional army so the issue of the security sector is a very big challenge for the SPLA, for the GOS this is one, political stability inclusiveness, what they agreed with the South Sudan is political parties they need to foster that they need really to implement it first of all the interim the interim South Sudan constitution at the end of July they need to bring the political parties to have a discussion on another interim or a draft constitution for South Sudan because that will be the law of the land and I think that is the fairest step the DDR disarmament demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers and so on that's something that is not going very well there is a lot of arms a lot of militias the disarmament didn't go well in the past years and if we look into the budget that it comes actually from the oil revenue from the north half of it or majority of it is going salaries for this big big security sector army and so on nothing going for social services and so on so they need to reduce that army and so that then some of this money but how they are going to do the reintegration and demobilisation reintegration for these people to go to do what in South Sudan because even now the returnees who are coming from the north we know that there is nothing for them at the moment so imagine the challenges in front of the air and of course they have to to address the issues of accountability very seriously corruption is very high and I think during the jubilation period they have to be very careful thinking of how they are going to use the money if they agree with the government of the north or the NCP on the post referendum issues and the oil and so on those issues are very very serious and I do not going to go into the details as you all know nothing being agreed but I think citizenship and so on is very important so what I really see that the way forward here and that brings me to the regional and international players is that if we look into the region Egypt, Libya what is their interest on Sudan they want stability I think so the issue of the Nile waters that people talk a lot about it as far as Egypt is concerned that is a bigger issue the cessation is not going to affect it in my opinion because if South Sudan seats it will take its share from the north from Sudan's 15 or 18 billion cubic meters not from the so that's becoming and so on and that's the question framework that recently signed by 5 or 6 countries is going to be an issue and I don't see how South Sudan is going to affect this for the moment and Egypt have been very good with South Sudan all the way actually the work to make unity attractive more than the north for Ethiopia it's a serious concern because they have got borders with both countries north and south and I think they are really looking for the stability but of course Kenya they invested on the CPAs through Egypt and now I think they are reaping the benefit of their hard work on the CPA so they are business people and they want stability and of course they don't mind the cessation because that will accelerate their investment and reaping the investment that they did in the last 6 years and so on but of course people are generally concerned about the Islamic discourse that the NCP might take in my opinion NCP became a middle class business people who are really looking into their interest of work wealth money more than becoming the Islamic the Iranian regime and so on they are different in the concept in principle now the recent call to go back Sudan to the Sharia laws and beating of the Gair and all that what we heard is addressing the internal constituencies to keep them together because a lot of people within the Islamist started to ask several questions about their leadership and it is not really solid the Islamist together and I think that call to go back is an important call to maintain the unity of the Islamist you know that division happened in 2000 when a Trabi left and the rest left if this divided and I think that will be a problem even for the rest of Sudan and but still they have a very big challenge in the NCP to maintain that cohesion within them because decisions now is in the hand of 5, 6 the Shura that is supposed to work the idea of the Shura and the Islamic discourse where it is a democratic process that it goes to up now it is very highly centralized at the moment there is no Shura and that will weaken the Islamic organization behind the National Congress Party but still they are the major players and people need to deal with them so I question the issue of the regime change and a lot of countries on the region, Ethiopia and so on they think that the regime change shouldn't be the way to go forward it's how to maintain the stability because NCP have got the monopoly of weapons, of money SPLM, of course the monopoly in the south but for the north NCP have got that monopoly you need to deal with the NCP they are the major players and to see how we can get strategic cooperation and so on between the north and the south and then to find political stability political stability in the north can not happen unless there is an open space for political dialogue for more pluralism resolution of southern Kurdistan they can feel that they are part of this rather than to contest the center and the resolution and therefore and I say this this cannot happen if there is no serious rethinking of the political system in the center and the restructuring of the state maybe somebody saying that oh this person is talking on behalf of the SPLM or the opposition party and I don't know if anybody presented of the government of Sudan might say that this person just read a couple of newspapers of opposition but it is a reality if that doesn't happen I think Sudan is going to face serious challenges finally note that things that in Sudan that south Sudan we can see that there is a lot of challenges it might take time I think so but the problems in the north might not take time where we see now the referendum is finished everything is going very well results may be accepted the referendum discussion a BA might be a problem but the problems in the north are going to erupt faster than in the south and that might jeopardize even the situation in south Sudan that's what I want to say thank you and now we have a discussion Thanks very much for that for such a comprehensive analysis of the picture a very confused picture right now I'm going to open the floor up to questions in a moment but perhaps first of all I could ask you to think about let's look at the very short term picture and the actual referendum process itself and perhaps the role of the international community in that process we're told it's going to take obviously voting takes place over the whole of this week the final outcome won't be known for several weeks after that we might have some results trickling out I suppose in the meantime all of which creates conditions for uncertainty and perhaps instability and perhaps the worst case scenario of all that the outcome itself might be contested faced with this potential picture what's the role for the international community do you think and particularly how should it be coordinating its response if the outcome is somewhat uncertain or is challenged by perhaps the north or one of the other parties so who should be taking the lead in this process when you think about that I'll maybe take a couple of questions from the floor as well please identify yourself and microphones should be on their way around as well at the front here please thank you it was a great talk I'm Doug Brooks with the international stability operations association and to follow up on that question specifically with the United Nations what should they be doing at this juncture right now that could be most beneficial considering the situation and let's take one more for this round and then we'll ask our respondents a gentleman in the middle there thank you my question to Fuad is about the recent development from the NCB side we all know that the NCB was reluctant to do any arrangements related to both referendum and even accepting the referendum results recently the NCB started to publicly say and in particular present the that he will accept the results and the new state of South Sudan will be recognized why do we think this southern shift the second question can you elaborate more about the African Union high implementation Benel in relation to doing the negotiation between north and south thank you okay he wants to tackle some or all of those questions don't ask me challenging questions I want just to say hello to my friend there and it's good to hear you I think the role of the international community is extremely important for the results the there is a lot of observers European Union League of Arab States African Union the Carter Center lot of observers plus of course the UN have got a special panel separate because as we know that UNMIS is working on the logistics and the technical support and so it cannot be the body that certify or to make a statement on the process because it is part of it that's why there is the panel led by president in Caba former president of Tanzania and what is really important now for the international community and especially the role of the UN panel plus of course the other observers and monitors is to keep on on day to day basis to communicate very clearly to the Sudanese to the international community on the process how is it going I think this is very important not to leave it until the end where then the results is going to be contested and in terms of the contestation I don't think so because if the NCP wanted to contest it they could have actually derailed the whole process because there were sufficient grounds that legally some of the petitions was taken to the constitutional court it could have derailed or could have but I think thanks to the NCP and president Bashir didn't want to pursue and stop that and he said that actually in his speech in Juba because he wants the referendum to go and they are going to accept the results of course the petitions are there still it can appear in the coming days still it might surprise us but I doubt and I hope not but the international community I think is very important especially the panel is to communicate on day-to-day basis how is it going if there is anything to mention it so that then the results is not contested and I think the panel is very important how the NCP accepted this I think the NCP what is before the conclusion of the CPA wanted more time so that's why they wanted the referendum to be postponed in the beginning to address their vulnerability and when you talk about the vulnerability because the NCP is the state and the state is the NCP in the north and when you talk about the vulnerability of the state is the vulnerability of the party the vulnerability of the party is the vulnerability of the state unfortunately because in Sudan it is like that and so the vulnerability one is the divisions within the slumist themselves that could have been very serious after the elections things went very bad and then goes back again and it went bad and so on so how to mitigate that vulnerability within the party itself the organization itself and the second thing is to address the issues of economy the economic situation to build up reserves and also to negotiate on the referendum to negotiate other things as we know the issues of Sudan relation with the US and all the issues in between the list of the list of terrorists and the other sanctions and so on and also the issue of the ICC so it delayed by time to address internal issues and also external issues but it didn't go anywhere there is some cuts being provided by the and that cuts was very very supportive and I don't think the sticks works on the NCP I personally I don't think so any thinking of another Afghan Iraq on Sudan bombing and so on doesn't work that will burn the whole region so I don't think but that was one of the reasons that they start to think that okay these issues is very difficult to delay to delay to delay because the region is going to go against even they were going to lose like the League of Arabic States and the African Union and inside if they continue they might not be stable as an organization and I think that's the decision more they decided that let go of the referendum to happen more than the external pressures external pressures played a role but I think more internal reasons that made them to decide okay let it go and then we deal with the consequences in that case let's have another round of questions let's take David up the front microphones on its way sorry David through CSIS I must confess that I think there is pretty great ignorance in this town about Sudanese politics and little understanding of the problems of Khartoum I was interested in what you said and I'd like to push you a little further about what is probably the fundamental problem from the perspective of President Bashir and that is actually the factional divisions within the NCP and there is a tendency to see the NCP as a uniform block and I think that's fundamentally wrong that there are serious fault lines and that Islamism as an ideology was fairly attractive to many northern Sudanese and not only in the Nile Valley in the periphery as well in the 1990s and that the Islamist agenda still has many supporters who may well be mobilised by what they see as perhaps a compromise a sellout over the independence of southern Sudan and the negation of 200 years of Sudanese history so my question is what do you see as the strains and the pressures from the Islamists within the NCP and it did without the NCP, those who followed Turabi into opposition in 2000 how potent a challenge are they? Obviously Darfur, southern Cordefa the Blue Nile are fundamental issues but if I were sat in Khartoum I'd be much more worried about these guys and what they are likely to do and I think the international community does not pay sufficient attention to this problem that the regime faces so I'd be interested to know what you think about that Thank you Let's take a question right at the back there the gentleman in the corner I'm Jeremy Canindec from Mercy Corps A question about the post referendum reconstruction of the south there's been a lot of criticism of the World Bank of the UN of the NGO community in terms of some of the development activities that have occurred in the south and the limited success in going beyond just humanitarian service provision and getting to actual development and reconstruction and some recent criticism levied particularly at the World Bank run multi donor trust fund with the government of south Sudan pointed out still spending upwards of 90% of its revenues on security sector issues not able to invest very much in social service provision what do you see as the prospects for actually getting beyond a paradigm of NGO provided services and getting to a point where the government of south Sudan has both adequate revenue and adequate capacity and will to start providing those services and what do you see as a donor structure or an international funding structure that would be more effective than we've seen so far in getting both the aid community and the government of south Sudan to that point OK, and let's take one more question a gentleman at the front here who phones on its way Yes, Marcus Guino US Department of State I wanted to follow up on part of the question of the second gentleman I was a little bit surprised Mr. Hickmott by how pessimistic you were about the framework that the AU had brokered in Addis when Pagana Moom was here back in November and spoke to a group at USIP he was far more upbeat in terms of saying that he felt that although the no framework agreement had been signed that there had been large agreement on major issues including areas such as wealth sharing he cited citizenship and Abye as being the two outstanding areas but he was upbeat for example on demarcation he used the 80% figure in terms of agreement the question really is how you view the AU in all of this particularly north south and specifically your thoughts on the role of Tabo Mbeke who certainly has emerged both for the south and for Darfur in a major role and how you think that AU role will continue after the referendum Thank you Okay, and let's also here we have a representative from the government of Sudan Fathur Aman Ali Mohammed on demarcation Would you like to say something as well? Thank you Thank you Hikmet for this deep analysis on our country also Sudanese sometime your views might be having some your own analysis on some views might give Okay I would like first to say in this critical time of Sudan in the history there is bold points which I think it might be raised on this the positive side of this historical moment is that there is a referendum which is recognized and the outcome is expected to be recognized by the whole parties the president said this and the vice president commented this and at this moment also people should be optimistic about before they were very worried about this critical moment how it goes it's a positive direction of recognition of this time the peace dividend at this time should be also recognized there is also some worries rumors and disinformation disinformation about this critical moment also here and there but the challenge which is he raised about this critical time the challenge of of the outcome which is coming this coming weeks and the worries about this new state might be in confrontation with the North I think the visit of the president said it clear that outcome would be recognized and the challenge of after post referendum regarding the citizenship the security arrangements between the two the area and many other critical issues which you mentioned here the two sides now they are negotiating that Mbiki is working with his high implementation group and the two sides now also they are working on discussing these issues and vice president Taha from the center and Dr Riyadh Maishar from the southern side they are negotiating and they are tabling these issues one by one and as one of the colleague here mentioned that even Bagan Amun was optimistic about many issues that were step forward in that issues but I think what you raise here is a bit optimistic that now people are optimistic that some challenge will be overcoming the coming time if this referendum recognized if the international community also satisfied about this process between the North and the South then another satisfaction will be if the people of the citizenship also agreed upon and declared the constitutional vacuum which you mentioned that there is now legislative organs in the south and the north the election of last April come with the parliament the regional parliament and these issues also will be discussed of course the other political political parties will be included as the president said that broad based government will be the discussion with the political parties also there is a regional and central parliament that will be in power but this post referendum issues is now under the negotiation locally between the inside the country between the north and the south these committees are working in Adi Sababa and again in Juba and now there is committees working together to come with there are many other challenges that you mentioned here but even the issue people now they are working to there is a delay also when there is disagreement on who will vote so there is a delay on the referendum in Abiyay there is a challenge also but I think the referendum now and the people starting to vote within a week will give people are optimistic about the result and how the people would respond to this will make the peace process going forward and not to go backward what I want to conclude that I think that the views which you shared or you put I think it is a bit gloomy I hope that the people would would be optimistic about the result since president said it and vice president also said it I think there might be some good fruits for the peace in the hope process even in the north and in the south and we hope that many of your worries will come in the other side in the positive direction and the country will prevail peace in the coming time and we would hear more cooperation between the north and the south in the coming time thank you thanks for those remarks any responses to the questions we had more details on sort of NCP internal dynamics and strength of the Islamists within them question of long term development in the south whether the south will become sort of economically self-sufficient and then a question from the state department representative about the are you being a little bit too gloomy about the efforts of the high level implementation panel and the post referendum negotiations thank you let me start with the question from the state department which is a little bit also touching on my brother here from the embassy actually I'm a little bit worried of what you said because that's actually the rhetoric that took us to problems in Sudan but I will come to it but in terms of of the AUHIP I'm not a pessimistic the framework is very important but what I said this is what have been reached so far and if you remember the decision was taken in September last year in Abuja when presented the report and then the security the peace and security council mandated the panel to become a high implementation panel and they give them extra not just on Darfur but to work on the CPA much have been achieved and I think the framework itself including the principles is very important and what is actually important now is that those principles to be communicated to the people because a lot of people doesn't know actually what is in this framework and was at those principles for example the communities at the ground where now there is an active mobilization of the PDF of the tribes along the borders of 1956 is that if that is communicated that there is no need because issues are going to be resolved as my colleague here said there no need for the military build up no need for mobilization of the PDF on the contrary those efforts to go for something positive something else so those principles need to come but still the post referendum issues need to be discussed in the coming six months and I think the role of Mbeiki and the African Union panel supported by the IGAT and the international community partners and so on is key and is extremely important and I think without it but the point is that unfortunately the panel is not mandated they cannot come and bring the two parties to say come here to discuss with you is there to facilitate the two parties to discuss and when they want then they can ask Mbeiki to come and facilitate that process to give the support I don't mean here imply that he need to be mandated but I think in the coming period the African Union panel need really and President Mbeiki to push these two parties to sit and to discuss the post referendum and I know that there is this community committees and so on discussing on the post referendum but contrary to what you said before yesterday Luca Bionc who is the presidential in the cabinet of the government of national unity says no discussion on post referendum issues unless we resolve RBA and this is somebody sitting next to the president so anyhow but still it is very very important and so I don't make a mistake but if there is no that thinking of a strategic relationship which I alluded to in my presentation if the two parties doesn't agree on what kind of form in principle what is the form of relationship is it union political separation but we are going to union in terms of economics that the currency will be the same no need for another currency we will agree on the oil the border the issue of citizenship we agree everybody remains if you want to be here or there no need to kick the 24000 no need to push the southerners and so on so that atmosphere is negative atmosphere it's not a positive atmosphere it started by one of the senior NCP people saying not a single injection for southerners that's the spokesperson of the government of national unity I don't think it's the spokesperson it's a NCP government so that's the person saying this and then President Bashir reverse those sentences no no no we will protect we will this we will that and then comes sharia laws is going to be implemented immediately followed by 20% have to go out from the civil service will consider them as foreigners what kind of a policy is this I don't know how to describe it for mutual and peaceful you are setting a tone for a very difficult confrontation on the positive random discussions I agree that there is a fundamental problems and it's very difficult to shift at the moment from the humanitarian assistance into I have been in this field for a couple of years in the humanitarian before coming to crisis group and that definitely people need to shift the humanitarian assistance into long term to adjust the pipeline of the humanitarian assistance and to get adapters for long term so that it doesn't go out and that's always the debate of that continuum but the first for the south is to get their independence become a member of the united nation be assessed by the IMF and then recommend World Bank to give money for development which is going to create an employment at the moment this process is yet there is no money for major development that could create jobs in south Sudan so the priority is to work on the security sector to reform that security sector to continue building the institutions while fostering the political consensus to ensure that there is political instability to accommodate those who are against the SPLM so that when the handover is finished at least then they can have a common ground where they can all move together first they need to address the issue of identity a lot of people think southerners are homogeneous and there is south Sudan identity there is no south Sudan identity I am a dinka I am aware when it comes to elections everybody goes to their constituency that's why the issue of ABA some of the southerners say that why do we need to jeopardise our relation just because of ABA so small thing but the people the leaders at the top in the SPLM who are from ABA Luca, Bianca and all this is very important because imagine in two years there is elections in south Sudan people still go to your constituency who are you, where are you from if you say I am from ABA which is part of the north who is going to vote for you to be a member of the government sorry your constituency is on the other side that's why they won't by any means that ABA to remain part of the so there is no that issue of identity they need to work and the beginning of it they have the rule of the law the rule of the land where they need to agree and to put the political system for inclusiveness and then definitely if that stage is there we'll be able to create the conditions from shifting from humanitarian assistance into a long term rehabilitation reconstruction which is it's going to be ideologically of course driven and on what ideology is it the SPLM to put that framework for reconstruction and development definitely it is a challenge finally I come to the question I think which is a very serious question the issue of the Islamist and I agree with you it's not a uniform block and there is not a lot of deep understanding to the issues of Sudan people tend to think of NCP south Sudan but if you want really to understand the problems of Sudan you have to go deeper into the Islamic movement then you will understand why the CPA had happened during the discussions of Mashachos or maybe go a little bit later when is the fairest possibility of real unity of Sudan was lost it was lost during the Cokadam agreement when the Islamist and the DUP didn't go on the Cokadam agreement that was the fairest opportunity for real united Sudan after the regime of Nimeri fell Islamist didn't want to go DUP didn't then there was the transitional of Suwaret Dap and then there was an election the all forces in Sudan agreed to postpone the elections to have a constitutional conference to discuss about the constitution of Sudan the nature of the Sudanese state and to abolish the September laws which is the sharia laws by the Islamist when they joined Bashir Islamist refused and when Sadig el-Madi went for the elections and won and became the prime minister he formed maybe about five governments three of them or two of them with the Islamist brought back the Islamist and that is where PDF and all these war intensive fight and SPLM was about to take Juba when the international really support for the SPLM they were about to take this one that's became a problem and that's when the military wrote the message to prime minister saying either you do something or we are going to change the regime so Merganee made the agreement with Garang they agreed on the agreement to go and implement the Cokadam outcomes with the Merganee John Garang agreement they agreed and that abolishing not abolishing but to suspend freeze the sharia laws accept Sudan as an Arabic African but not an Islamic and to go for the constitutional review conference to review and put the constitution form an interim government with SPLM SAF political parties and all the civil society, trade unions and so on and including the transitional military council of Suwarat Dahab and Juzuli at that time, they all agreed so after pressure Sadig el-Mahdi removed a Turabi from power from the government, he formed again a government with the DUP of Merganee and they agreed finally on the constitutional conference that would have led today but who then very quickly made a coup Islamist they made a coup because they simply doesn't want that to happen they removed the democratic period closed the door for constitutional conference and we know what happened so that's why halfway the idea is to create that Islamic country where the Islamic organization of the Islamic movement that you know it how do I say it that it simulates the Sudanese people into that Islamic thinking through the organization of course creating a patronage system related with all the tribes and the groups and so on and then with Barons who served that patronage system which is the rulers of the states who also make their own patronage system within the state and to simulate the whole Sudanese together into that Islamic discourse they need to go for federalism and decentralized but they took it wrong the military was supposed to move after three years they disguised the Islamist in the military form al-Bashir and all this they were supposed to move after three years that's what they agreed to make the coup put a Trabi in prison so that nobody knows that it is an Islamist then take out a Trabi they were driving the whole thing and then the military to go out of three months three years and to start to put the constitution of Sudan federalism decentralization the military refused they like it because they have been three years there so they refused for a Trabi so okay president Bashir became the president he's a vice president who died later I forgot his name the vice president and then the military became the power president Bashir remained and that continued until until today and so they had that discussions and division until when they disagreed on the federalism and the decentralization system and also that the army should go back to the barracks and the civilians to rule and to go back to the Shura when they disagreed they divide it and so what remained now NCP became the business people who felt the money and that the oil was a problem it's always an oil problem when oil is discovered and so that became a problem and so when the money started to flow that patronite system became so strong and now bit by bit that patronite system it went into ethnic patronite system if you go to the palace you will see whose tribe is this to the NISS to the government to the positions to everything they cleanse the civil services the army they fire the generals, the police the civil service and everything that's a system now a very serious of a patronite system but now with the cessation coming of course people are asking questions for president Bashir himself you ruled for 20 years you did couple of agreements the CPA came you didn't maintain the unity of Sudan and you want to continue ruling Sudan on what basis on what legitimacy you want to continue ruling Sudan so the NCP have got a question to question the president versus the future of the party as a political party the party versus the future of Sudan and the stability of Sudan now it is split but also the stability in the north finding solution to Darfur so they are in Cordefa also the president versus the whole future of Sudan between brackets there is the issues of IC those three fundamental questions need to be asked within the Islamist if they want to maintain to continue as a viable political party to play that's why there is those divisions within even the current and I can go further but I can see eyes looking at me but it's a major question that's why I question the ambassador here talking about yes the president say it and so on I understand that I am Sudanese it's not about saying it is about what are the key issues you want to do in the coming period post referendum issues it have to address the vulnerability of the party which became an estate that state have to be separated from the party art is the NCP willing to do that if not that will continue the struggle to find a viable lasting peace in Sudan thank you very much I am very reluctant to stop you in mid flow for very much appreciate your analysis but I am afraid we are pretty much out of time now I don't have comfort do you have anything to add fair enough fair enough I just like to thank you both of you for coming and agreeing to take part on what is really a momentous time right now with the referendum underway I am sure you all agree despite the sort of notes of some gloominess and pessimism that Sudan has come a long way to this point at least but of course the big challenges lie ahead both internally within north and south and how these two areas if they are to separate govern themselves and manage the diverse people and interests within their borders so please join me in thanking our two guests for our higmat and comfort arrow and thanks for your interest and we will be following the twists and turns of the referendum and beyond at CSIS and you can find more information on our website and similarly ICG will be putting out a new report on Sudan shortly there is a report there is a report that somebody is working on it actually on the big question the slumists the future of Sudan after CSIS and that's the key question I think for me well thanks very much