 CHAPTER I. OF WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERAL 1. Man Fitted to Form Articulate Sounds God, having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and commentary of society. Man, therefore, had by nature his organ so fashioned as to be fit to frame articulate sounds, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language, for parrots and several other birds will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough, which yet by no means are capable of language. 2. To Use These Sounds as Signs of Ideas Besides articulate sounds, therefore, it was further necessary that he should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereas they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed from one to another. 3. To Make Them General Signs But neither was this sufficient to make words so useful as they ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of language that sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless those signs can be so made use of as to comprehend several particular things, for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by. To remedy this inconvenience, language had yet a further improvement in the use of general terms, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences, which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were made signs of, those names becoming general, which are made to stand for general ideas, and those remaining particular, where the ideas they are used for are particular. 4. To Make Them Signify the Absence of Positive Ideas Besides these names which stand for ideas, there be other words which men make use of, not to signify any idea, but the want or absence of some ideas, simple or complex, or all ideas together, such as our knee-hill in Latin and in English, ignorance and barrenness, are which negative or private words cannot be said properly to belong to or signify no ideas, for then they would be perfectly insignificant sounds, but they relate to positive ideas and signify their absence. 5. Words Ultimately Derived from Such as Signify Sensible Ideas It may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common sensible ideas, and how those which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses, for example, to image, apprehend, comprehend, adhere, conceive, instill, disgust, disturbance, tranquility, etc. are all words taken from the operations of sensible things and apply to certain modes of thinking. Spirit in its primary signification is breath, angel a messenger. I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their sources we should find in all languages the names which stand for things that fall not under our senses to have had their first rise from sensible ideas, by which we may give some kind of guess what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds who were the first beginners of languages, and how nature even in the naming of things unawares suggested to men the originals and the principles of all their knowledge, whilst to give names that might make known to others any operation they felt in themselves, or any other ideas that came not under their senses, they were feigned to borrow words from ordinary known ideas of sensation, by that means to make others the more easily to conceive those operations they experimented in themselves, which made no outward sensible appearances. And then, when they had got known and agreed names to signify those internal operations of their own minds, they were sufficiently furnished to make known by words all other ideas, since they could consist of nothing but either of outward sensible perceptions or of the inward operations of their minds about them. We having as has been proved no ideas at all but what originally come, either from sensible objects without or what we feel within ourselves, from the inward workings of our own spirits, of which we are conscious of ourselves within. 6. Distribution of Subjects to be Treated of But to understand better the use and force of language as subservient to instruction and knowledge, it will be convenient to consider, first, to what it is that names in the use of language are immediately applied. Secondly, since all except proper names are general, and so stand not particularly for this or that single thing, but for sorts and ranks of things, it will be necessary to consider in the next place what the sorts and kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin names, what the species and genera of things are, wherein they consist, and how they come to be made. These being, as they are, well looked into, we shall the better come to find the right use of words, the natural advantages and defects of language, and the remedies that ought to be used to avoid the inconveniences of obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of words, without which it is impossible to discourse with any clearness or order concerning knowledge, which, being conversant about propositions, and the most commonly universal ones, has greater connection with words than perhaps is suspected. These considerations, therefore, shall be the matter of the following chapters. CHAPTER II OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS Words are sensible signs necessary for communication of ideas. Man, though he have great variety of thoughts, and such from which others, as well as himself, might receive profit and delight, yet they are all within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to appear. The comfort and advantage of society, not being to be had, without communication of thoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be known to others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made use of by men, as the signs of ideas, not by any natural connection that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men, but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. The use, then, of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas, and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification. Two, words in their immediate signification are the sensible signs of his ideas who uses them. The use men have of these marks being either to record their own thoughts for the assistance of their own memory, or as it were to bring out their ideas and delay them before the view of others. Words in their primary or immediate signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them. How imperfectly so ever or carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they are supposed to represent. When a man speaks to another it is that he may be understood, and the end of speech is that those sounds as marks may make known his ideas to the hearer. That, then, which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker, nor can anyone apply them as marks immediately to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath, for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time, and so in effect to have no signification at all. Words being voluntary signs they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification. A man may make his words the signs either of qualities in things or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till he has some ideas of his own he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man, nor can he use any signs for them, for thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothing. But when he represents to himself other men's ideas by some of his own, if he consents to give them the same names that other men do, it is still to his own ideas, to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he has not. Three. Examples of this. This is so necessary in the use of language that in this respect the knowing and the ignorant, the learned and the unlearned, use the words they speak with any meaning, all alike. They in every man's mouth stand for the ideas he has, in which he would express by them. A child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called gold, but the bright shining yellow color, he applies the word gold only to his own idea of that color, and nothing else, and therefore calls the same color in a peacock's tail gold. Another that hath better observed adds to shining yellow great weight, and then the sound gold, when he uses it, stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow and a very weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities fusibility, and then the word gold signifies to him a body bright yellow fusible and very heavy. Another adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word gold, when they have occasion to express the idea which they have applied it to, but it is evident that each can apply it only to his own idea, nor can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea he has not. Four, words are often secretly referred first to the idea supposed to be in other men's minds. But though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker, yet they in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things. First, they suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men, with whom they communicate, for else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood. If the sounds they applied to one idea were such as by the hearer were applied to another, which is to speak two languages. But in this men stand not usually to examine whether the idea they and those they discourse with have in their minds be the same. But think it enough that they use the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptance of that language in which they suppose that the idea they make it a sign of is precisely the same to which the understanding men of that country apply that name. Five, secondly, to the reality of things. Secondly, because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imagination, but of things as really they are, therefore they often suppose the words to stand also for the reality of things. But this relating more particularly to substances and their names, as perhaps the former does, to simple ideas and modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes and substances in particular. Though give me leave here to say that it is a perverting the use of words and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification whenever we make them stand for anything but those ideas we have in our own minds. Six, words by use readily excite ideas of their objects. Concerning words also it is further to be considered. First, that they being immediately the sign of men's ideas and by that means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts. There comes, by constant use, to be such a connection between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for that the names heard almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects themselves which are apt to produce them did actually affect the senses which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities and in all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us. Seven, words are often used without signification and why? Secondly, that though the proper and immediate signification of words are ideas in the mind of the speaker yet because by familiar use from our cretals we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly and have them readily on our tongues and always at hand in our memories but yet are not always careful to examine or settle their significations perfectly. It often happens that men even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration do set their thoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of them learned before the ideas are known for which they stand. Therefore some, not only children but men, speak several words no otherwise than parrots do only because they have learned them and have been accustomed to those sounds. But so far as words are of use and signification so far is there a constant connection between the sound and the idea and a designation that the one stands for the other without which application of them there are nothing but so much insignificant noise. Eight, their signification perfectly arbitrary not the consequence of a natural connection. Words by long and familiar use as have been said come to excite in men certain ideas so constantly and readily that they are apt to suppose a natural connection between them. But that they signify only men's peculiar ideas and that by a perfect arbitrary imposition is evident in that they often fail to excite in others even that use the same language the same ideas we take them to be signs of. And every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has when they use the same words that he does. And therefore the great Augustus himself in the possession of that power which ruled the world acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word, which was as much as to say that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of in the mouths and common language of his subjects. It is true common use by a tacit consent appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages which so far limits the signification of that sound. That unless a man applies it to the same idea he does not speak properly. And let me add that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequences of any man's using the words differently either from their general meaning or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them this is certain. Their signification in his use of them is limited to his ideas and they can be signs of nothing else. All things that exist being particulars it may perhaps be thought reasonable that words which ought to be conformed to things should be so too. I mean in their signification but yet we find quite the contrary. The far greatest part of words that make all languages are general terms which has not been the effect of neglect or chance but of reason and necessity. Two that every particular thing should have a name for itself is impossible. First it is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name for the signification and use of words depending on that connection which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of them it is necessary in the application of names to things that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one with its peculiar appropriation to that idea but it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with. Every bird and beast man saw, every tree and plant that affected the senses could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army by his proper name we may easily find a reason why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock or crew that flies over their heads much less to call every leaf of plants or grain of sand that came in their way by a peculiar name. Three and would be useless if it were possible. Secondly if it were possible it would yet be useless because it would not serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names and use them in talk with others only that they may be understood which is then only done when by use or consent the sound I make by the organs of speech excites in another man's mind who hears it. The idea I apply it to in mine when I speak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind the names of them could not be significant or intelligible to another who was not acquainted with all those very particular things which had fallen under my notice for a distinct name for every particular thing not fitted for enlargement of knowledge. Thirdly but yet granting this also feasible which I think is not yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge which though founded in particular things enlarges itself by general views to which things reduced into sorts under general names are properly subservient. These with the names belonging to them come within some compass and do not multiply every moment beyond what either the mind can contain or use requires and therefore in these men have for the most part stopped but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things by appropriated names where convenience demands it and therefore in their own species which they have most to do with and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons they make use of proper names and their distinct individuals have distinct denominations. Five what things have proper names and why besides persons countries also cities rivers mountains and other the like distinctions of place have usually found peculiar names and that for the same reason they being such as men have often as occasion to mark particularly and as it were set before others in their discourses with them and I doubt not but if we had reason to mention particular horses as have reason to mention particular men we should have proper names for the one as familiar as for the other and Busephalus would be a word as much in use as Alexander and therefore we see that amongst jockeys horses have their proper names to be known and distinguished by as commonly as their servants because amongst them there is often occasion to mention this or that particular horse when he is out of sight six how general words are made the next thing to be considered is how general words come to be made for since all things that exist are only particulars how come we by general terms or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for words become general by being made the signs of general ideas and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence by this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea is as we call it of that sort seven soon by the way we enlarge our complex ideas from infancy but to deduce this a little more distinctly it will not perhaps be a miss to trace our notions and stems from their beginning and observe by what degrees we proceed and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from our first infancy there is nothing more evident than that the ideas of the persons children converse with to instance in them alone are like the persons themselves only particular the ideas of the nurse and the mother are well framed in their minds and like pictures of them there represent only those individuals the names they first gave to them are confined to these individuals and the names of nurse and mama the child uses determine themselves to those persons afterwards when time and a larger acquaintance have made them observe that there are a great many other things in the world that in some common agreements of shape and several other qualities resemble their father and mother and those persons they have been used to they frame an idea which they find those many particulars do for taking and to that they give with others the name man for example and thus they come to have a general name and a general idea wherein they make nothing new but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane that which is peculiar to each and retain only what is common to them all yet and further enlarge our complex ideas by still leaving out properties contained in them by the same way that they come by the general name and idea of man they easily advance to more general names and notions for observing that several things that differ from their idea of man and cannot therefore be comprehended out under that name have yet certain qualities were in they agree with man by retaining only those qualities and uniting them into one idea they have again another and more general idea to which having given a name they make a term of a more comprehensive extension which new idea is made not by any new addition but only as before by leaving out the shape and some other properties signified by the name man and retaining only a body with life sense and spontaneous motion comprehended under the name animal nine general natures are nothing but abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones that this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas and general names to them I think is so evident that there needs no other proof of it but the considering of a man's self or others and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge and he that thinks general natures or notions or anything else but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones taken up first from particular existences well I fear be at a loss where to find them for let anyone effect and then tell me where and as his idea of man differ from that of Peter and Paul or his idea of horse from that of view cephalus but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas several particular existences as they are found to agree in the complex ideas signified by the names man and horse leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ and retaining only those wherein they agree and of those making a new distinct complex idea and giving the name animal to it one has a more general term that comprehends with man several other creatures leaving out of the idea of animal sense and spontaneous motion and the remaining complex idea made up of the remaining simple ones of body life and nourishment becomes a more general one under the more comprehensive term the vans and not to dwell longer upon this particular so evident in itself by the same way the mind proceeds to body substance and at last to being thing and such universal terms which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever to conclude this whole mystery of genera and species which make such a noise in the skulls and are with just a so little regarded out of them is nothing else but abstract ideas more or less comprehensive with names annexed to them in all which this is constant and unvariable that every more general term stands for such an idea and is but a part of any of those contained under it ten why the genus is ordinarily made use of in definitions this may show us the reason why in the defining of words which is nothing but declaring their signification we make use of the genus or next general word that comprehensive which is not out of necessary but only to save the labor of enumerating the several simple ideas with the general word or genus stands for or perhaps sometimes the shame of not being able to do it but though defining by genus and differential I crave leave to use these terms of art though originally Latin since they most probably sit those notions they are applied to I say though defining by the genus be the shortest way yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the best this I am sure it is not the only and so not absolutely necessary for definition being nothing but making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands for a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined and if instead of such an enumeration men have accustomed themselves to use the general term it has not been out of necessity or for greater clearness but for quickness and dispatch sake for I think that to one who desired to know what idea the word man stood for if it should be said that man was a solid extended substance having life since spontaneous motion and the faculty of reasoning I doubt not but the meaning of the term man would be as well understood and the idea it stands for be at least as clearly made known as when it is defined to be a rational animal which by the several definitions of animal bevans and corpus resolves itself into those enumerated ideas I have in explaining the term man followed here the ordinary definition of the schools which though perhaps not the most exact yet serves well enough to my present purpose and one may in this instance see what gave occasion to the rule that a definition must consist of genus and differentiate and it suffices to show us the little necessity there is of such a rule or advantage in the strict observing of it for definitions as has been said being only the explaining of one word by several others so that the meaning or idea it stands for may be certainly known languages are not always so made according to the rules of logic that every term can have its signification exactly and clearly expressed by two others experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary or else those who have made this rule have done ill that they have given us so few definitions conformable to it but of definitions more in the next chapter 11 general and universal are creatures of the understanding and belong not to the real existence of things to return to general words it is plain by what has been said that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding made by it for its own use and concern only signs whether words or ideas words are general as has been said when used for signs of general ideas and so are applicable in differently to many particular things and ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things but universality belongs not to things themselves which are all of them particular in their existence even those words and ideas which in their signification are general when therefore we quit particulars the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars for the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them 12 abstract ideas are the essences of genera and species the next thing therefore to be considered is what kind of signification it is the general words have for as it is evident that they do not signify barely one particular thing for then they would not be general terms but proper names so on the other side it is as evident they do not signify a plurality for man and men would then signify the same and the distinction of numbers as the grammarians call them would be superfluous and useless that then which general word signify is a sort of things and each of them does that by being a sign of an abstract idea in the mind to which idea as things existing are found to agree so they come to be ranked under that name or which is all one be of that sort whereby it is evident that the essences of the sorts or if the Latin word please is better species of things are nothing else but these abstract ideas for the having the essence of any species being that which makes anything to be of that species and the conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed being that which gives a right to that name the having the essence of the having that conformity must needs be the same thing since to be of any species and to have a right to the name of that species is all one as for example to be a man or of the species man and to have right to the name man is the same thing again to be a man or of the species man and have the essence of a man is the same thing now since nothing can be a man or have a right to the name man but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for nor anything be a man or have a right to the species man but what has the essence of that species it follows that the abstract idea for which the name stands and the essence of the species is one and the same from whence it is easy to observe that the essences of the sorts of things and consequently the sorting of things is the workmanship of the understanding that abstracts those general ideas 13 they are the workmanship of the understanding but have their foundation in the similitude of things I would not here be thought to forget much less to deny that nature in the production of things make several of them alike there is nothing more obvious especially in the races of animals and all things propagate it by seed but yet I think we may say the sorting of them under names is the workmanship of the understanding taking occasion from the similitude it observes amongst them to make abstract general ideas and set them up in the mind with names annexed to them as patterns or forms for in that sense the word form has a very proper signification to which as particular things existing are found to agree so they come to be of that species have that denomination or are put into that classes for when we say this is a man that a horse this justice that cruelty this a watch that a jack what do we else but rank things under different specific names as agreeing to those abstract ideas of which we have made those names the science and what are the essences of those species set out and marked by names but those abstract ideas in the mind which are as it were between particular things that exist and the names they are to be ranked under and when general names have any connection with particular beings these abstract ideas are the medium that unites them so that the essences of species as distinguished and denominated by us neither are nor can be anything but those precise abstract ideas that we have in our minds and therefore the supposed real essences of substances if different from our abstract ideas cannot be the essences of the species we rank things into for two species may be one as rationally as two different essences may be the essence of one species and I demand what are the alterations which may or may not be made in a horse or lead without making either of them to be of another species in determining the species of things by our abstract ideas this is easy to resolve but if anyone will regulate himself herein by supposed real essences he will I suppose be at a loss and he will never be able to know when anything precisely ceases to be of the species of a horse or lead 14 each distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence nor will anyone wonder that I say these essences or abstract ideas which are the measures of name and the boundaries of species or the workmanship of the understanding who considers that at least the complex ones are often in several men different collections of simple ideas and therefore that is covetousness to one man which is not so to another nay even in substances where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves they are not constantly the same no not in that species which is most familiar to us with which we have the most intimate acquaintance it having been more than once doubted whether the fetus born of a woman were a man even so far as that it have been debated whether it were or were not to be nourished and baptised which could not be if the abstract idea or essence to which the name man belonged were of natures making and various collection of simple ideas which the understanding put together and then abstracting it affixed a name to it so that in truth every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence and the names stand for such distinct ideas or the names of things essentially different thus a circle is as essentially different from an oval as a sheep from a goat is as essentially different from snow as water from earth that abstract idea which is the essence of one being impossible to be communicated to the other and thus any two abstract ideas that in any part vary one from another with two distinct names and next to them constitute two distinct sorts or if you place species as essentially different as any two of the most remote or opposite in the world fifteen several significations of the word essence but since the essences of things are thought by some and not without reason to be wholly unknown it may not be a miss to consider the several significations of the word essence real essences first essence may be taken for the very being of anything whereby it is what it is and thus the real internal but generally in substances unknown constitution of things whereon their discoverable qualities depend may be called their essence this is the proper original signification of the word as is evident from the formation of it essential in its primary notation signifying properly being and in this sense when we speak of the essence of particular things without giving them any name nominal essences secondly the learning and disputes of the skills having been much busy about genus and species the word essence has almost lost its primary signification and instead of the real constitution of things has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of genus and species it is true there is ordinarily supposed to real constitution of sorts of things and it is passed out there must be some real constitution on which any collection of simple ideas coexisting must depend but it being evident that things are ranked under names into sorts or species only as they agree to certain abstract ideas to which we have annexed those names the essence of each genus or sort comes to be nothing but that abstract idea which the general or sort will if I may have leave so to call it from sort as I do general from genus name stands for and this we shall find to be that which the word essence supports in its most familiar use these two sorts of essences I suppose may not unfitly be termed the one the real the other nominal essence 16 constant connection between the name and nominal essence between the nominal essence and the name there is so near a connection that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being but what has its essence whereby it answers that abstract idea where of that name is the sign 17 supposition that species are distinguished by their real essences useless concerning the real essences of corporeal substances to mention these only there are if I mistake not to opinions the one is of those who using the word essence for they know not what suppose a certain number of those essences according to which all natural things are made and wherein they do exactly every one of them per take and so become of this or that species the other and more rational opinion is of those who work on all natural things to have a real but unknown constitution of their insensible parts from which flow those sensible qualities which serve us to distinguish them one from another according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts under common denominations the former of these opinions which supposes each essences as a certain number of forms or moulds wherein all natural things that exist are cast and do equally per take as I imagine very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things the frequent production of monsters in all the species of animals and of changelings and other strange issues of human birth should be with them difficulties not possible to consist with this hypothesis since it is as impossible that two things per taking exactly the same real essence should have different properties as that two figures per taking of the same real essence of a circle should have different properties but where there are no other reason against it yet the supposition of essences that cannot be known and the making of them nevertheless to be that which distinguishes the species of things is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of our knowledge that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by and content and content ourselves with such essences of the sorts or species of things that come within the reach of our knowledge which when seriously considered will be found as I have said to be nothing else but those abstract complex ideas to which we have annexed distinct general names real and nominal essences essences being thus distinguished into nominal and real we may further observe that in the species of simple ideas they are always the same but in substances always quite different thus a figure including a space between three lines is the real as well as nominal essence of a triangle it being not only the abstract idea to which the general name is annexed but the very essencia or being of the thing itself that foundation from which all its properties flow and to which they are all inseparably annexed but it is far otherwise concerning that parcel of matter which makes the ring on my finger wherein these two essences are apparently different for it is the real constitution of its insensible parts which depend all those properties of colour weight, fusibility, fixedness etc which are to be found in it which constitution we know not and so having no particular idea of having no name that is the sign of it but yet it is its colour weight, fusibility, fixedness etc which makes it to be gold and yet a right to that name which is therefore its nominal essence since nothing can be called gold but what has a conformity of qualities to that abstract complex idea to which that name is annexed but this distinction of essences belonging particularly to substances we shall when we come to consider their names more fully, 19 essences in generable and incorruptible that such abstract ideas with names to them as we have been speaking of our essences may further appear by what we are told concerning essences namely that they are all in generable and incorruptible which cannot be true of the real constitutions of things which begin and perish with them all things that exist besides their author are all liable to change especially those things we are acquainted with and have ranked into bands under distinct names or insigns thus that which was grasped today is tomorrow the flesh of a sheep and within a few days after becomes part of a man in all which and the like changes it is evident their real essence i.e. that constitution where on the properties of these several things dependent is destroyed and perishes with them but essences being taken for ideas established in the mind with names annexed to them they are supposed to remain steadily the same whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to for whatever becomes of alexander or for whatever becomes of alexander and bicephalus the ideas to which man and horse are annexed are supposed nevertheless to remain the same and so the essences of those species are preserved whole and undestroyed whatever changes happen to any or all of the individuals of those species by this means the essence of a species rests safe and entire without the existence of so much as one individual of that kind for where there now no circle existing anywhere in the world as perhaps that figure exists where they were exactly marked out yet the idea annexed to that name would not cease to be what it is nor cease to be as a pattern to determine which of the particular figures we meet with have or have not a right to the name circle and so to show which of them by having that essence was of that species and though there neither were nor had been in nature such a beast as a unicorn or such a fish as a mermaid yet supposing those names to stand for complex abstract ideas that contained no inconsistency in them the essence of a mermaid is as intelligible as that of a man and the idea of a unicorn as certain, steady and permanent as that of a horse from what has been said it is evident that the doctrine of the immutability of essences proves them to be only abstract ideas and is founded on the relation established between them and certain signs as signs of them and will always be true as long as the same name can have the same 20. Recapitulation To conclude this is that which in short I would say namely that all the great business of genera and species and their essences amounts to no more but this that men making abstract ideas and settling them in their minds with names annexed to them do thereby enable themselves to consider things as it were in bundles for the easier and readier improvement of communication of their knowledge which would advance but slowly where their words and thoughts confined only to particulars End of Section 3 Recording by Chad Section 4 of an Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book 3 of Words by John Locke This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Sarah Lorenowich Chapter 4 of the Names of Simple Ideas 1. Names of simple ideas modes and substances have each something peculiar Though all words as I have shown signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker yet upon a near survey we shall find the names of simple ideas mixed modes under which I comprise relations to and natural substances have each of them something peculiar and different from the other for example 2. First names of simple ideas and of substances intimate real existence First the names of simple ideas and substances with the abstract ideas in the mind which they immediately signify intimate also some real existence from which was derived their original pattern but the names of mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind and lead not the thoughts any further as we shall see more at large in the following chapter 3. Secondly names of simple ideas and modes signify always both real and nominal essences 2. The names of simple ideas and modes signify always the real as well as nominal essence of their species but the names of natural substances signify rarely if ever anything but barely the nominal essences of those species as we shall show in the chapter that treats of the names of substances in particular 3. Thirdly names of simple ideas are undefinable 3. Thirdly the names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition the names of all complex ideas are it has not that I know been yet observed by anybody what words are and what are not capable of being defined the want whereof is as I am apt to think not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses some demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined and others think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more general word and its restriction or to speak in terms of art by a genus and difference when even after such definition made according to rule those who hear it have often know more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before this at least I think that the showing what words are and what are not capable of definitions and where and consist a good definition is not wholly besides our present purpose and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature of these signs and our ideas as to deserve a more particular consideration 5. If all names were definable it would be a process in infinitum I will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are not definable from that progress in infinitum which it will visibly lead us into if we should allow that all names could be defined 4. If the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another where at last should we stop but I shall from the nature of our ideas and the signification of our words show why some names can and others cannot be defined and which they are 6. What a definition is I think it is agreed that a definition is nothing else but the showing the meaning of one word by several other not synonymous terms the meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them the meaning of any term is then showed or the word is defined when by other words the idea it is made the sign of and annexed to in the mind of the speaker is as it were represented or set before the viewer of another and thus its signification ascertained this is the only use and end of definitions and therefore the only measure of what is or is not a good definition 7. Simple ideas why undefinable this being premised I say that the names of simple ideas and those only are incapable of being defined the reason where of is this that several terms of a definition signifying several ideas they can altogether by no means represent an idea which has no composition at all and therefore a definition which is properly nothing but the showing of meaning of one word by several others not signifying each the same thing can in the names of simple ideas have no place 8. Instances scholastic definitions of motion the not observing this difference in our ideas and their names has produced that eminent trifling in the schools which is so easy to be observed in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple ideas 4. As to the greatest part of them even those masters of definitions were feigned to leave them untouched merely by the impossibility they founded in what more exquisite jargon could the wit of man invent than this definition the act of a being in power as far forth as in power which would puzzle any rational man to whom it was not already known as absurdity to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of if Tully asking a Dutchman what bewegenge was should have received this explication in his own language that it was actus entus impotentia quatenus impotentia I ask whether anyone can imagine he could thereby have understood what the word bewegenge signified or have guessed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind would signify to another when he used that sound 9. Modern definition of motion nor have the modern philosophers who have endeavored to throw off the jargon of the schools and speak intelligibly much better succeeded in defining simple ideas whether by explaining their causes or any otherwise the atomists who define motion to be a passage from one place to another what do they more than put one synonymous word for another what is passage other than motion and if they were asked what passage was how would they better define it than by motion for is it not at least as proper and significant to say passage is a motion from one place to another as to say motion is a passage etc this is to translate and not to define when we change two words of the same signification one for another which when one is better understood than the other may serve to discover what idea the unknown stands for but is very far from a definition unless we will say every English word in the dictionary is the definition of the Latin word it answers and that motion is a definition of motus nor will the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another which the Cartesians give us prove a much better definition of motion when well examined 10. Definitions of light the act of perspicuous as far forth as perspicuous is another peripatetic definition of a simple idea which though not more absurd than the former of motion yet betrays its uselessness and insignificancy more plainly because experience will easily convince anyone that it cannot make the meaning of the word light which it pretends to define at all understood by a blind man but the definition of motion appears to the sight so useless because it escapes this way of trial for this simple idea entering by the touch as well as sight it is impossible to show an example of anyone who has no other way to get the idea of motion but barely by the definition of that name those who tell us that light is a great number of little globules striking briskly on the bottom of the eye speak more intelligibly than the schools but yet these words never so well understood would make the idea the word light stands for no more known to a man that understands it not before than if one should tell him that light was nothing but a company of little tennis balls which ferries all day long struck with rackets against some men's foreheads whilst they pass by others for granting this explication of the thing to be true yet the idea of the cause of light if we had it never so exact would no more give us the idea of light itself that is such a particular perception in us than the idea of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel would give us the idea of that pain which it is able to cause in us for the cause of any sensation and the sensation itself in all the simple ideas of one sense are two ideas and two ideas so different and distant one from another that no two can be more so and therefore should Descartes' globules strike never so long on the retina of a man who was blind by a gut of serena he would thereby never have any idea of light or anything approaching it though he understood never so well what little globules were and what striking on another body was and therefore the Cartesians very well distinguish between that light which is the cause of that sensation in us and the idea which is produced in us by it and is that which is properly light eleven simple ideas very undefinable further explained simple ideas as has been shown are only to be got by those impressions objects themselves make on our minds by the proper inlets appointed to each sort if they are not received this way all the words in the world made use of to explain or define any of their names will never be able to produce in us the idea it stands for four words being sounds can produce in us no other simple idea than of those very sounds nor excite any in us but by that voluntary connection which is known to be between them in those simple ideas which common use has made them the signs of he that thinks otherwise let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pineapple and make him have the true idea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit so far as he is told it has a resemblance with any tastes whereof he has the ideas already in his memory printed there by sensible objects not strangers to his palette so far may he approach that resemblance in his mind but this is not giving us that idea by a definition but exciting in us other simple ideas by their known names which will be still very different from the true taste of that fruit itself in light and colors and all other simple ideas it is the same thing for the signification of sounds is not natural but only imposed an arbitrary and no definition of light or redness is more fitted or able to produce either of those ideas in us than the sound light or red by itself for to hope to produce an idea of light or color by a sound however formed is to expect that sounds should be visible or colors audible and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses which is all one as to say that we might taste, smell a sort of philosophy were the only essential panza who had the faculty to see and therefore he that has not before received into his mind by the proper inlet the simple idea which any word stands for can never come to know the signification of that word by any other word or sounds whatsoever put together according to any rules of definition the only way is by applying to his senses the proper object and so producing that idea in him for which he has learned the name already a studious blind man who had mightily beat his head about visible objects and made use of the explication of his books and friends to understand those names of light and colors which often came in his way bragged one day that he now understood what scarlet signified upon which his friend demanding what scarlet was the blind man answered it was like the sound of a trumpet such an understanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have who hopes to get it only from a definition or other words made use of to explain it 12 the contrary shown in complex ideas by instances of a statue and rainbow the case is quite otherwise in complex ideas which consisting of several simple ones it is in the power of words standing for the several ideas that make that composition print complex ideas in the mind which were never there before and so make their names we understood in such collections of ideas passing under one name definition or the teaching the signification of one word by several others has place and may make us understand the names of things which never came within the reach of our senses and frame ideas suitable to those in other men's minds when they use those names provided that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in his thought thus the word statue may be explained to a blind man by other words when picture cannot his senses have given him the idea of figure but not of colors which therefore words cannot excite him this gain the prize to the painter against the statuary each of which contending for the excellency of his art and the statuary bragging that his was he preferred because it reached further and even those who had lost their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it the painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man who being brought where there was a statue made by the one and a picture drawn by the other he was first led to the statue in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body and with great admiration applauded the skill of the workmen but being led to the picture and having his hands laid upon it the painter was told that now he touched the head and then the forehead eyes nose etc and his hand move over the parts of the picture on the cloth without finding any the least distinction where upon he cried out that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanship which could represent to them all those parts where he can neither feel nor perceive anything 13 colors indefinable to the born blind he that should use the word rainbow to one who knew all those colors but yet had never seen that phenomenon would by enumerating the figure largeness position and order of the colors so well defined that word that it might be perfectly understood but yet that definition how exact and perfect so ever would never make a blind man understand it because several of the simple ideas that make that complex one being such as he never received by sensation and experience no words are able to excite them in his mind 14 complex ideas definable only when the simple ideas of which they consist have been got from experience simple ideas as has been shown can only be got by experience from those objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions when by this means we have our mind stored with them and know the names for them then we are in a condition to define and by definition to understand the names of complex ideas that are made up of them but when any term stands for a simple idea that a man has never yet had in his mind it is impossible by any words to make them known its meaning to him when any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with but is ignorant that the term is the sign of then another name of the same idea which he has been accustomed to may make him understand its meaning but in no case however is any name of any simple idea capable of a definition 15 fourthly names of simple ideas of less doubtful meaning than those of mixed modes and substances fourthly but though the names of simple ideas have not the help of definition to determine their signification yet that hinders not but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those of mixed modes and substances because they standing only for one simple perception men for the most part easily and perfectly agree in their signification and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning he that knows once that whiteness is the name of that color he has observed in snow or milk will not be apt to misapply that word as long as he retains that idea which when he has quite lost he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it but perceives he understands it not there is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes nor a supposed but unknown real essence with properties depending thereon the precise number whereof is also unknown which makes the difficulty in the names of substances but on the contrary in simple ideas the whole signification of the name is known at once and consists not of parts whereof more or less being in the idea may be varied and so the signification of name be obscure or uncertain 16 simple ideas have few assents in linear predicamentality fifthly this further may be observed concerning simple simple ideas and their names that they have but few assents in linear predicamentality as they call it from the lowest species to the sumum genus the reason whereof is that lowest species being but one simple idea nothing can be left out of it that so the difference being taken away it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both which having one name is the genus of the other two VG there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red to make them agree in one common appearance and so have one general name as rationality being left out of the complex idea of man makes it agree with brute in the more general idea and name of animal and therefore when to avoid unpleasant enumerations men would comprehend both white and red and several other such simple ideas under one general name they have been feigned to do it by a word which denotes only the way they get into the mind for when white red and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name color it signifies no more but such ideas as are produced in the mind only by the sight and have entrance only through the eyes and when they would frame yet a more general term to comprehend both colors and sounds and the like simple ideas they do it by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one sense and so the general term quality in its ordinary acceptation comprehends colors, sounds, tastes smells and tangible qualities with distinction from extension number, motion, pleasure and pain which make impressions on the mind and introduce their ideas by more senses than one 17 6thly, names of simple ideas not arbitrary but perfectly taken from the existence of things 6thly, the names of simple ideas substances and mixed modes have also this difference that those of mixed modes stand for ideas perfectly arbitrary those of substances are not perfectly so but refer to a pattern but with some latitude and those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of things and are not arbitrary at all which, what difference it makes in the signification of their names we shall see in the following chapters simple modes the names of simple modes differ little from those of simple ideas end of section 4 section 5 section 5 of an essay concerning human understanding book 3 of words by John Locke this is a LibreBox recording all LibreBox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibreBox.org chapter 5 of the names of mixed modes and relations number 1, mixed modes stand for abstract ideas as other general names the names of mixed modes being general they stand as has been shown for source of species of things each of which has its peculiar essence the essences of these species also as has been shown are nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind to which the name is asked thus far the names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas but if we take a little nearer survey of them we shall find that they have something peculiar which perhaps may deserve our attention number 2 first abstract ideas they stand for are made by the understanding the first particularity I shall observe in them is that the abstract ideas or if you please the essences of the several species of mixed modes are made by the understanding wherein they differ from those of simple ideas in which the mind has no power to make anyone but only receives such as are presented to it by the real existence of things operating upon it number 3 secondly made arbitrarily and without patterns in the next place these essences of the species of mixed modes are not only made by the mind but made very arbitrarily made without patterns or reference to any real existence where they differ from those of substances which carry with them the supposition of some real being from which they are taken and to which they are comfortable but in its complex ideas of mixed modes the mind takes the liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly it unites and retains certain collections of so many distinct specific ideals whilst others that is often occur in nature and are as plainly suggested by outward things past neglected without particular name or specifications nor does the mind in these of mixed modes as in the complex idea of substances examine them by the real existence of things or verify them by patterns containing such peculiar compositions in nature to know whether his idea of adultery or incest be right will a man seek it anywhere amongst things existing or is it true because anyone has been witness to such an action no but it suffices here that men have put together such a complex action into one complex idea that makes the archetype a specific idea whether any such action were committed in Miriam, Natura or no number four how is this done to understand this right we must consider where in this making of these complex ideas consists and that is not in the making any new idea but putting together those which the mind had before we're in the mind of these three things first it chooses a certain number secondly it gives them connection and makes them into one idea thirdly it ties them together by a name if we examine how the mind proceeds in these and what liberty it takes in them we shall easily observe how these essences of species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind and consequently that the species themselves are of men's making number five evidently arbitrarily in that the idea is often before the existence nobody can doubt but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of ideas put together in the mind independent from any original patterns in nature who will but reflect that this sort of complex ideas may be made abstracted and have names given them and say species be constituted before any one individual of that species ever existed who can doubt but the ideas of sacrilege or adultery might be framed in the minds of men and have names given them and so these species of mixed modes be constituted before any of them was ever committed and might be as well discourse of and reason about and as certain truths discovered of them they had no being but in the understanding as well as now but they have too frequently a real existence whereby it is how much the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding where they have a being a subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge as when they really exist and we cannot doubt but lawmakers have often made laws about species of actions which were only the creatures of their own understandings beings that had no other existence but in their own minds and I think nobody can deny that the resurrection was a species of mixed modes in the mind before it really existed number six instances murder incest stabbing to see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the mind who need to take a view of almost any of them little looking into them will satisfy us that it is the mind that combines several scattered independent ideas into one complex one and by the common name it gives them makes them the essence of a certain species without regulating itself by any connection they have in nature for what greater connection in nature has the idea of a man than the idea of a sheep with killing that this is made a particular species of action signified by the word murder and the other not or what human is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father with killing than that of a son or neighbor that those are combined into one complex idea and thereby made the essence of the distinct species parasite whilst the other makes no distinct species at all but though they have made killing a man's father or mother a distinct species from killing his son or daughter yet in some other cases son and daughter are taken into as well as father and mother and they are all equally comprehended in the same species as in that of incest that's the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex ideas such as it finds convenient whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature are left loose and never combined into one idea because they have no need of one name it is evident then that the mind by its free choice gives a connection to a certain number of ideas which in nature have no more union with one another than others then it leaves out why else is the part of the weapon the beginning of the wound is made with taking notice of to make the distinct species call stabbing and the figure and matter of the weapon left out I do not say this is done without reason as you shall see more by and by but this I say that it is done by the free choice of the mind pursuing its own ends and that therefore these species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding there's nothing more evident than that for the most part in the framing these ideas the mind searches not its patterns in nature nor references the ideas it makes to the real existence of things but puts such together as may best serve its own purposes without tying itself to a precise imitation of anything number seven but still subservient to the end of language and not made at random but though these complex ideas or essences of mixed modes depend on the mind and are made by it with great liberty yet they are not made at random and jumbled together without any reason at all though these complex ideas be not always copied from nature yet they are always suited to the end for which abstract ideas are made and though they be combinations made of ideas that are loose enough and have as little union in themselves as several other to which the mind never gives a connection that combines them into one idea yet they are always made for the convenience of communication which is the chief end of language. The use of language is by short sounds to signify with ease and dispatch general conceptions wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained but also a great variety of independent ideas collected into one complex one in the making thereof the species of mixed modes may have regard only to such combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another those they have combined into distinct complex ideas and given names to whilst others that in nature have as narrow union are left loose and unreguarded for to go no further than human actions themselves if they would make distinct abstract ideas of all the varieties which might be observed in them the number must be intended and the memory confounded with the planning as well as overcharged to little purpose it suffices that men make and name so many complex ideas of these mixed modes so they find they have occasion to have names for in ordinary occurrence of their fears if they join to the idea of killing the idea of father or mother and so make it distinct species from killing in my son or neighbor it is because of a different heinousness of the crime and that distinct punishment is due to the murdering in man's father and mother different what ought to be inflicted on the murder of his son or neighbor and therefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct name which is the end of making that distinct combination but though the ideas of mother and daughter are so differently treated in reference to the idea of killing that the one is joined with it to make a distinct abstract idea with a name and so a distinct species and other not yet in respect of crime and knowledge they are both taken under incest and that still for the same convenience of expressing under one name and reckoning of one species such uncleaned mixtures as have a peculiar trippitude beyond others and this is to avoid circumlutions and tedious descriptions. Number 8 where of the intranslatable words of diverse languages are a group. A modern skill in different languages will easily satisfy one of the truth of this it being so obvious to observe each store of languages in one language which have not any that answer them in another. Which finally shows that those of one country by their customs and manner of life have found occasion to make several complex ideas and give names to them which others never collected into specific action. This could not have happened if these species were the steady membership of nature and not collections made and abstracted by the mind in order to naming and for the convenience of communication. The terms of our Allah which are not empty sounds will hardly find words that answer them in the Spanish or Italian no scanty languages much less I think could anyone translate them into the Caribbean or Westold tongues and the Versa of the Romans or Coven of the Jews have words in other languages to answer them the reason where all this frame from what has been said. Nay, if we look a little more nearly into this matter and exactly compare different languages we shall find that though they have words which in translations and dictionaries are supposed to answer one another yet there is scarce one often amongst the names of complex ideas especially of mixed modes that stands for the same precise idea which the word does that in dictionaries is rendered by. There are no ideas more common and less compounded than the measures of time, extension and weight and the Latin names Ora, Pez, Libra are without difficulty rendered by the English names our foot and pound but yet there is nothing more evident than that the ideas a Roman annex to these Latin names were very far different from those which an Englishman expresses by those English ones and if either of these should make use of the measures that those of the other language designed by their names he would be quite out in his account. These are two sensible folks to be doubted and we shall find this much more so in the names of more abstract and compounded ideas such as are the greatest part of those which make up moral discourses whose names when men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into in other languages they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their significations. Number nine, they show a species to be made for communication. The reason why I take a particular notice of this is that we may not be mistaken about genera and species and their essences as if they were things regularly and constantly made by nature and had a real existence in things when they appear upon a more wary survey to be nothing else but an artifice of the understanding for the easier signifying such collections of ideas as it should often have occasion to communicate by one general term under which diverse particulars as far forth as they agree to that abstract idea might be comprehended. And if the doubtful signification of the word species may make it sound harsh to some that I say the species of mixed modes are made by the understanding yet I think it can by nobody be denied that it is the mind makes those abstract complex ideas to which specific names are given. And if it be true as it is that the mind makes the patterns for sorting and naming of things, I leave it to be considered who makes the boundaries of the sort or species since within species and sort have no other difference than that of the Latin and English medium. Number ten, in mixed modes it is the name that ties the combination of simple ideas together and makes it a species. The name relation that there is between species essences and their general name at least in mixed modes will further appear when we consider that it is the name that seems to preserve those essences and give them their lasting duration for the connection between the loose parts of those complex ideas being made by the mind, this union which has no particular foundation in nature would cease again were there not something that did as it were hold it together and keep the parts from scattering. Though therefore it be the mind that makes the collection, it is the name which as it were the knot that ties them fast together. What a vast variety of different ideas does a word try umphus hold together and deliver to us as one species. Had this name been never made or quite lost we might no doubt have had descriptions of what passed in that salamity but yet I think that which holds those different parts together in the unity of one complex idea is that very word annex to it without which the several parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing than any other show which have never been made but once had never been united into one complex idea under one denomination. How much therefore in mixed modes the unity necessary to any essence depends on the mind and how much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in common use annex to it. I leave it to be considered by those who look upon essences and species as real established things in nature. Number 11 suitable to this we find that men speaking of mixed modes sell them imagine or take any other for species of them but such as are set out by name because they being men's making only in order to naming no such species are taking notice of or supposed to be unless the name be joined to it as a sign of men's having combined into one idea several loose ones and by that name giving a lasting union to the parts which would otherwise cease to have any as soon as the mind laid by that abstract idea and cease actually to think on it but when a name is once annex to it we're in the parts of that complex idea have a settled and permanent union then is the essence as it were established and the species looked on as complete for to what purpose should the memory charge itself with such compositions unless there were abstractions to make them general and to what purpose make them general unless there were that they might have general names to the convenience of discourse and communication thus we see that killing a man with a sword or a hatchet are looked on as no distinct species of action but at the point of the sword first enter the body it passes for a distinct species where it has a distinct name as an England in whose language it is called stabbing but in another country where it has not happened to be specified under a particular name it passes not for a distinct species but in a species of couple substances though it would be the mind that makes nominal essence yet since those ideas which are combined in it are supposed to have a union in nature whether the mind joins them or not if are those are looked on as distinct species without any operation of the mind either abstraction or giving a name to that complex idea number 12 for the originals of our mixed modes we look them further than the mind which also shows them to be the workmanship of the understanding conformable also to what has been said concerning the essences of species of mixed modes but they are the creatures of understanding rather than the works of nature conformable I say to this we find that their names leave our thoughts in the mind and no further or gratitude let me speak of justice or gratitude we frame to ourselves no imagination of anything existing which we would conceive but our thoughts terminate in the abstract ideas of those virtues and look not further as they do when we speak of horse or iron with specific ideas we consider not as barely in the mind but as in things themselves which afford the original patterns of those ideas but in mixed modes at least the most considerable parts of them which are moral beings we consider the original patterns as being in the mind and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular beings under names and hence I think it is that these essences of the species of mixed modes are by a more particular name called notions as by a particular right appertaining to the understanding number 13 hence likewise we may learn why the complex ideas of mixed modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded than those of natural substances because they being the workmanship of the understanding pursuing only its own ends and the convenience of expressing in short those ideas that they would make known to another it does with great liberty unite often into one abstract idea things that in their nature have no coherence and so under one term bundle together a great variety of compounded and decompounded ideas that's the name of procession what a great mixture of independent ideas of persons, habits tapirs, borders motions, sounds does it contain in doubt complex which the mind of man has arbitrarily put together to express by that one name whereas the complex ideas of the sorts of substances are usually made up of only a small number of simple ones and the species of animals these two vice shape commonly make the whole nominal essence number 14 names of mixed modes done all way for their real essences which are the relationship of our minds another thing we may observe from what has been said is that the names of mixed modes always signify when they have any determined signification the real essences of their species for these abstract ideas being the workmanship of the mind and not refer to the real existence of things there is no supposition of anything more signified by that name but barely that complex idea of the mind itself has formed which is all it would have expressed by and is that on which all the properties of a species depend and from which all own they all flow and so in these the real nominal essence is the same which of what concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth we shall see hereafter number 15 why their names are usually got before their ideas this also may show us the reason why for the most part the names of mixed modes are got before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known because there being no species of these ordinarily taking notice of what have names and those species or rather their essences being abstract complex ideas made arbitrarily by the mind it is convenient if not necessary to know the names before one endeavor to frame these complex ideas unless a man still has had with a company of abstract complex ideas which others having no names were he has nothing to do with to lay by and forget again I confess that in the beginning of languages it was necessary to have the idea before one gave it the name and so it is still where making a new complex idea one also by giving it a new name makes a new word but this concerns not languages made which have generally pretty well provided for ideas which men have frequent occasion to have and communicate and in such I ask not the ordinary method that children learn the names of mixed modes before they have their ideas what one of a thousand ever frames abstract ideas of glory and ambition before he has heard the names of them in simple ideas and substances I grant it is otherwise which being such ideas as have a real existence in nature the ideas and names are got one before the other as it happens number 16, reasoning of my being so large on this subject what has been said here of mixed modes is with very little difference applicable also to relations which since every man himself may observe I may spare myself the paints in large on especially since what I have said here said concerning words in his third book will possibly be thought by some to this be much more than what so slightly subject required I allow it might be brought into a narrow compass but I was willing to stay my reader on an argument that personally knew and a little out of the way I am sure it is one I thought not of when I began to write that by searching it to the bottom and turning it on every side some part or other might meet with everyone's thoughts and give occasion to the most or negligent to reflect on a general miscarriage which though of great consequence is little taken notice of when it is considered what a putter is made about essences and how much all sorts of knowledge discourse and conversation are pestered and disordered by the careless and confused use of application of words it will perhaps be thought worthwhile thoroughly to lay it open and I shall be pardoned if I have wrong on an argument which I think therefore needs to be inculcated because the false men are usually guilty of in this kind are not only the greatest hindrance of true knowledge but are so well thought of as the password men would often see what a small pretence of reason and truth or possibly none at all is mixed with those huffing opinions they are swelled with if they would but look beyond fashionable sounds and observe what ideas are or are not comprehend under those words with which they are so armed at all points and with which they so confidently lay about them. I shall imagine I have done some service to truth peace and learning if by any enlargement on this subject I can make men reflect on their own use of language and give them reason to suspect that since it is frequent for others it may also be possible for them to have sometimes be very good and approve words in their mouths and writing with very uncertain little or no signification and therefore it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others with this design therefore I shall go on with what I have further to say concerning this matter End of section 5