 Good afternoon. Thank you for coming to the New America Foundation. I'm Peter Bergen. And it's really a pleasure to introduce today's guest and my co-host of Shamala Chowdhury, who is at the New America Foundation. Also, as many of you know, director on the NSC for Pakistan worked with Ambassador Holbrook in the State Department before that, worked for Hillary Clinton at the State Department as a policy planning. And so she will introduce our guest today. Naseem Zara. And we'll have a, Naseem will make some sort of observations. Shamala will ask us some questions and then we'll throw it open to your questions. Okay, thank you for coming. It's my pleasure to introduce Naseem Zara. She's the director of the current fairs and host of the program Policy Matters at Dunia TV. She is a well-known expert on national security and development strategy in Pakistan and was also an associate fellow at the Asia Society and also a fellow at the Harvard University Asia Center and has lived in D.C. previously as well when she was an adjunct professor at SICE. So we're in good hands. You can ask her plenty of difficult questions about Pakistan. What I thought I would do is start out by just introducing a few issues and offering some food for thought for Naseem and then she'll talk for about 15 minutes. We can open it up for questions after that. I think the most obvious place to start when having a conversation about Pakistan in Washington is the US-Pakistan relationship. Many have called this year, or last year, the worst year for US-Pakistan relations and we've seen a series of unfortunate events lead us to today. I saw in the news recently that a joint session of parliament will review the US-Pakistan relationship on March 17th and much of this debate has focused on NATO supply lines, the apology that the Pakistani government expects from Washington for the Salala attack in November and drone strikes and then there are also the other improvements that are being pushed for in the relationship on democracy, public diplomacy and other security cooperation. What's not clear though is how this review will change the relationship. Will it change it drastically or will it simply be a return to status quo after yet another series of unfortunate events? And it begs the question, what can we feasibly expect from this review? Also, is a better defined, less ambiguous but limited relationship even possible between these two countries? And if so, under what conditions would that be? But many of us are struggling with an even simpler question of whether this relationship actually has any long-term strategic interests beside the most obvious ones which are, we all know them, nuclear proliferation and terrorism. So if a long-term relationship is possible, what would it be based on? And I think the answer for the short term is relationship is possible and necessary and most of it is actually based on Afghanistan. That seems to be the main tie that binds the US to Pakistan right now. And in that context, we've all read the news today over the weekend, past week, we've seen a dramatic shift in the security situation on the ground in Afghanistan since the most recent trigger event which is the Khran burning incident. Yesterday's New York Times said that US Pakistan talks are faltering and the consequences for Afghanistan are obviously dire. These talks are intended to lay out an American commitment to Afghanistan in terms of aid and security cooperation for the next 10 years. And many are saying that if these talks falter then Afghanistan will just end up in civil war similar to the 90s. But I think what's being not focused on enough, another elephant in the room if you will, is the question of Pakistan. Pakistan's clearly not isolated from these developments. So the question that I would ask and seem to consider is how does the absence of a strategic partnership agreement between the US and Afghanistan harm Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan? What are the security implications for Pakistan there? And when it comes to the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship specifically, we have seen an increase in diplomatic outreach to Afghanistan in recent months. Pakistani government has said we will cooperate in any Afghan-led process. But at the same time, we're getting mixed messages from the government. The foreign minister in Pakistan has said it would be preposterous for Afghanistan to expect Islamabad to deliver the Taliban leadership to a negotiating table. So this begs the question of what can we actually expect Pakistan to do on reconciliation? So can we get a better sense of the government's limitations or possible red line issues when it comes to Afghanistan? So clearly, Afghanistan will be a major factor affecting Pakistan's stability in the long run. But I'll conclude with a broader question on Pakistan's internal stability, which we tend to talk about a lot, but we don't go into much detail. The country faces huge domestic challenges that are generating an entirely new set of risk factors for us to consider. So the opposition seems to be coming from all fronts in Pakistan. The military, judiciary, political parties, and even in the United States in some cases, is pulled into this domestic political realm. But on the other hand, we saw last week that the Pakistan People's Party just won a huge victory in the Senate elections. And a lot of the speculation is that this guarantees that the PPP and Zardari will be a strong political force to be reckoned with, not just in the next election, but until 2015. So does this actually mean that the government has the staying power to be the first civilian government to finish its term in Pakistan's history? Does this mean that the Supreme Court will not be in such a strong position to pressure the government? But more broadly, I think the question that we're all interested in is, how should we approach this constant question of Pakistan's collapse? Those of us that work on Pakistan constantly get asked, how long is the government going to last? Is the country going to fall apart? Is there going to be a military coup? And given that both the government and the institutions have proven more resilient than our expectations, do you have any suggestions for a different way of seeing Pakistan and analyzing the country, for those of us that are making policy and writing articles for Washington? So I think that's plenty of food for Thoughtford and it seems she doesn't really need my help, but I'll turn it over to her and then we'll open it up for questions. Thank you, Shimala, thank you, Peter, and thank you for having me here. Those are a lot of questions that should take a lot of time. Let me just start with the last comment. In terms of Pakistan falling apart, this is a theory that's been going around now for what, 40 years, literally, and I think you should be bored with that. It's too dated. So Pakistan is here to stay for a number of reasons. We can go into detail. In terms of where we are today in Pakistan and the chaos what Shimala described as threats to the government from different quarters, I would put it differently. I think Pakistan is really on its work in progress and Pakistan is on an irreversible path of constitutional democracy. And there is no question that Pakistan is going to move further on that path. And while it moves on that path, it is going to be chaotic. What is different in Pakistan now from what it has been in the past is that from 2007 onwards, in 2007 is the lawyers movement, et cetera. I think Pakistan has been engaged in its own story and its own narrative in its own power politics, which actually emerges from within. So you have, on the one hand, we will go into the details on Pakistan-U.S. relationship, but internally Pakistan's story is one of different power groups, different groups trying to assert their own authority, trying to exercise their authority, but within constitutional parameters. Some are doing it willingly. Some have been forced to do it because of force of circumstances. So today, whether it is the Pakistan armed forces, whether it's the judiciary or whether it's the politicians or the opposition, I think everybody is certainly vying for power, but nobody is in a position to go beyond the constitution, beyond the parameters set by the constitution. So I think one thing is clear to make just a broad point and we can go into detail during the discussions. So judiciary, and Shamila's point about is the judiciary now, judiciary plus others going to be kept at bay and there's going to be no challenging the government. I don't think that's going to be the case. There will be issues in which the judiciary will, at times the judiciary goes beyond its own mandate and raises issues. For example, Supreme Court Chief Justice wanted the prime minister to give it in writing that he wasn't going to remove the ISI Chief and the Army Chief and within the constitutional, the prime minister has the authority to do it. So while on the one hand, I mean, obviously, the prime minister must be responsible as he exercises such authority, nothing gives this Chief Justice of Pakistan the authority to ask for that kind of written statement. So what I'm saying, those are, there are certain areas where the judiciary goes beyond the call of its constitutional duty. On the other hand, in the cases of corruption, et cetera, when the judiciary raises questions, I think that people welcome that. Then you have issues like ISI's role and a very old case, I don't know, 16-year-old case, 14-year-old case where ISI was involved in giving money to the political parties way back in the 90s. That case has been brought up. Missing person's case, the ISI is being brought to, you know, been taken to task by the Supreme Court. So you have those kind of things happening in Pakistan and I think that's very positive. And Pakistan's challenges, I mean, some of the cross-cutting challenges are, obviously, they range from terrorism. Terrorism is the big one. I mean, in terms of its ability to destabilize, in terms of the costs that is incurred, in terms of economic costs, in terms of lives of people, in terms of what it is doing to the country on the whole. But all that challenge plus the challenge of governance, the role of the media is such that the awareness of the public is, you know, multiplying literally by the second, both in terms of what the public wants and in terms of what the government is incapable and has not been able to deliver. So you've got that kind of tension also going on in terms of, in some ways, you know, a new social contract, the environment within which new social contracts emerge is an environment that you see in Pakistan. So you have all of that chaos and I would say a lot of energy, a lot of energy, some which is, you know, which is channelized in a way that can be absorbed by the current system, in the current situation and some energy which is destabilizing, but that's part of the game. And as I said, you've got terrorism that's a continuing challenge. So also, you know, you have the opposition, you have the government on the one hand, there obviously, there is tension, but when they need to cooperate for the right reason, as they just did on the 20th amendment. So you now have a situation in Pakistan where the caretaker government for the next elections is going to be one that the opposition and the government are together going to be putting together. Those are very, very positive things. I think some of the things that we tend to overlook. So I think on domestic front, the economic, I can go into details, but I mean, I'm not trying to undermine the problems and the challenges, which in some ways you're seeing in any part of the world today, but the framework within which these challenges have to be responded to is a framework that is pretty much taking root in Pakistan. So let me move from there to Pakistan-U.S. In terms of Pakistan-U.S. relations, I think what is this review that is being awaited, this review is really not a review that's going to come up with anything new, what we already know in terms of red lines. I think these red lines have been discussed, no drone attacks, all decisions to be taken by Pakistan within the context of its national interest and the Iran-Pakistan pipeline emerges within that context. A new issue on which Pakistan and U.S. are having problems, then you have other issues like drone attacks and then cooperation in terms of Afghanistan, reconciliation process, and beyond that also in terms of access transit route facilities to NATO forces, those are some of the things that will be discussed, but I think pretty much in terms, can I have some water please? In terms of the dialogue, I don't think the dialogue has stopped, the dialogue, thanks, there's an ongoing dialogue between Pakistan and U.S. So you had the foreign secretary of state and the foreign minister meet in London, you have the CIA chief and the ISI chief, they've met I think a couple of times and there is intel cooperation that is continuing. So when Pakistan takes the position that we need to just hold off for the time being, it's an interesting position that Pakistan takes because at one level the dialogue is really, it is ongoing and we can go into details in terms of Pakistan-U.S. relations, the problems are all there, but I would like to look at 2011 slightly differently from Shemaila. 2011, from my point of view, was an unfortunate but necessary year and I think that inevitable also in some ways because what prefaced 2011 was two or three years where there was suspicion on both sides where there were problems and nobody knows that better than Peter, so I think where we came, yeah, I mean somebody who follows terrorism, follows all of this, there were problems on both sides, I was distressed by both sides and so Raymond Davis did not happen out of the blue, May 2nd did not happen out of the blue and so in November after the Salala attack, when Pakistan pulled down what I like to refer to as a porous iron curtain on this relationship, porous because the dialogue kept going and iron curtain because Pakistan said, okay, wait, we don't want to talk for now and yet there was some talking there for porous, but I think that was very positive. I think that in some ways was going to happen in this relationship. Now the question is, where do we go from where we arrived at in November and where we are standing today, these two countries, unlike the 50s and the 80s, the two periods in which there was very close cooperation between Pakistan and US and in both in the 50s and 80s, US decided we've got what we wanted or we didn't get what we want out of this relationship and let's walk away. In this 2012, as Shamila said, US needs Pakistan's cooperation and Pakistan needs US's cooperation on the reconciliation process. So these two countries are going to remain engaged and where they go in terms of the future is going to really depend on how they're going to cooperate over Afghanistan, cooperate or not cooperate and the nature of this engagement over Afghanistan over the reconciliation confidence building process in Afghanistan is going to be, to some extent, determining the future. Now whether it's a strategic relationship or not, it's yet to be seen, but clearly, if you're looking at today's world, Pakistan and US will remain engaged. Now, I mean, it's only natural and inevitable. Pakistan is a major country in South Asia. It's a country where five regions meet. Look at the size of the country. In fact, I was telling Shamila before this talk that I met Bruce Rydell about two weeks ago. I was sitting in his office and he said, I am writing a book. So I said, what is your book on? And he said, it's on two rising nations of South Asia. So I said, yeah, I understand India. These are the indicators and water. So the other nation that he was talking about was Pakistan. So I laughed and I said, is this the same Bruce Rydell who wrote Containment of Pakistan? I mean, I know him. So I was just joking with him, but it's interesting what he said. He said, as far as Pakistan is concerned, the indicators, he said, the size of the population. He said, the economy is huge. It's obviously downturn. It's slow, but potential is there. The size of the army, the location of the country, and so on and so forth. I mean, I thought that it was interesting. And what he said was that Pakistan actually belongs in the category of the BRICS. And he said, Pakistan, I would compare with Turkey, with Indonesia, with Malaysia, et cetera. Now as a Pakistani, obviously I'll say, we've got to get there sooner rather than later. Too much of imagining ourselves to be there and still not getting there. But in terms of, therefore, to make the point that Pakistan-U.S. relationship will always continue. What is going to be the content of this relationship? I mean, Pakistan is talking increasingly about trade over aid. Pakistan is Pakistan. I think the kind of work we do at home, the kind of reform and reconstruction we're going to do within Pakistan within the next couple of years is also going to be determining the kind of partnership that we have with the United States on multiple fronts. Trade is inevitable. And trade, in terms of a regional country, Pakistan's significance is there. Pakistan is a country which has its own vision of Jinnah's Pakistan, whether we look at women's progress, we look at safeguarding, minority rights, et cetera. Now on all these fronts, obviously Pakistan faces major, major challenges. I mean, we can talk about that. But I think that there is a determination that it'll take time, but we have to move forward. Coming back to Pakistan-U.S., in the Q&A, I'll focus more on this. But just on the last issue in terms of Pakistan's role in reconciliation, what I would like to say is that what we have seen, I think, in the last one week is that the Afghan dynamic itself is now asserting itself on this process. U.S.'s secondary, I mean, the way I look at the Afghan situation is that you have multiple concentric circles in terms of Afghanistan. The innermost and the primary, of course, is Afghanistan itself. And then the two key countries in the innermost kind of core of the circle is Pakistan and the United States. But United States, because obviously it sits in Afghanistan right now, and Pakistan for obvious reasons. But even so, let's see what the Taliban are doing. Let us see what President Karzai has done. What President Karzai has done in the last 48 hours, 72 hours, is he's basically said, the strategic partnership document, I'm not going to sign. He said, I want to take control of the facilities where Taliban prisoners are being kept. Why is he saying this? He's saying this because he wants leverage now in the negotiations. So as I said, there is the internal Afghan dynamic that is at play. And the Taliban are engaged with the United States. There is a real engagement going on. But anybody to conclude that you're actually entered the reconciliation phase. And some formula is going to be up for discussion is a little too premature. Right now, there's just confidence building that is taking place on all sides. And as far as Pakistan is concerned, I would say that there has been in the last one month a real change in Kabul and Islamabad slash Rawalpindi dynamic. So you really have the two countries there engaged for the first time. And I was in Pakistan. I just landed here last evening. And I was talking to some Afghan friends very close to President Karzai. And they were saying that after the trilateral dialogue, especially, the kind of progress that is being made. I mean, one example is what the Prime Minister finally said that the Taliban should be willing to talk to get into the reconciliation process. They should be talking to Kabul. I know that this is something that Ambassador Mark Grossman and President Karzai had been asking Islamabad to do for the last eight to 10 months. So finally, obviously, Pakistan is feeling comfortable enough and that it can actually make that kind of public statement. And similarly, with the Americans, Pakistan has actually helped on the Taliban front. Some of the Taliban traveled from Kuwait for this Qatar process. And as far as the Americans are concerned, I think Americans were focusing much more on the Qatar process. Kabul is much more keen on involving the Saudis. And the Americans are, I guess, engaging the Saudis. So all of that is pretty much in a melting pot of sorts. Everybody is trying to build confidence with each other. And as far as the Afghans are concerned, they are posturing and positioning themselves, whether it's the Taliban and whether it is Kabul, et cetera. And Pakistan, perhaps, as I said, is cooperating on all fronts. But it's not going to close any options right now because who knows where this process is going. And every country has kept all its options open, including the United States. So as Pakistan, as far as, so I would say that what the foreign minister said, very interesting, undiplomatic words where she said, preposterous expectation. I think Pakistan has kind of gone beyond that. And there is an engagement on that front with President Karzai and his team. So that's where I'll end and just wait for any Q&A. Great. Well, it's refreshing to hear some optimism about Pakistan. Which I share. But you don't often hear it in Washington. You mentioned Turkey and Indonesia as being potential models. And of course, one of the most important features are both those countries that they were essentially countries with military dictatorships that became democracies. That's the most right ideas that go anywhere. Well, I mean, there was an interesting comparison. Can you sort of, do you think that the veto that the military enjoys over Pakistan's national security policy will ever change? In the sense, will the civilian government be ever able to really, on the decisions that really matter to Pakistan on national security, have a role? I think that the force of circumstances have taken the Pakistan military even in a direction where it has to begin to look at things differently. Let me give you an example of where the civilians have led a process. And the army has come along with that, which is the MFN. I mean, MFN was something which was unheard of two years ago. And not only two years ago, the defense, what is this? Defense Pakistan Council, DPC, yeah. It was a group of literally thousands and thousands of people coming out every two weeks in different cities, major rallies. And they were against the MFN. Government has taken a decision. So yes, I think that combination of continued civilian rule. And just on that, Peter, I wanted to remind you that this will be the second democratically elected government, generally democratically elected government, which will complete its term. The first one was Zulfiqar Ali-Bhuttoz in 72 to 77, because he held even the second elections. And then during Jail Musharraf's rule, I don't consider that a democratically elected government. So because, oh, you need to know that ABC and Pakistani politics, but you see how soon you get into a response mode. So but anyway, what were we talking about? The MFN, the rest of it. The MFN, yeah. So there was a process. And in fact, this whole notion of strategic depth and then using Taliban is kind of mainstay for promoting Pakistan's interest. Today, there is a consensus in Pakistan, I think, in all sections of Pakistani state and executive and so on and so forth, that it is totally against Pakistan's interest to have any kind of militant government in Afghanistan. So there are things by force of circumstances approaches that have undergone change. And I think the stronger civilian government, the more coherent its positions, the stronger it will be in a position to take the right decisions. So open to questions. And if you could identify yourself and wait for the microphone. Eric, if you're over here. Ryan Evans, Center for National Policy. You mentioned strategic depth. I guess I have two parter. How does the Pakistani military view Pakistani interests in Afghanistan? And is it possible to reconcile or at least deconflict Pakistani interests, the interests of the Afghan government and U.S. interests in Afghanistan? I don't want to comment on U.S. interests. Those are so kind of they come pretty lower down in the rung in terms of what is important and relevant for the region. As far as Afghanistan, Pakistan is concerned. Let's see. I don't want to talk about the military. I don't want to talk about Pakistan as a country. What are our interests in Afghanistan? I think first and foremost, you want a stable government in Afghanistan because don't forget, as a result of what happened in Afghanistan, Pakistan had hosted the largest, virtually one of the largest refugee influx for how many years now? 20 plus years, few people realize that even today we have 2.4 to 2.5 million Afghan refugees sitting in Pakistan. So one is that. Number two, obviously, I just mentioned that ideologically, Pakistan is one of the major problems that we are facing in Pakistan today is the issue of militancy, terrorism, extremism. There are multiple reasons for it, whether it has been 80s war, whether it's been U.S. policy, whether it's been countries in the region. But certainly the point is, until and unless you have stability in Afghanistan, we will have the same kind of problem continuing and any kind of government, which is a Taliban dominated government, that can cause problems and therefore we need to be careful about that. And finally, obviously, Pakistan from a security point of view does not want a two front situation. It's important if who rules in Cuba and what government is there in Cuba is a problem that United States has continues to harp on after 30, 40 years. Certainly for a country like Pakistan, it's important to have a government that is a friendly government. Your point is well taken, a friendly government doesn't translate into Pakistan manipulating it. And I think Pakistan doesn't have the ability beyond a certain point to manipulate. It suffered enough over the last 20 years. So I think the issue of a two front situation is also relevant. So whether Pakistan and Afghanistan's interests can converge now, I think that we are seeing that as a reality, as I just mentioned, you see greater cooperation between Kabul and Islamabad-Rawalpindi and I think that would apply broadly to all different players inside Kabul. You had for the first time, I think about a month ago when the Pakistan foreign minister went to Kabul, she actually went and reached out to all the political groups in Kabul and I thought that was an important and needed gesture. If I could just push his question a little further. We can't talk about Pakistan's strategy in Afghanistan without addressing the India question. And we have seen greater progress on the dialogue overall and MFN is definitely a good thing and the military is behind that. But will that be enough, that cooperation in the realm of economic issues? Will that actually be enough to move Pakistan and India forward on the very difficult security questions? And if not, does that actually harden Pakistan's calculus in Afghanistan when it comes to security cooperation? Because that is the concern. Well, I think there are two things. One is that the road to Pakistan-India cooperation in Afghanistan or kind of accommodation in Pakistan certainly lies through Delhi Islamabad. So that your question about whether they are heading in that direction. I think that you have the dialogue that's been resumed, dialogue on all issues has been resumed. And again, I think it's one of those situations where we think that this is something that is going to continue. Whether it is on Kashmir, whether it's on nuclear issues, whether it is on all the other various problems that you have, trade is one that is kind of resolved, but militancy, cooperation, and kind of anti-terrorism. So it's hopeful on the Pakistan-India front. But even in terms of Afghanistan, I think that Pakistan will be concerned if you have major presence of Indian advisors, et cetera, in an environment, military advisors, et cetera, in an environment where Pakistan-India relationship is on the downturn. But I think overall, I see it positively. And having said that, of course, Pakistan's security interest in Afghanistan is much greater, and Pakistan's concerns are much greater. And therefore, in any dialogue for the future of Afghanistan, Pakistan will be a greater partner. And I think that's recognized all around. The gentleman here. Thariborz Fatemi, Oxford Char Group. Thank you for your presentation. I want to follow up with the Indian question, because when I talk to my Pakistani friends, it seems that there's a subtext always there, that there is a lack of security on their part. After three wars with India, 450,000, half a million troops in Kashmir, a little piece of land like that, they keep saying, what's in it for us in terms of our relationship with the United States? Because the United States seems to be always siding with India. Now, on the other hand, you have the ISI and the Lash Guards and the support of the Lash Guards, and so forth and so on. So my question is, if you don't get to the Kashmir issue, you could solve all the other problems. And as long as that festers, what do you do? And this is what my Pakistani friends ask all the time. Hi. Yeah, good question. But I think I don't know why your Pakistani friends ask this question of Washington, because we've stopped asking Washington this question. I think we do this bilaterally now between Pakistan and India. I think that US is a role in resolving it. I think we've gone past that stage. The truth is fighting wars with India, both countries waging covert wars against each other, car gills, Gibraltas, et cetera. I think, again, there's been a lot of learning in Pakistan. And when I say that there is Pakistan's own narrative, there's Pakistan's own story, sitting from Washington, I guess it's what the focus is often just terrorism and Afghanistan. And if I may say, US's own failed policy in Afghanistan is also dumped on Pakistan. So it's a very skewed view of Pakistan. Not that we haven't had our share of major blunders. Some we may even continue to indulge in. But on Kashmir, I want to say that Pakistan's policy, I think somewhere in the 90s, before the 90s, Pakistan's policy was Kashmir first. Then Pakistan's policy turned into Kashmir plus. And now Pakistan's policy is bilateral dialogue plus Kashmir. So I think that while Kashmir is not by no stretch of imagination not relevant, it's there. It's important. But I think there is a buy into the broader vision that you improve the relationship, at least try to improve the relationship. And then the thrust on Kashmir, you can go forward with. And you will probably achieve more. And also, let's not forget, some things have happened in Kashmir, opening of the LOCE trade. I mean, it's very, very slow moving. But that is open. The exchange of people moving across, the intra-Kashmiri engagement has increased. So it's a little more upbeat than. You mentioned that there have been three wars, in fact, there have been three and a half wars. And Naseem is writing a book about cargo. We can't forget about that half war in the back. Zahid from the Embassy of Pakistan. I'm a research analyst there. Both of you, Naseem and Shumaila, indicated a little bit to Pakistan's future relationship with US, at least the immediate future relationship, to be dependent on what happens in Afghanistan. Why limit it to Afghanistan? Are the relationship between two countries should be independent of anything happening in Afghanistan? Of course, it will affect it. But it should go much beyond that. So would you like to talk on that? I didn't say it's going to be dependent on Afghanistan at all. I said that's going to be an important fact in terms of determining the texture of the future relationship and the future relationship is going to be much broader, as I said earlier on. But the question gets to what Shumaila was talking about, which is, is the relationship between Pakistan and the United States going to be basically very tactical and about issues like Afghanistan and nothing more? And it will quite defined? Or is it going to be something, could it be something larger in the future, more like the strategic partnership that was being discussed in 2009? And is it better, perhaps, for it to be this more tactical thing that everybody agrees on, and everybody understands the rules of the road? Or is it more desirable to have this deeper friendship? Or is that just a pipe dream we should forget about? Yeah, but I mean, the content of a deeper friendship, I mean, a trade relationship. There's a trade relationship that is an ongoing between the two countries. And that would perhaps increase over time, not decrease. There is cooperation at the diplomatic level. In terms of content, there is a relationship in the development front. How it moves forward will depend. I think there's going to be a review of the way we are engaging even in the development field. So I see this relationship continuing. I mean, in terms of whether it is going to be that close, a military cooperation that you've had in the 50s and the 80s, I personally think it's clearly a no. There's going to be review. That's the area where there's going to be genuine review. But if we see this relationship only primarily as a military relationship, then I think that you will see major changes. Will the review say no drone strikes at all? Or will it say only drone strikes that we operate jointly, or what do you think? I think that the negotiations that took place between General Pasha and Patrice, I think they were the ones, they focused to some extent on the question of how do you deal with the issue of drones? And I don't know. I think it depends on how they'll work out because it seems to me that a far reduced number of drone strikes is something that may be something that is conceivable. But under what circumstances? I mean, who has control? Does Pakistan? Is Pakistan told beforehand, and so on and so forth? I think those will be the questions. This is interesting because I did say that the US has limited interests in Pakistan and in their link to Afghanistan. I mean, that was my statement. But this is the fundamental issue is that the relationship, the recent relationship since 2008 has been crafted on very limited security objectives. And those objectives themselves have been a constant source of tension for the relationship. And as Naseem said, that is what will come out out of the review. But to no one's surprise, these same concerns came out of the Pakistani government after the Raymond Davis situation, after the bin Laden raid, after the Salah attack. They're the same security concerns. And so there's a fundamental policy dissonance between the two countries. And so it's clearly linked to Afghanistan. It's clearly linked to the fact that there are safe havens in Pakistan where Al Qaeda and Taliban are able to operate and finance activities against the US. That's why there are continued drone attacks. That's why there's continued military cooperation. So the question then becomes, after the US leaves in 2014, what becomes of the US-Pakistan relationship? And there's clearly some benefit that Pakistan has gotten from, quote-unquote, partnering with the United States coalition support funds, which we know are a big portion are on hold now. Significant development and economic aid, which we did not see before 2008. So again, clearly linked to Afghanistan policy. So what becomes of this relationship post-2014? And I think this is a question that we shouldn't forget to ask. We might not be able to answer it 100%, but we have to ask. Yeah, but just I'm glad you raised you throughout these figures. Gives me a chance to respond to them. In terms of just to stay with facts, in terms of Kerry Lugar, $2 billion or $3 billion plus. And I have it from your own, from American sources that I think about $400 million or something have been released. So you haven't had the kind of funds that the figure that is quoted often. In terms of Al-Qaeda, and you take Al-Qaeda and Taliban, you take their name in the same breath, but you realize that there is a divide even within the US policy itself is looking at the two very differently, Al-Qaeda and Taliban. But one thing we cannot overlook when we are looking at Pakistan, US, and we are looking at Afghanistan is the great divide within Washington itself on the Afghanistan policy, on where this whole process is going, where it should go. I mean, the Raymond Davis affair really gave an opportunity to CI into Pentagon to basically assert itself in a situation here where State Department, et cetera, seemed to then be beginning to look at this relationship differently. And today, I've done the rounds in different institutions in Washington, and it's very clear that CIA, Pentagon, and partly the Hill, which is obviously, which hears a lot from Pentagon and CIA, have a different view on where, or at least parts of these institutions have a different view on where the Afghanistan reconciliation process is going to go, as opposed to how people are looking at it in the State Department. It's more war versus kind of the political reconciliation process. So it's a little more complex even here. Any other? Yeah. Frank Keller from the World Bank. There's been some discussion in local Pakistani media about the likelihood, or about the possibility of a merger between KP and FATA, and also the creation of South Punjab province that would be a separate from the larger Punjab. How likely are either of these two eventualities and what are the potential implications of these? Well, I think that in terms of a new province, South Punjab, I think that that's very likely, perhaps not any longer before the elections, but it's going to be, I think that's an issue that's not going to go away. And in fact, increasingly the debate is now that perhaps one has to be looking at smaller administrative units as a response to the governance crisis in Pakistan. So it's not necessarily going to be, it's not going to be restricted to just, the ethnic dimension. But, and let me remind you that way back in the 80s, late 80s, or just early 90s, when Benazir Bhutto was in the government the first round, she had a study done in which Kamal Asfar, he was then the governor, he had come out with the proposal that there should be 32 administrative units in Pakistan. So this is an old debate, but I think there is a very strong likelihood now that there will be an emergence of a new province in terms of KP and FATA, et cetera, amalgamation of that. I don't think that's going to happen, but increasingly you'll see FATA regulations being brought up to the mark in terms of more constitutional rights, et cetera, that's what is now happening. So KP and FATA would then be reversing the trend in terms of basically dividing existing units down to smaller units, you'd be joining these two up. I don't think that's likely. Speaking of the election, who is, when is it going to happen, who's going to win? I don't have any crystal ball, but elections will not happen before, I think October, November, I mean, they're going to be no major. You're supposed to have a crystal ball. I'm going to go to that, just give me a minute, but I don't think they're going to be elections any time sooner barring any major crisis. My own sense is that the people's party is going to contest with its coalition partners. All of them are going to stick together and you have now Q is well joining up, I mean, in a way that it's going to stay with people's parties. So people's party and its coalition partners are going to be major contender. I think Imran Khan will have better showing than he has had in the past, which, you know, what is he? He had only one seat in the past, so I think 15, 20, 25 seats, perhaps, because while he has a lot of support and people are looking up to him and he represents change and so on, it's urban politics, the nature of constituency, politics is very different. I think as far as politics is concerned, people have a, you know, have a greater sense of, you know, who understands the mechanics of politics of elections and so on. So while Imran will definitely have a better showing, I think that people's party will be a major fighting force and Navashreev, between now and the next six months, let's see what else Navashreev is able to pull out of the bag. Well, I would just add a follow-up. I mean, coalition politics in Pakistan for the past few years has been quite difficult. We should give credit where the credit is due. The government has pushed forward the 18th Amendment and the 20th Amendment, both major historical wins and that. This is sort of a dumb question. What is the 20th Amendment? What does it do? The 20th Amendment basically is an agreement between the government and the opposition that when the interim setup is put in place, you know, the prime minister and the key positions will be positions that will be held by individuals that the two agree upon, the opposition and the government, which is a major thing. So the 20th Amendment is the interim setup under which the elections are held. I see. How long will that interim setup last? Three months or 90 days. 90 days. 90 days of four. Yeah. So that's major. I mean, those are kind of major in terms of the political process. Those are major things. So on political gains, this government has done. Well, I think Pakistan has done very well on political gains and again, as I said, I think it's on an irreversible path through democratic politics. No question. Great. Any other questions? This gentleman here. I'm an Afghan journalist. You said that Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghans in Pakistan. But that's not kind of a hosting like in West, like Western countries. When Western countries host their refugees. So Afghan refugees also have a great contribution to Pakistani economy. And also, my question is, you didn't come to the Afghan issue directly. Usually when I read and watch in Pakistani media and Western media, Pakistan is taking this credit that what all is happening in Afghanistan, it's because, I mean, the West blames for you, but Pakistan take this credit. But you didn't you? Because you are a journalist also, you know about the region, that the problem is actually inside Afghanistan. The vast majority of Pashtun people are deprived of power. And it's not only Taliban that they call it, Taliban. I am from Kandahar. I am from the South. And many people who fight, they are not from my district, from Panjwai district, people are, there were some Taliban. But they are Pashtun people, they fight for their freedom. They fight the power. The Kabul does not represent their rights. Yeah, please let me complete it. So here, what I'm trying to say, that you say Pakistan is doing this, and Pakistan is taking this credit from the United States, that it's only Pakistan can do this. Afghanistan does not exist. All this is in control of Pakistan. My question is, you did not come, you didn't come with any point if the problem exists in Afghanistan. It's not only the Pakistan credit to say that whatever we are doing, that's our credit, and we have to take a big role in negotiation process. Thank you. I mean, I can understand how you feel. But I am sorry, I don't think I suggested at any point that Pakistan has to take credit. In fact, I shy away from that, because there's so much trouble that we've contributed to. So the last thing I'm going to say is, Pakistan takes credit. I think there's some confusion there. As far as people in Afghanistan fighting what many see as an occupation force, I mean, those are things that are there, and as an Afghan, you're saying that I'm nobody to add to that. And I'm not sure that at any point, I said Pakistan has to take credit or that Pakistan. In fact, our refrain is, in fact, our point is that beyond a certain point, there is the internal dynamics. In fact, I responded, I started by saying that it's the internal dynamics of Afghanistan that is taking over the process, and beyond a certain point, Pakistan has very limited input in terms of, As-Salaam-Alaikum-Azami'il. In terms of Afghan refugees, all I can say is that there is very few examples in history where countries of Pakistan's own size and its own problems have hosted so many millions for almost a quarter of a century, my friend. And I've – after all, there is some – there is a feeling of brotherhood or sisterhood that these two countries have that we've hosted so many Afghan refugees beyond that. What can I say? Well, don't forget you brought him to Pakistan. That's right. To say thank you very much. Thank you very much, Ramayana. Thank you, Nassim. That was really wonderful, very stimulating. Thanks.