 Introduction of On War. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Timothy Ferguson. On War by Carl von Klasowitz. Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. Introduction. The Germans interpret their new national colours, black, red and white, by the saying, through night and blood to light. And no work yet written conveys to the thinker a clearer conception of all that the red streak in their flag stands for, than this deep and philosophical analysis of war by Klasowitz. It reveals war stripped of all accessories as the exercise of force for the attainment of a political object unrestrained by any law save that of expediency. And thus gives the key to the interpretation of German political aims, past, present and future, which is unconditionally necessary for every student of the modern conditions of Europe. Step by step, every event since Waterloo follows with logical consistency from the teachings of Napoleon, formulated for the first time some twenty years afterwards by this remarkable thinker. What Darwin accomplished for biology, generally Klasowitz did for the life history of nations nearly half a century before him. For both have proved the existence of the same law in each case vis the survival of the fittest. The fittest as Huxley Longsins pointed out not necessarily being synonymous with the ethically best. Neither of these thinkers was concerned with the ethics of the struggle, which each studied so exhaustively. But to both men the phase or condition presented itself neither as moral nor immoral, any more than our famine, disease or other natural phenomena, but as emanating from a force inherent in all living organisms which can only be mastered by understanding its nature. It is in that spirit that, one after the other, all the nations of the continent toward such drastic lessons as Konengratz and Seden have accepted the lesson, with the result that today Europe is an armed camp and peace is maintained by the equilibrium of forces and will continue just as long as this equilibrium exists and no longer. Whether this state of equilibrium is in itself a good or desirable thing may be open to argument. I have discussed it at length in my war in the world's life but I venture to suggest that no one would a renewal of the era of warfare be a change for the better as far as existing humanity is concerned. Meanwhile however with every year that elapses the forces at present in equilibrium are changing in magnitude. The pressure of populations which have to be fed is rising and an explosion along the line of least resistance is sooner or later inevitable. As I read the teaching of the recent Hague Conference no responsible government on the continent is anxious to form in themselves that line of least resistance. They know only too well what war would mean and we alone, absolutely unconscious of the trend of the dominant thought of Europe are pulling down the dam which may at any moment let in on us the flood of invasion. Now no responsible man in Europe perhaps, least of all in Germany, thanks us for this voluntary destruction of our defences. For all who are of any importance would very much rather end their days in peace than incur the burden of responsibility which war would entail but they realize that the gradual dissemination of the principles taught by Klasowicz has created a condition of molecular tension in the minds of the nations they govern analogous to the critical temperature of water heated above boiling point under pressure which may at any moment bring about an explosion which they will be powerless to control. The case is identical with that of an ordinary steam boiler delivering so and so many pounds of steam to its engines as long as the envelope can contain the pressure but let a breach in its continuity arise relieving the boiling water of all restraint and in a moment the whole mass flashes into vapor developing a power no work of man can oppose. The ultimate consequences of defeat no man can foretell the only way to avert them is to ensure victory and again following out the principles of Klasowicz victory can only be ensured by the creation in peace of an organization which will bring every available man, horse and gun or ship and gun if there will be on the sea in the shortest possible time and with the utmost possible momentum upon the decisive field of action which in turn leads to the final doctrine formulated by Wundergolds an excuse for the action of the late President Kruger in 1899 the statesman who, knowing his instrument to be ready and seeing war inevitable, hesitates to strike first is guilty of a crime against his country. It is because this sequence of cause and effect is the unknown to our members of parliament elected by popular representation that all our efforts to ensure a lasting peace by securing efficiency with economy in our national defenses have been rendered nuggetory. This estimate of the influence of Klasowicz's sentiments on contemporary thought in continental Europe may appear exaggerated to those who have not familiarized themselves with M. Gustav de Bon's exposition of the laws governing the formation and conduct of crowds. I do not wish for one minute to be understood as asserting that Klasowicz has been conscientiously studied and understood in any army, not even in the Prussian but his work has been the ultimate foundation on which every drill regulation in Europe except our own has been reared. It is this ceaseless repetition of his fundamental ideas to which one half of the male population of every continental nation has been subjected for two to three years of their lives which has turned their minds to vibrate in harmony with its precepts and those who know and appreciate this fact at its true value have only to strike the necessary chords in order to evoke a response sufficient to overpower any other ethical conception which those who have not organized their forces beforehand can appeal to. The recent setback by the socialists in Germany is an illustration of my position. The socialist leaders of that country are far behind the responsible governors in their knowledge of the management of crowds. The latter had not long before in 1893 in fact made their arrangements to prevent the spread of socialistic propaganda beyond certain useful limits. As long as the socialists only threatened capital they were not seriously interfered with for the government knew quite well that the undisputed sway of the employer was not for the ultimate good of the state. The standard of comfort must not be pitched too low if men are to be ready to die for their country but the moment the socialists began to interfere seriously with the discipline of the army the word went round and the socialists lost heavily at the polls. If this power of predetermined reaction to acquired ideas can be evoked successfully in a manner of internal interest only in which the obvious interest of the majority of the population is so clearly on the side of the socialist it must be evident how enormously greater it will prove when set in motion against an external enemy where the obvious interest of the people is from the very nature of things as manifestly on the side of the government and the statesman who failed to take into account the force of the resultant thought wave of a crowd of some seven million men all trained to respond to their ruler's call would be guilty of treachery as grave as one who failed to strike when he knew the army to be ready for immediate action. As already pointed out it is to the spread of class of its ideas that the present state of more or less immediate readiness for war of all European armies is due and since the organization of these forces is uniform this more or less of readiness exists in precise proportion to the sense of duty which animates the several armies where the spirit of duty and self-sacrifice is low the troops are unready and inefficient where as in Prussia these qualities of training of the whole century have become instinctive troops really are ready to the last button and might be poured down upon any one of her neighbors with such rapidity that the very first collision must suffice to ensure ultimate success. A success by no means certain if the enemy whoever he may be is allowed breathing time in which to set his house in order. An example will make this clearer Germany was on the very verge of war with France and Russia at that moment her superior efficiency the consequence of this inborn sense of duty surely one of the highest qualities of humanity was so great that it is more than probable that less than six weeks should have sufficed to bring the French to their knees indeed after the first fortnight it would have been possible to begin transferring troops from the Rhine to the Neiman and the same case may arise again but if France and Russia had been allowed even ten days warning the German plan would have been completely defeated France alone might then have claimed all the efforts that Germany could have put forth to defeat her yet there are politicians in England so grossly ignorant of the German reading of the Napoleonic lessons that they expect that nation to sacrifice the enormous advantage they have prepared by a whole century of self-sacrifice and practical patriotism by an appeal to a court of arbitration and the further delays which must arise by going through the medieval formalities of recalling ambassadors and exchanging ultimatums most of our present-day politicians have made their money in business a form of human competition greatly resembling war to paraphrase Klasowitz did they, when in the throes of such competition send formal notice to their rivals of their plans to get the better of them in commerce did Mr. Carnegie, the arch-priest of peace at any price when he built the Steel Trust notify his competitors when and how he proposed to strike the blows which successively made him master of millions surely the directors of a great nation may consider the interests of their shareholders that is the people they govern are sufficiently serious not to be endangered by the deliberate sacrifice of the predominant position of readiness which generations of self-devotion, patriotism and wise forethought have won for them as regards the strictly military side of this work though the recent researches of the French general staff into the records and documents of the Napoleonic period have shown conclusively that Klasowitz had never grasped the essential point of the great emperor's strategic method yet it is to be admitted that he has completely fathomed the spirit which gave life to the form and notwithstanding the variations in application which have resulted from the progressive invention in every field of national activity not in the technical improvements in armament alone this spirit still remains the essential factor in the whole matter indeed if anything modern appliances have intensified its importance for though with equal armaments on both sides the form of battles must always remain the same the facility and certainty of communication which better methods of communicating orders and intelligence have conferred upon the commanders has rendered the control of great masses immeasurably more certain than it was in the past men kill each other at greater distances it is true but killing is a constant factor in all battles the difference between now and then lies in this thanks to the enormous increase in range the essential feature in modern armaments it is possible to concentrate by surprise on any chosen spot a man killing power fully twentyfold greater than was conceivable in the days of Waterloo and whereas in Napoleon's time this concentration of man killing power which in his hand took the form of the great case-shot attack depended almost entirely on the shape and condition of the ground which might or might not be favourable nowadays such concentration of fire power is almost independent of the country altogether thus at Waterloo Napoleon was compelled to wait till the ground became firm enough for his guns to gallop over nowadays every gun at his disposal and five times that number had he possessed them might have been opened on any point in the British position he had selected as soon as it became light enough to see or to take a more modern instance is the battle of Saint-Provat-Gravolot 18 August 1870 where the Germans were able to concentrate on both wing batteries of 200 guns and upwards it would have been practically impossible owing to the section of the slopes of the French position to carry out the old fashioned case-shot attack at all nowadays there would be no difficulty in turning on the fire of two thousand guns on any point of the position and switching this fire up and down the line like water from a fire engine hose if the occasion demanded such concentration but these alterations in method make no difference in the truth of the picture of war which class of its presents with which every soldier and above all every leader should be saturated death, wounds, suffering and privation remain the same whatever the weapons employed and their reaction on the ultimate nature of man is the same now as in the struggle of century ago it is this reaction that the great commander has to understand and prepare himself to control and the task becomes ever greater as fortunately for humanity the opportunities for gathering experience become more rare in the end and with every improvement in science the result depends more and more on the character of the leader and his power of resisting the sensuous impressions of the battlefield finally for those who would fit themselves in advance for such responsibility I know of no more inspiring advice than that given by Krishna to Anjuna ages ago when the latter trembled before the awesome responsibility of launching his army against the host of the Pandavs this life within all living things my prince hides beyond harm scorn now to suffer then for that which cannot suffer do thy part be mindful of thy name and tremble not not better can betide a marshal soul than lawful war happy the warrior to whom comes joy of battle but if thou shunst this honourable field a kishitriya if knowing thy duty and thy task thou bits duty and task go by that shall be sin and those to come shall speak thee in infamy from age to age but infamy is worse for men of noble blood to bear than death therefore arise thou son of Kunti brace thine arm for the conflict nerve thy heart to meet as things are like to thee pleasure or pain profit or ruin victory or defeat so minded gird thee to the fight for so thou shall not sin Colonel F.N. Maud C.B. late R.E. end of introduction recording by Timothy Ferguson Gold Coast, Australia Preface to the first edition of On War this LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Linda and Timothy Ferguson On War by Carl von Klausowitz translated by Colonel J.J. Graham Preface to the first edition it will naturally excite surprise that a preface by a female hand should accompany a work on such a subject as the present for my friends no explanation of the circumstances required but I hope by a simple relation of the cause to clear myself of the appearance of presumption in the eyes also of those to whom I am not known the work to which these lines serve as a preface occupied almost entirely the last twelve years of the life of my inexpressibly beloved husband who has unfortunately been torn too soon for myself and his country to complete it was his most earnest desire but it was not his intention that it should be published during his life and if I tried to persuade him to alter that intention he often answered half ingest but also perhaps half in foreboding of early death thou shall publish it these words which in those happy days often drew tears from me little as I was inclined to attach a serious meaning to them make it now in the opinion of my friends a duty encumbered on me to introduce the posthumous works of my beloved husband with a few prefatory lines from myself and although here may be a difference of opinion on this point still I am sure there will be no mistake as to the feeling which has prompted me to overcome the timidity which makes any such appearance even in a subordinate part so difficult for a woman it will be understood as a matter of course that I cannot have the most remote intention of considering myself as the real editor of a work which is far above the scope of my capacity I only stand at its side as an affectionate companion on its entrance into the world this position I may well claim as a similar one was allowed me during its formation and progress those who are acquainted with our happy married life and know how we shared everything with each other not only joy and sorrow but also every occupation every interest of daily life will understand that my beloved husband could not be occupied on a work of this kind without its being known to me therefore no one can, like me, bear testimony to the zeal to the love with which he laboured on it to the hopes which he bound up with it as well as the manner and the time of its elaboration his richly gifted mind had from his early youth longed for light and truth and, varied as were his talents still he had chiefly directed his reflection to the science of war to which the duties of his profession called him in which were of such importance for the benefits of the States Scharnhorst was the first to lead him into the right road and his subsequent appointment in 1810 as Instructor at the General War School as well as the honour conferred on him at the same time of giving military instruction to his Royal Highness the Crown Prince tended further to give his investigations and studies that direction and to lead him to put down in writing whatever conclusions he arrived at a paper with which he finished the instruction of his Royal Highness the Crown Prince contains the germ of his subsequent work but it was in the year 1816 at Koblenz that he first devoted himself again to scientific labours and to collecting the fruits which his rich experience in those four eventful years had brought to maturity he wrote down his views in the first place in short essays only loosely connected with each other the following without date which has been found amongst his papers seems to belong to those early days in the principles he committed to paper in my opinion the chief things which compose strategy as it is called are touched upon I look upon them only as materials and had just got to such a length towards the moulding them into a hole these materials have been amassed without any regularly preconceived plan my view was at first without regard to system and strict connection to put down the results of my reflections upon the most important points in quite brief precise compact propositions the manner in which Montesquieu has treated his subject floated before me in idea I thought that concise sententious chapters which I proposed at first to call grains would attract the attention of the intelligent just as much by that which was to be developed from them as by that which they contained in themselves I had therefore before me in idea intelligent readers already acquainted with the subject but my nature which always impels me to development and systematising at last worked its way out also in this instance for some time I was able to confine myself to extracting only the most important results from the essays which to attain cleanness and conviction in my own mind I wrote upon different subjects to concentrating in that manner their spirit in a small compass but afterwards my peculiarity gained descendancy completely I have developed what I could and thus naturally have supposed to read a not yet acquainted with the subject the more I advanced with the work and the more I yield to the spirit of investigation so much the more I was also led to system thus then chapter after chapter has been inserted my ultimate view has now been to go through the whole once more to establish by further explanation much of the early treaties and perhaps to condense into results many analysis on the later ones and thus to make a moderate whole out of it forming a small octavo volume but it was my wish also in this to avoid everything common everything that is plain of itself that has been said a hundred times and is generally accepted for my ambition was to write a book that would not be forgotten in two or three years and which any one interested in the subject would at all events take up more than once in Koblenz where he was much occupied with duty he could only give occasional hours to his private studies it was not until 1818 after his appointment as director of the General Academy of War at Berlin that he had the leisure to expand his work and enrich it from history of modern wars this leisure also reconciled him to his new application which in other respects was not satisfactory to him as according to the existing organization of the Academy the scientific part of the course is not under the director but conducted by a board of studies free as he was from all petty vanity from every feeling of restless egotistical ambition still he felt a desire to be really useful and not to leave inactive the abilities with which God had endowed him in active life he was not in a position in which this longing could be satisfied and he had little hope of attaining to any such position his whole energies were therefore directed upon the domain of science and the benefit which he hoped to lay the foundation of by his work was the object of his life that notwithstanding this the resolution not to let the work appear until after his death became more confirmed is the best proof that no vain paltry longing for praise and distinction no particle of egotistical views was mixed up with this noble aspiration for great and lasting usefulness thus he worked diligently on until in the spring of 1830 he was appointed to the artillery and his energies were called into activity in such a different sphere and to such a high degree that he was obliged, for the moment at least to give up all literary work he then put his papers in order sealed up the separate packets labelled them and took sorrowful leave of this employment which he loved so much he was sent to Breslau in August of the same year as chief of the second artillery district but in December recalled to Berlin and appointed chief of the staff to Field Marshal Count Nysenner for the term of his command in March 1831 he accompanied his revered commander to Pozen when he returned from there to Breslau in November after the melancholy event which had taken place he hoped to resume his work and perhaps complete it in the course of the winter the Almighty had willed it should be otherwise on the 7th November he returned to Breslau on the 16th he was no more and the packets sealed by himself were not opened until after his death the papers thus left are those now made public in the following volumes exactly in the condition in which they were found without a word being added or erased still however there was much to do before publication in the way of putting them in order and consulting about them and I am deeply indebted to the several sincere friends for the assistance they have afforded me particularly Major Oetzel who kindly undertook the correction of the press as well as the preparation of maps to accompany the historical parts of the work I must also mention my much loved brother who was my support in the hour of my misfortune and who has also done much for me in respect of these papers amongst other things by careful examining and putting them in order he found the commencement of the revision which my dear husband wrote in the year 1827 and mentions in the notice hereafter annexed as a work he had in view this revision has been inserted in the place intended for it in the first book for it does not go any further there are still many other friends to whom I might offer my thanks for their advice for the sympathy and friendship which they have shown me but if I do not name them all they will I am sure not have any doubts of my sincere gratitude it is all the greater for my firm conviction that all they have done was not only on my account but for the friend whom God has thus called away from them so soon if I have been highly blessed as the wife of such a man during one and twenty years so am I still not withstanding my irreparable loss by the treasures and by recollections and of my hopes by the rich legacy of sympathy and friendship which I owe the beloved departed by the elevating feelings which I experience at seeing his rare worth so generally and honourably acknowledged the trust confided to me by a royal couple is a fresh benefit for which I have to thank the Almighty as it opens to me an honourable occupation to which I devote myself may this occupation be blessed and may the dear little prince who is now entrusted to my care some day read this book and be animated by it to deeds like those of his glorious ancestors Written at the Marble Palace Potsdam 30th June 1832 Marie-Yvonne Klasiewicz born Countess Bruehl Oberhof Maesternan to his royal highness the Prince William End of Preface Recording by Linda and Timothy Ferguson Gold Coast Australia Notice of On-War This LibriVox recording is in the public domain Recording by Timothy Ferguson On-War by Carl von Klasiewicz Translated by Colonel J. J. Graham Notice I look upon the first six books of which a fair copy has now been made as only a mass which is still in a manner without form and which has yet to again be revised In this revision the two kinds of war will everywhere be kept more distinctly in view by which all ideas will acquire a clearer meaning a more precise direction and a closer application The two kinds of war are first those in which the object is the overthrow of the enemy whether it be that we aim at his destruction politically or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms and next those in which our object is merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country either for the purpose of retaining them permanently or of turning them to account as matter for exchange in the settlement of a peace Transition from one kind to the other must certainly continue to exist but the completely different nature of the tendencies of the two must everywhere appear and must separate from each other things which are incompatible Besides establishing this real difference in wars another practically necessary point of view must be at the same time established which is that war is only a continuation of state policy by other means This point of view being adhered to everywhere will introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject and things will be more easily disentangled from each other Although the chief application of this point of view does not commence until we get to the eighth book still it must be completely developed in the first book and also lend assistance through the revision of the first six books Through such a revision the first six books will get rid of a good deal of dross Many rents and chasms will be closed up and much that is of a general nature will be transformed into distinct conceptions and forms The seventh book, On Attack for the different chapters of which sketches are already made is to be considered a reflection of the sixth and must be completed at once according to the above mentioned more distinct points of view so that it will require no fresh revision but rather may serve as a model in the revision of the first six books For the eighth book, On the Plan of a War that is the organization of a whole war in general several chapters are designed but they are not at all to be regarded as real materials they are merely a track roughly cleared as it were through the mass in order by means to ascertain the points of most importance They have answered this object and I propose on finishing the seventh book to proceed at once to the working out of the eighth with the two points of view above mentioned will be chiefly affirmed by which everything will be simplified and at the same time have a spirit breathed into it I hope in this book to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen and at least to show the object of action and the real point to be considered in war Now, when I have bought my ideas clearly out by finishing this eighth book and have properly established the leading features of war it will be easier for me to carry the spirit of these ideas into the first six books and to make these same features show themselves everywhere therefore I shall defer till then the revision of the first six books Should the work be interrupted by my death then What is found can only be called a mass of conceptions not bought into form but as these are open to endless misconceptions they will doubtless give rise to a number of crude criticisms for in these things everyone thinks when he takes up his pen that whatever comes into his head is worth saying in printing and quite as incontrovertible as that twice to make four If such a one would take the pains as I have done to think over the subject for years and to compare his ideas with military history he would certainly be a little more guarded in his criticism Still notwithstanding this imperfect form I believe that an impartial reader thirsting for truth and conviction will rightly appreciate in the first six books the fruits of several years' reflection and a diligent study of war perhaps he will find in them some leading ideas which may bring about a revolution in the theory of war Berlin 10th of July 1827 Besides this notice among the papers left the following unfinished memorandum was found which appears to be a very recent date The manuscript on the conduct of the Grand Goyeur which will be found after my death in its present state can only be regarded as a collection of materials from which it is intended to construct a theory of war With the greater part I am not yet satisfied and the sixth book is to be looked at as a mere essay I should have completely remodeled it and have tried a different line But the ruling principles which pervade these materials I hold to be the right ones they are the result of a very varied reflection keeping always in view the reality and always bearing in mind what I have learned by experience by my intercourse with distinguished soldiers The seventh book is to contain the attack the subjects of which are thrown together in a hasty manner The eighth, the plan for a war in which I would have examined war more especially in its political and human aspects The first chapter of the first book is the only one which I consider as completed It will at least serve to show the manner in which I propose to treat the subject throughout The theory of the Grand Goyeur and its strategy, as it is called, is beset with extraordinary difficulties and we may affirm that very few men have clear conceptions of the separate subjects that is, conceptions carried up to their full logical conclusions In real action most men are guided merely by the tact of judgment which hits the object more or less accurately according as they possess more or less genius This is the way in which all great generals have acted and therein partly lay their greatness and their genius that they have always hit upon what was right by this tact Thus also it will always be in action and so far this tact is amply sufficient but when it is a question of not acting oneself but of convincing others in a consultation then all depends on clear conceptions and demonstrations of the inherent relations and so little progress has been made in this respect that most deliberations are merely a contention of words resting on no firm basis and ending either in everyone retaining his own opinion or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect a middle course really without any value Clear ideas on these matters are therefore not wholly useless Besides the human mind has a general tendency to clearness and always wants to be consistent with the necessary order of things Owing to the great difficulties attending a philosophical construction of the art of war and the many attempts at it that have failed most people have come to the conclusion that such a theory is impossible because it concerns things which no standing law can embrace We should also join in this opinion and give up any attempt at theory where it not that a great number of propositions make themselves evident without any difficulty as for instance that the defensive form with a negative object is the stronger form the attack with the positive object the weaker that great results carry the little ones with them that therefore strategic effects may be referred to certain centres of gravity that a demonstration is a weaker application of force than a real attack that therefore there must be some special reason for resorting to the former that victory consists not merely in the conquest of the field of battle but in the destruction of armed forces physically and morally which can only in general be affected by a pursuit after the battle is gained that successes are always greatest at the point where the victory has been gained that therefore the change from one line and object to another can only be regarded as a necessary evil that a turning movement is only justified by a superiority of numbers generally or by the advantage of our lines of communication and retreat over those of the enemy that flank positions are only justifiable on similar grounds that every attack becomes weaker as it progresses End of notice Recording by Timothy Ferguson, Gold Coast, Australia The introduction of the author of On War This LibriVox recording is in the public domain Recording by Timothy Ferguson On War by Carl von Klasowitz Translated by Colonel J. J. Graham Introduction of the author That the conception of the scientific does not consist alone or chiefly in system and its finished theoretical constructions requires nowadays no exposition System in this treaties is not to be found on the surface and instead of a finished building of theory there are only materials The scientific form lies here in the endeavor to explore the nature of military phenomena to show their affinity with the nature of the things of which they are composed nowhere has the philosophical argument been evaded but where it runs out into too thin a thread the author has preferred to cut it short and fall back upon the corresponding results of experience for in the same way as many plants only bear fruit when they do not shoot too high so in the practical arts the theoretical leaves and flowers must not be made to sprout too far but kept near to experience which is their proper soil unquestionably it would be a mistake to try and discover from the chemical ingredients of a grain of corn the form of the ear of corn which it bears as we have only to go to the field to see the ears ripe investigation and observation philosophy and experience must neither despise nor exclude one another they mutually afford each other the rights of citizenship consequently the propositions of this book with their arch of inherent necessity are supported either by experience or by the conception of war itself as external points so they are not without abutments it is perhaps not impossible to write a systematic theory of war full of spirit and substance but ours hitherto have been very much the reverse to say nothing of their unscientific spirit in their striving after coherence and completeness of system they overflow with common places, truisms and twaddle of every kind if we want a striking picture of them we have only to read Lichtenberg's extract from a code of regulations in case of fire if a house takes fire we must seek above all things to protect the right side of the house standing on the left and on the other hand the left side of the house on the right for if we, for example, should protect the left side of the house on the left then the right side of the house lies to the right of the left and consequently as the fire lies to the right of this side and of the right side for we have assumed the house is situated to the left of the fire therefore the right side is situated nearer to the fire than the left and the right side of the house might catch fire if it was not protected before it came to the left, which is protected. Consequently, something might be burnt that is not protected, and that sooner than something else would be burnt, even if it were not protected. Consequently, we must let alone the latter and protect the former. In order to impress the thing on one's mind, we have only to note that if the house is situated to the right of the fire, then it is the left side, and if the house is to the left, it is the right side. In order not to frighten the intelligent reader by such common places and to make the little good that there is distasteful by pouring water upon it, the author has preferred to give in small ingots of fine metal his impressions and convictions, the results of many years reflection on war, of his intercourse with men of ability, and of much personal experience. Perhaps the seemingly weakly bound together chapters of this book have arisen, but it is hoped that they will not be found wanting illogical connection. Perhaps soon a greater head may appear, and instead of these single grains, give the whole in a casting of pure metal without dross. End of Introduction of the Author Recording by Timothy Ferguson, Gold Coast, Australia. Brief memoir of General Klausavitz. Of On War. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Timothy Ferguson. On War by General Carl von Klausavitz. Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. Brief memoir of General Klausavitz by Translator. The author of the work here translated, General Carl von Klausavitz, was born at Berg, near Magdeburg, in 1780, and entered the Prussian Army as Farnand Juncker, that is Ensign, in 1792. He served in the campaigns of 1793 and 94 on the Rhine, after which he seems to have devoted some time to the study of the scientific branches of his profession. In 1801 he entered the military school at Berlin, and remained there till 1803. During his residence there he attracted the notice of General Scharnhorst, then at the head of the establishment, and the patronage of this distinguished officer had immense influence on his future career, and we may gather from his writings that he ever afterwards continued to entertain a higher steam for Scharnhorst. In the campaign of 1806 he served as aid to camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia, and being wounded and taken prisoner, he was sent into France until the close of that war. On his return he was placed on General Scharnhorst's staff, and employed in the work then going on for the reorganization of the army. He was also at this time selected as a military instructor to the late King of Prussia, then Crown Prince. In 1812 Klasovitz, with several other Prussian officers having entered the Russian service, his first appointment was as aid to camp to General Foul. Afterwards, while serving in Wittgenstein's army, he assisted in negotiating the famous Convention of Torogen with York. Of the part he took in that affair he has left an interesting account in his work on the Russian campaign. It is there stated that, in order to bring the correspondence which had been carried on with York to a termination in one way or another, the author was dispatched to York's headquarters with two letters. One was from General Dauvray, the chief of staff of Wittgenstein's army, to General Dibitch, showing the arrangements made to cut off York's corps from Macdonald. This was necessary in order to give York a plausible excuse for seceding from the French. The other was an intercepted letter from Macdonald to the Duke of Bassano. With regard to the former of these, the author says, it would not have had weight with a man like York, but for a military justification, if the Prussian court should require one as against the French, it was important. The second letter was calculated, at the least, to call up in General York's mind all the feelings of bitterness which had, perhaps for some days passed, had been diminished by the consciousness of his own behaviour towards the writer. As the author entered General York's chamber, the letter called out to him, Keep off from me, I will have nothing more to do with you. Your damned Cossacks have let a letter of Macdonalds pass through them, which brings me in order to march to Pike Thropoen, in order there to affect our junction. All doubt is now at an end. Your troops do not come up, you are too weak, march I must, and I must excuse myself from further negotiation, which may cost me my head. The author said that he would make no opposition to all this, but begged for a candle, as he had letters to show the General, and as the latter seemed still to hesitate, the author added, Your Excellency will not, surely, place me in the embarrassment of departing without having executed my commission. The General ordered candles and called in Colonel von Roder, the chief of his staff, from the anti-chamber. The letters were read. After a pause of an instant the General said, Class of its, you are a Prussian. Do you believe that the letter of General Dalvray is sincere, and that Wittgenstein's troops will really be at the points he mentioned on the 31st? The author replied, I pledge myself for the sincerity of this letter, upon the knowledge I have of General Dalvray, and the other men of Wittgenstein's headquarters. Whether the dispositions he announces can be accomplished as he lays down, I certainly cannot pledge myself for Your Excellency knows that in war we must often fall, short of the line we have drawn for ourselves. The General was silent for a few minutes of earnest reflection, then he held out his hand to the author and said, You have me. Tell General Dibich that we must confer early to-morrow, at the mill of Pochenin, and that I am now firmly determined to separate myself from the French and their cause. The hour was fixed for eight a.m. After this was settled the General added, But I will not do the thing by halves. I will get you Massenbach also. He then called in an officer, who was of Massenbach's cavalry, and who had just left them, much like Schiller's Wallenstein, he asked, walking up and down the room the while. What say your regiments? The officer broke out with enthusiasm at the idea of a riddance from the French alliance, and said that every man of the troops in question felt the same. You young ones may talk, but my older head is shaking on my shoulders, replied the General. After the close of the Russian campaign Klasovitz remained in the service of that country, but was attached as a Russian staff officer to Blush's headquarters till the armistice in 1813. In 1814 he became Chief of Staff of General Walmodin's Russo-German Corps, which formed part of the Army of the North under Bernadotte. His name is frequently mentioned with distinction in that campaign, particularly in connection with the affair of Goerd. Klasovitz re-entered the Prussian service in 1815, and served as Chief of Staff to Thielman's Corps, which was engaged with Grosje at Wavre on the 18th of June. After the peace he was employed in a command on the Rhine. In 1818 he became Major General and Director of the Military School, at which he had been previously educated. In 1830 he was appointed Inspector of Artillery at Breslau, but soon after nominated Chief of the Staff of the Army of Observation under Marshal Nysau on the Polish frontier. The latest notices of his life and services are probably to be found in the memoirs of General Brandt, who, from being on the staff of Nysau's Army, was brought into daily intercourse with Klasovitz in matters of duty, and also frequently met him at the table of Marshal Nysau at Pozen. Among other anecdotes General Brandt relates, upon one occasion, the conversation at the Marshal's table turned upon a sermon preached by a priest in which some great absurdities were introduced, and a discussion arose as to whether the bishop should not be made responsible for what the priest had said. This led to the topic of theology in general, when General Brandt, speaking of himself, says, I expressed an opinion that theology is only to be regarded as an historical process, as a moment in the gradual development of the human race. This brought upon me an attack from all quarters, but, more especially from Klasovitz, who ought to have been on my side, he having been an adherent and pupil of Kaiser Wetters, who had indoctrinated him in the philosophy of Kant, certainly diluted, I might even say in homeopathic doses. This anecdote is only interesting, as the mention of Kaiser Wetters points to a circumstance in a life of Klasovitz that may have had an influence in forming those habits of thought, which distinguish his writings. The way, says General Brandt, in which General Klasovitz judged things, drew conclusions from movements and marches, calculated the times of the marches, and the points where decisions would take place, was extremely interesting. Fate has unfortunately denied him an opportunity of showing his talents in high command, but I have a firm persuasion that as a strategist, he would have greatly distinguished himself. As a leader on the field of battle, on the other hand, he would not have been so much in his right place. From a monk de habitude de commandment, he wanted the art de en lever les troupes. After the Prussian army of observation was dissolved, Klasovitz returned to Breslau, and a few days after his arrival was seized with cholera, the seeds of which he must have bought with him from the army on the Polish frontier. His death took place in November 1831. His writings are contained in nine volumes, published after his death, but his fame rests most upon the three volumes forming his treaties on war. In the present attempt to render into English this portion of the works of Klasovitz, the translator is sensible of many deficiencies, but he hopes, at all events, to succeed in making this celebrated treatise better known in England, believing, as he does, that so far as the work concerns the interests of this country, it has lost none of the importance it possessed at the time of its first publication. JJ Graham, Colonel End of brief memoir of General Klasovitz, recording by Timothy Ferguson, Gold Coast, Australia Book 1, Chapter 1, of On War This LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by Timothy Ferguson One War by Carl von Klasovitz Translated by Colonel JJ Graham Book 1, on the nature of war Chapter 1, what is war One, introduction We propose to consider first the single elements of our subject, then each branch or part, and, last of all, the whole, in all its relations, therefore to advance from the simple to the complex. But it is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the whole, because it is particularly necessary that in the consideration of any of the parts, their relation to the whole should be kept constantly in view. 2. Definition We shall not enter into the abstruse definitions of war used by publicist. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a war, we shall do best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by a physical force to compel the other to submit to his will, each endeavors to throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further resistance. War, therefore, is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will. Violence arms itself with the inventions of art and science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of international law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say, physical force, for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law, is therefore the means. The compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to obtain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes, therefore, the immediate object of hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, and puts it aside as something we can eliminate from our calculations. 3. At most use of force. Now philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skillful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated, for in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the cooperation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application. The former then dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to extremities to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of the counteracting force on each side. This is the way in which the matter must be viewed, and it is to no purpose, it is even against one's own interest, to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair, because the horror of its elements excites repugnance. If the wars of civilised people are less cruel and destructive than those of savages, the difference arises from the social condition both of the states in themselves and in their relations to each other. Out of this social condition, and its relations, war arises, and by it war is subjected to conditions, is controlled and modified, but these things do not belong to war itself. They are only given conditions, and to introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity. Two motives lead men to war, instinctive hostility and hostile intention. In our definition of war we have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these elements because it is the most general. It is impossible to conceive the passion of hatred, of the wildest description bordering on me instinct without combining with it the idea of a hostile intention. On the other hand, hostile intentions may often exist without being accompanied by any, or at all events by any extreme, hostility of feeling. Among savages views emanating from the feelings, among civilised nations those emanating from the understanding have predominance. But this difference arises from the attendant circumstances, existing institutions and such, and therefore is not to be found necessarily in all cases, although it prevails in the majority. In short, even the most civilised nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other. We may see from this what a fallacy it would be to refer the war of a civilised nation entirely to an intelligent act on the part of the government, and to imagine it as continually freeing itself more and more from all feeling of passion in such a way that at last the physical masses of combatants would no longer be required. In reality their mere relations would suffice, a kind of algebraic action. Theory was beginning to drift in this direction until the facts of the last war taught it better. Before is an act of force, it belongs necessarily also to the feelings. It does not originate in the feelings, it reacts more or less upon them, and the extent of this reaction depends not on the degree of civilisation, but upon the importance and duration of the interests involved. If we find civilised nations do not put their prisoners to death, do not devastate towns and countries, this is because their intelligence exercises greater influence on their mode of carrying on war, and has taught them more effectual means of applying force than these rude acts of mere instinct. The invention of gunpowder, the constant progress of improvements in the construction of firearms, are sufficient proofs that the tendency to destroy the adversary, which lies at the bottom of the conception of war, is in no way changed or modified through the progress of civilisation. We therefore repeat our proposition that war is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds. As one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action which logically must lead to an extreme. This is the first reciprocal action and the first extreme with which we meet. Open bracket, first reciprocal action. Close bracket. For the aim is to disarm the enemy. We have already said that the aim of all action in war is to disarm the enemy, and we shall now show that this, theoretically at least, is indispensable. If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand. But the disadvantages of this position must naturally not be of a transitionary nature, at least in appearance, otherwise the enemy instead of yielding will hold out in the prospect of a change for the better. Every change in this position which is produced by a continuation of the war should, therefore, be a change for the worse. The worst condition in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being completely disarmed. If, therefore, the enemy is to be reduced to submission by an act of war, he must either be positively disarmed or placed in such a position that he is threatened with it. From this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim of warfare. Now war is always the shock of two hostile bodies in collision, not the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass, because an absolute state of endurance would not be making war. Therefore, what we have just said as to the aim of action in war applies to both parties. Here, then, is another case of reciprocal action. As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may defeat me. When I shall be no longer my own master, he will dictate the law to me, as I did to him. This is the second reciprocal action, and leads to a second extreme. Open bracket, second reciprocal action, close bracket. Five, utmost exertion of powers. If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors, which cannot be separated, namely the sum of available means, and the strength of will. The sum of the available means may be estimated in a measure, as it depends, although not entirely, upon numbers. But the strength of volition is more difficult to determine, and can only be estimated to a certain extent by the strength of the motives. Granted we have obtained, in this way, an approximation of the strength of the power to be contended with, we can then take our own means, and either increase them, so as to obtain a preponderance, or, in case we have not the resources to affect this, then do our best by increasing our means as far as possible. But the adversary does the same. Therefore, there is a new mutual enhancement, which, in pure conception, must create a fresh effort towards an extreme. This is the third case of reciprocal action, and a third extreme with which we meet. Open bracket, third reciprocal action, close bracket. 6. Modification in the reality Thus reasoning in the abstract, the mind cannot stop short of an extreme, because it has to deal with an extreme, with a conflict of forces left to themselves, and obeying no other but their own inner laws. If we should seek to deduce from the pure conception of war, an absolute point for the aim which we shall propose, and for the means which we shall apply, this constant reciprocal action would involve us in extremes, which would be nothing but a play of ideas, produced by an almost invisible train of logical subtleties. If adhering closely to the absolute, we try to avoid all difficulties by the stroke of the pen, and insist with logical strictness that in every case the extreme must be the object, and the utmost effort must be exerted in that direction, such a stroke of the pen would be a mere paper law, not by any means adapted to the real world. Even supposing this extreme tension of forces was an absolute which could be easily ascertained, still we must admit that the human mind would hardly submit itself to this kind of logical chimera. There would be in many cases an unnecessary waste of power, which would be in opposition to other principles of statecraft. An effort of will would be required, disproportioned to the proposed object, which therefore it would be impossible to realise, for the human will does not derive its impulse from logical subtleties, but everything takes a different shape when we pass from abstractions to reality. In the former everything must be subject to optimism. We must imagine the one side as well as the other, striving after perfection and even attaining it. Will this ever take place in reality? It will if, one, war becomes a completely isolated act which arises suddenly and is in no way connected with the previous history of the combatant states, two if it is limited to a single solution or to several simultaneous solutions, three if it contains within itself the solution perfect and complete, free from any reaction upon it through a calculation beforehand of the political situation which will follow from it. Seven war is never an isolated act. With regard to the first point, neither of the two opponents is an abstract person to the other, not even as regards that fatter in the sum of resistance which does not depend on objective things, that is, the will. This will is not an entirely unknown quantity, it indicates what it will be tomorrow by what it is today. War does not spring up quite suddenly, it does not spread to the full in a moment, each of the two opponents can therefore form an opinion of the other in a great measure, from what he is and what he does instead of judging him according to what he, strictly speaking, should be or should do. But now, man with his incomplete organization is always below the line of absolute perfection and thus these deficiencies, having an influence on both sides, become a modifying principle. Eight, war does not consist of a single instantaneous blow. The second point gives rise to the following considerations. If war ended in a single solution or a number of simultaneous ones, then naturally all the preparation for the same would have a tendency to the extreme, for an omission could not in any way be repaired. The utmost then, that the world of reality could furnish as a guide for us, would be the preparations of the enemy as far as they are known to us. All the rest would fall into the domain of the abstract. But if the result is made up from several successive acts, then naturally that which proceeds with all its phases may be taken as a measure for that which will follow, and in this manner the world of reality again takes the place of the abstract and thus modifies the effort toward the extreme. Yet every war would necessarily resolve itself into a single solution or a sum of simultaneous results if all the means required for struggle were raised at once, or could at once be raised, for as one adverse result necessarily diminishes the means then if all the means had been applied in the first, a second cannot properly be supposed. All hostile acts which might follow would belong essentially to the first, and form in reality only its duration, but we have already seen that even in the preparation for war the real world steps into the place of mere abstract conception, a material standard into the place of the hypotheses of an extreme, that therefore, in that way both parties, by the influence of the mutual reaction, remain below the line of extreme effort, and therefore all forces are not at once brought forward. It lies also in the nature of these forces and their application that they cannot or will be brought forward into activity at the same time. These forces are the armies actually on foot, the country with its superficial extent and population, and the allies. In point of fact the country with its superficial area and population, besides being the source of all military force, constitutes in itself an integral part of the efficient quantities in war, providing either the theatre of war or exercising a considerable influence on the same. Now it is possible to bring all movable military forces of a country into operation at once, but not all fortresses, rivers, mountains, people and such, in short not the whole country unless it is so small that it may be completely embraced by the first act of the war. Further the cooperation of allies does not depend on the will of the belligerents, and from the nature of the political relations of states to each other, this cooperation is frequently not afforded until after the war has commenced, or it may be increased to restore the balance of power. That this part of the means of resistance, which cannot at once be brought into activity, in many cases, is a much greater part of the whole than might at first be supposed, and that it often restores the balance of power seriously affected by the great force of the first decision will be more fully shown hereafter. Here it is sufficient to show that a complete concentration of all available means in a moment of time is contradictory to the nature of war. Now this in itself furnishes no ground for relaxing our effort to accumulate strength to gain the first result, because an unfavorable issue is always a disadvantage to which no one would purposely expose himself, and also because the first decision, although not the only one, still will have more influence on subsequent events, the greater it is in itself. But the possibility of gaining a later result causes men to take refuge in that expectation owing to the repugnance of the human mind to making excessive efforts, and therefore forces are not concentrated, and measures are not taken for the first decision with that energy which would otherwise be used. Whatever one belligerent emits from weakness becomes to the other a real objective ground for limiting his own efforts, and thus again through this reciprocal action extreme tendencies are brought down to efforts on a limited scale. 9. The result in war is never absolute. Lastly, even the final decision of a whole war is not always to be regarded as absolute, the conquered state often sees in it only a passing evil which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations. How much this must modify the degree of tension and the vigor of the efforts made is evident in itself. 10. The probabilities of real life take the place of the conceptions of the extreme and the absolute. In this manner, the whole act of war is removed from the rigorous law of forces exerted to the utmost. If the extreme is no longer to be apprehended and no longer to be sought, it is left to the judgement to determine the limits for the efforts to be made in place of it, this can only be done on the data furnished by the facts of the real world, by the laws of probability. Once the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions, but individual states and governments, once war is no longer an ideal but a definite substantial procedure, then the reality will furnish the data to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found. From the character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to the designs of the other, and will act accordingly. 11. The political object now reappears. Here the question which we had laid aside forces itself again into consideration. 2. Viers the political object of the war. The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object. Just as this law loses its force, the political must again come forward. If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand from ours, the smaller it may be expected, will be the means of resistance which he will employ, but the smaller his preparation, the smaller ours will require to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether. Thus therefore the political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force, and also the amount of effort to be made. This it cannot be in itself, but it is so in relation to both the belligerent states because we are concerned with realities, not with mere abstractions. When the same political object may produce totally different effects upon different people, or even upon the same people at different times, we can therefore only admit the political object as the measure by considering it in its effect upon those masses which it is to move, and consequently the nature of those masses also comes into consideration. It is easy to see that this result may be very different according as these masses are animated by a spirit which will infuse vigour into the action, or otherwise. It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two states that a very trifling political motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate, in fact a perfect explosion. This applies to the efforts which the political object will call forth in the two states, and to the aim which the military action shall prescribe for itself. At times it may itself be the aim, as for example the conquest of a province. At other times the political object itself is not suitable for the aim of military action, then such a one must be chosen as will be equivalent for it, and stand in its place as regards the conclusion of peace. But also in this, due attention to the peculiar character of the state's concern and is always supposed, there are circumstances in which the equivalent must be much greater than the political object in order to secure the latter. The political object will be so much the more the standard of aim and effort, and have more influence in itself, the more the masses are indifferent, the less that any mutual feeling of hostility prevails in the two states from other causes. And therefore there are cases where the political object, almost alone, will be decisive. If the aim of the military action is an equivalent for the political object, that action will in general diminish as the political object diminishes, and in a greater degree the more the political object dominates. Thus it is explained how without any contradiction in itself there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy from a war of extermination down to the mere use of an army of observation. This however leads to a question of another kind, which we have hereafter to develop and answer. 12. A suspension in the action of war unexplained by anything said as yet. However insignificant the political claims mutually advanced, however weak the means put forth, however small the aim to which military action is directed. Can this action be suspended even for a moment? This is a question which penetrates deeply into the nature of the subject. Every transaction requires for its accomplishment a certain time which we call its duration. This may be longer or shorter according as the person acting throws more or less dispatch into his movements. Without this more or less we shall not trouble ourselves here, each person acts in his own fashion, but the slow person does not protract the thing because he wishes to spend more time about it, but because by his nature he requires more time, and if he made more haste would not do the thing so well. This time therefore depends on subjective causes, and belongs to the length so called of the action. If we allow now to every action in war this, its length, then we must assume at first sight at least that any expenditure of time beyond this length, that is, every suspension of hostile action appears an absurdity. With respect to this it must not be forgotten that we now speak not of the progress of one or other of the two opponents, but of the general progress of the whole action of the war. In 2013 there is only one cause which can suspend the action, and this seems to be only possible on one side in any case. If two parties have armed themselves for strife then a feeling of animosity must have moved them to it. As long now as they continue armed, that is, do not come to terms of peace, this feeling must exist, and it can only be brought to a standstill by either side by a single motive alone, which is that he waits for a more favourable moment for action. Now at first sight it appears that this motive can never exist except on one side, because it, EOYPSO, must be prejudicial to the other. If the one has an interest in acting then the other must have an interest in waiting. A complete equilibrium of forces can never produce a suspension of action for during this suspension he who has the most positive object, that is the assailant, must continue progressing, for if we should imagine an equilibrium in this way, that he who has the positive object, therefore the strongest motive, can at the same time only command the lesser means, so that the equation is made up by the product of the motive and the power, then we must say if no alteration in this condition of equilibrium is to be expected, the two parties must make peace, but if an alteration is to be expected, then it can only be favourable to one side and therefore the other has a manifest interest to act without delay. We see that the conception of equilibrium cannot explain a suspension of arms, but that it ends in the question of the expectation of a more favourable moment. Let us suppose, therefore, that one of two states has a positive object as, for instance, the conquest of one of the enemy's provinces, which is to be utilised in the settlement of peace, after this conquest his political object is accomplished, the necessity for action ceases, and for him a pause in shoes. If the adversary is also contented with this solution he will make peace, if not he must act, now if we suppose that in four weeks he will be in a better condition to act, then he has sufficient grounds for putting off the time of action, but from that moment the logical course for the enemy appears to be to act that he may not give the conquered party the desired time. Of course, in this mode of reasoning a complete insight into the state of circumstances on both sides is supposed. Fourteen thus a continuance of action will ensure which will advance toward a climax. If this unbroken continuity of hostile operations really existed the effect would be that everything would again be driven toward the extreme, for irrespective of the effect of such incessant activity in inflaming the feelings, and infusing into the whole a greater degree of passion a great elementary force, there would also follow from this continuance of action a stricter continuity, a closer connection between the cause and effect, and thus every single action would become of more importance and consequently more replete with danger. But we know that the course of action in war has seldom or never this unbroken continuity, and that there have been many wars in which action occupied by far the smallest portion of time employed, the whole of the rest being spent consumed in action. It is impossible that this should be always an anomaly, suspension of action in war must therefore be possible, that is no contradiction in itself. We now proceed to show how this is. Fifteen, here therefore the principle of polarity is brought into requisition. As we have supposed the interest of one commander, to be always antagonistic to those of the other, we have assumed a true polarity. We reserve a fuller explanation of this for another chapter, merely making the following observation on it at present, the principle of polarity is only valid when it can be conceived in one and the same thing, where the positive and its opposite the negative completely destroy each other. In a battle both sides strive to conquer, that is true polarity, for the victory of the one side destroys that of the other. But when we speak of two different things, which have a common relation external to themselves, then it is not the things, but their relations, which have the polarity. Sixteen, attack and defence are things differing in kind and of unequal force. polarity is therefore not applicable to them. If there was only one form of war, to wit, the attack of the enemy, therefore no defence, or in other words, if the attack was distinguished from the defence merely by the positive motive, which the one has and the other has not, but the methods of each were precisely one and the same, then in this sort of fight every advantage gained on the one side would be a corresponding disadvantage on the other and true polarity would exist. But action in war is divided into two forms, attack and defence, which as we shall hereafter explain more particularly, are very different and of unequal strength. Polarity therefore lies in that to which both bear a relation, in the decision, but not in the attack or defence itself. If the one commander wishes the solution put off, the other must hasten to it, but only by the same form of action. If it is A's interest not to attack his enemy at present, but for weak sense, then it is B's interest to be attacked not for weak sense, but at the present moment. This is the direct antagonism of interests, but it by no means follows that it would be for B's interest to attack A at once. That is plainly something totally different. 17. The effect of polarity is often destroyed by the superiority of the defence over the attack and thus the suspension of action in war is explained. If the form of defence is stronger than that of a defence, as we shall hereafter show, the question arises is the advantage of a deferred decision as great on the one side? As the advantage of the defensive form on the other? If it is not, then it cannot by its counterweight, other balance the latter, and thus influence the progress of the action of the war. We see therefore that the impulsive force existing in the polarity of interests may be lost in the difference between the strength of the offensive and the defensive, and thereby become ineffectual. If therefore that side for which the present is favourable is too weak to be able to dispense with the advantage of the defensive, he must put up with the unfavourable prospects which the future holds out, for it may still be better to fight a defensive battle in the unpromising future than to assume the offensive or make peace at present. Now being convinced that the superiority of the defensive, rightly understood, is very great, and much greater than may appear at first sight, we can see that the greater number of these periods of inaction which occur in a war are thus explained without involving any contradiction. The weaker the motives to action are, the more will those motives be absorbed and neutralised by this difference between the attack and defence, the more frequently they therefore will action in warfare be stopped, as indeed experienced teachers. 18. A second ground consists in the imperfect knowledge of circumstances. But there is still another cause which may stop action in war, vis an incomplete view of the situation. Each commander can only know fully his own position that of his opponent can only be known to him by reports which are uncertain. He may therefore form a wrong judgement with respect to it upon data of this description, and in consequence of that error he may suppose that the power of taking the initiative rests with his adversary when it lies really with himself. This want of perfect insight might certainly, just as often, occasion an untimely action as untimely inaction, and hence it would in itself no more contribute to delay than to accelerate action in war still, it must always be regarded as one of the natural causes which may bring action in war to a standstill without involving a contradiction. But if we reflect how much more we are inclined and induced to estimate the power of our opponents too high than too low, because it lies in human nature to do so, we shall admit that our imperfect insight, in fact in general, must contribute very much to delay action in war, and to modify the application of the principles pending our conduct. The possibility of a standstill brings into the action of war a new modification, in so much as it deludes the action with the element of time, checks the influence or sense of danger in its course, and increases the means of reinstating a lost balance of force. The greater of tension of feelings, from which the war springs, the greater therefore the energy with which it is carried on. So much the shorter will be the periods of inaction, on the other hand, the weaker the principle of warlike activity, the longer will be these periods, for powerful motives increase the force of the will, and this, as we know, is always a factor in the product of force. 19. Most periods of inaction in war remove it further from the absolute and make it still more a calculation of probabilities. But the slower the action proceeds in war, the more frequent and longer the periods of inaction, so much the more easily can an error be repaired, therefore so much the bolder a general will be in his calculations, so much more readily will he keep them below the line of the absolute, and build everything upon probabilities and conjecture. Thus according as the course of the war is more or less slow, more or less time will be allowed for that which the nature of a concrete case particularly requires, calculation of probability based on given circumstances. 20. Therefore the element of chance only is wanting to make of war a game, and in that element it is least of all deficient. We see from the foregoing how much the object in a nature of war makes it a calculation of probabilities. Now there is only one single element still wanting to make it a game, and that element it certainly is not without, it is chance. There is no human affair which stands so constantly and so generally in close connection with chance as war, but together with chance the accidental and along with it good luck occupy a great place in war. 21. War is a game both objectively and subjectively. If we now take a look at the subjective nature of war, that is to say at those conditions under which it is carried on it will appear to us still more like a game, primarily the element in which the operations of war are carried on is danger, but which of all the moral qualities is the first in danger? Courage. Now certainly courage is quite compatible with prudent calculation, but still they are things of quite a different kind, essentially different qualities of the mind. On the one hand daring reliance on good fortune, boldness, rashness are only expressions of courage, and all these propensities of the mind look for the fatuitous or accidental because it is their element. We see therefore how, from the commencement, the absolute, the mathematical as it is called, nowhere finds any sure basis in the calculations in the art of war, and that from the outset there is a play of possibilities, probabilities, good and bad luck which spreads about with all the coarse and fine threads of its web and makes war, of all branches of human activity, the most like a gambling game. 22. How this accords best with the human mind in general. Although our intellect always feels itself urged toward clearness and certainty, still our mind often feels itself attracted by uncertainty, instead of threading its way with the understanding along the narrow path of philosophical investigations and logical conclusions in order, almost unconscious of itself, to arrive in spaces where it feels itself a stranger, and where it seems to part from all well-known objects, it prefers to remain with the imagination in the realms of chance and luck, instead of living yonder on poor necessity. It revels here in the wealth of possibilities, animated thereby. Which then takes wings to itself, and daring and danger make the element into which it launches itself, as a fearless swimmer plunges into the stream. Shall theory live it here, and move on, self-satisfied with absolute conclusions and rules? Then it is of no practical use. Theory must also take into account the human element. It must accord a place to courage, to boldness, even to rashness. The art of war has to deal with living, and with moral forces. The consequence of which is that it can never attain the absolute and positive. There is therefore everywhere a margin for the accidental, and just as much in the greatest things as in the smallest. As there is room for this accidental on the one hand, so on the other there must be courage and self-reliance in proportion to the room available. If these qualities are forthcoming in a high degree, the margin left may likewise be great. Courage and self-reliance are, therefore, principles quite essential to war. Consequently theory must only set up such rules as to allow ample scope for all degrees and varieties of these necessary and noblest of military virtues, in daring there may still be wisdom and prudence as well. Only they are estimated by a different standard of value. 23. War is always a serious means for a serious object. It's more particular definition. Such is war. Such the commander who conducts it. Such the theory which rules it. But war is no pastime. No mere passion for venturing and winning. No work for a free enthusiasm. This is a serious means for a serious object. All that appearance which wears from varying hues of fortune, all that it assimilates into itself of the oscillations of passion, of courage, of imagination, of enthusiasm are only particular properties of this means. The war of a community, of whole nations and particularly of civilised nations, always starts from a political condition and is called forth by a political motive. It is therefore a political act. Now if it was a perfect unrestrained and absolute expression of force, as we had to deduct from its mere conception, then the moment it is called forth by policy, it would step into the place of policy, and as something quite independent of it, would set it aside, and only follow its own laws, just as a mine, at the moment of explosion, cannot be guided in any other direction than that which has been given to it by preparatory arrangements. This is how the thing has really been viewed here the two. Whenever a want of harmony between policy and the conduct of war has led to theoretical distinctions of this kind, but it is not so and the idea is radically false. War in the real world, as we have already seen, is not an extreme thing which expends itself at one single discharge. It is the operation of powers which do not develop themselves completely in the same manner and in the same measure, but which at one time expands sufficiently to overcome the resistance opposed by inertia or friction, while at another they are too weak to produce an effect. It is therefore, in a certain measure, a pulsation of violent force more or less vehement, consequently making its discharges and exhausting its powers more or less quickly, in other words, conducting more or less quickly to the aim, but always lasting long enough to admit of influence being exerted on its course, so as to give it this or that direction, in short, to be subject to the will of a guiding intelligence. If we reflect that war has its root in a political object, then naturally this original motive, which called it into existence, should also continue the first and highest consideration in its conduct. Still, the political object is no despotic law-giver on that account. It must accommodate itself to the nature of the means. And though changes in these means may involve modification in the political objective, the latter always retains a prior right to consideration. Policy therefore is interwoven with the whole action of war, and must exercise a continuous influence upon it. As far as the nature of the forces liberated by it will permit. 24. War is a mere continuation of policy by other means. We see therefore that war is not merely a political act, but a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this, which is strictly peculiar to war, relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses, that the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means. The art of war in general and the commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one, but, however powerfully this may react on political views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them. For the political view is the object, war is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception. 25. Diversity in the nature of wars. The greater and more powerful the motives of a war, the more it affects the whole existence of a people. The more violent the excitement which precedes the war, by so much the nearer will the war approach to its abstract form. So much more will it be directed to the destruction of the enemy. So much the nearer will the military and political ends coincide. So much the more purely military and less political the war appears to be. But the weaker the motives and the tensions, so much the less will the natural direction and the military element, that is, force, be coincident with the direction which the political element indicates. So much the more must therefore the war become diverted from its natural direction, the political object diverge from the aim of an ideal war, and the war appear to become political. But that the reader may not form any false conceptions, we must here observe that by this natural tendency of war, we only mean the philosophical, the strictly logical, and by no means the tendency of forces actually engaged in conflict, by which would be supposed to be included all the emotions and the passions of the combatants. No doubt in some cases these also might be excited to such a degree, as to be with difficulty restrained and confined to the political road. But in most cases such a contradiction will not arise, because by the existence of such strenuous exertions, a great plan in harmony herewith would be implied. If the plan is directed only upon a small object, then the impulses of feeling among the masses will also be so weak that these masses will require to be stimulated, rather than repressed. 26. They may all be regarded as political acts. Returning now to the main subject, although it is true that in one kind of war the political element seems almost to disappear, while in another kind it occupies a very prominent place, we may still affirm that the one is as political as the other. For if we regard the state policy as the intelligence of the personified state, then among all the constellations in the political sky whose movements it has to compute, those must be included which arise when the nature of its relations imposes the necessity of a great war. It is only if we understand by policy not a true appreciation of affairs in general, but the conventional conception of a cautious, subtle, also dishonest craftiness, averse from violence that the latter kind of war may belong more to policy than the first. 27. Influence of this view on the right understanding of military history and on the foundations of theory. We see therefore in the first place that under all circumstances, war is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument. And it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history. This is the only means of unlocking the great book and making it intelligible. Secondly, this view shows us how wars must differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed. Now, the first, the grandest and most decisive act of judgement which the statesman and general exercises is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages. Not to take it for something, or to wish to make of it something, which by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be. This is therefore the first, the most comprehensive of all strategic questions. We shall enter into this more fully in treating of the plan of a war. For the present, we content ourselves with having brought the subject up to this point and having thereby fixed the cheap point of view from which war and its theory are to be studied. 28. Result for Theory War is therefore not only chameleon-like in character because it changes its colour in some degree in each particular case, but it is also as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct, of the player probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul, and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to reason. The first of these three phases concerns more the people, the second, more the general in his army, the third, more the government. The passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence in the peoples. The range which the display of courage and talent shall get into the realm of probabilities and of chance depends on the particular characteristics of the general and his army, but the political objects belong to the government alone. These three tendencies, which appear like so many different law-givers, are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject, and at the same time variable in degree. A theory which would leave any one of them out of account, or set up any arbitrary relation between them, would immediately become involved in such a contradiction with reality that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone. The problem is, therefore, that theory shall keep itself poised in a manner between these three tendencies as between three points of attraction. The way in which alone this difficult problem could be solved, we shall examine in the book on the theory of war. In every case, the conception of war as here defined will be the first ray of light which shows us the true foundation of theory and which first separates the great masses and allows us to distinguish them from one another. End of book 1, chapter 1, recording by Timothy Ferguson, Gold Coast, Australia.