 Chapter 5 Part 2 of Principia Ethica, this LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by Fredrik Karlsson, Principia Ethica by G.E. Moore, 93. But 3. It is plain that even this is a task of immense difficulty. It is difficult to see how we can establish even a probability that by doing one thing we shall obtain a better total result than by doing another. I shall merely endeavour to point out how much is assumed when we assume that there is such a probability, and on what lines it seems possible that this assumption may be justified. That no sufficient reason has ever yet been found for considering one action more right or more wrong than another. A. The first difficulty in the way of establishing a probability that one course of action will give a better total result than another lies in the fact that we have to take account of the effects of both throughout an infinite future. We have no certainty but that if we do one action now, the universe will throughout all time differ in some way from what it would have been if we had done another. And if there is such a permanent difference, it is certainly relevant to our calculation. But it is quite certain that our causal knowledge is utterly insufficient to tell us what different effects will probably result from two different actions, except within a comparatively short space of time. We can certainly only pretend to calculate the effects of action within what may be called an immediate future. No one, when he proceeds upon what he considers a rational consideration of effects, would guide his choice by any forecast that went beyond a few centuries at most, and in general we consider that we have acted rationally if we think we have secured a balance of good within a few years or months or days. Yet if a choice guided by such considerations is to be rational, we must certainly have some reason to believe that no consequences of our action in a further future will generally be such as to reverse the balance of good that is probable in the future which we can foresee. This large postulate must be made if we are ever to assert that results of one action will be even probably better than those of another. Our utter ignorance of the far future gives us no justification for saying that it is even probably right to choose the greater good within the region over which a probable forecast may extend. We do then assume that it is improbable that effects after a certain time will in general be such as to reverse the comparative value of the alternative results within that time, and that this assumption is justified must be shown before we can claim to have given any reason whatever for acting in one way rather than in another. It may perhaps be justified by some such considerations as the following. As we proceed further and further from the time at which alternative actions are open to us, the events of which either action would be part course become increasingly dependent on those other circumstances which are the same whichever action we adopt. The effects of any individual action seem after sufficient space of time to be found only in trifling modifications spread over a very wide area, whereas its immediate effects consist in some prominent modifications of a comparatively narrow area. Since however most of the things which have any great importance for good or evil are things of this prominent kind, there may be a probability that after a certain time all the effects of any particular action become so nearly indifferent, that any difference between their value and that of the effects of another action is very unlikely to outweigh an obvious difference in the value of immediate effects. It does in fact appear to be the case that in most cases whatever action we now adopt it will be all the same a hundred years hence. So far as the existence of that time of anything greatly good or bad is concerned, and this might perhaps be shown to be true by an investigation of the manner in which the effects of any particular event become neutralized by lapse of time. Failing such a proof we can certainly have no rational ground for asserting that one of two alternatives is even probably right another wrong. If any of our judgments of right and wrong are to pretend to probability we must have reason to think that the effects of our actions in the far future will not have value sufficient to outweigh any superiority of one set of effects over another in the immediate future. 94. B. We must assume then that if the effects of one action are generally better than those of another so far forward in the future as we are able to foresee any probable difference in their effects at all, then the total effect upon the universe of the former action is also generally better. We certainly cannot hope directly to compare their effects except within a limited future, and all the arguments which have ever been used in ethics and upon which we commonly act in common life, directed to showing that one course is superior to another are, apart from theological dogmas, confined to pointing out such probable immediate advantages. The question remains then, can we lay down any general rules to the effect that one among a few alternative actions will generally produce a greater total of good in the immediate future? It is important to insist that this question, limited as it is, is the utmost, to which with any knowledge we have at present or are likely to have for a long time to come, practical ethics can hope to give an answer. I have already pointed out that we cannot hope to discover which is the best possible alternative in any given circumstances, but only which among a few is better than the others. And I have also pointed out that there is certainly no more than a probability, even if we are entitled to assert so much, that what is better in regard to its immediate effects will also be better on the whole. It now remains to insist that, even with regard to these immediate effects, we can only hope to discover which among a few alternatives will generally produce the greatest balance of good in the immediate future. We can secure no title to assert that obedience to such commands as though shalt not lie, or even though shalt do no murder, is universally better than the alternatives of lying and murder. Reasons why no more than a general knowledge is possible have already been given in Chapter 1. But they may be recapitulated here in the first place of the effects which principally concern us in ethical discussions as having intrinsic value. We know the causes so little that we can scarcely claim with regard to one single one to have obtained even a hypothetical universal law, such as has been obtained in the exact sciences. We cannot even say if this action is performed under exactly these circumstances and if no others interfere, this important effect at least will always be produced. But in the second place, an ethical law is not merely hypothetical. If we are to know that it will always be better to act in a certain way under certain circumstances, we must know not merely what effects such actions will produce, provided no other circumstances interfere, but also that no other circumstances will interfere. And this it is obviously impossible to know with more than probability. An ethical law has the nature not of a scientific law, but of a scientific prediction. And the latter is always merely probable, although the probability may be very great. An engineering is entitled to assert that if a bridge be built in a certain way, it will probably bear certain loads for a certain time. But it can never be absolutely certain that it has been built in the way required, nor that, even if it has, some accident will not intervene to falsify his prediction. With any ethical law, the same must be the case. It can be no more than a generalization. And here, owing to the comparative absence of accurate hypothetical knowledge on which the prediction should be based, the probability is comparatively small. But finally, for an ethical generalization, we require to know not only what effects will be produced, but also what are the comparative values of those effects. And on this question too, it must be admitted, considering what a prevalent opinion hedonism has been, that we are very likely to be mistaken. It is plain then, that we are not soon likely to know more than that one kind of action will generally produce better effects than another, and that more than this has certainly never been proved. In no two cases will all the effects of any kind of action be precisely the same, because in each case some of the circumstances will differ. And although the effects that are important for good or evil may be generally the same, it is extremely unlikely that they will always be so. 95. C. If now, we confine ourselves to a search for actions which are generally better as means than any probable alternative, it seems possible to establish as much as this in defense of most of the rules most universally recognized by common sense. I do not propose to enter upon this defense in detail, but merely to point out what seemed to be the chief distinct principles by the use of which it can be made. In the first place then, we can only show that one action is generally better than another as a means provided that certain other circumstances are given. We do, as a matter of fact, only observe its good effects under certain circumstances, and it may be easily seen that a sufficient change in these would render doubtful what seemed to be the most universally certain of general rules. Thus the general disutility of murder can only be proved provided the majority of the human race will certainly persist in existing. In order to prove that murder, if it were so universally adopted as to cause the speedy extermination of the race, would not be good as a means we should have to disprove the main contention of pessimism, namely that the existence of human life is on the hold and evil. And the view of pessimism however strongly we may be convinced of its truth or falsehood is one which never has been either proved or refuted conclusively. That universal murder would not be a good thing at this moment can therefore not be proved. But as a matter of fact we can and do assume with certainty that even if a few people are willing to murder, most people will not be willing. When therefore we say that murder isn't generally to be avoided, we only mean that it is so, so long that the majority of mankind will certainly not agree to it, but will persist in living. And that under these circumstances it is generally wrong for any single person to commit murder seems capable of proof. For since there is in any case no hope of exterminating the race, the only effect which we have to consider are those which the action will have upon the increase of the goods and the diminution of the evils of human life. Where the best is not attainable, assuming extermination the best, one alternative may still be better than another. And apart from the immediate evils which murder generally produces, the fact that if it were common practice the feeling of insecurity thus caused would absorb much time which might be spent to better purpose is perhaps conclusive against it. So long as men desire to live as strongly as they do, and so long as it is certain that they will continue to do so, anything which hinders them from devoting their energy to the attainment of positive goods seem plainly bad as a means. And the general practice of murder, falling so far short of universality as it certainly must in all known conditions of society seems certainly to be a hindrance of this kind. A similar defense seems possible for most of the rules, most universally enforced by legal sanctions such as respect of property, and for some of those most commonly recognized by common sense such as industry, temperance and the keeping of promises. In any state of society in which men have that intense desire for property of some sort, which seems to be universal, the common legal rules for the protection of property must serve greatly to facilitate the best possible expenditure of energy. And similarly industry is a means to the attainment of those necessaries without which the further attainment of any great positive goods is impossible. Temperance merely enjoins the avoidance of those successes which by insuring health would prevent a man from contributing as much as possible to the acquirement of these necessaries. And the keeping of promises greatly facilitates cooperation in such acquirement. Now all these rules seem to have two characteristics to which it is desirable to call attention. One, they seem all to be such that in any known state of society a general observance of them would be good as a means. The conditions upon which their utility depends, namely the tendency to preserve and propagate life and the desire of property seems to be so universal and so strong that it would be impossible to remove them. And this being so, we can say that under any conditions which could actually be given, the general observance of these rules would be good as a means. For while there seems to be no reason to think that their observance ever makes a society worse than one in which they are not observed, it is certainly necessary as a means for any state of things in which the greatest possible goods can be attained. And two, these rules, since they can be recommended as a means to that which is itself only a necessary condition for the existence of any great good, can be defended independently of correct views upon the primary ethical question of what is good in itself. On any view commonly taken, it seems certain that the preservation of civilized society which these rules are necessary effect is necessary for the existence in any great degree of anything which may be held to be good in itself. 96. But not by any means all the rules commonly recognized combine these two characteristics. The arguments offered in defense of common sense morality very often presupposes the existence of conditions which cannot be fairly assumed to be so universally necessary as the tendency to continue life and to desire property. Such arguments accordingly only prove the utility of the rules so long as certain conditions which may alter remain the same. It cannot be claimed of the rules thus defended that they would be generally good as means in every state of society. In order to establish this universal general utility it would be necessary to arrive at a correct view of what is good or evil in itself. This for instance seemed to be the case with most of the rules comprehended under the name of chastity. These rules are commonly defended by utilitarian writers who assume as their end the conservation of society with arguments which presuppose the necessary existence of such sentiments as conjugal jealousy and paternal affection. These sentiments are no doubt sufficiently strong and general to make the defense valid for many conditions of society. But it is not difficult to imagine a civilized society existing without them and in such a case if chastity were still to be defended it would be necessary to establish that its violation produced evil effects other than those due to the assumed tendency of such violation to disintegrate society. Such a defense may no doubt be made but it would require an examination into the primary ethical question of what is good and bad in itself far more thorough than any ethical writer has ever offered to us. Whether this be so in this particular case or not it is certain that a distinction not commonly recognized should be made between those rules of which the social utility depends upon the existence of circumstances more or less likely to alter and those of which the utility seems certain under all possible conditions. 97. It is obvious that all the rules which were enumerated above as likely to be useful in almost any state of society can also be defended owing to results which they produce under conditions which exist only in particular states of society. And it should be noticed that we are entitled to reckon among these conditions the sanctions of legal penalties of social disapproval and of private remorse where these exist. These sanctions are indeed commonly treated by ethics only as motives for the doing of actions of which the utility can be proved independently of the existence of these sanctions. And it may be admitted that sanctions ought not to be attached to actions which would not be right independently. Nevertheless it is plain that where they do exist they are not only motives but also justifications for the actions in question. One of the chief reasons why an action should not be done in any particular state of society is that it will be punished since the punishment is in general itself a greater evil than would have been caused by the omission of the action punished. Thus the existence of a punishment may be an adequate reason for regarding an action as generally wrong even though it has no other bad effects but even slightly good ones. The fact that an action will be punished is a condition of exactly the same kind as others of more or less permanence which must be taken into account in discussing the general utility or disutility of an action in a particular state of society. 98. It is plain then that the rules commonly recognized by common sense in the society in which we live and commonly advocated as if they were all equally and universally right and good are of very different orders. Even those which seem to be most universally good as means can only be shown to be so because of the existence of conditions which though perhaps evils may be taken to be necessary and even these owe their most obvious utilities to the existence of conditions which cannot be taken to be necessary except over longer or shorter periods of history and many of which are evils. Others seem to be justifiable solely by the existence of such more or less temporary conditions unless we abandon the attempt to show that they are means to that preservation of society which is itself a mere means and are able to establish that they are directly means to things good or evil in themselves but which are not commonly recognized to be such. If then we ask what rules are or would be useful to be observed in the society in which we live it seems possible to prove a definite utility in most of those which are in general both recognized and practiced. But a great part of ordinary moral exhortation and social discussion consists in the advocating of rules which are not generally practiced and with regard to these it seems very doubtful whether a case for their general utility can ever be conclusively made out. Such proposed rules commonly suffer from three main defects. In the first place one the actions which they advocate are very commonly such as it is impossible for most individuals to perform by any volition. It is far too usual to find class together with actions which can be performed if only they be willed others of which their possibility depends on the possession of a peculiar disposition which is given to few and cannot even be acquired. It may no doubt be useful to point out that those who have the necessary disposition should obey these rules and it would in many cases be desirable that everybody should have this disposition. But it should be recognized that when we regard a thing as a moral rule or law we mean that it is one which almost everybody can observe by an effort of volition in that state of society to which the rule is supposed to apply. Two. Actions are often advocated of which though they themselves are possible yet the proposed good effects are not possible because the conditions necessary for their existence are not sufficiently general. A rule of which the observance would produce good effects if human nature were in other respects different from what it is is advocated as if its general observance would produce the same effects now and at once. In fact however by the time that the conditions necessary to make its observance useful have arisen it is quite as likely that other conditions rendering its observance unnecessary or positively harmful may also have arisen. And yet this state of things may be a better one than that in which the rule in question would have been useful. Three. There also occurs the case in which the usefulness of a rule depends upon conditions likely to change or of which the change would be as easy and more desirable than the observance of the proposed rule. It may even happen that the general observance of the proposed rule would itself destroy the conditions upon which its utility depends. One or other of these objections seem generally to apply to proposed changes in social custom advocated as being better rules to follow than those now actually followed. And for this reason it seems doubtful whether ethics can establish the utility of any rules other than those generally practiced. But the inability to do so is fortunately of little practical moment. The question whether the general observance of a rule not generally observed would or would not be desirable cannot much affect the question how any individual ought to act. Since on the one hand there is a large probability that he will not by any means be able to bring about its general observance and on the other hand the fact that its general observance would be useful could in any case give him no reason to conclude that he himself ought to observe it in the absence of such general observance. With regard then to the actions commonly classed in ethics as duties, crimes or sins the following points seem deserving of notice. One. By so classing them we mean that they are actions which it is possible for an individual to perform or avoid if he only wills to do so and that they are actions which everybody ought to perform or avoid when occasion arises. Two. Three. And of these some only are such that their general performance would be useful in any state of society that seems possible. Of others the utility depends upon conditions which exist now but which seem to be more or less alterable. End of chapter 5 part 2. Chapter 5 part 3 of Principia Ethica, this LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by Fredrik Karlsson, Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore. 99. D. So much then for moral rules or laws in the ordinary sense rules which assert that it is generally useful under more or less common circumstances for everybody to perform or omit some definite kind of action. It remains to say something with regard to the principles by which the individual should decide what he ought to do. Alpha with regard to those actions as to which some general rule is certainly true and beta with regard to those where such a certain rule is wanting. Alpha. Since as I've tried to show it is impossible to establish that any kind of action will produce a better total result than its alternative in all cases, it follows that in some cases the neglect of an established rule will probably be the best course of action possible. The question then arises, can the individual ever be justified in assuming that his is one of these exceptional cases? And it seems that this question may be definitely answered in the negative, for if it is certain that in a large majority of cases the observance of a certain rule is useful, it follows that there is a large probability that it would be wrong to break the rule in any particular case. And the uncertainty of our knowledge both of effects and of their value in particular cases is so great that it seems doubtful whether the individual's judgment that effects will probably be good in his case can ever be sent against the general probability that that kind of action is wrong. Added to this general ignorance is the fact that if the question arises at all our judgment will generally be biased by the fact that we strongly desire one of the results which we hope to obtain by breaking the rule. It seems then that with regard to any rule which is generally useful we may assert that it ought always to be observed, not on the ground that in every particular case it will be useful, but on the ground that in any particular case the probability of its being so is greater than that of our being likely to decide rightly that we have before us an instance of its disutility. In short, though we may be sure that there are cases where the rule should be broken we can never know which those cases are and ought therefore never to break it. It is this fact which seems to justify the stringency with which moral rules are usually enforced and sanctioned and to give a sense in which we may accept as true the maxims that the end never justifies the means and that we should never do evil that good may come. The means and the evil intended by these maxims are in fact the breaking of moral rules generally recognized and practiced and which therefore we may assume to be generally useful. Thus understood these maxims merely point out that in any particular case although we cannot clearly perceive any balance of good produced by keeping the rule and do seem to see one that would follow from breaking it nevertheless the rule should be observed. It is hardly necessary to point out that this is so only because it is certain that in general the end does justify the means in question and that therefore there is a probability that in this case it will do so also although we cannot see that it will. But moreover the universal observance of a rule which is generally useful has in many cases a special utility which seems deserving of notice. This arises from the fact that even if we can clearly discern that our case is one where to break the rule is advantageous yet so far as our example has any effect at all in encouraging similar action it will certainly tend to encourage breaches of the rule which are not advantageous. We may confidently assume that what will impress the imagination of others will not be the circumstances in which our case differs from ordinary cases and which justify our exceptional action but the point in which it resembles other actions that are really criminal. In cases then where example has any influence at all the effect of an exceptional right action will generally be to encourage wrong ones and this effect will probably be exercised not only on other persons but on the agent himself. For it is impossible for anyone to keep his intellect and sentiments so clear but that if he has once approved of a generally wrong action he will be more likely to approve of it also under other circumstances than those which justified it in the first instance. This inability to discriminate exceptional cases offers of course a still stronger reason for the universal enforcement by legal or social sanctions of actions generally useful. It is undoubtedly well to punish a man who has done an action right in his case but generally wrong even if his example would not be likely to have a dangerous effect. For sanctions have in general much more influence upon conduct than example so that the effect of relaxing them in an exceptional case will almost certainly be an encouragement of similar action in cases which are not exceptional. The individual can therefore be confidently recommended always to conform to rules which are both generally useful and generally practiced. In the case of rules of which the general observance would be useful but does not exist or of rules which are generally practiced but which are not useful no such universal recommendations can be made. In many cases the sanctions attached may be decisive in favor of conformity to the existing custom but it seems worth pointing out that even apart from these the general utility of an action most commonly depends upon the fact that it is generally practiced in a society where certain kinds of theft are the common rule the utility of abstinence from such theft on the part of a single individual becomes exceedingly doubtful even though the common rule is a bad one. There is therefore a strong probability in favor of adherence to an existing custom even if it be a bad one. But we cannot in this case assert with any confidence that this probability is always greater than that of the individual's power to judge that an exception will be useful. Since we are here supposing certain one relevant fact namely that the rule which he proposes to follow would be better than that which he proposes to break if it were generally observed. Consequently the effect of his example so far as it tends to break down the existing custom will here be for the good. The cases where another rule would certainly be better than that generally observed are however according to what was said above very rare and cases of doubt which are those which arise most frequently carry us into the next division of our subject. This next division consists in the discussion of the method by which an individual should decide what to do with regard to possible actions of which the general utility cannot be proved. And it should be observed that according to our previous conclusions this discussion will cover almost all actions except those which in our present state of society are generally practiced. For it has been urged that a proof of general utility is so difficult that it can hardly be conclusive except in a very few cases. It is certainly not possible with regard to all actions which are generally practiced though here if the sanctions are sufficiently strong they are sufficient by themselves to prove the general utility of the individual's conformity to custom. And if it is possible to prove a general utility in the case of some actions not generally practiced it is certainly not possible to do so by the ordinary method which tries to show in them a tendency to that preservation of society which is itself a mere means but only by the method by which in any case as will be urged the individual ought to guide his judgment namely by showing their direct tendency to produce what is good in itself or to prevent what is bad. The extreme improbability that any general rule with regard to the utility of an action will be correct seems in fact to be the chief principle which should be taken into account in discussing how the individual should guide his choice. If we accept those rules which are both generally practiced and strongly sanctioned among us there seem to be hardly any of such a kind that equally good arguments cannot be found both for and against them. The most that can be said for the contradictory principles which are urged by moralists of different schools as universal duties are in general that they point out actions which for persons of a particular character and in particular circumstances would and do lead to a balance of good. It is no doubt possible that the particular dispositions and circumstances which generally render certain kinds of action advisable might to some degree be formulated but it is certain that this has never yet been done and it is important to notice that even if it were done it would not give us what moral laws are usually supposed to be rules which it would be desirable for everyone and even for most people to follow. Moralists commonly assume that in the matter of actions or habits of action usually recognized as duties or virtues it is desirable that everyone should be alike whereas it is certain that under actual circumstances and possible that even in a much more ideal condition of things the principle of division of labor according to special capacity which is recognized in respect of employments would also give a better result in respect of virtues. It seems therefore that in cases of doubt instead of following rules of which he is unable to see the good effects in his particular case the individual should rather guide his choice by a direct consideration of the intrinsic value or vileness of the effects which his action may produce. Judgments of intrinsic value have this superiority over judgments of means that if once true they are always true whereas what is a means to a good effect in one case will not be so in another. For this reason the department of ethics which it would be most useful to elaborate for practical guidance is that which discusses what things have intrinsic value and in what degrees and this is precisely that department which has been most uniformly neglected in favor of attempts to formulate rules of conduct. We have however not only to consider the relative goodness of different effects but also the relative probability of there being attained. A less good that is more likely to be attained is to be preferred to a greater that is less probable if the difference in probability is great enough to outweigh the difference in goodness. And this fact seems to entitle us to assert the general truth of three principles which ordinary moral rules are apt to neglect. One that a lesser good for which any individual has a strong preference if only it be a good and not an evil is more likely to be a proper object for him to aim at than a greater one which he is unable to appreciate. For natural inclination renders it immensely more easy to attain that for which such inclination is felt. Two. Since almost everyone has a much stronger preference for things which closely concern himself it will in general be right for a man to aim rather at goods affecting himself and those in whom he has a strong personal interest than to attempt a more extended beneficence. Egoism is undoubtedly superior to altruism as a doctrine of means. In the immense majority of cases the best thing we can do is to aim at securing some good in which we are concerned since for that very reason we are far more likely to secure it. Three. Goods which can be secured in a future so near as to be called the present are in general to be preferred to those which being in a further future are for that reason far less certain of attainment. If that is to say as a mere means to good we are apt to neglect one fact at least which is certain namely that a thing that is really good in itself if it exists now has precisely the same value as a thing of the same kind which may be caused to exist in the future. Moreover more rules as has been said are in general not directly means to positive goods but to what is necessary for the existence of positive goods. And so much of our labor must in any case be devoted to securing the continuance of what is thus a mere means. The claims of industry and attention to health determine the employment of so large a part of our time that in cases where choices open the certain attainment of a present good will in general have the strongest claims upon us. If it were not so the whole of life would be spent in merely assuring its continuance and so far as the same rule were continued in the future that for the sake for which it is worth having would never exist at all. A fourth conclusion which follows from the fact that what is right or what is our duty must in any case be defined as what is a means to good is as was pointed out above that the common distinction between these and the expedient or useful disappears. Our duty is merely that which will be a means to the best possible and the expedient if it is really expedient must be just the same. We cannot distinguish them by saying that the former is something which we ought to do whereas of the latter we cannot say we ought. In short the two concepts are not as is commonly assumed by all except utilitarian moralists simple concepts ultimately distinct. There is no such distinction in ethics the only fundamental distinction is between what is good in itself and what is good as a means the latter of which implies the former. But it has been shown that the distinction between duty and expediency does not correspond to this. Both must be defined as means to good though both may also be ends in themselves. The question remains then what is the distinction between duty and expediency. One distinction to which these distinct words refer is plain enough. Certain classes of action commonly excite the specifically moral sentiments whereas other classes do not. And the word duty is commonly applied only to the class of actions which excite moral approval or of which the omission excites moral disapproval especially to the latter. Why this moral sentiment should have become attached to some kinds of action and not to others is a question which certainly not yet be answered. But it may be observed that we have no reason to think that the actions to which it was attached were or are in all cases such as aided or aided the survival of a race. It was probably originally attached to many religious rites and ceremonies which had not the smallest utility in this respect. It appears however that among us the classes of action to which it is attached also have two other characteristics in enough cases to have influenced the meaning of the words duty and expediency. One of these is that duties are in general actions which a considerable number of individuals are strongly tempted to emit. The second is that the omission of duty generally entails consequences markedly disagreeable to someone else. The first of these is a more universal characteristic than the second. Since the disagreeable effects on other people of the self regarding duties, prudence and temperance are not so marked as those on the future of the agent himself. Whereas the temptations to imprudence and intimperance are very strong. Still on the whole the class of actions called duties exhibit both characteristics. They are not only actions against the performance of which they are strong natural inclinations but also actions of which the most obvious effects commonly considered goods are effects on other people. Expedient actions on the other hand are actions to which strong natural inclinations prompt us almost universally and of which all the most obvious effects commonly considered goods are effects upon the agent. We may then roughly distinguish duties from expedient actions as actions with regard to which there is a moral sentiment which we are often tempted to emit and of which the most obvious effects are effects upon others than the agent. But it is to be noticed that none of these characteristics by which a duty is distinguished from an expedient action gives us any reason to infer that the former class of actions are more useful than the latter, that they tend to produce a greater balance of good. Nor when we ask the question, is this my duty? Do we mean to ask whether the action in question has these characteristics? We are asking simply whether it will produce the best possible results on the whole. And if we ask this question with regard to expedient actions, we should quite as often have to answer it in the affirmative as when we ask it with regard to actions which have the three characteristics of duties. It is true that when we ask the question, is this expedient? We are making a different question, namely whether it will have a certain kinds of effect with regard to which we do not inquire whether they are good or not. Nevertheless, if it should be doubted in any particular case whether these effects were good, this doubt is understood as throwing doubt upon the action's expediency. If we are required to prove an action's expediency, we can only do so by asking precisely the same question by which we should prove it a duty, namely, has it the best possible effects on the whole? Accordingly, the question whether an action is a duty or merely expedient is one which has no bearing on the ethical question whether we ought to do it. In the sense in which either duty or expediency are taking as ultimate reasons for doing an action, they are taken in exactly the same sense. If I ask whether an action is really my duty or really expedient, the predicate of which I question the applicability to the action in question is precisely the same. In both cases, I am asking, is this event the best on the whole which I can effect and whether the event in question be some effect upon what is mine, as it usually is where we talk of expediency or some other event, as is usual where we talk of duty. This distinction has no more relevance to my answer than the distinction between two different effects on me or two different effects on others. The true distinction between duties and expedient actions is not that the former are actions which it is in any sense more useful or obligatory or better to perform, but that they are actions which it is more useful to praise and to enforce by sanctions, since they are actions which there is a temptation to omit. 102. With regard to interested actions, the case is somewhat different. When we ask the question, is this really to my interest, we appear to be asking exclusively whether its effects upon me are the best possible, and it may well happen that what will affect me in the manner which is really the best possible will not produce the best possible results on the whole. Accordingly, my true interest may be different from the cause which is really expedient and dutiful. To assert that in action is to my interest is indeed, as was pointed out in chapter 3, to assert that its effects are really good. My own good only denotes some event affecting me which is good absolutely and objectively. It is the thing and not its goodness which is mine. Everything must be either a part of universal good or else not good at all. There is no third alternative conception good for me. But my interest, though it must be something truly good, is only one among possible good effects, and hence by affecting it, though we shall be doing some good, we may be doing less good on the whole than if we had acted otherwise. Self-sacrifice may be a real duty just as a sacrifice of any single good whether affecting ourselves or others may be necessary in order to obtain a better total result. Hence the fact that an action is really to my interest can never be a sufficient reason for doing it. By showing that it is not a means to the best possible, we do not show that it is not to my interest as we do show that it is not expedient. Nevertheless, there is no necessary conflict between duty and interest. What is to my interest may also be a means to the best possible, and the chief distinction conveyed by the distinct words duty and interest seems to be not this source of possible conflict but the same which is conveyed by the contrast between duty and expediency. By interested actions are mainly meant those which, whether a means to the best possible or not, are such as have their most obvious effects on the agent, which he generally has no temptation to omit, and with regard to which we feel no moral sentiment. That is to say, the distinction is not primarily ethical. Here, too, duties are not, in general, more useful or obligatory than interested actions. They are only actions which it is more useful to praise. 5. A fifth conclusion of some importance in relation to practical ethics concerns the manner in which virtues are to be judged. What is meant by calling a thing a virtue? There can be no doubt that Aristotle's definition is right in the main so far as he says that it is an habitual disposition to perform certain actions. This is one of the marks by which we should distinguish a virtue from other things. But virtue and vice are also ethical terms. That is to say, when we use them seriously we mean to convey praise by the one and dispraise by the other. And to praise a thing is to assert either that it is good in itself or else that it is a means to good. Are we then to include in our definition of virtue that it must be a thing good in itself? Now it is certain that virtues are commonly regarded as good in themselves. The feeling of moral approbation with which we generally regard them partly consists in an attribution to them of intrinsic value. Even a hedonist, when he feels a moral sentiment towards them, is regarding them as good in themselves. And virtue has been the chief competitor with pleasure for the position of soul good. Nevertheless, I do not think we can regard it as part of the definition of virtue that it should be good in itself. For the name has so far an independent meaning that if in any particular case a disposition commonly considered virtuous were approved not to be good in itself, we should not think that a sufficient reason for saying that it was not a virtue, but was only thought to be so. The test for the ethical connotation of virtue is the same as that for duty. What should we require to be proved about a particular instance in order to say that the name was wrongly applied to it? And the test which is thus applied both to virtues and to duties and considered to be final is the question, is it means to good? If it could be shown of any particular disposition commonly considered virtuous that it was generally harmful, we should at once say, then it is not really virtuous. Accordingly, a virtue may be defined as an habitual disposition to perform certain actions which generally produce the best possible results. Nor is there any doubt as to the kind of actions which it is virtuous habitually to perform. They are in general those which are duties, with this modification that we also include those which would be duties if only it were possible for people in general to perform them. Accordingly, with regard to virtues, the same conclusion holds as with regard to duties. If they are really virtuous, they must be generally good as means. Nor do I wish to dispute that most virtues, commonly considered as such, as well as most duties, really are means to good. But it does not follow that they are a bit more useful than those dispositions and inclinations which lead us to perform interested actions. As duties from expedient actions, so virtues are distinguished from other useful disposition, which it is particularly useful to praise and to sanction, because there are strong and common temptations to neglect the actions to which they lead. Virtues, therefore, are habitual dispositions to perform actions which are duties, or which would be duties if a volition were sufficient on the part of most men to ensure their performance. And duties are a particular class of those actions, of which the performance has, at least generally, better total results than the omission. They are, that is to say, actions generally good as means. But not all such actions are duties. The name is confined to that particular class which it is often difficult to perform, because there are strong temptations to the contrary. It follows that in order to decide whether any particular disposition or action is a virtue or a duty, we must face all the difficulties enumerated in Section 3 of this chapter. We shall not be entitled to assert that any disposition or action is a virtue or duty except as a result of an investigation such as was there described. We must be able to prove that the disposition or action in question is generally better as a means than any alternatives possible and likely to occur. And this we shall only be able to prove for particular states of society. What is a virtue or a duty in one state of a society may not be so in another. 104. But there is another question with regard to virtues and duties which must be settled by intuition alone, by the properly guarded method which was explained in discussing hedonism. This is the question whether the dispositions and actions commonly regarded rightly or not as virtues or duties are good in themselves, whether they have intrinsic value. Virtue or the exercise of virtue has very commonly been asserted by moralists to be either the sole good or at least the best of goods. Indeed, so far as moralists have discussed the question what is good in itself at all, they have generally assumed that it must be either virtue or pleasure. It would hardly have been possible that such a gross difference of opinion should exist, or that it should have been assumed the discussion must be limited to two such alternatives if the meaning of the question had been clearly apprehended. And we have already seen that the meaning of the question has hardly ever been clearly apprehended. Almost all ethical writers have committed the naturalistic fallacy. They have failed to perceive that the notion of intrinsic value is simple and unique, and almost all have failed in consequence to distinguish clearly between means and end. They have discussed as if it were simple and unambiguous the question what ought we to do, or what ought to exist now, without distinguishing whether the reason why a thing ought to be done or to exist now is that it itself possessed of intrinsic value, or that it is means to what has intrinsic value. We shall therefore be prepared to find that virtue has as little claim to be considered the sole or chief good as pleasure, more especially after seeing that, so far as definition goes, to call a thing a virtue is merely to declare that it is a means to good. The advocates of virtue have, we shall see, this superiority over the hedonists, that inasmuch as virtues are very complex mental facts, there are included in them many things which are good in themselves and good in a much higher degree than pleasures. The advocates of hedonism, on the other hand, have the superiority that their method emphasizes their distinction between means and ends, although they have not apprehended the distinction clearly enough to perceive that this special ethical predicate, which they assign to pleasure as not being a mere means, must also apply to many other things. With regard then to the intrinsic value of virtue it may be stated broadly, one, that the majority of dispositions which we call by that name and which really do conform to the definition, so far as that they are dispositions generally valuable as means, at least in our society, have no intrinsic value whatever, and two, that no one element which is contained in the minority nor even all the different elements put together can without gross absurdity be regarded as the sole good. As to the second point it may be observed that even those who hold the view that the sole good is to be found in virtue almost invariably hold other views contradictory of this, owing chiefly to a failure to analyze the meaning of ethical concepts. The most marked instance of this inconsistency is to be found in the common Christian conception that virtue, though the sole good can yet be rewarded by something other than virtue. Heaven is commonly considered as the reward of virtue and yet it is also commonly considered that in order to be such a reward it must contain some element called happiness which is certainly not completely identical with the mere exercise of those virtues which it rewards. But if so, then something which is not virtue must be either good in itself or an element in which has most intrinsic value. It is not commonly observed that if a thing is really to be a reward it must be something good in itself. It is absurd to talk of rewarding a person by giving him something which is less valuable than what he already has or which has no value at all. Thus Kant's view that virtue renders us worthy of happiness is in flagrant contradiction with the view which he implies and which is associated with his name that a good will is the only thing having intrinsic value. It does not indeed entitles to make the charge sometimes made that Kant is inconsistently an ev-di-manist or a hedonist for it does not imply that happiness is so good. But it does imply that the good will is not the sole good that a state of things in which we are both virtues and happy is better in itself than one in which the happiness is absent. 106 In order however, justly to consider the claims of virtue to intrinsic value it is necessary to distinguish several very different mental states all of which fall under the general definition that they are habitual dispositions to perform duties. We may thus distinguish three very different states all of which are liable to be confused with one another upon each of which different moral systems have laid great stress and for each of which the claim has been made that it alone constitutes virtue and by implication that it is the sole good. We may first of all distinguish between A. that permanent characteristic of mind which consists in the fact that the performance of duty has become in the strict sense a habit like many of the operations performed in the putting on of clothes and B. that permanent characteristic which consists in the fact that what may be called good motives habitually helped to cause the performance of duties and in the second division we may distinguish between the habitual tendency to be actuated by one motive namely the desire to do duty for duty's sake and all other motives such as love, benevolence, etc. We thus get three kinds of virtue of which we are now to consider the intrinsic value. A. There is no doubt that a man's character may be such that he habitually performs certain duties without the thought ever occurring to him when he wills them either that they are duties or that any good will result from them. Of such a man we cannot and do not refuse to say that he possesses the virtue consisting in the disposition to perform those duties. I, for instance, am honest in the sense that I habitually abstain from any of the actions legally qualified as thieving even where some other persons would be strongly tempted to commit them. It would be grossly contrary to common usage to deny that for this reason I really have the virtue of honesty. It is quite certain that I have an habitual disposition to perform a duty and that as many people as possible should have a like disposition is no doubt of great utility. It is good as a means. Yet I may safely assert that neither my various performances of this duty nor my disposition to perform them have the smallest intrinsic value. It is because the majority of instances of virtue seem to be of this nature that we may venture to assert that virtues have, in general, no intrinsic value whatsoever. And there seem to be good reason to think that the more generally they are of this nature, the more useful they are, since a great economy of labour is affected when a useful action becomes habitual or instinctive. But to maintain that a virtue which includes no more than this is good in itself is a gross absurdity. And of this gross absurdity it may be observed the ethics of Aristotle is guilty. For his definition of virtue does not exclude a disposition to perform actions in this way whereas his descriptions of the particular virtues plainly include such actions. That in action, in order to exhibit virtue, must be done, to calo enica is a qualification which he allows often to drop out of sight. And on the other hand he seems certainly to regard the exercise of all virtues as an end in itself. His treatment of ethics is indeed, in the most important points, highly unsystematic and confused owing to his attempt to base it on the naturalistic fallacy. For strictly we should be obliged by his words to regard theopia as the only thing good in itself, in which case the goodness which he attributes to the practical virtues cannot be intrinsic value. While on the other hand he does not seem to regard it merely as utility since he makes no attempt to show that they are means to theopia. But there seems no doubt that on the whole he regards the exercise of the practical virtues as a good of the same kind as that is having intrinsic value only in a less degree than theopia. So that he cannot avoid the charge that he recommends as having intrinsic value such instances of the exercise of virtue as we are at present discussing. Instances of a disposition to perform actions which, in the modern phrase, have merely an external rightness. That he is right in applying the word of virtue to such a disposition cannot be doubted. But the protest against the view that external rightness is sufficient to constitute either duty or virtue a protest which is commonly and with some justice attributed as a merit to Christian morals seems in the main to be a mistaken way of pointing out an important truth. Namely that where there is only external rightness there is certainly no intrinsic value. It is commonly assumed, though wrongly, that to call a thing a virtue means that it has intrinsic value. And on this assumption the view that virtue does not consist in a mere disposition to do externally right actions does really constitute an advance in ethical truth beyond the ethics of Aristotle. The inference that if virtue includes in its meaning good in itself then Aristotle's definition of virtue is not adequate and expresses a false ethical judgment is perfectly correct. Only the premise that virtue does include this in its meaning is mistaken. 107. B. A man's character may be such that when he habitually performs a particular duty there is in each case of his performance present in his mind a love of some intrinsically good consequence which he expects to produce by his action or a hatred of some intrinsically evil consequence which he hopes to prevent by it. In such a case this love or hatred will generally be part cause of his action and we may then call it one of his motives. With such a feeling as this is present habitually in the performance of duties it cannot be denied that the state of the man's mind in performing it contains something intrinsically good nor can it be denied that where a disposition to perform duties consists in the disposition to be moved by them by such feelings we call that disposition a virtue. Here therefore we have instances of virtue the exercise of which really contains something that is good in itself and in general we may say that wherever a virtue does consist in a disposition to have certain motives the exercise of that virtue may be intrinsically good although the degree of its goodness may vary indefinitely according to the precise nature of the motives and their objects. Insofar then as Christianity tends to emphasize the importance of motives of the inward disposition with which a right action is done we may say that it has done a service to ethics but it should be noticed that when Christian ethics as represented by the New Testament are praised for this two distinctions of the utmost importance which they entirely neglect are very commonly overlooked. In the first place the New Testament is largely occupied with continuing the tradition of the Hebrew prophets by recommending such virtues as justice and mercy as against more ritual observances and insofar as it does this it is recommending virtues which may be merely good as means exactly like Aristotelian virtues. This characteristic of its teaching must therefore be rigorously distinguished from that which consists in its enforcement of such a view as that to be angry without a cause is as bad as actually to commit murder. And in the second place though the New Testament does praise some things which are only good as means and others which are good in themselves it entirely fails to recognize the distinction. Though the state of the man who is angry may be really as bad in itself as that of the murderer and so far Christ may be right his language would lead us to suppose that it is also as bad in every way that it also causes as much evil and this is utterly false. In short when Christian ethics approves it does not distinguish whether it's approval asserts this is a means to good or this is good in itself. And hence it both praises things merely good as means as if they were good in themselves and things merely good in themselves as if they were also good as means. Moreover it should be noticed that if Christian ethics does draw attention to those elements in virtues which are good in themselves it is by no means alone in this. The ethics of Plato are distinguished by upholding far more clearly and consistently than any other system the view that intrinsic value belongs exclusively to those states of mind which consist in love of what is good or hatred of what is evil. 108. But see the ethics of Christianity are distinguished from those of Plato by emphasizing the value of one particular motive that which consists in the emotion excited by the idea not of any intrinsically good consequences of the action in question nor even of the action itself but by that of its rightness. This idea of abstract rightness and the various degrees of the specific emotion excited by it are what constitute the specifically moral sentiment or conscience. An action seemed to be most properly termed internally right solely in virtue of the fact that the agent has previously regarded it as right. The idea of rightness must have been present to his mind but need not necessarily have been among his motives and we mean by a conscientious man one who when he deliberates always has this idea in his mind and does not act until he believes that his action is right. The presence of this idea and its action as a motive certainly seems to have become more common objects of notice and commendation owing to the influence of Christianity. But it is important to observe that there is no ground for the view which can't implies that it is the only motive which the New Testament regards as intrinsically valuable. There seems little doubt that when Christ tells us to love our neighbors as ourselves he did not mean merely what can't call practical love beneficence of which the soul motive is the idea of its rightness or the emotion caused by that idea. Among the inward dispositions of which the New Testament inculculates the value they are certainly included what can't terms mere natural inclinations such as pity etc. But what are we to say of virtue when it consists in a disposition to be moved to the performance of duties by this idea? It seems difficult to deny that the emotion excited by rightness as such has some intrinsic value and still more difficult to deny that its presence may heighten the value of some holes into which it enters. But on the other hand it certainly has not more value than any other motives treated in our last section emotions of love towards things really good in themselves. And as for Kant's implication that it is the soul good this is consistent with the other of his own views. For he certainly regards it as better to perform the actions to which he maintains that it prompts us namely material duties than to omit them. But if better at all then these actions must be better either in themselves or as a means. The former hypothesis would directly contradict the statement that this motive was soul good and the latter is excluded by Kant himself since he maintains that no actions can cause the existence of this motive. It may also be observed that the other claim which he makes for it namely that it is always good as a means can also be maintained. It is a certain as anything can be that very harmful actions may be done from conscientious motives and that conscience does not always tell us the truth about what actions are right. Nor can it be maintained even that it is more useful than many other motives. All that can be admitted is that it is one of the things which are generally useful. What more I have to say with regard to those elements in some virtues which are good in themselves and with regard to their relative degrees of excellence as well as the proof that all of them together cannot be the soul good may be deferred to the next chapter. 109. The main points in this chapter to which I desire to direct attention may be summarized as follows. One, I first pointed out how the subject matter with which it deals, namely ethical judgments on conduct involves a question utterly different in kind from the two previously discussed namely A. What is the nature of the predicate peculiar to ethics and B. What kinds of things themselves possess this predicate. Practical ethics asks not what ought to be but what ought we to do. It asks what actions are duty, what actions are right and what wrong. And all these questions can only be answered by showing the relation of the actions in question as causes or necessary conditions to which it is good in itself. The inquiries of practical ethics thus fall entirely under the third division of the ethical questions. Questions which ask what is good as a means which is equivalent to what is means to good what is cause or necessary condition of things good in themselves. But two, it asks this question almost exclusively with regard to actions which it is possible for most men to perform if only they will them. And with regard to these it does not ask merely which among them will have some good or bad result but which among all the actions possible to volition at any moment will produce the best total result. To assert that an action is a duty is to assert that it is such a possible action which will always in certain known circumstances produce better results than any other. It follows that a universal proposition or which duty is predicate so far from being self-evident always require a proof which it is beyond our present means of knowledge ever to give. But three, all that ethics has attempted or can attempt is to show that certain actions possible by volition generally produce better or worse total results than any probable alternative. And it must obviously be very difficult to show this with regard to the total results even in a comparatively near future. Whereas that what has the best results in such a near future also has the best on the whole is a point requiring investigation which it has not received. If it is true and if accordingly we give the name of duty to actions which generally produce better total results in the near future than any possible alternative it may be possible to prove that a few results of duty are true but only in certain conditions on society which may be more or less universally presented in history. And such a proof is only possible in some cases without a correct judgment of what things are good or bad in themselves a judgment which has never yet been offered by ethical writers. With regard to actions of which the general utility is thus proved the individual should always perform them but in other cases where rules are commonly offered he should rather judge of the probable results in his particular case guided by a correct conception of what things are intrinsically good or bad. 4. In order that any action may be shown to be a duty it must be shown to fulfill the above conditions but the actions commonly called duties do not fulfill them in any greater extent than expedient or interested actions. By calling them duties we only mean that they have in addition certain non-ethical predicates. Similarly by virtue is mainly meant a permanent disposition to perform duties in this restricted sense and accordingly a virtue if it is really a virtue must be good as a means in the sense that it is above conditions but it is not better as a means than non-virtuous dispositions it generally has no value in itself and where it has it is far from being the sole good or the best of goods. Accordingly virtue is not as is commonly implied an unique ethical predicate. End of chapter 5 Chapter 6 part 1 of Principia Ethica This LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Fredrik Karlsson Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore. Chapter 6 The Ideal 110 The title of this chapter is ambiguous when we call a state of things ideal we may mean three distinct things which have only this in common that we always do mean to assert of the state of things in question that it is good in itself but that it is good in itself in a much higher degree than many other things the first of these meanings of ideal is one that to which the phrase the ideal is most properly confined by this is meant the best state of things conceivable the sumum bonum the absolute good it is in this sense that a right conception of heaven would be a right conception of the ideal we mean by the ideal a state of things which would be absolutely perfect but this conception may be quite clearly distinguished from a second namely to that of the best possible state of things in this world this second conception may be identified with that which has frequently figured in philosophy as the human good or the ultimate end towards which our action should be directed it is in this sense that utopias are said to be ideals the constructor of an utopia may suppose many things to be possible which are in fact impossible but he always assumes that some things at least are rendered impossible by natural laws and hence his construction differs essentially from one which may disregard all natural laws or are they certainly established at all events the question what is the best state of things which we could possibly bring about is quite distinct from the question what would be the best state of things conceivable but thirdly we may mean by calling a state of things ideal merely three that it is good in itself in a high degree and it is obvious that the question what things are ideal in this sense is one which must be answered before we can pretend to settle what is the absolute or the human good it is with the ideal in this third sense that this chapter will be principally concerned its main object is to arrive at some positive answer to the fundamental question of ethics the question what things are goods or ends in themselves to this question we have here to obtain only a negative answer that pleasure is certainly not the soul good 111 I have just said that it is upon a correct answer to this question that correct answers to the two other questions what is the absolute good and what is the human good must depend and before proceeding to discuss it it may be well to point out the relation which it has to these two premises 1 it is just possible that the absolute good may be entirely composed of qualities which we cannot even imagine this is possible because though we certainly do know a great many things that are good in themselves and good in a high degree yet what is best does not necessarily contain all the good things there are that this is so follows from the principle explained in chapter 1 to which it was there proposed that a name principle of organic unity should be confined this principle is that the intrinsic value of a whole is neither identical nor proportional to the sum of the values of its parts it follows from this that though in order to obtain the greatest possible sum of values in its parts the ideal that would necessarily contain all the things which have all these parts might not be so valuable as some other whole from which certain positive goods were omitted but if a whole which does not contain all positive goods may yet be better than a whole which does it follows that the best whole may be one which contains none of the positive goods with which we are acquainted it is therefore possible that we cannot discover what the ideal is but it is plain that though this possibility cannot be denied no one can have any right to assert that it is realized that the ideal is something unimaginable we cannot judge of the comparative values of things unless the things we judge are before our minds we cannot therefore be entitled to assert that anything which we cannot imagine would be better than some of the things which we can although we are also not entitled to deny the possibility that this may be the case consequently our search for the ideal must be limited to a search for that one among all the holes composed of elements known to us which seems to be better than all the rest we shall never be entitled to assert that this whole is perfection but we shall be entitled to assert that it is better than any other which may be presented as a rival but since anything which we can have any reason to think ideal must be composed of things that are known to us it is plain that a comparative valuation of these must be our chief instrument for deciding what is ideal the best ideal we can construct will be that state of things which contains the greatest number of things having positive value and which contains nothing evil or indifferent provided that the presence of none of these goods or the absence of things evil or indifferent seems to diminish the value of the whole and in fact the chief defect of such attempts as have been made by philosophers to construct such an ideal to describe the kingdom of heaven seems to consist in the fact that they omit many things of very great positive value although it is plain that this omission does not enhance the value of the whole where this is the case it may be confidently asserted that the ideal proposed is not ideal and the review of positive goods which I am about to undertake will I hope show that no ideals yet proposed are satisfactory great positive goods it will appear are so numerous that any whole which shall contain them all must be of vast complexity to decide what is the ideal what is the absolute best state of things imaginable it is sufficient to condemn those ideals which are formed by omission without any visible gain in consequence of such omission philosophers seem usually to have sought only for the best of single things neglecting the fact that the whole composed of two great goods even though one of these be obviously inferior to the other may yet be often seen to be decidedly superior to either by itself 2. On the other hand utopias, attempted descriptions of a heaven upon earth commonly suffer not only from this but also from the opposite defect they are commonly constructed on the principle of merely omitting the great positive evils which exist at present with utterly inadequate regard to the goodness of what they retain the so-called goods to which they have regard are for the most part things which are at best mere means to good things such as freedom without which possibly nothing very good can exist in this world but which are of no value in themselves and are by no means certain even to produce anything of value it is of course necessary to the purpose of their authors whose object is merely to construct the best that may be possible in this world that they should include in the state of things which they describe many things which are themselves indifferent but which according to natural laws seem to be absolutely necessary for the existence of anything which is good but in fact they are apt to include many things of which the necessity is by no means apparent under the mistaken idea that these things are goods in themselves and not merely here and now are means to good while on the other hand they also omit from their description great positive goods of which the attainment seems to be quite as possible as many of the changes which they recommend that is to say, conceptions of good commonly are not only like those of the absolute good in omitting some great goods but also by including things indifferent and they both omit and include in cases where the limitations of natural necessity by the consideration of which they are legitimately differentiated from the conceptions of the absolute good will not justify the omission and inclusion it is in fact obvious that in order to decide correctly at what state of things we ought to aim we must not only consider what results it is possible for us to obtain but also which among equally possible results will have the greatest value and upon this second enquiry the comparative valuation of known goods has no less important bearing than upon the investigation of the absolute good 112 the method which must be employed in order to decide the question what things have intrinsic value and in what degrees has already been explained in chapter 3 in order to arrive at a correct decision on the first part of this question it is necessary to consider what things are such that if they existed by themselves in absolute isolation we should yet judge the existence to be good and in order to decide upon relative degrees of value of different things we must similarly consider what comparative value seems to attach to the isolated existence of each by employing this method we shall guard against two errors which seem to have been the chief causes which have vitiated previous conclusions on the subject the first of these is one that which consists in supposing that what seems absolutely unnecessary here and now for the existence of anything good what we cannot do without is therefore good in itself if we isolate such things which are mere means to good and suppose a world in which they alone and nothing but they existed their intrinsic worthlessness becomes apparent and secondly there is the more subtle error 2 protecting the principle of organic unities this error is committed when it is supposed that if one part of a whole has no intrinsic value the value of the whole must reside entirely in the other parts it has in this way been commonly supposed that if all valuable holes could be seen to have one and only one common property the holes must be valuable solely because they possess this property and the illusion is greatly strengthened if the common property in question seems considered by itself to have more value than the other parts of such holes considered by themselves but if we consider the property in question in isolation and then compare it with a whole of which it forms a part it may become easily apparent that existing by itself the property in question has not nearly so much value as has the value to which it belongs thus if we compare the value of a certain amount of pleasure existing absolutely by itself with the value of certain enjoyments containing an equal amount of pleasure it may become apparent that the enjoyment is much better than the pleasure and also in some cases much worse in such a case it is plain that the enjoyment does not owe its value solely to the pleasure it contains although it might easily have appeared to do so when we only consider the other constituents of the enjoyment and seem to see that without the pleasure they would have had no value it is now apparent on the contrary that the whole enjoyment owes its value quite equally to the presence of the other constituents even though it may be true that the pleasure is the only constituent having any value by itself and similarly if we are told that all things owe their value solely to the fact that they are realizations of the true self we may easily refute this statement by asking whether the predicate that is meant by realizing the true self supposing it could exist alone would have any value whatsoever either the thing which does realize the true self has intrinsic value or it has not and if it has then it certainly does not owe its value solely to the fact that it realizes the true self 113 if now we use this method of absolute isolation and guard against these errors it appears that the question we have to answer is far less difficult than the controversies that our ethics might have led us to expect indeed once the meaning of the question is clearly understood the answer to it in its main outlines appears to be so obvious that it runs the risk of seeming to be a platitude by far the most valuable things which we know or can imagine are certain states of consciousness which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects no one probably who has asked himself this question has ever doubted that personal affection and the appreciation of what is beautiful in art or nature are good in themselves nor if we consider strictly what things are worth having purely for their own sakes does it appear probable that anyone will think that anything else has nearly so greater value as the things which are included under these two heads I have myself urged in chapter 3 that the mere existence of what is beautiful does appear to have some intrinsic value but I regarded as indubitable that professor Siegwick was so far right in the view there discussed that such mere existence of what is beautiful has value so small as to be negligible in comparison with that which refers to the consciousness of beauty this simple truth may indeed be said to be universally recognized what has not been recognized is that it is the ultimate and fundamental truth of moral philosophy that it is only for the sake of these things in order that as much of them as possible may at some time exist that anyone can be justified in performing any public and private duty that they are the raison d'être of virtue that it is they those complex holes themselves and not any constituents or characteristic of them that form the rational ultimate end of human action and the sole criterion of social progress these appear to be truths which have been generally overlooked that they are truths that personal affections and aesthetic include all the greatest and by far the greatest goods we can imagine will I hope appear more plainly in the course of that analysis of them to which I shall now proceed all the things which I have meant to include under the above descriptions are highly complex organic unities and in discussing the consequences which follow from this fact and the elements of which they are composed I may hope to affirm and to define my position 114 first I propose to begin by examining what I have called aesthetic enjoyments since the case of personal affections presents some additional complications it is I think universally admitted that the proper appreciation of a beautiful object is a good thing in itself and my question is what are the main elements embedded in such an appreciation one it is plain that in those instances of aesthetic appreciation which we think most valuable there is included not merely a bare cognition of what is beautiful in the object but also some kind of feeling or emotion it is not sufficient that a man should merely see the beautiful qualities in a picture and know that they are beautiful to his state of mind the highest praise we require that he should also appreciate the beauty of that which he sees and which he knows to be beautiful that he should feel and see its beauty and by these expressions we certainly mean that he should have an appropriate emotion towards the beautiful qualities which he cognizes it is perhaps the case that we have some common quality but it is certain that differences in the emotion seem to be appropriate to differences in the kind of beauty perceived and by saying that different emotions are appropriate to different kinds of beauty we mean that the whole which is formed by the consciousness of that kind of beauty together with the emotion appropriate to it is better than if any other emotion had been felt in contemplating that particular beautiful object accordingly we have a large variety of different emotions each of which is a necessary constituent in some state of consciousness which we judge to be good all of these emotions are essential elements in great positive goods they are parts of organic holes which have great intrinsic value but it is important to observe that these holes are organic and that hence it does not follow that the emotion by itself would have any value whatsoever nor yet that if it were directed to a different object the hole thus formed might not be positively bad and in fact it seems to be the case that if we distinguish the emotional element in any aesthetic appreciation from the cognitive element which accompanies in it and is in fact commonly thought of as a part of the emotion and if we consider what value this emotional element would have existing by itself we can hardly think that it has any great value even if it has any at all whereas if the same emotion be directed to a different object if for instance it is felt towards an object that is positively ugly the whole state of consciousness is certainly often positively bad in a high degree one hundred and fifteen two in the last paragraph I pointed out the two facts that the presence of some emotion is necessary to give any very high value to a state of aesthetic appreciation and that on the other hand this same emotion in itself may have little or no value it follows that these emotions give the holes of which the form apart a value far greater than which they themselves possess the same is obviously true of the cognitive element which must be combined with these emotions in order to form these highly valuable holes and the present paragraph will attempt to define what is meant by this cognitive element so far as to guard against a possible misunderstanding when we talk of seeing a beautiful object or more generally of the cognition or consciousness of a beautiful object we may mean by these expressions something which forms no part of any valuable hole there is an ambiguity in the use of the term object which has probably been responsible for as many enormous errors in philosophy and psychology as any other single cause this ambiguity may easily be detected by considering the proposition which though a contradiction terms is obviously true that when a man sees a beautiful picture he may see nothing beautiful whatever the ambiguity consists in the fact that by the object of vision or cognition may be meant either the qualities actually seen or all the qualities possessed by the thing seen thus in our case that the picture is beautiful it is meant that it contains qualities which are beautiful when it is said that the man sees the picture it is meant that he sees a great number of the qualities contained in the picture and when it is said that nevertheless he sees nothing beautiful it is meant that he does not see those qualities of the picture which are beautiful when therefore I speak of the cognition of a beautiful object as an essential element in a valuable aesthetic appreciation I must be understood to mean only the cognition of the beautiful qualities possessed by that object and not the cognition of other qualities of the object possessing them and this distinction must itself be carefully distinguished from the other distinction expressed above by the distinct terms seeing the beauty of a thing and seeing its beautiful qualities by seeing the beauty of a thing we commonly mean the having an emotion towards it beautiful qualities whereas in the seeing of its beautiful qualities we do not include any emotion by the cognitive element which is equally necessary with emotions to the existence of a valuable appreciation I mean merely the actual cognition of consciousness of any or all of an object's beautiful qualities that is to say any or all of those elements in the object which possess any positive beauty that such a cognitive element is essential to a valuable whole may be easily seen by asking what value should we attribute to the proper emotion excited by hearing Beethoven's fifth symphony if that emotion were entirely accompanied by any consciousness either of the notes or of the melodic and harmonic relations between them and that the mere hearing of the symphony even accompanied by the appropriate emotion is not sufficient maybe easily seen if we consider what would be the state of a man who should hear all the notes but should not be aware of any of those melodic and harmonic relations which are necessary to constitute the smallest beautiful elements in the symphony End of chapter 6 part 1