 I think already we've got a sense of what this trajectory is. I think Shurajit highlighted very beautifully how there's this medium-term trajectory whereby growth is not generating employment, it's generating more inequality, and that itself is giving you this problem over time of inadequate demand. Consumption is driving growth, but consumption cannot keep driving growth beyond a point. And that consumption itself, as it slows because of all that inadequate employment and insufficient wage growth, that means investment is less incentive. So that's why investment rates are falling. And of course, to add to that, we have various issues on the banking front, which I'm sure Professor Chandrasekhar will talk about. I won't go into those. So we have this medium-term trajectory, and then as if things weren't bad enough along comes the government and thus demonetization and GST, which have been talked about at great length. But the critical point here is that they disproportionately affected informal activities. It's not just that they were bad news for the economy as a whole, they were really bad for the informal sector, which was almost destroyed. Both agriculture and all micro-small, medium enterprises, etc., were really very, very badly hit. That hit in the initial period wasn't so bad for the formal sector, because a lot of these formal enterprises thought, oh, well, fine, we can actually enter those markets. And you had a bit of a celebration, actually, of some of that. Over time, the fact that you have destroyed demand from such a large segment of the Indian population, 90%, shall we say, has to come home to roost. What we are seeing over the last two years is really that. That massive suppression or decline in demand from all of these informal activities from the livelihood and wages, which is now translating into demand falling even for the formal sector. So all the hullabaloo about automobiles and so on, we should have had very similar hullabaloo when it came to all of the major informal activities that were very, very dramatically hit, and with many, many more millions of people affected. But that's the context. Why is that important? Because, I mean, that's a big explanation for what we're going through now. But we also know that the Indian economy is much more integrated than ever before. We became progressively more integrated, especially in the 2000s, when we were kind of discovered by global finance. And so we had a boom that was facilitated by a lot of foreign capital inflow that provided a lot more liquidity, allowed us to have our own credit-enabled boom. Now the world economy is much less willing to give us that kind of leeway. And in fact, if anything, the global economy now is in very bad shape itself. I think there were some hints of that already. I think Praveen already talked about some of that. But what we're experiencing globally is pretty bad news, okay? Now a lot of ministers, I'm sure the next thing they will think of telling you is that, oh, all of this is happening because global economy is in bad shape. Yeah? When you've stopped blaming millennials and Ola and et cetera, you can now turn and say, well, you know, it's stuff happening in New York and elsewhere that is affecting us. And it will affect us, but the reason it will affect us badly is because we are singularly badly placed to handle it today, okay? We are in a much, much worse situation today in terms of our domestic economy than we were in 2008. And therefore any global crisis, which it's no doubt global crisis is coming, any global crisis is going to hit us very badly. Okay, now just to tell you about the fact that neither there, this is about expectations of exports, okay? And it's very sharply to the red. It has moved very significantly to the red. The other part with the right hand side is the global trade barometer. That's the blue line and the global trade volumes. That's the black line. And basically over the last nine months, everything's gone negative. Both the barometer of expectations and actual trade volumes. Now, it's quite interesting that trade volumes have gone negative. For a while, what we were getting was trade values falling, but volumes still growing because people were lowering their prices or other countries were lowering their prices in the hope that you can push out more exports. Now prices are falling, but volumes are also falling. So it's really, in terms of global trade now, quite a bad situation. It's no surprise therefore that Indian exports are also coming down. These are current account surpluses, okay, of different categories of countries. And why do we look at globally the current account surpluses? Because they are a kind of, or deficits, because they're a kind of proxy for net demand. A country that is running a deficit is actually demanding more from the rest of the world, okay? Countries that are running surpluses are actually sucking in more in terms of surpluses and therefore they are not contributing to net demand, okay? They are taking advantage of that net demand. What we find is that the developed world, the advanced economies, that's the blue line, I don't know if you can see it, but it's going up, it's going up and up, okay? And this increase in the net current account surpluses of the developed world is basically a sign that in the net, they are not now providing a stimulus, a demand stimulus to the global economy. A large part of that is because of the European Union whose surpluses are growing, basically Germany is making the rest of the world behave like itself, the rest of Europe behave like itself, and because US surpluses have been shrinking, okay? The developing countries, that's the red, which were earlier running very large surpluses, are now running small deficits, but really small deficits, okay? So not really enough to make a net difference to the global economy, and green bars are India, that's our current account deficit in absolute million dollars, so we are running current account deficits, we are too tiny in the global economy to make much difference to what's going to happen in the world, we are certainly not going to be able to stave off a global recession through our demand, but on the other hand, the fact that we have this current account deficit is for our economy a sign of weakness, okay? So as I mentioned, both our current account and our trade deficits are worsening. The left side, the red blocks are the absolute trade deficit, and on the right side, the current account deficit, okay? Now the current account deficit, for those of you who don't do economics, includes not just the merchandise trade, but also all of these other trade and services, invisible broadly, remittances from abroad, net factor payments that we make for the investments that come in, all of that. Our current account deficit used to be significantly smaller than our trade deficit, okay? It's slightly smaller now, just very slightly, and that's a cause of worry. We used to have a lot of remittances and a lot of service exports that helped us to cover at least a significant part of our trade deficit, no longer the case. And even in the slowdown, that's the weird thing, our imports continue to grow faster than our exports, okay? The jotted bars, the striped bars are the imports, and the plain bars are the exports. And basically, both exports and imports coming down relatively speaking, but imports coming down less than exports, okay? And of course we have, why is this thing happening about our imports keeping on growing even continuously? One of them is this extraordinary thing we have, which is the trade in petroleum, oil, and lubricants. Now you all know we are net importers of oil, right? And we're all very happy when the global price declines because then we get a benefit. The government is really happy because they don't pass on that benefit. They add indirect taxes, so they tax the rest of us and they get all that fiscal windfall. But basically the economy as a whole is much better off and global oil prices are low. So why on earth are we exporting petroleum and oil products? If we are net importers, why would we export them? And the answer to that is one word, one company, one man, okay, reliance, basically, okay? There used to be the saying in the United States that either the government owns the oil companies or the oil companies own the government. So we know which one we are in at the moment. What we've got here is basically a company taking advantage of differential duty rates to export certain petroleum products and import certain petroleum products. So we have a very significant export of petroleum products. It came down slightly last year because of the changes in global price, but it is still a significant part of our exports. It accounts for 14% of our exports, petroleum alone, okay? And of course we are net importers of POL, as you can see, very large net importers. The red bar is the petroleum import, POL import, and the blue bars are the POL export, which is all, it doesn't have the economy one bit. It's basically, it's helping a particular company. And it also means that we have to look at our trade data accordingly. We have to recognize that there is this significant thing going on, which is not really reflecting real trade. So we used to get major benefit from the world oil prices being low, but let's face it, they went up slightly last year. And as a result, the benefits of that low oil price are now increasingly less available both to the economy and to the government. In other words, that fiscal windfall, the advantages from that windfall, I think Shurajit already pointed it out, they were there certainly for a few years, but they are no longer present and they are less likely to happen now. A lot of people, I mean, there's a lot of discussion what's gonna happen to world oil prices, because it's quite possible that world recession means that there's a depressed demand for oil and oil prices stay low, all of that could happen. On the other hand, we know that all kinds of things are going on in the Middle East. We have a crazy man in the White House who may still do things with Iran. You know, there are genuine fears in terms of what will happen to global oil supplies in that situation. Our non-oil imports, this is both non-gold and non-oil, we import a lot of gold. A century ago, Keynes wrote, India is the sink of precious metals. And if anything, we've become sinker, you know? We import gold like anything and it's not only for our jewelry exports, it's also because gold is seen as the store of value. And of course, with financial markets in the state they're in, maybe it's a sensible thing who knows by now to actually go for gold, but if you exclude gold and oil imports, they went up quite significantly in 2017-18, but then last year they were down again, largely because really domestic demand, domestic production, all of that stuff, all of that was already happening before it hit the headlines in a very big way, before the automobile company started cutting back on workforce before people stopped buying biscuits and so on, that already was underway. Also, there's a deceleration in services income and net factor income from abroad. Can you see the top line there? That's the orange line, that's services. And that has more or less remained stagnant in the last year. Remittances continue to grow. Most of the remittances now coming from Middle East. It used to be half and half from H-1B visa holders and the Middle East. Now it's a shift back again in terms of the Middle East, but overall our net factor income from abroad, which is to say that total in terms of the payments you make for the interest on the capital that comes in, the profits that are emitted outside and so on, so forth, that remains significantly negative. Now all this means we're really quite vulnerable. And of course that vulnerability is inevitably going to show when you have an open capital account. And we do increasingly have an open capital account. So we have very, very volatile foreign portfolio investment. As you can see, the blue line is the net portfolio investment and it's crazy because it goes from significantly negative to significantly positive to significantly negative again. It's extremely volatile. It is what you could call skittish. And the skittishness reflects a lot of things which are not necessarily happening in India. It can be news from anywhere in the world that affects an outflow from emerging markets. But of course it could also be the sudden realization by foreign portfolio investors that India isn't the wonderful dynamic stable goldmine that they thought it would be and that there are serious problems in the Indian economy. And that of course in turn means that our foreign exchange reserves which have sometimes been called upon to actually address the volatile currency have also been quite volatile in the last year. These are monthly data. I don't know if you can see it, but anyway it's monthly data. And as you can see, there's been quite a dip over the year and then a slight recovery until April, the data end here in April. Now, all of this basically means that we are what you could call one of the fragile economies of the world. Certainly we are a very fragile emerging market, a vulnerable emerging market. So to add to all of the things that Shurajit and Praveen were mentioning, the fact that our domestic sources of dynamism are non-existent at the moment, that fiscal policy is not willing to actually come and compensate and so on, we are externally in a relatively weak position. Now this means that any major changes globally can affect us very badly. I don't want to be very Cassandra about it, but consider the kinds of things that could affect us badly. I already mentioned, any reason for a sharp or high-ken oil price would immediately push up our import bill and push us into a larger current account deficit and with attendant consequences also on the rupee because there would be associated capital flight. We are supposed to be one of the beneficiaries of the US-China trade war. Our extremely erudite trade minister, Commerce Minister basically made the same point in the same speech where he said a number of other interesting things. He actually said that we are going to do really well because we are going to be big beneficiaries of the fact that US and China are fighting with each other and so we are going to gain because the US is going to trade with us instead. Now one of the remarkable things about this in fact is that the US-China trade war has affected some Asian economies. It's affected Vietnam, Philippines, positively. It has not affected India. We are actually losing out even though we didn't have major value chains with China. The countries that had significant value chains with China, you would expect them to lose out. We didn't. Nonetheless, we're losing out. And why? Because we have not seen the same kind of shift of US exports to India. We don't have comparable exports in many areas. We're not competitive in many of the things on which the tariffs have been imposed in China. But also, China is increasingly looking to developing Asia as another way of coping with the impact of the US. And it is actually focusing much more on exporting more to developing Asia. Our trade deficit with China has tripled in the last five years. We are importing much, much more from China, even as we export less to China. China's imports from us have come down. China's exports to us have gone up. So the fact that global value chains are breaking up is bad news for many countries that were deeply integrated. We were not deeply integrated, but nonetheless, we are still actually adversely affected by this. We are not benefiting from any substitution of US imports from China to any other country. And we are unable at present, despite the rupee depreciation, to be competitive with a whole range of other similarly placed countries in terms of exporting to the North. Now, I already mentioned the North, it's taking less and less net imports. In fact, Europe is giving you net exports. The US is taking smaller and smaller net imports. We are financially so integrated that in fact, even though our external debt to GDP ratio is relatively low and the ratio of short-term debt to total debt is relatively low, we are nonetheless extremely vulnerable because of the impact of these portfolio flows. And of course, the other thing which we don't like to mention, but we should know by now, the most patriotic of all Indians we know, the most nationalists are of course the NRIs, right? And NRI deposits, on the other hand, are the most volatile and the most apt to flee at the first sign of a crisis. So all of these things actually make our balance payments extremely vulnerable. So if you thought we had a lot of problems internally, well, then if you look externally, things look even worse.