 Hello and welcome to Mapping Fortlines, NewsClick's new show. In this show, every week, we look at certain geopolitical issues in a particular region and analyze its implications not only for this region, but for the entire world. Today, we'll be talking about the situation in West Asia, specifically with reference to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, after the victory of the Houthis in what is called the Najran Front. To talk more about this, we have with us Prabir Purghaista. Hello, Prabir. Prabir, so the Yemen war we've discussed this earlier has been going on for since 2015. And as far as we understand the victory the Houthis have claimed in Najran, the occupying certain amount of territory in Saudi Arabia, capturing at least three brigades, seems to mark a qualitative difference as far as operations are concerned, because they have entered into Saudi Arabia, actually captured soldiers and territory. So how do you see the immediate implications of this as far as this war is concerned, that is, before we go to the regional implications, as far as the war is concerned immediately? You know, it's clear that Saudi Arabia has been faltering on the Yemen war after the attack that it launched. It believed that the air force or the air force superiority it had, they could bomb Yemen to submission. And they had a mercenary army, United Arab Emirates was very much a party, if not leadership, providing military leadership to that army. But also they had soldiers from all over to fight for them. And they thought these two were enough, air power and a mercenary army, and they would really be able to remove the Houthis from power and install their puppet. That was the intent that they had. But even after the brutality of the bombings they have done for the last four years, killing of nearly 100,000 people as far as official statistics, virtually official statistics are concerned, and the huge damage it has caused, starvation, recurrence of cholera and so on. With all of this, they have not really succeeded their objectives. But the last month, there have been two significant challenges they have faced. One is of course the fact that Houthis can hit them as well. And even Aramco, the big refinery complexes that they have is not safe. These alienation plants, the airports, their capital, all of this is under the Houthis drone capabilities. So they have equalized the air potential that Saudis have and primal control over air over Yemen. They have neutralized partially by their ability to hit Saudi Arabia at will using drones and Saudis have not been able to prevent that. But the Najran battle, as you say, marks a qualitative change because the first time in a positional warfare not within Yemen, but in Saudis, they have captured larger quantities of arms, ammunition, vehicles, as well as they have claimed that they have actually defeated three brigades, which would be anything, 9 to 15,000 people, and have also taken a lot of prisoners. A lot of these three brigades seem to be from the videos, the pictures that we see are probably Yemenis who have been fighting under the Saudi banner, aligning with the Saudis, Mansur Hadi's troops. So they seem to have broken. But what is significant is, we also saw insignias of Saudi national guards, the Saudi Arabia's national guards, which is the Bedouin force, which is loyal to the House of Saud, and they are supposed to be the crack troops that Saudis always had, and they were essentially used for very specific purposes, mainly for the protection of the royal family. So the fact that even they were involved and they lost with such overwhelming air superiority, missile capabilities, and of course, much superior arms against Houthis who are lightly armed. They used rocket launchers, we could see rocket launchers being there in their hands. Probably some of the Iranian supplies, 1980s level of arms otherwise, all of that they seem to have not only fought, out fought them, but have completely broken them in this battle. And this takes place, as you've said, within Saudi Arabia. Of course, one could argue that these were the territories Saudis have taken over from Yemen in the 30s and not returned. But let's not get into those territorial claims as of now. The interesting part is, this was within Saudi Arabia, and this, if it continues, then it appears the Saudis may actually be open to a Yemeni invasion. And let's also look at the Saudi map itself. The eastern part of Saudi Arabia is a Shia-dominated area. And Saudis have, let's put it in the most mild manner possible, have not treated them very well. These are the oil areas. So this is where really the oil wealth of Saudi Arabia is. And this is with the area is largely populated by Shias. They are not the fiber Shias of the Houthi variety. They are really the traditional Arab 12-verseers or the Iranian 12-verseers, as they are called. And therefore, this is a force which is not particularly happy or the population particularly happy with the Saudi king and the Saudi dispensation, which has been brutally stamping down of all opposition and has also had a capital punishment to one of the Imams that they had. This is not a very nice picture for Saudi Arabia. If the Houthis militarily come into this area, this is really hitting at the soft underbelly of Saudi Arabia. The Shia population, which is there in this region, and also the fact that the large part of this, or at least the part with near Yemen, also are under historical claims that Yemen has in Saudi Arabia. So not good omen for Saudi Arabia as of now. I don't think they can sustain a capturing of Saudi territory for too long. But it does create huge problems of Saudi Arabia. Certainly invasion of Yemen is no longer a possibility for Saudi Arabia. I think that writing on that is very clear on the wall. And I think the Houthis have also claimed during the Aramco attack that they had the support of certain sections within Saudi Arabia. So it's even more of a concern for the country. So moving on from here, let's look at some of the diplomatic steps that have taken place after this. So after the Aramco attacks, the Houthis did offer ceasefire, which Saudi Arabia refused. And after that, there was some talk of Saudi Arabia suspending aerial raids, talking about prisoner exchange, although in the aftermath of this operation, they seem to have again bombed their own soldiers. But the most important development that has happened after this is Iraqi prime minister's assistant, announcing that Saudi Arabia has expressed willingness to engage with Iran probably in Iraq. And there was also Mohammed bin Salman's interview where he said that a war with Iran would be disastrous, and it would completely destroy the entire region. So do you see this as some sort of a back down as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned or have they finally figured that there is really no other option but to have some form of talks? I think there are two aspects to this. One is, of course, the picture of the Houthi-Saudi battles that are going on. And in this, you are right that Houthis were the first to offer unconditional ceasefire. And Saudis at that point of time had said four areas will not bomb, but we don't accept an unconditional ceasefire. When you talk about bombing their troops, they really bombed the troops which had surrendered, who were probably Yemenis and with Houthi. So that itself is also something, a question mark, who they were really bombing. They were afraid that they are going to join the Houthis and therefore probably taking them out as it were before they really joined them. But when it comes to sitting down with the Houthis, they still seem to have a problem. So what they are doing is trying to get Iraq and trying to negotiate with Iran at the moment, believing that Iran will pull back the Houthis. So that's the other part of it, that it's not so much a Houthi-Saudi sitting down and talking, but it is saying, let's look at the whole region. And now we have Houthis on one side with Iran, and let's negotiate with Iran and let's talk about the region as a whole. So at the moment, it's not very clear that on what is the level at which Saudis want to disengage. Are they saying that our talks with Iran will also open itself to an arrangement with the Houthis? It also means discussion regarding Iraq, whether the Shia and Sunni population. Does it also mean regarding Syria? So there's a large number of areas or questions in which the Saudi Iranians really confront each other ideologically as well as militarily. But that is a much larger picture that includes Israel, it includes Turkey, it includes the United States and of course includes Russia as well. So I'm not very sure what Saudis are looking for in terms of engaging Iran. But I think the good part is post that bombing that Saudis did on their own troops or on the surrendered troops, there has been no further air activity that we are getting reports of in Yemen. So Saudis seem to have stopped their attacks. The Yemenis of course wanted them to come to the table and they feel that they at the moment have the stronger hand. In being able to force a negotiations. But even if they get a ceasefire, it's a huge victory for them. Even it's an unofficial ceasefire. So I think that is changing the context in Yemen itself. So I think you are going to see a two track development over here. The larger engagement with Iran, which will at some point, you'll have to involve the United States, Russia at the local level. Certainly Iraq and Syria and at the narrow level, which is Saudi Yemen. I think you are going to see a direct Saudi Yemen engagement. But probably as a part of brokering a larger peace. And the fact that Iraq is brokering this is interesting. Because Iraq has in its government a Shia section and a Sunni section. So they are saying that we are the best place to do it. But the US is not taking very kindly to this. And one of the arguments is the Iraqi upsurge that is taking place right now against the government. So part of the reason it's taking place at this time is really also American encouragement for them to take to the streets. So try to destabilize the Iraqi regime or put pressure on the Iraqi regime. If you don't, if you do what we don't want you to do, then we still have the ability to hit you. So this seems to be a more market picture at the moment. But I think what we are seeing slowly is the region as a whole has to come together to solve these problems. And instead of getting brokers from outside the United States who are more interested in querying the pitch in the region, that these countries learn to live how can they get a certain kind of security and how they can work on the via media for themselves. And in that sense, the Russian proposal, which has been one of collective security, I think is increasingly going to look more and more attractive to the region. Then the US brokered hegemonic peace or shall we call the peace of the hegemon. But the United States imposes peace on all the warring groups and appears to be an independent neutral interlocutor as long as you give all its oil to the US or at least in US dollars. So I think that part of the hegemonic control of the United States is really breaking over the region. And the fact this talk is taking place is not being brokered by the United States. US has originally said we will broker a talk with the Houthis. That seems to have been a no starter, so a non-starter. So I think what you are seeing is also a hesitant return to countries talking to each other how they can resolve these differences. And I hope Saudis and Houthis will also resolve the differences. And let's put it very bluntly, good sense will dawn on the Saudi royal family, which at the moment seems to be remarkably devoid of it. And it's also interesting what you said because the process in which in the region, or the broad region in which the US is involved and that's in Afghanistan, has completely almost collapsed. Whereas we also, we saw the earlier example in Syria where the Astana talks were actually quite instrumental in bringing about peace and that was against something without the US and with countries in the region. So as far as Iran is concerned too, it's something they have been saying that collective involvement from all the countries in the region is what can bring peace. So it might be, this might again be another instance of a similar discussion actually having impact. Well I think yes, it's a very small start. We still haven't seen Saudis and Iranians talk to each other. We still haven't seen Saudis and Houthis talk to each other. But as I said, some hesitant start of processes is I think important. But let's face it, the United States has the ability to scupper this process as well. How, whether they will play a spoiler or to the degree they will play a spoiler has to be seen. And at the moment, of course, Trump is a little bit hamstrung by the fact of that Ukraine and his impeachment, which you know in rest of the world we don't just understand that what is the, what's happening in the United States, but leaving that out. What we do think is yes, hesitant shall start of certain processes, but what is happened, what's going to happen is something that is not going to be straightforward, linear, great peace. Everybody is singing peace and so on, but it is going to be a slow return and it will be probably some steps forward, couple of steps back till we get a process when we get a regional peace agreements looked at and regional understandings and arrangements rather than guarantees from outside between neighbors. Thank you, Prabir. That's all we have for this episode of Mapping Fortlines. See you next week and keep watching NewsClick.