 So, welcome to everybody in the audience to this panel which has the title mainstreamed or sidelined non-MPT states in the nuclear order. And let me first introduce myself, I'm Magnus Houghgren, I'm the head of the Disarmament and Employment Department in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I'm going to be the moderator for this session and I want to thank the audience for joining us. I know that there are three parallel sessions going on and I'm glad to see that so many of you are interested in this very timely topic. I also want to remind you that also in this panel there are going to be half of the time will be devoted to a Q&A session so when that time comes there's going to be microphones and you know how to line up and use a standing line for them and also introduce yourselves when you ask sharp and direct questions that you also identify yourself when doing that. In this panel we will also have an experiment which will be an app polling question at the end so if somebody has not downloaded the conference app you're not going to be able to vote it's like registered to vote so there will be a question and the answer supposedly is supposed to come up and we will see the opinion of the audience on the question that will be put to you so download the app now if you haven't done it if you want to be part of that. So the panel is as I mentioned about the non-embedded states in the nuclear order and we have here on the panel represent people who will be able to give the perspective of the three non-embedded states India, Israel and Pakistan who have in recent years enhanced their participation in the international nuclear governance efforts in various ways and in a way that some believe or fear blur the distinction between an MPT state and a non-embedded state. The other perspective is of course that this is a very good development and this is one of the themes that we're going to explore today. We also have a representative of a non-embedded states. I think I will go straight to introducing quickly my fellow panelists. Over on the far left I have Professor Federico Merque who is a professor of international relations and director of undergraduate studies in political science and international relations at the San Andreas University in Argentina. So he will be giving an Argentinian perspective and non-nuclear weapons state, MPT state perspective on the issues. At his right we have this Sadia Taslim who teaches at the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at the Guadalajara University in Islamabad in Pakistan. To her right we have Mr. Gil Reich, Director General for Policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission where he has served in various capacities over a decade. And to my left Dr. Manpreet Seti who is a senior fellow at the Center for Airpower Studies in New Delhi and there she heads the project on nuclear security. So with those initial introductions I think I'm going to go straight into asking my panelists to a few questions and then hopefully we can have a free flowing exchange among the panelists and with the audience. First I will ask Dr. Seti to articulate why India seeks to join the nuclear suppliers group. And what Indians believe becoming a participant means for India's place in the nuclear global order. Thank you very much and good afternoon everyone. I am really grateful to Carnegie and to George and Toby for having me here in this conference. It seems like such a huge affair and anybody who's anybody on the nuclear domain seems to be here. So I'm glad to be here and to have a panel discussion with some of the old friends and some new friends here. Why does India want NSG membership? That's the first question that's been posed to me and I think I would say India wants the NSG membership for three reasons. Firstly for better protection of its own interests. Secondly for better availability of nuclear expertise from India on a collective panel. And thirdly for India being able to feed into the global nuclear export control system for better management of risks which exist today. So let me try and flesh out these three reasons that I've pointed out. Now India gained the exceptionalization of the NSG in 2008 which has enabled the country to fast track its nuclear power program. The most tangible result has been in the form of the availability of uranium which has allowed India's nuclear reactors not only to raise the capacity factors but also for India to be able to plan the indigenously developed pressurized heavy water reactor program so that we are now looking at six reactors of 700 megawatts which are under construction and six more that has been approved. So the idea then is that there is greater predictability for India to be able to plan out a program because of the availability of uranium. The second track is that you would be importing nuclear reactors of larger capacities because right now India has shown the capability to indigenously develop 700 megawatts but to go beyond that given the energy requirements that the country has the gap that exists between demand and supply and to be able to fulfill our commitments under the climate change greenhouse gas emission cuts which are necessary. Nuclear energy is seen as a very important component of the energy basket. And as you all realize investing in nuclear energy whether it's in terms of the financial investments which are not small but also the manpower investments the investments that come from the ancillary industries which must match up to the capability that the establishment has. All of this calls for a fair amount of predictability in the environment and therefore as I said it's for protection of our own interests when we are investing so much into the nuclear power program that it becomes very important that you're part of the rulemaking and you know you're part of the body which is doing that rulemaking on many of these issues. Secondly if you look at the criteria that has been posted on the NSG website on membership the foremost criteria is the ability to supply items that are covered by the NSG lists and given that India has a nuclear power program where 22 plants indigenously built are operational except for one or two which have come from Russia given that we want to we have a capability that will be able to plug into the global nuclear supply chain it becomes very important then that a country of this nature of this capability of this technical prowess is not left out in out of a body which is doing export controls on many of these issues so and you know I don't speak for the government but it's my view that if we wanted for instance the nuclear power corporation of India which is the main operating body with nuclear power plants to enter into a joint venture or even a consortium of sorts with more than one country on supplying nuclear reactors which are you know proven within the country and have a high safety record of 220 and 500 megawatt reactors then there is a possibility of supplying those for the developing you know some of the smaller countries which don't have grids which can support very large reactors so there is a possibility of India emerging as a potential nuclear supplier which then makes it very worthy of being a member of the group and thirdly as I said collectively if there are gaps in export controls it becomes very important then for a country that has you know recently there was a conference that was held in which 200 small and medium enterprises were able to showcase their ability to supply equipment for the nuclear power program so this is a very large industry then and India brings to the table in the NSG its own experience and track record with export controls just to give a very brief example for instance you know it's been seen that when normal pathways to proliferation of weapons are blocked people trying to find other ways of being able to you know look for options and high frequency converters for instance is one way with software to be able to get to the centrifuges which you can't get otherwise so it's been India's experience that when such kinds of things are being asked for if you plug in into the database and do best practice sharing with the other countries it helps the overall export control regime at the global level so I think these were the three reasons that I wanted to pan out on why it's important for India and for the NSG to collectively you know look at many of these issues and for India to be a part of the NSG thank you very much for that comprehensive perspective from from India I think it's timely then to move on to to to your neighbor Mr. Slim if you could well both follow up on what what for the from the Pakistani perspective is the main reason for why you have applied for membership but also what does the Pakistani government mean when they so clearly talk about the importance of a non-discriminatory approach to NSG membership and and what how that is dealt with in the NSG will affect the Pakistani and nuclear policies and programs. Okay so to begin with it might sound now like a cliched statement but I'm extremely grateful to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to George Prakowicz and Toby Dalton in particular for giving me this opportunity to be here at this panel again with friends. Now coming to the first question as far as Pakistan's interest in the membership in NSG is concerned there are multiple reasons one of the most commonly stated reason by the government Pakistan is that there is a genuine interest in the in the nuclear energy sector given the fact that there is a direct connection between nuclear energy and Pakistan's economic growth potential there is a serious energy crisis that Pakistan is going through and it's it wants to invest in nuclear energy and have more cooperation with international community on nuclear energy to meet those requirements but there is certainly another reason which is directly linked with the question of legitimacy of nuclear arms states that are outside the NPT and it's certainly with India having been granted the waiver on NSG and with the Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement there has been this growing sense in Pakistan that India is being recognized as a nuclear weapon state and because of that reason of course Pakistan feels singled out and isolated in a number of senses it also has a lot to do with how the how the issue of discrimination sense of discrimination has has grown inside Pakistan with how Pakistan is generally sort of portrayed in international media reports and how Pakistan is sort of discussed and talked about so because of all of that baggage there is this there is this greater urge for the issue of legitimacy now coming to the second question which is what does Pakistan mean by a non-discriminatory approach to NSG to simply put it in Pakistan basically talks about equitable treatment to all the nuclear armed non-NPD states of course much of the conversation inside Pakistan has focused on India and Pakistan as opposed to like other nuclear armed non-NPD states like Israel or for that matter even DPRK but the idea is that there should be a there should be the responsibilities and rights should be equally distributed amongst these non-NPD nuclear armed states and there should be a criteria-based approach as opposed to a case-by-case approach as far as this question is concerned with regard to criteria-based approach there has been a lot of development in the NSG itself and the NS 2016 NSG meetings brought some degree of relief to Pakistan with the conversations focusing too much on the need for a criteria-based approach so what would this mean for Pakistan's nuclear policy and program it depends on what eventually turns out to be the criteria that is mutually agreed to at the NSG platform and if a criteria so after the 2016 NSG meetings there has been a lot of conversation inside Pakistan on what kind of criteria would be acceptable to Pakistan and there's a lot of opening up on the issue of additional protocol on that there are lots of people who are making a case that Pakistan should now completely separate its civilian facilities and military facilities but it's on good but also for increasing the potential of Pakistan getting membership so on that particular count and also on the issue of CTBT there is there's a lot of positive momentum but the the more crucial part is associated with the facility to cut off to it and and unless Pakistan's reservations regarding what Pakistan sees as a growing asymmetry visa be India are addressed the detention on FMCT will remain there Pakistan has recently hinted that it might show flexibility it might be willing to show flexibility on FMCT if India is asked to put under safeguards its fast reader program and other civilian facilities that are still outside the safeguards so that's a that's a positive development but other than that I would say that regardless of whether eventually India and Pakistan get into NSG or not if a non-discriminatory approach is pursued it is eventually going to have a very positive impact particularly with regard to how the conversations are conducted inside Pakistan so there will be there there will be more faith with regard to international institutions the Pakistani concerns regarding the larger hostility that in Pakistan's perception prevails with regard to the international security environment would also change and I think it's also going to give a lot of space to liberal voices that advocate more cooperation with the international community thank you thank you that leads me to naturally ask Mr. Raj you follow or in Israel one follows the the strong interest in in India and now also in Pakistan of joining the NSG how has Israel's view on this evolved over over the last years and and you think it's likely that also Israel will apply for membership in the NSG in the near future thank you once again I'd like to use this opportunity and say thank you and how grateful I am to be here specifically to thank George and Will for the opportunity to an honor to be here in this amazing event you know the NSG from an Israeli perspective is something that we are viewing from a perspective of 15 years we started our dialogue discussions with the regime more than 15 years ago and I think that since then there is several elements that are following this kind of a conversation that Israel had with the regime I think the main focus should be on the word responsibility responsibility which is translated into criterias and criterias that should be demonstrated by clear actions and basically credentials so when a country is entering such a dialogue it should have a very clear agenda what is nuclear norm from the point of view of responsibility and at least from our perspective I think one should tackle it or try and analyze it into three different ways I think the first issue is nuclear safety the second issue is nuclear security including export control as a part of it and the third one is something which is a bit more vague that you can put under the title of a stability and control I think that at least from the point of view of Israel when one is thinking about nuclear safety there are things which are very clear if God forbid an accident happens in a nuclear facility nobody would ask the question what it was supervised or verified by the IAEA and the fact that as for today at least the three countries which are represented in this side of the in the middle of this discussion we cannot buy openly equipment which is related to safety due to the energy I think there's something that should be taught twice because if God forbid again something will happen in this realm it has nothing to do with verification it's something that all of us should do our outmost in order to avoid and when you're speaking about criterion safety the question is how high is your standard are you obeying the nuclear the international norms are you a part of the IAEA relevant regimes in this regard and I think it's something that could be judged very easily at least from the point of view of the NSG when we're speaking about security and export control you know when Israel started its dialogue with the NSG our aim was to become an adherent country I think we were the first country which was non NSG member stage that adhered to this regime we adhered by obeying and by basically trying to take the elements of the energy and insert them into our own legislation we did it because we believe that it's important from an export control non proliferation perspective the problem was that this dialogue was one sided we haven't seen any response from the energy and we haven't seen any benefit if one can use this word from this kind of a dialogue now we're not going to say that it was a mistake no it was not a mistake it was part of our very clear policy in export control and non proliferation in the nuclear realm but this is something that the energy member state should take into account what what is the message that it is sending to states which are outside the this regime for the time being when you're speaking about nuclear security I think that from an Israeli perspective it's one of the more important and crucial elements in a world post-September 11 in a world in which we are all confronting the ISIS phenomena this is something that we should take into account and I think that the process that was started in 2008 in the NSS conferences I think it is very important and I think once again a country should be judged solely on its merits by the credential in this regard I can say that it's not only an international issue it's also a regional issue it's something that we should move stronger into regional cooperation last but not least I said that there is a trade element its stability and control I think that states with advanced nuclear technology and capability should be judged also by their strong civilian society by engagement with the international community by adherence to international commitments and norms which are beyond and not just the NPT again going back to nuclear safety and security and accountability you asked your the second half of the question or the last part of it was looking towards the future I think that bearing in mind the above mentioned principles we believe that the energy might benefit from encouraging engagement ending with a full membership to those who are standing and sticking and obeying to those criteria and in this regard I can view I don't know when but definitely I can view Israel as a very relevant candidate to join the energy in the future. Thank you that brings us to a country which is part of the NSG and also of the MPT so Dr. Merke what how would you describe how Argentina has approached the issue of non-MPT states joining the NSG and the issues of sort of fairness and so forth that has been raised in that context. Thank you thank you to Carnegie for this invitation it's an honor for me to be here and going to your question it's a bit awkward you know coming from Argentina being on the mainstream side of the equation so I'm glad to be on this side this time around and as it happens with Argentina there are always two stories to tell because Argentina up to the 90s was mainly outside of the many nuclear clubs in the world and the dominant narrative of Argentina was that of fairness and justice. When democracy came to Argentina at the beginning of the 80s when two political rivalry with Brazil started to decline Argentina saw the need to fully involved in the nuclear order and we become part became part of the many nuclear clubs in the world today Argentina is part of the Australia group of the Bassenar group of the NSG of course the MTCR and many other formal and informal forums so I think in some to some extent Argentina moved from a narrative of fairness and justice towards a narrative of compliance to make the system work because Argentina started to carve a niche in the nuclear marketplace. We adapted a more trade a business oriented approach toward the nuclear sector because we are not in a neighborhood as complicated as India and Pakistan and of course Israel so we have very different regional circumstances and geopolitical considerations that made Argentina be part of this global nuclear order but having said that I think that the instinct in Argentina is to see with positive eyes the membership of India to NSG and I couldn't say only India why not Pakistan as well or even Israel. I think that the rationale is that to put as many countries as possible into that group but of course this is not an easy task. It comes with a lot of challenges because it will be it will involve transactional dilemmas, problem challenges of credible commitments coming from India and Pakistan and so I think the issue of putting India and Pakistan into the NSG shouldn't be analyzed only through as a single specific isolated point but part as a broader movement to put these countries into the global nuclear order and I'm putting them in many different regimes as well. Thank you very much. Well one question that comes to mind to the applicants and also perhaps to Israel is how would you you've all discussed that the main sort of criteria-based approach is about fulfilling the intent of the export control regime the NSG when it regards control lists and having stringent national legislation and a good track record when it comes to export controls but how would you feel and how do you think your governments would feel if there were more let's say MPT related conditions put on an NSG membership. The MPT member states have committed to certain things when the MPT review process like for example the CTBT is one of those if one were to say to India and Pakistan to join the NSG you need to sign the CTBT put you on equal footing with US and China for example let's stay at signing at this point in time what do you think would be the reaction to such a if it was put as a condition. I think the general understanding in the Indian official circles on the CTBT is that there is a voluntary moratorium that has been stated at the highest level against testing and that stays and that's the maximum that in the current situation that the government is willing to go on the CTBT. I must point out to you that it's not that India cannot sign the CTBT for any of the testing benefits that we are looking at from the deterrence perspective because given the nature of the weapon it's such that to do damage which is of an unacceptable nature given the densities of population and the intelligent targeting that we today know how to do with nuclear weapons creating that kind of a damage is not a very difficult thing. The testing issue is more because the domestic narrative in the country has been built along the lines of 1996 when India had first rejected the treaty. So in the at the floor of the parliament the prime minister at that time had said that we will not sign on to the CTBT because it doesn't meet India's security concerns. So to change that narrative around in the country is going to be something in which political investment will have to be made and right now there is no priority that is being placed from the domestic political level on the issue of the CTBT. So I think as far as India's membership of the NSG is concerned there will be a statement again to say that the voluntary moratorium stays which has been already done and the distinction that you make about signing and ratification of the treaty that might work for the presidential systems but in the Indian system for instance it's the prime minister who has that authority to sign the treaty and he need not put it through the ratification process in the parliament. So there have been many treaties which haven't gone through that process so there isn't really a clear distinction between signing and ratification. So that's why once you've signed there is no other step that you're going to go beyond for that. So given that the momentum for the CTBT at the international level today is so low I don't see the political leadership in my country making an investment in the CTBT. Okay would you Mr. Slim do you think Pakistan is more open to that idea? I think Pakistan's position has been pretty straightforward on CTBT. Pakistan also observes a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing but it has always held a position that Pakistan is ready to sign the treaty if India does so. Pakistan's policy would completely depend on how India goes about it. One another question that comes to mind and I will stay with you two for just one more round is this process of NSG membership has been going on now for some time even though it was just last year that the two countries handed in their formal applications. How does the political landscape look in in your capitals as regards patients with this process? Is there a risk that if this drags on for years and years with discussions in the NSG that your capital loses interest in this process? We've seen in the past Russia wanted to join the Australia group and then by not being successful in that in that quest have lost interest. Is that something that could happen to India and Pakistan's interest in NSG membership? Well you know India has a fair amount of strategic patience. It's a 2000 year old country and it has shown that when we are looking at a situation which is almost akin to a paradigm shift given that you know the NSG was created to penalize India after the 1974 tests we do realize that it's going to call for a fair amount of investment in outreach to all the NSG members to be able to change their minds on why India's membership is important for the NSG and for India. So strategic patience for India I don't think will be a problem. What we are worried about more is that there will be a loss of that patience and the fatigue factor that will come in a lot of other capitals which are wanting to support the Indian case for membership. And I think in this China has played its game very well by listing out a list of objections which are both political and technical to India's membership so that you are left trying to resolve all of those issues with each of the NSG member states. So the patience of the others would probably run out after a while to say that why are we going through this entire process and investing so much in this. What is ultimately when it becomes so contentious that within the NSG there are views about whether there should be any simultaneity in the induction of both India and Pakistan. And I think India's case has been very clear that given the clear distinction that exists in the histories in the behaviors in the capacities of the industries in the energy requirement everything is so different that you cannot treat Pakistan and India at the same level. So even if there are certain criteria which are laid down and applied to others there is each case is standing on its own merit and demerit and that is how it has to be seen. So therefore with the spin that has been put by China in terms of its objections trying to blur these lines between India and Pakistan the fatigue factor I'm worried about is more from the international community that will set into it because in for India it's important to be part of the NSG so we will continue to make that investment but will the others continue along that path? That's the worrisome factor. I would say it is hard to give a clear answer in a yes or no because even within Pakistan the discussion on NSG is fairly diverse. So the Strategic Plans Division and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might have two very different ways of looking at how to go about NSG and should there be a sustained effort over a long period of time or not. And I think that my sense is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be interested in having continued and sustained investment in this process and the time factor may not necessarily impinge upon its calculations. I'm not really sure about how the SPD would view it and for them the fatigue factor might take over and over a period of time it would largely depend on who is going to become more influential in terms of the decision making with regard to the diplomatic questions and that's again something that you're pretty uncertain about given the kind of power transitions that we are witnessing in Pakistan. Thank you. Dr. Murki, you mentioned that in Argentina the deliberation has gone back and forth on this and that there is an openness for these new applicants to join the NSG. But also there is traditional and I come from a country who also have this traditional mantra of India, Pakistan and Israel should join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. This is our formal policy. So this is, in light of new developments, is this something that needs to be reviewed when we are, because we know that that is not going to happen, to speak frankly, when it comes to the NPT. But we are at the same time opening up for them to come into other nuclear international bodies. Do you see a debate on this in your country and how to approach this apparent dilemma? Yes. Well, first of all, I agree that it will not happen. I don't see a debate right now in Argentina on this issue. But I do see a concern, a common concern we have with countries like India and Pakistan because we don't have nuclear weapons, they do, but they have an arrested nuclear identity. And what these countries want at the end of the day is recognition. Recognition of that situation. And blurring the difference between the euro and the factor nuclear state could be a path forward to achieve a sort of recognition. I mean, seeing the problem from Pakistan and India, having said this, Argentina shared something with these countries. Because sometimes the problem is presented as a dilemma between justice and compliance. And I have the feeling that we don't have a dilemma, we have a trilemma. And we can achieve two, but not three things. And these things are reputation, technology and sovereignty. If you want technology and you want reputation, then autonomy goes down. And so you pay a price in terms of sovereignty. If you want reputation and autonomy, then you will have restricted access to technology. And this is a problem we have in the south, in the global south. And then if you want autonomy and technology, okay, but your reputation will go down. So how can we achieve a compromise and reach a sort of equilibrium between these three dimensions? This is a challenge coming from the south. Thank you. Mr. Reich, from this really perspective, you mentioned already that you feel that the criteria should be based on implementation of nuclear safety and nuclear security and export control requirements. And you also made reference to the NSS, which I think is appropriate for being here in Washington. This was a US initiative and it ended up here with the summit in 2000 and well, last year. What is, from your perspective, the experiences of this and similar processes where a country like Israel has been able to participate in international nuclear fora on an equal footing? Is that something that has been given you a stronger interest and has been a positive experience? And what is your reflection around that kind of fora where Israel, in the United States and Pakistan have all been able to fully participate? I think it's a great question because it demonstrates the importance of finding the mechanisms in which the world can identify topics and subjects that are relevant and at the same time build the relevant, if I may use the term, participant club, which is relevant to tackle this specific problem. And I think the NSS mechanism was a kind of demonstrated exactly those two issues. On the one hand, there was the issue of nuclear security that turned to be something that we should cope with. Maybe it was an issue that during the 70s, 80s and 90s was less relevant today, as I think was discussed in the morning sessions as well, is more relevant than ever. And at the same time, you should build the relevant club and which can tackle these specific issues for the benefit of the international community. Not only that, I think that at least from an Israeli perspective, and I'm speaking now internally, for years, I don't know how it's in India and Pakistan, but if I may use the term suffered from misunderstanding or from realizing that the international organs are, so to say, against Israel when it comes to the nuclear realm. The NSS was a kind of a proof, was a kind of demonstration that the world can work on equal basis with countries that are part of the NPT, countries choose not to be a part of the NPT, but to combine forces, to work on equal basis, and to tackle a problem which was, as I said, relevant to all of us. Thank you. Yes, please. If I can just add to that, I completely agree with the points that you've made. The nonproliferation regime is beyond the NPT. The NPT is one component of the nonproliferation regime, which has been an anchor, a very central strong point of the nonproliferation regime. But instruments such as the Nuclear Security Summit, the IAEA, the governmental group of experts on FMCT, the open-ended working group on disarmament, all of these are other instruments which are part of the nonproliferation regime, which give you an opportunity then to seek the cooperation of countries which are not NPT. I mean, we've said that it might be a mantra to you have universality of the NPT, because I think it also holds the non-nuclear weapon states together to continue to say that. But it is the reality of the times that you cannot have the three countries in as nuclear weapon states because of the definition which was crafted in a different age and a different space, but also because you can't have them as non-nuclear weapon states. So if the reality has to be accommodated, and it can't be done in a rigid structure like the NPT, then other instruments become useful. And the NSG in that sense is far more flexible, particularly where it feeds into the export control issues, which are so important from the nuclear security perspective as well. So where you can bring in these countries to be on an equal footing, I think it strengthens the nonproliferation regime completely. Thank you. I think it's about time to start lining up for questions from the audience. And let's see where they might, if you could go to the microphones. I think that's the easiest. But while we're doing that, maybe I can throw in one last because you actually opened up to something that I was thinking about, which is one of the criticisms of India and Pakistan of the NPTs. Of course, it's discriminatory nature and the two categories where you don't really fit in. Well, next week in New York, they're starting to talk about a new treaty. We don't really know what's going to become of it. But at least it's not going to be discriminatory. So while the audience are preparing their questions, if perhaps any of you in India or Pakistan could comment on how you would approach or how would you relate to that process that's starting next week in New York? So I would wish spanning the warm movement all success. But having said that, I would say that as far as the conversation in Pakistan on banning the warm movement is concerned, there are two, two particular issues that receive more attention. One is, is discrimination or non-discrimination really a question here? Or is it the effectiveness of the banning movement? And most Pakistanis do not, unfortunately, like with no offense to all the people who have invested so much of their energy into the entire movement. Unfortunately, most people in Pakistan think that it's not going to be effective given the fact that it does not really have support of the nuclear weapon states. So that completely takes out the issue of discrimination and non-discrimination out of discussion. But also the diplomatic community in particular thinks that somehow banning the warm movement just because it has moved away from what was agreed in the special session on Disarmament I, SSOD I, by not talking about proportional reductions is actually, so it is thought that NAMM has compromised its own position in some ways. And therefore, the entire movement somehow becomes ineffective. Couple of technical points on the ban treaty. You know, I have been a strong proponent of nuclear disarmament. I think that is the only way that we can have sustainable non proliferation. But unfortunately, this mechanism, I don't think is going to succeed very much. Because what it's doing is it's banning the possession, the use, the transfer, etc. of the weapon without actually taking the next step towards dismantlement enforcement of that dismantlement and to do a verified, you know, check on how it's going to happen. So the insecurities of the countries that are making them have the weapon are not going away just by banning the weapon. In fact, I think India had a more practical solution in banning the use and the threat of use of the weapon. Because by doing that, you're not banning the possession of the weapon. The technical problem here is how do countries that have nuclear weapons, then sign on to a treaty like this, which is banning the possession, you're delegitimizing the weapon without actually getting countries to dismantle it to, you know, verifiably put it out of use. So therefore, the insecurities are not being taken care of through this kind of a sledgehammer approach to the banning of the weapon. The other issue is about the countries which are under treaty alliance for protection under the nuclear umbrella. How do those countries then relate to the ban treaty? Because if that weapon is banned, but you're under a nuclear umbrella of another country, what does that do to your position? So therefore, there are these technical issues which haven't been resolved before we're going into this. So while every avenue that leads us to the nuclear weapons free world is worth looking at carefully and therefore, I think India hasn't made up its mind on whether it's going to be a part of the conference or not. But it was part of the preparatory meeting leading up to the conference. But my suggestion to my country would be to sit in on the meeting to try and find ways that could come out of such a gathering to look for more practical solutions to get to the nuclear weapons free world. Well, thank you. And I hear a lot of questions. And I know that there is a session in this conference tomorrow that will deal more deeply with that. But with that, I will open up for some questions from the floor. I think we'll open up on that side. Yes, sir. Hi, Sebastian Bricksy-Williams. I'm from Basic in London. I wanted to pick up on something Mr. Reich brought up, which was responsibility. And it seems to me that that's going to be absolutely crucial to questions, such as non MPT states joining the NSS and so forth. The problem is that every nuclear arms state has at some point issued a statement saying that they're responsible, including DPRK. And I think that should actually be taken seriously, because everyone has a different idea of what it means to be responsible. And there is no agreed common framework of what it means to be a responsible nuclear arms state. And this is a discussion that probably needs to be had. And this is some of the work we're doing at Basic. And I have a report here, which we put out last month on this issue. So my question, which I guess is slightly provocative, and is of the nuclear states represented on this panel, do you think that you are a responsible nuclear state? And if so, what are the primary reasons you think that? Because in our experience, all these states have different reasons. Thank you. Thank you. I think we'll take one question from that side also, before I go back to the panel. Thank you very much. My name is Rizwan Abassi. I'm an academician from Pakistan. My question is to all the panelists, can the NPT Treaty be universalized by legitimizing the NSG or to include enough non-member states in the NSG, in the present or contemporary environment? And question number two is directed to Indian colleague. Since India is non-NPT Treaty, and of course, it does not follow the IAEA's full scope safeguards. Does India have any plan to place its eight reactors under the IAEA safeguards that are not actually presently under the safeguards system? Thank you. Could you just repeat the first question? Can NPT be universalized by legitimizing the NSG and to include enough non-member states in the NSG group? Thank you. Okay. Well, important and difficult questions. I'll go to the panel who wants to start with those two. I think you can respond as you wish, Jill, if you want to start with... You have started the issue of responsible nuclear armed states, so... Well, at least from my perspective, the question of responsibility, first and foremost, should be translated into criteria. It would be much easier to tackle it. As for today, as was well said before, it's a word. And then the question is, what is contained inside this word? I tried to set some elements that could be included from an international perspective, safety, security, and maybe one can use the word openness, transparency, cooperation with the national community. At least from my perspective, Israel stands and sticks to those norms. But again, this is something that before we have a set of clear criteria, it would be hard to define, hard to tackle, where each country stands for. And by the way, it's not an issue only of India, Pakistan, and Israel. It's an issue which is relevant to the P5. And it's an issue which is relevant to countries with high level of technology in the nuclear realm. So, you know, I would like to see states all around the world adhering to those criteria and norms, not connected directly to the issue of the energy and the NPT, but for a safer and secured world in the nuclear domain. So at least from my perspective, well, of course, the answer is, as an Israeli representative, yes, Israel is a responsible state in the nuclear realm. But the question again is, it's a bit more complicated. What is the meaning of responsibility? Dr. Sethi? That's a very good question on what makes a responsible, you know, nuclear state. And fortunately for India, the title was given to us by President Bush, when he described India as a responsible nuclear weapon state. So I would go along with the two parameters that he's listed out on nuclear safety and nuclear security. But I'd add a couple of others as well. The initiatives that the country has shown on its steadfastness on nonproliferation and disarmament. So and I would, you know, while we talk about the non proliferation order and we look at the NPT, the idea of the NPT was also something that India was very much a part of in the making of the NPT. It's just that the treaty developed in such a manner that India could not be a part of that discriminatory regime, the CTBT, the partial test ban treaty before that, you know, the action plan that was put out by India on disarmament and had we followed that at that time by 2022, the world would have been without nuclear weapons, but it was just wrong timing, caught as the world was at the peak of the cold war at that time. So your approach to nonproliferation and disarmament is also something that makes you responsible or irresponsible nuclear behavior. Is it behavior of brinksmanship or is it behavior that is looking more at strategic restraint and responsible, you know, talk even, not just action, but talk also about the use of nuclear weapons? Nuclear doctrine, is that stabilizing or destabilizing? I think these are all criteria that make a go into the making of a nuclear responsible nuclear state. And if you look at all of them, I would put my country in the category of responsible nuclear state very clearly. Can I can I also answer the other question that the lady asked about whether India would put its eight nuclear reactors into safeguards? No, India will not. In fact, the separation plan was clearly made out to keep those eight reactors out of this out of the civilian program. So these eight reactors certainly stay there. But the safeguard intensity of India's nuclear power program is certainly going to increase as more reactors come online, because not all of those reactors are going to be kept as part of the military program. In fact, all of them which are using imported fuel from outside will go into the safeguarded part of the program. The fast breeder reactors, I think Sadia had made a mention of whether India would agree to put its fast breeder reactor under safeguards. We had a very long and protracted debate within the country when the separation plan was being made out. And it was a demand from the American side that the FBR should be a part of the safeguarded program. And India held on very steadfastly to keep it out of the program, because it's the prototype fast breeder reactor. And we would like that technology to be patented before we can put a reactor like that under safeguards, which then comes under camera surveillance from the outside. So for a period of time, India is unlikely to put its fast breeder reactor under the safeguards program, not because, and more and more, as we use reprocessing technology or imported uranium that will need to go into such programs, they will come under safeguards. But as long as it remains with indigenous use of fuel, it will be as part of the unsafeguarded section of the Indian program. So building on what my other two colleagues have said, I would say that if the criteria is restricted to issues of safety and security and to export controls, clearly I would see Pakistan as a responsible new state. But I'll take this conversation a little further. The question of what actually qualifies to be a responsible behavior is very, it's very complicated responsibility towards who? Responsibility involves this kind of discussion should focus not only on responsibility toward other state actors, but also responsibility towards one's own citizens. And when I look at India and Pakistan, I don't find any of the two as responsible nuclear armed states, given the way they are prioritizing their security policies, the kind of weapons development that they are undertaking, the kind of investment that they are making into their military programs, often at the cost of a lot of other developmental projects that need to be undertaken. So those kinds of factors should also be made part of the conversation when we are talking about responsibility. And I, being one of the skeptics of the entire conversation in nuclear deterrence, would of course slightly disagree with a lot of other people on these issues. Thank you. Do you want to come in or should we take a couple of more questions? I think we... And I think there was another question that is one that we didn't address, which was about the NPT and... Yeah, sterilization. Making, like, NSG membership a way to sort of legitimize the status of the nuclear non-nuclear armed states that are not party to NPT. I think, again, it depends on where we stand. From the non-nuclear weapon states that are party to NPT, from their standpoint, it becomes a little too tricky to sort of make a case that NSG membership should be accorded as a legitimate legitimacy certificate for the non-nuclear, for the nuclear arms states that are not party to NPT. But from where we come, which is like India, Pakistan, Israel, that decided to stay out of NPT because they thought that the issue of sovereignty, the issue of their security consideration was too important, there is this ongoing struggle to find a way to have some degree of legitimacy. But I think when we talk about fairness and justice, it shouldn't be just about us. That conversation needs to be much broader. It needs to take into consideration standards of behavior that are acceptable to everyone as opposed to things that only favor us or our interest. Let's take a couple of more questions. First on that side. Howard Moreland, a retired journalist. Israel and Pakistan and India can each cite each other as the reason they have nuclear weapons. But Israel is not surrounded, has no nuclear armed neighbors. It's always had a nuclear weapons monopoly. In light of this, what exactly are the targets for Israel's nuclear weapons? I mean they're not permission to exist. They're bombs that go boom. Where are they going to be when they go boom? I think while Jill reflects on how to react to that, I wish you luck. Yes, Jim Ostroff with Platt's nuclear publications to briefly recap, as many know, India and Pakistan. Sort the acquiescence of the United States several years ago to support admission to the NSG. And as mentioned, this was rebuffed effectively by China. Is there any sense that that is now a dead end? That, you know, basically after all is said and done, China will continue to raise issues and for the foreseeable future that alone will be enough to foreclose India and Pakistan's membership in the NSG. Is there one more question? Perhaps from that side? No. Okay, then I will let the panel take those upon themselves and the first maybe Jill if you want to respond to but I understand it's a tricky one. No, it's okay. Look, in the end of the day, I think that as one was mentioned before by my Pakistani colleague, the question of joining a treaty is a sovereign decision of a country. Now, I think that Israel today is probably the only country in the world which is under an existential threat which was stated very clearly if one could go back to the Iranian missiles and try and translate what was written on them, I can make his life easier because it was in Hebrew. They didn't even try to write it in Persian. They wrote it in Hebrew and the message was very clear Israel should be destroyed. Okay, the second thing is you know we had a very interesting panel which I listened carefully in the morning dealing about scenarios or possible scenarios in which nuclear war can start. The interesting thing was that the Middle East was not among those scenarios. So when you are speaking about responsibility, when you're speaking about tension, when you are speaking about who should the world be frightened from, the Middle East was not a part of this debate. Very interesting, I'm taking it as a kind of remark but none of the panelists nor one of the questions even mentioned the idea that nuclear and the Middle East is something that the world should be frightened from as for today. So again when Israel is under existential threat which is demonstrated almost day by day by the statements and actions taken by some states in a region, I think that the sovereign decision of Israel not to be a part of the NPT will remain for the time being, for a long time being. Thank you. Well maybe we'll ask Dr. Murky to respond to the question on whether the process going on within the NSG is a dead end or if that process is going to continue and lead to result. So you're the only NSG member state on the panel. What do you think? I don't have a straight answer and I don't think somebody has it. We do hope that the NSG process continued but I go back to my first answer related India's membership to NSG. This created tension between you know the universal norms and the particular situations and the global order is plagued of particular situation and I think we should avoid that. It shouldn't be India yes or India no. It should be a global rule, a normal rule for all the countries wanted to join the group. Thank you. Maybe you would like to come in also on that because the conventional wisdom among NSG states and I have personally been part of the NSG meetings where this has been discussed is that in the end well I have two issues. You have the importance of elaborating criteria that are non-NASG military and equal for all countries who would like to join but also that the particular issue of India's application also if it is going to move forward it is has to be one part of the solution has to be bilateral between India and China. Do you agree with that and and do you see prospects of such a development in the near future? So basically I'm answering the question in is NSG membership a dead end. I think in diplomacy there never is a dead end on anything it's just that there is a lull for now because the immediacy of the plenary is over there's been a change of president at the NSG you know with the change of the South Korean person who's the president with the change in the White House it was expected that there would be a sort of slowing down of the momentum and for the time being within the country within my country as well not everyone is hopeful that it'll be something that can be achieved easily or very quickly but certainly it's not a dead end I think we will go ahead and you said one of the solutions to the problem could be for India's outreach to China to be able to you know because we are no longer in a situation where President Barack Obama could pick up the phone and speak to the Chinese Premier and bring him on board on the NSG. So the US-China equation is so different today that India will have to fight its own battle with China on getting them to back off on their objections on the NSG. So I think there has been a lot of thinking within the country we've had our first strategic dialogue with China very recently on which these kinds of issues have certainly surfaced it's not going to be an easy road but I think some of the suggestions that I've been making for instance are having some kind of for instance a commercial nuclear reactor agreement with China where we are providing those more to the outside so joining up with China at the commercial nuclear reactor level having certain cooperation between the centres of excellence the nuclear centres of excellence that exists between India and China so trying to look for opportunities that would give China a face-saving device because it has put itself into a corner by making all those objections against India's membership and I remain hopeful that given the pragmatist approach that China often takes on many of these issues there would be hope that they would understand the value of having India as a member of the NSG but even if it was not to happen in a hurry or not happen for a very long time I would still say India has been mainstreamed into the non-proliferation order and I don't say it only because of the exceptionalization that has been granted by the NSG which has helped India to raise you know its level of the nuclear power program but it's because of the reality of India's nuclear power program given the fact that we are looking at a very ambitious target for the nuclear power program given that the industry is rising up to be able to meet those targets within the country given that India is such an important member of the export controls because we've got a dual use industry which goes beyond nuclear so for us to be plugging into the into the gaps that exist on export control is going to be extremely important and all of this then makes India a part of the non-proliferation regime whenever the NSG membership comes along and I don't think anyone in India is losing sleep over it the exceptionalization has given us the capability to be an importer and also eventually emerge as an exporter so it'll be a reality that India will be a nuclear supplier at some point in the future so there is no way that you know NSG can keep us out or keep us out and be effective in and off by itself I had heard you know when the Indo-US nuclear deal was being negotiated and in both the US and India it voluble democracies which went through huge debates about whether this should happen or not and one of the analysts I remember at that time had said if the deal stands the NPT will fall it's been eight years or ten years almost since then the deal stands and the NPT hasn't fallen either so I think we tend to straightjacket ourselves into very narrow you know sizes of thinking when we make statements of that nature it's well beyond that and lastly I'd just like to comment on something that Sadia had said about India and Pakistan being engaged in nuclear weapons development and I've heard this several times earlier as well that we are in a nuclear arms race well yes India is developing its nuclear capability but it's not doing it as part of an arms race it's doing it in a very deliberate calibrated manner based on a doctrine that was put out in 1999 so if you're looking at survivability because we've got a no first use doctrine yes we are going out to the sea with nuclear capable submarines but that doesn't put us in an arms race with anyone it's the fact that you have to build a certain amount of capability for the purposes of deterrence and India has a philosophy with nuclear weapons which is essentially for deterrence and not for warfighting so if it's an arms race that Pakistan believes that might be in it is in an arms race with itself I would say than it you know with the capability that India is building up we are certainly not in an arms race with China in fact we are following the same policy and philosophy that the Chinese followed for a long time remaining secure in its survivability and that's exactly the path that we are taking thank you I think in fairness now I will give Sadia the last two minutes before we go to the the polling part of this panel thank you so much I would say that I purposefully didn't use the word arms race despite the fact that I do think that Pakistan and India are in a military in some sort of a competition but I talked about military developments nuclear weapons related developments and I do think that we have seen India having moved away from its position its 1999 position on number of counts and the entire conversation on what minimum deterrence is and what credible minimum deterrence has been evolving in India and in Pakistan so we can take refuge in the words like we can endlessly discuss that the word credibility itself provides both Pakistan and India enough sort of opportunity and space to continue working on some of the programs that they think are mandatory for ensuring their deterrence requirements but I do think that the thinking and the kind of conversation that was going on in India back in 1999 and the and some of the influential Indian thinkers had set up certain criteria with regard to what would be minimum what would be the requirements of minimum deterrence for India has fundamentally altered and with the kind of investments that India is making in a lot of advanced technologies again I would say that that is changing the nature of the entire conversation on strategic balance in South Asia. Thank you and I think if we had more time we could have gone deeper into that debate and I think it's good that the conversation can continue during this conference with that I want to really thank the audience and the panelists for a very interesting and insightful panel and we will now I hope succeed in also this technological experiment I've been told that if one pulls up the app and press take the poll there should be a question related to our debate but actually currently I see another question which has to do with with the start treaty. Does anybody else what do you I see I see the question there yeah but it should be there should be also in the app it is not yet in the app it's in the app now okay well I see I see in my app the another question but anyway if you see it perfect so the question is apart from adherence to NSG guidelines what is the most important criterion for non-embedded states to join the NSG. It's an open question or you have it. There should be options exactly that they should be in the app in this audience. It's in the app for this session where do one press also one has to go to this session correct not take the poll so one goes to mainstream or sideline and then you press live poll okay so does anybody got that up apart from adherence to NSG guidelines what is the most important criterion for non-embedded states to join the NSG and there are four possible answers sign the CTBT make legal commitment to disarmament sees fissile material production non-embedded states should not be permitted to become NSG members or there should be no additional criteria particular for non-embedded states. There are four quite distinct answers I'm going to vote myself as the audience been able to maneuver through the through the app so it's you go into this session and at the bottom there is live poll and you press that and you should come up to this question with the four different answers. Do we have have the votes come in? I just wanted to clarify for you all navigating the app we just figured it this out here so what you're going to do is go to the agenda get the agenda and then you go down and you will see the concurrent session one made and streamed or sidelined nine non-MPT states in the nuclear order I want you to click that you're going to scroll down to the very bottom of the page pass the speakers pass the publications and click on the live poll mainstreamed or sidelined and then you should see on your screen in fairly large font apart from adherence to the NSG guidelines and so on so we're going to be floating around if anyone has any questions definitely raise your hand we'll come over and help see more votes are coming in see the percentages shifting should we give we have another 30 seconds to vote exactly it's it's it's a it's an anonymous polling so you're not gonna get credit for it if you if you are in the winning side but I see the the percentages stabilizing a few more votes are coming in should we close the vote now and and I can draw the conclusion that the most popular answer is that the non-MPT stage should sign the CTBT and make a legal commitment to disarmament like a sign on to article 6 but I also see that there are almost well 22% who think that they should not at all be allowed to become NSG members as long as they're not part of the MPT and also that there are 16% who think that there should be no additional criteria needed apart from the ones related to export controls and and the regular NSG guidelines so I think we're not gonna draw I'm not gonna draw any particular conclusions from this I think we have a particular we have contributed to to to knowledge and debate on this issue and I think this is a theme that will will continue for for some time to be discussed and I think many of the points that have been made during this panel will also be reflected in the coming panels in the coming day and a half so with that I want to thank everybody for taking their time to be here the organizers have asked me to let you know that that there will be a break now of about 30 minutes or a little bit less because we run a few minutes over time and that the next set of concurrent sessions will begin promptly at 315 and with that I want to thank you and I want to ask you to join me in a round of applause for the panelists