 Welcome, Members, to the 30th meeting in 2017 of the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee. David Torrance and Alison Harris have submitted apologies. Bill Bowman is taking Alison's place today. Can I welcome Robin Walker MP and Chris Skidmore MP to the meeting? A gender item 1 decision on taking business in private. I propose that the committee takes items 7, 8 and 9 in private and those items are the contents of a report to the Justice Committee on the Civil Litigation Expenses and Group Proceedings Scotland Bill, consideration of the evidence heard on the European Union withdrawal bill and the committee's draft report on instruments considered during the first quarter of the parliamentary year. Does the committee agree to take these items in private? We'll move straight on to agenda item 2, which is the European Union withdrawal bill. Welcome again, Robin Walker MP, parliamentary under secretary of state for exiting the European Union and Chris Skidmore MP, minister for the constitution UK government to the committee this morning. We'll move straight into questions. I'm going to take the first few. We all want to get to a point where all the parliaments in the UK can agree to a legislative consent motion. How do you think we'll get there? First of all, chair, may I thank the committee for this opportunity to be able to speak to you today? As the minister of the constitution, I'm responsible for constitutional policy and democracy in the UK government, the Cabinet Office. I'm part of the team responsible for taking this essential piece of primary legislation through the UK Parliament and it's very much in the spirit of being able to engage with you today that I welcome this opportunity. The process of the bill, which is yet to reach the floor of the House of Commons, is one in which, as members of the UK government, we are extremely keen to engage all parties that are involved. While we will be seeking legislative consent motion for the bill, and that has been stated repeatedly by the secretary of state for DECSU, both on the floor of the House, in committees and in explanatory notes to the bill, we want to ensure that we can work with committees such as yourself. We can work with both members of the Scottish Parliament, with the devolved administrations, Scottish members of the House of Commons. I've recently had several meetings with Scottish members of the House of Commons to discuss the bill and amendments. We want to ensure that this is an inclusive process by which we can secure legislative consent motions for this crucial piece of legislation that will be needed in order to ensure that come exit day. We are prepared as the United Kingdom, as the internal market of the United Kingdom, so we have stability and security for all of our constituents across the United Kingdom, for all of those businesses who need to ensure that EU law, once retained into UK law, is transferred over with the minimum possible disruption. That is why we want the bill to take place as rapidly as possible and to ensure that we can obtain consent, which is why, going forward with the committee process in the House of Commons being here today, we want to ensure that this is a conversation by which we can pick up any concerns, points of detail that you have as a committee, to ensure that we can secure that legislative consent motion. I just add to us that it's very important to look at this in the context of what the purpose of the bill is. The purpose of the bill is very much about broadening continuity and certainty in all parts of the United Kingdom and each of the devolved administrations. We are making sure that we can do that with consent that is being sought, which is very important in that respect. I think also being clear that this bill has been carefully drafted with a view to preserving the devolved arrangements as they stand today and contains the mechanisms for increasing the powers for each of the devolved legislatures. That's something that we've been very clear that our intention through the whole of this process is for each of the devolved, let's just see a significant increase in its powers and that's what we believe will be the outcome. Of course, there is the process of committee stage to come and you'll understand, convener, that we can't pre-empt too much of that process in terms of discussing the detail of individual amendments. We do respect the fact that a large number of amendments have been put forward that those have been very carefully drafted and we will be carefully considering all of those and responding to them during that committee stage. Alongside that, there is also the process of discussion which is underway between the administrations and the JMC process where I think it's a very positive thing. We've seen agreement, both on where common frameworks may be required, but just as importantly, on the respect that needs to be shown to the existing devolution settlement and to protecting the powers for each of the devolved legislatures within that. Just out of interest, because we're going to have to do a report, probably several reports, but our first report will be based on the bill probably in its original form and clearly that's going to change. Can you give us an idea of timeframes in the commons for this? If we talk through that in a bit more detail, obviously we've had second reading of the bill which took place in September and we now move into committee stage. The first two days of that committee stage have been announced for the 14th and 15th of November. There will be eight days in all of committee stage and the devolution clauses are going to be debated on the fourth and the fifth day of that process. There are not specific set dates for those yet because the way that this works in the House of Commons leader of the House comes forward on the Thursday of each week with a business statement and that sets out for next week's business. The next opportunity for her to do so will be the 16th of November. The bill confers wide powers on UK and devolved ministers to correct retained EU law. We, i.e. the committees, heard from witnesses that there are concerns about the breadth of the powers, in particular wide reach of the term deficiencies. At the same time, we recognise that deficiencies must arise from the UK's withdrawal from the EU in order to fall within the scope of the correcting power. Can you explain how the term deficiencies is to be understood in terms of the powers in the bill to prevent remedy or mitigate deficiencies in retained EU law? Simply, the deficiencies power, which is set out in clause 7, is about making sure that the statute book works, about therefore recognising where there may be references to EU institutions which would no longer be appropriate in the context of our membership, for instance. However, there are appropriate references made domestically in that case, making sure that the statute books are functional in each part of the UK. Very importantly, it is not about making changes. One of the things across the whole approach to this bill is that this is a bill that is about continuity and certainty as we go through the process. It is not about making policy change and the focus on deficiencies in clause 7 very clearly limits the powers to focusing on putting things right. I think also it's important to recognise that each of the powers for ministers to bring forward devolved legislation is constrained and sunsetted. Obviously, the sunset clauses are important in this respect as well because this bill is about how we exit the European Union, how we make sure we have a functioning statute book through that period of exit. Day after we are out, the law continues to function in each part of the UK. It's not about setting how we develop a policy from there on in, and that will be in the hands of the respective parliaments and legislatures that will be determining what our laws should be going forward. I think it's also important to note that when you're looking at the deficiencies that need to be corrected, they have been not only tightly defined in terms of time, but also in terms of scope. So there are a list of certain powers that cannot be enacted through the deficiencies power, tax-raising powers for example, and the majority of these deficiencies are technical. So when you look at the changes that are needed, this is a process by which we need to ensure that the statute book is ready for exit day and to be able to ensure that with a vast amount of legislation that needs to be corrected, this correction process can take place with a minimum possible disruption. We've heard evidence that the powers should be framed so that they're available only where necessary to correct deficiencies in retained EU law, rather than where considered appropriate. I think that this was a point raised in the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee as well. How would you respond to that and what your views on that? This is an issue that we will be debating as part of the committee stage, but I think that there are some concerns about where, for instance, two different solutions may be possible. That does not make either one of those solutions necessary and therefore there is a need to have a power to bring forward the appropriate delegated legislation where it is appropriate rather than only necessary. As I say, that constraint of necessary would leave you in some circumstances where you weren't able to take what you and I might define as necessary steps because there was a choice of two different ways of addressing the issue. I think also on the point of necessary versus appropriate, it's also worth taking into account the comments of the House of Lords Select Committee on the constitution that reported in the ninth report of their session that it will be difficult to tightly define in advance the limits of delegated powers granted under the bill without potentially hobbling the Government's ability to adapt EU law to fit the UK circumstances following Brexit. We do not think that it is realistic to assume that the Government will have worked out in advance of the bill being considered by Parliament what amendments will be needed to the corpus of EU law. That being in the case, it's unrealistic to assume that Parliament will be able to tightly limit the delegated powers granted under the bill because it will not be clear what exactly they will be required to do. So it's in with the context of the negotiations as well, then also frames the question of necessary versus appropriate. I'll just quote you from that committee's report on this subject. It says, ministers have powers to alter 60 years of EU law when they consider it appropriate to deal with deficiencies. This goes much wider than the Government's white paper commitment not to make major changes to policy beyond those that are necessary to ensure UK law continues to function properly. So is this a bit of a U turn? No, I think we still very much see this as being a bill which is about providing continuity rather than in any way making changes to policy. I think the specific point in terms of why purely using the necessary terminology in terms of the drafting of the bill is about making sure that we are able to act in cases where there are a number of different options available which are strictly necessary. I'd just like to reiterate the key assurance at the top of this and the point that was made in our white paper is that the focus of this process will be about providing continuity uncertainty. It's not about making changes to policy and where we see there being changes to policy we will bring forward primary legislation. You've already seen that in a number of areas where the Government has announced primary legislation. Certainly, after the point of exit, there would be further primary legislation to make policy changes, not something that we see as being in the interests of the United Kingdom in the meantime because we recognise that people are calling out for the maximum certainty and assurance through this process. I think also to come back on the committee report in particular, they also did state that the bill itself will be an exceptional piece of legislation necessitated by the extraordinary circumstance of Brexit. While the Government may make a wide case for a wide array of discretionary powers, there should no way be taken as precedent when considering the appropriate bounds of delegated powers in the future. In that committee themselves went on to recognise the sunset provision and the correcting power that is curtailed by the sunset provision in subsection 7. Therefore, while these are exceptional circumstances in order to be able to change legislation in order to adapt to the legislative circumstances of leaving the EU, I think that the committee welcomed the fact that the sunset provisions were in place. We will come on to the sunset provisions now then. Can you explain the approach that you have taken to the sunset clauses? Why have you chosen the time periods for the powers to lapse that you have? There are obviously different sunset clauses in different areas of the bill with regard to the withdrawal agreement powers, the powers on the clause 9 that's unsetted at the point of withdrawal. This is about making preparations so that the statute book is in the right place at that point. With regard to the deficiencies powers, we've recognised that the process of making all the corrections may not be possible to get all the relevant delegated legislation and corrections through for that point. Therefore, we would need to prioritise those that are most important. Therefore, there is a two-year sunset clause on those particular powers after the point of exit. It's an important point that has been acknowledged by the various committees in the UK Parliament that there are sunset clauses on those powers. It's important that we listen to the debate around that as to how we can make sure that that works in the most effective way. Do you think that there should be a sunset clause applying to clause 11, which has caused quite a lot of controversy? Well, this was a point that was made to me at the Select Committee for Exiting the European Union the other day. My answer there, which is the same answer I would give you, is that I would hope that the discussion on common frameworks can make progress so that that controversy is actually not there. We can agree where the powers in clause 11 to use orders in council to release certain areas, because there's agreement that common frameworks aren't required, are able to be put to use. That should be on a timetable, which I think is sooner than any of the sunset clauses in the bill. I think that that's something that we need to press on with. We need to make sure that that agreement is there. I think that that will deal with that issue without the necessity of putting the sunset clause into the bill. How confident are you going to get that agreement on common frameworks? I think that it's a good sign, obviously, that the JMC, a short period of time ago, agreed the key principles of that. I think that that's a very balanced agreement, which reflects a respect for the devolution settlement and an agreement that there will be a requirement for common frameworks in some areas. Obviously, we now need to move forward with the discussions, and I know that the Cabinet Office is leading in that process in the JMC. I think that when it comes to clause 11, we've been very keen to not only state in the clause itself that, when we look at powers that are currently held by devolved administrations, there are no powers that are currently held by devolved administrations that will be taken away from those devolved administrations. That's clearly stated in subsection 4B of the clause, and when it comes to subsection 4C of the clause, there is obviously this commitment also to releasing non-common framework powers as and when those are suitably identified. That was working in conjunction with the JMCN process. We had the Concordia agreed on 16 October to be able to investigate where we understand common frameworks will be needed. It comes back to this point of certainty and understanding that we want for all of our constituents across the UK to make sure that, as we leave the European Union, we do so protecting that integral single market of the UK single market to ensure that we've got stability for businesses, for employers. I think that when it comes to those common frameworks, that's a process, which obviously there's another meeting of JMCN taking place in December, and obviously we'll be willing to get to work as fast as possible on this. I think that Minister Walker made the absolutely vital point here is that this is work that needs to happen now. This is not work that we will therefore upgrade an artificial boundary in legislation to suddenly suggest that this work can then be completed in two years' time. It needs to happen now in order to be able to give the Scottish Parliament and all devolved ministrations the confidence that we want to respect the devolution process. When you look at this legislation, when you look at clause 11, it is framed within the existing devolution legislation. When it comes to ensuring that we respect the devolution process, we believe in a strong United Kingdom, but a strong United Kingdom that can only be delivered through having a stronger devolution process. We hope that by identifying areas of non-common frameworks that can be released, that is why the Order in Council process, the section 30 process that is already in the Scotland Act will be used in future in order to be able to approve our commitment that we want to return more powers. That is why I view today as an opportunity not only to be questioned by the committee but to listen to your concerns and to reflect on your concerns, to take those concerns back to Westminster and to invite all members of the committee that if they have any additional concerns that are not raised today by all means, do right into the Cabinet Office under DEXU because we are in a process of listening to what needs to be done. Earlier, Mr Walker, you appeared before another committee. An interesting phrase was used. You described something as a deep dive process. That was probably the Secretary of State for Scotland. It was discussed in NASA. We blame Mr Mundell for that. Have you any idea what he was talking about? He was talking about the work that is going forward to move forward from the last JMC to the next one and to look into areas where having agreed the principles on common frameworks, we can then take forward some detailed technical work at an official level to begin to scope out where common frameworks might be needed and where they might not. I think that it is really important, but that work does move forward between the Governments. I am afraid that I cannot go much further than that because I am reporting back on what my colleague said rather than necessarily something that I said myself. We will just take it that a deep dive process means detailed work. I think that also the deep dive processes that are currently being engaged are not betraying secrets to say that there are certain areas that are being looked at such as agriculture and justice. I am not party to the discussions, but they are taking place at regular, if not daily, levels between officials. As a minister, I have been struck by the enthusiasm for officials on both sides of the devolved administrations and the UK Government to work together. We have seen significant levels of increased co-operation, rightly so. We need to ensure that all our constituents are confident that we, as the Scottish Parliament or the UK Parliament, are doing the right thing and making sure that this process works for all of us. Do you think that some common frameworks should appear on the face of the bill? The bill obviously holds the power within the Orders and Council process, modelled on the approach taken in the Scotland Act, where common frameworks are agreed not to be required to release areas and where they are required, clause 11 provides for them to be maintained. The aims of the bill are to provide continuity and certainty. We need to do that both with regard to the domestic statute books that we have, but also with regard to our negotiations with the European Union in order to show that we can deliver on the outcomes that we will commit to in terms of any future trade negotiations. I think that is hugely in the interests of all the devolved administrations and parliaments and of the UK to agree between ourselves. The fact that the bill provides that mechanism is the key thing, but what we have said and what I would absolutely stand by is that we want that conversation on common frameworks to move forward as quickly as possible. One more question from me and then we will move on to other members. The bill restricts any amendment of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. It does not restrict amendment of the Scotland Act 1998. Why is it appropriate that the provisions of the Scotland Act should be capable of amendment or appeal in regulations made under the bill? Across the whole range of legislation, there are references and provisions that would not make sense when we leave the EU. Unlike other pieces of legislation that would predominantly be corrected using the powers in the bill through secondary legislation, we have recognised the special standing of all three devolution acts. That is why the bill corrects as many deficiencies as possible in the free devolution act on the face of the bill in schedule 3 part 2. However, you are right in saying that the bill maintains a correcting power for the Wales Act and the Scotland Act. This is limited only to correcting deficiencies and it is provided as a contingency arrangement to prevent gaps in the statute book. The Northern Ireland Act is the main statutory manifestation of the Belfast agreement and therefore if it does require correction that has to be carried out by primary legislation. Bill Bowman has a couple of questions. If I can move to devolved authorities powers, can you explain the reason for the limitations on the correcting powers in schedule 2 that apply to devolved authorities but not to UK ministers? It comes down to protecting the integrity of that single market. We want to ensure that there is no divergence. When we look at EU law, there has not been any divergence that has had those common frameworks. We are simply carrying on the process by which section 22 of the European Communities Act 1972 operated. That ensures that, as we then look at the establishment of where common frameworks will be needed and not needed, we have that certainty and security by knowing that when it comes to ensuring that we have retained EU law that the situation is exactly the same as it currently is. I mean, just to echo the point, I think the key thing with regard to schedule 2 and clause 10 is that this does give important powers to devolved legislatures to make necessary corrections to their statute books but it is within the framework of existing EU frameworks and the approach that is provided by those. As Mr Skidmore just said, it is important to recognise that this approach echoes the arrangements that we have at the moment under European law. It returns to the point that the bill itself is really about providing some continuity through this process rather than making big changes. We certainly do think that it reflects the existing balance of the devolution settlement in terms of allowing devolved legislatures and administrations to take decisions in all the areas where they previously could. Let me ask a sort of related question. There is no procedure that allows Scottish ministers to make regulations urgently although there is such a procedure for available to the UK ministers. Firstly, can you explain the circumstances in which you would expect to use this procedure? Secondly, why is this procedure not available to Scottish ministers? I think that there has already been a commitment to any, when it comes to the delegated powers memo for the bill, the Government has committed to not normally using the correcting power to amend domestic legislation in areas that devolve competence without the agreement of the relevant devolved authority. That is a commitment for engagement and consent that we have looked at when Secretary David Davis made his second reading speech. It comes back again to that point of certainty and control of ensuring that we have a statute book that is ready for exit day on that point of exit. On that point of scrutiny, it is important to be clear that we would be absolutely prepared to listen to any suggestions from the Scottish Parliament or the Scottish Government if they feel that the approach that we have for the UK Parliament would be appropriate. The reason why we have not written that into the bill is respect for the fact that it is the Scottish Parliament at the end of the day that sets its own scrutiny procedures. We would not want to introduce a novel concept without having had feedback from the Scottish Parliament that that would be welcomed. That is an area where we would appreciate your feedback and your views as to whether that is something that would be valuable to explore. Are you saying that there could be such a procedure for Scottish ministers? If the Scottish Parliament decided to create such a procedure for Scottish experience, it is within the competence of the Scottish Parliament to do that. If the committee feels that this is something that we should be looking at further from the concept of the bill, we would be keen to hear that, because that is not something that we have heard to date from the Scottish Government or the Scottish Parliament. Monica Lennon Thank you, convener. We are sticking with the same theme of devolved authorities powers. There is no equivalent for the devolved authorities of the power in clause 17 to make consequential or transitional provision in connection with the bill. Are you able to explain the reasons for that? When it comes to consequential and transitional powers, those are usually standard powers that are contained in most bills. The consequential power can only be used in clause 17 by ministers to amend other laws to the extent that they think that this is needed as a result of something that is done by this bill. The transitional powers used to manage the change from the old legal regime to the new regime introduced by the bill. It is not the normal practice to confer such a power in active Parliament on devolved ministers. When you look at the Scotland Act 2016 and the Wales Act 2017, they both provide such powers and confirm them only on UK ministers. In the interests of transparency accountability, we sought to make a number of significant consequential and transitional provisions that are necessary in relation to devolved matters on the face of the bill. Where we could do so, for instance, in paragraphs 21 to 23 of schedule 8, which introduced new definitions and the interpretation less for Scotland Act as concepts created by the bill, which might have been lost by virtue of repealing the ECA, we have done so. Furthermore, the devolved administrations have consequential powers provided elsewhere in the bill to make consequential provisions when exercising their powers in schedule 2. That means that they can make provisions that are consequential on the secondary legislation that they make using their powers in the bill. It is not an exceptional process. It follows the existing pattern of legislation when applied to devolved administrations. Obviously, that is what we have done previously in the Scotland Act and Wales Act. If that is a concern, we are welcome to take that back and look again. Does that mean that there could be an opportunity for the bill to be amended to give a similar power to Scottish ministers? As Minister Walker said at the beginning, we do not want to prejudge what takes place on the floor of the house. We have committee stage and we have, I think, over 100 amendments now made specifically around the clauses relating to devolution. I am in the current process by which we are meeting some of the authors of those amendments to discuss their concerns. However, it is our duty as ministers to make sure that we reflect upon all opinions that we value the input for those people who want to make this bill work and to ensure that we have a transition period that creates stability and security as we leave the United Kingdom. We will listen to those concerns and, obviously, the process of the bill going forward. We have committee stage and we have report stage. However, we are keen to ensure that we take the devolved administrations with us and that we obtain that legislative consent motion at the end of this process. Notwithstanding that volume of possible amendments and suggestions that people are making, I wonder what assurances the ministers can give of responding favourably and, in a timely manner, to request from Scottish ministers for the UK to exercise the powers in close 17 where it is considered necessary. I think returning to my original point, if there are concerns from Scottish ministers, we will listen to those. We will respond appropriately at the point where the legislation allows us to on committee stage. I am not sure when clause 17, which day that is reached, and certainly the relevant minister responding to that will reflect all those concerns on that particular day in the appropriated schedule that has been set out by the House. Something else that we have been reflecting on in the committee and I hope that you can help us. Are you able to explain why the Scottish ministers' powers are restricted so that they cannot amend retained direct EU legislation? This is fundamentally about the question of where frameworks currently sit above both Scottish and UK law at the EU level and having the conversation, which we are having through the JMC process, about frameworks. It is the need in order to provide the continuity uncertainty that is the aim of the bill to maintain those frameworks, where they are important, but also to find those areas where we do not necessarily need legislative frameworks as quickly as possible and agree between us that those can then use the order and council mechanism to move on. It is not an intention that there should be any permanent restriction on the powers that are held. It is about making sure that we have a process in place to provide continuity uncertainty on the frameworks that we have in place and that we also have a process in place to increase the powers of each devolved administration. That is absolutely our intent. That was set out in our white paper and that will be something that we will continue to focus on through the bill. I think that we all appreciate that the discussions on common frameworks are on going. In terms of a principle, the minister for UK negotiations on Scotland's place in Europe argued that the Scottish ministers should have this power, suggesting that, as devolution is predicated on subsidiarity, there should be scope for variation within the UK with decisions made at the appropriate level. How would you respond to that? There is already, of course, significant scope for variation with the UK in terms of the implementation, in terms of the interpretation of EU law, where it is to go, and, of course, the devolved administrations already have significant powers in some of these areas. However, they are constrained by the frameworks that sit at an EU level. What we are saying is that we want to have a proper process for agreeing how we treat those constraints going forward so that there are not sudden changes which could disrupt the functioning of what is a very important UK internal market. I appreciate that the minister has a different view of what this approach is set out to achieve. Our view is that it certainly is one that respects the existing frameworks of devolution. It respects the position of the devolved legislatures to be able to have their say on all of these issues. However, it ensures that we have a process for dealing with the frameworks that are required to continue functioning. Bill, you want to come back in? Fees and charges are the things that always interest us. Schedule 4 of the bill confers a wide power on UK ministers and devolved authorities to create fees and charges in connections with functions that public bodies in the UK take on exit and also to modify those fees or charges. The power goes beyond enabling public authorities to recover the costs of their functions. It is wide enough to enable taxation measures to be imposed, for example to cross subsidise or to cover the wider functions or running costs of a public body or to lower regulatory costs for certain groups or sectors. Why is it appropriate for taxation measures to be included in subordinate legislation? We see there being two distinct categories of existing fees and charges relating to EU law. Fees and charges are made at an EU level by institutions and agencies of the EU, and domestic fees and charges created in the UK are functions which UK public authorities perform stemming from EU law. As part of the preservation of EU law, directly effective permission setting out how an EU institutional agency can levy fees or charges on individuals will be converted into domestic law. The bill enables us to preserve domestic, UK domestic fees and charges connected with EU law under section 22 ECA, section 57 Finance Act 1973. However, it will repeal the former and the latter will no longer be exercisable in relation to EU obligations on exit, meaning that replacement power is needed in order to make and update fees and charges. That is a very technical issue, and I assure you that there is no intention to introduce new taxes and broad powers under this area. It is very much about keeping things working in the way that they have done previously. The schedule 4 exists simply because, when you have the Claw 7 power, that on the face of the bill states that, when you look at the deficiencies power, it cannot be used to impose taxation and therefore cannot be used in all cases where fees will charge are needed to be updated or set. The power in Claw 7 is also sunset so that it is not possible to keep fees and charges up to date in line with changes to inflation and the increase or decrease in the cost of services. The Claw 7 power can only be used for fixing deficiencies and not all these fees will be deficient as a result of exit, which is why, therefore, schedule 4 exists and provides devolved ministers with that power. It is right that those powers are there. While fees and charges that are set for service on a strict cost-recovery basis are not taxed, any fee or charge that goes further than direct cost recovery, for instance, if it cross-subsidises or compulsory level or funds the broader functioning of an organisation, does suggest that there are fees that therefore need to be flexible and therefore that power is there in the schedule. Why is it appropriate for ministers or devolved administrations to sub-delegate the power to create fees or charges to a public body and for that body to impose those fees or charges administratively rather than by way of the statutory instrument? I think that this is really about replicating the effect of arrangements that already exist under the European Union. Where there are some bodies that are able to apply fees and charges, clearly it will be necessary for us to replicate their effect. It is allowing that maintenance of that effect to be maintained, but there is no suggestion that there would be sub-delegation taking place in areas where it did not already take place under the existing arrangements. I will take it one step further. The bill provides that where regulations under this power impose a new fee or charge, the affirmative procedure will apply to scrutiny of those regulations, but where subsequent regulations modify the fees or charges, the negative procedure will apply. In theory, successive Governments may impose large or massive fee increases by regulation subject to scrutiny under the negative procedure, the concept of the £10 charge becoming 100 later. Why is that considered appropriate? I do not think that there is any change. The Government's aim is for continuity uncertainty and it is the same continuity uncertainty that currently applies when it comes to the regulation of fees as applicable so far. For instance, when you look at existing fees and charges across the UK and fees that are currently being made at EU level by EU bodies and functions, which will be transferred, we take one example as an illustrative example. We might expect an EU regime to be replaced by an equivalent UK regime in the chemical industry where, in addition to the functions related to EU legislation, the health and safety executive already charges for such as approving pesticides, the health and safety executive will take on functions carried out by, say, the European Chemicals Agency such as evaluating and authorising chemical substances which UK firms are charged by the ECA under EU reach legislation. Without the ability to charge fees, the HSE would need to meet the costs of carrying out these functions from Government funding. Making such examples out of prejudice-only future arrangements for an interim period co-operation that we may negotiate with the EU, but the current structures of fees and charging at EU level are simply being carried over. What we have here is a situation of continuity and stability rather than to disrupt a process by which we already have arrangements in place as part of our European framework. I believe that it is the case that, in terms of the point about replicating the current arrangements, the scrutiny procedures that you have referred to are also reflecting the current scrutiny procedures that exist for fees and charges. The creation of a new one requires affirmative and the maintenance of those points, such as updating them for inflation and so on, would only require a negative procedure. That is something that I am happy to double check and to write back if necessary. The room for better scrutiny. We will move on to another line of questioning from Stuart McMillan. Good afternoon, gentlemen. The bill provides the choice of three legislative routes to exercise the powers of correction, regulations made by UK ministers acting alone, regulations made by devolved authority acting alone and regulations made jointly by UK ministers and devolved authorities. What factors will determine the choice of the route that is chosen? Take the joint exercise procedure. When would we expect a joint exercise procedure to occur? At the moment, it is there to provide a mechanism through which regulations can be scrutinised by both Parliament and the devolved legislators. It is light to occur, for instance, where devolved administration requests that the UK Government legislate on their behalf, but the appropriate change to retain the new law is significantly significant. We agree that it would be appropriate for the relevant devolved legislator to also scrutinise the regulations. This is an evolutionary process. It is not a new creation of a precedent. For example, the joint procedure has been used by the UK Government and the Welsh Government when making the Water Framework Directive of England and Wales regulations 2017. Those regulations consolidated existing legislation and implemented EU obligations to provide a common strategic framework for the protection of the water environment in England and Wales. Those regulations were made under the 2-2 power of the European Communities Act, so legally they could have been made by the UK acting alone. However, in the circumstances and giving the significant policy content of the statutory instruments, it was decided that it would be appropriate to make them jointly so that the National Assembly for Wales could participate in the scrutiny process. There will be a case-by-case basis through which we will be looking at using the joint procedure. It is appropriate that when it comes to looking at the conferred powers to UK ministers to act, we will not seek to take that conferred power without the agreement of the devolved administration to start with. I come back to the point that the UK Government on the one hand wants to ensure that, while we take retained EU legislation forward until we can understand where the common frameworks need to exist and where we can further provide areas to strengthen the devolution settlement, while that process is on going, when it comes to issues of retained EU law where traditionally there would have been a UK wide operating framework, if we can work together with our devolved administrations, we will do so both in terms of where conferred powers are needed by asking for permission and to try and agree to gain acceptance of that, but also secondly when it comes to the joint procedure and obviously that's a subject case-by-case I said of understanding where those significant issues arise. What role would you envisage that the Scottish Parliament might have in the decisions to proceed with the joint power? Also certainly with the decisions that the UK Government should act alone should exercise the powers and devolve the areas? When it comes to the Scottish Parliament, the bill is explicit that we have provided it for the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament to change the arrangement when it comes to scrutiny and we want to ensure that the scrutiny arrangements that are available for the Scottish Parliament to be decided by the Scottish Parliament and also with the devolved administration and Scottish Government, but we want to ensure that the Scottish Government is able to come up with its own arrangements for scrutiny going forward on those issues? Following on from that, the bill doesn't provide for any mechanism for the Scottish Parliament's scrutiny of regulations made by the UK ministers acting alone, irrespective of whether the regulations are a matter of significance for Scotland or would have attracted the benefit of the sole convention had the matter been included in primary legislation. Can you explain why that's the case, please? I think the key point here is to set out as a bill. This is simply the equivalent of scrutiny procedures that apply in the devolved legislatures as they apply in the UK Parliament. We've invited comments from the Scottish Government on their views of the appropriateness of the scrutiny arrangements in the bill, but when it comes to defining scrutiny and providing those procedures, obviously it's an integral part of creating a secondary legislation power. If we don't have a scrutiny procedure that's specified when that power is created, the legal position is that power can be exercised by the relevant authority by simply making the instrument without any oversight for Rolf or Leicester, that, we believe, would be unorthodox and irresponsible, which is why we have created scrutiny provisions in the bill to ensure that the Scottish Parliament provides for scrutiny in the use of the powers, but we recognise the flexibility there that the Scottish Parliament at a later stage may wish to adapt those scrutiny procedures. I sat as a Government minister, I took through the Digital Economy Act last year, just to give again an evolutionary principle by which we have taken forward and added into schedule 7 the sort of framework by which scrutiny should take place. The Digital Economy Act in 2017 conferred a number of new powers on Scottish ministers and sets out the procedures for the Scottish Parliament's scrutiny of those powers. In its report as part of the LCM process, the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee commented on those procedures but at no point questioned the appropriateness of the inclusion of the procedures in that bill. When it comes to scrutiny, yes, we have applied a process of several different kinds of resolutions, whether affirmative, whether negative and whether made affirmative, but we want to ensure that going forward we work with the Scottish Government and obviously with the Scottish Parliament and those of the Scottish Government in order to understand that we recognise that Scottish Parliament does have different scrutiny procedures and technicalities that obviously want to be reflected in your own ability to scrutinise future delegated legislation regulations, but we want to ensure that going forward with the bill. You can see this throughout the entire process of how the bill has been framed. This is about continuity and stability and certainty, which is why we have taken existing frameworks and existing legislation. We have not looked to create new constitutional context here. The bill is a process bill by which we need to ensure that the statute book remains applicable on exit day, which is why we have taken forward processes that had already existed in order to ensure that there was a minimum degree of change and maximum degree of stability. One aspect regarding that minute. I did not hear the issue of either agreement or consent with the Scottish ministers being mentioned in your reply, Mr Skidmore, and certainly with the Delegate of Powers memorandum. That states that the UK Government will not normally use the power to amend domestic legislation in areas of devolved competence without the agreement of the relevant devolved authority. I am certainly very interested to understand more in terms of what the word normally means in that particular phrase. It is in the Delegate of Powers memorandum that I quoted that earlier in the session. David Davis wrote to Mike Russell and Mark Drakeford on 13 July, stating that, Without first consulting you, I have placed such commitment in the bill's explanatory notes. In second reading, he stated that the Government has committed to ensuring that the powers work for administrations and legislatures. For instance, I have already confirmed that we will always consult the Administrations on corrections made to direct EU law relating to otherwise devolved areas of competence. We are determined to ensure that that engagement takes place and that we can ensure that, when we take forward legislation, we can reach a process by which we are able to have that consultation process. The views of this committee are listened to within this Parliament and other committees. How can the views of this committee and those of the Scottish Parliament as a whole be fed into the scrutiny of statutory instruments in Westminster? First and foremost, we have a process by which we are legislating on the EU withdrawal bill. The bill, as it exists in its current form, is subject to the committee stage and the report stage of the House of Commons. We want a bill that works for the whole of the United Kingdom that works for the devolved Administrations that is able to receive legislative consent from the devolved Administrations. We want to work with you first and foremost on making sure that we get the bill right and that we take the confidence of the Scottish Parliament and the devolved Administrations with us on that process. First and foremost, we are here today to listen and we look forward to the committee's report, which feeds into the interim report of the Finance and Constitution Committee, which I think is out on, I believe, the 23rd of November. I will be reading that closely, but I give you a commitment that the work of this committee will be looked at closely by ministers both in the Cabinet Office and in DEXU in order to ensure that we have a bill that works for the devolved Administrations in the United Kingdom. I will follow up to that line and then I will come in with your final question. When you are talking about using the power to amend domestic legislation in areas of devolved competence and you want to work with the Scottish Government, what if you wanted to do something and they did not agree to it? What happens then? I think that, again, when you look at the bill and you look at, for instance, clause 11, when you look at 4C, the ordering council process, we have put on the face of a bill a commitment to ensure that, when it comes to having established what common frameworks are, we can then use the section 30 order of the Scotland Act to be able to provide further powers using the existing reserve powers model in order to strengthen the devolution process. I want to ensure that this legislation is seen as a process. This legislation is absolutely necessary and crucial for ensuring that our legislative book, when we exit the European Union, is correct and is not deficient. That is the purpose of this bill. The bill is not to seek to redefine our constitutional processes, which is why it has been established on the basis of the devolution settlements and successive devolution settlements and any reassurances and ministers that we can provide. We will go away from this committee and reflect upon it. This morning, in this session, there has been a lot of positive comment, which I do welcome, regarding trying to get to a successful outcome for the four nations within the UK. Some of the comments this morning, Mr Skibmore spoke about the stability and security, also in the process of listening to what needs to be done. On Thursday, in the European Committee, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr Mundell, spoke of wanting to have a united and cohesive approach. The scrutiny is crucial and key to this. The GMC process, which has been touched upon by the cells this morning, has certainly not been a process that has been fully working the way it should be. This morning, Mr Mundell, in the earlier session, spoke of the intergovernmental relations needs to do more and improve. What would the UK Government like to do? How do you see the whole IGR process improving to allow not just the two Governments, but the three Governments, within the UK, to have a better process and to allow links to the committee and the Parliament to have a better input and a greater input into the process? I mean, probably a lot of this fits within Chris's area, so I'll let him expand on this, but I think from the perspective of our department, we recognise very much from the start of this process that there is a really important intergovernmental conversation to be having around this process, but we need to be engaging with the First Ministers, the relevant European Ministers. Of course, there has been a lot of direct contact between David Davis and Mike Russell, and we need to take that forward both through the GMC process and bilaterally, and I think it's important to recognise that even whilst the GMC was not meeting for much of this year, there was a lot of direct bilateral contact going on between Ministers. I welcome the fact that the GMC has now reconvened, and I think in its new format we've seen very welcome progress with the statement on joint principles coming out of that, but we are very clear that we need to keep working at this. We need to make sure that we continue to lean into the relationship with each of the devolved administrations, and of course in that respect we would really like to have an executive in place in Northern Ireland to be able to do that with, because at the moment we can deal directly with Ministers in Scotland and in Wales, but not in the Northern Ireland context, and that is certainly a problem. So it would be good to get beyond that, it would be good to be able to take that forward, and I can, both as the minister responsible, also know how seriously my Secretary of State takes this. This is a major, major priority for us, but I know that the Cabinet Office is obviously leading on that cross-government work, and so Chris May want to add on that front. I think that it's important to reflect on the post the vote in 2016. The consequential effect of this has been a necessary strengthening of that inter-governmental process, not only in terms of the number of occasions by which we can ensure that the GMC process is enacted, not just GMC-N, because obviously that equally feeds into GMC-P. But at the same time looking at ensuring that we have stronger working, we have an opportunity here that reflecting upon the union and our understanding that we need to protect the single market that we operate within the UK for the livelihood of businesses across every border, at the same time when it comes to not only working together but creating strong bonds of co-operation, we reflect upon the fact that a strong union is only as strong as the devolution settlement that underpins it. I passionately believe that when it comes to ensuring that we have a union that is fit for the 21st century, the rights and responsibilities that have reflected in devolution settlements when it comes to understanding where we may be able to devolve further powers, that commitment is here in this bill and it will begin a process by which the common frameworks arrangements and those discussions will continue and the concordia that was agreed on this 16th of October was a huge step forward in cross-inter-governmental working. I am very positive at the commitments that all the UK Government, Scottish Government and Welsh Government have made to work together because we recognise that we have a duty and a responsibility to ensure that our legislation works. The convener posed the question earlier regarding the common frameworks that have been touched upon by ourselves this morning. That clearly was an issue that was discussed in the constitution committee this morning too. The convener of that committee posed the question of should the common frameworks then be placed on the face of the bill because they are so important. In the whole issue of scrutiny of those frameworks, should they not have that importance of actually being placed upon the bill? I think that I have already tried to answer that question, but I think that the way in which the bill deals with this, given that that process is running alongside the process of this bill, is to create, to have the powers within the orders and council mechanism specifically for releasing powers where common frameworks are not required. And within clause 11 to have the ability to maintain them where they are required. But I do recognise, and I think we all recognise, the importance of moving forward with that discussion on common frameworks in a timetable, which will help to define the scope of that clause within this bill. I think that is something that I discussed with the constitution committee earlier. We are clear that that will have some bearing on people's understanding of the scope of clause 11. But certainly the detail of the issue of the frameworks is absolutely crucial for that wider scrutiny as well, not just certainly within the Parliament but certainly for external organisations particularly when it comes to the business interests. I think that I accept the comments made earlier this morning in terms of the economic impact that we do now when we do leave the EU to have as less of a negative impact as possible. So I think that that issue is absolutely crucial in terms of making sure that more people about the whole of the population are aware of what the details actually are. My final question, if I may convener, is just that on that particular area it is once again just regarding the issue of scrutiny and in terms of information that is available. There has been the discussion and the issue of the 58 papers and as to whether they do exist or don't exist or the details of those papers as to whether they do or don't exist and the details of the economic analysis and the sectoral analysis. This came up also this morning in your previous committee but also in the European committee here on Thursday of last week. In terms of the details of them, can you provide some clarity as to what the situation actually is regarding those papers? Do they exist? I think that the most straightforward thing we should do is refer you to the written ministerial statement that was posted by our department earlier this week which set out some of this detail. I also discussed some of these things in a debate in the House of Commons the previous week when we were debating the original Opposition motion on this front. What we said is that the information does not exist in the form that it has been asked for in the form of 58 economic impact assessments, which the motion referred to. We have also said that there is sectoral analysis and just to quote my colleague Steve Baker yesterday in the debate, the sectoral analysis has been discussed with the devolved administrations and the joint ministerial committee and we will give careful consideration as and when the information is released to the select committee to how we share that information with the devolved administrations. That is something that I reiterated earlier on in my evidence to the Finance and Constitution Committee. There are, as I made clear in my speech to the Commons debate, some legal constraints on ministers in terms of the information that we can release and we have to operate within those legal constraints. Of course, because the specific motion that we are dealing with asked us to refer information to a select committee, we do need to make sure that we have agreed the terms on which information will be released with that select committee first and foremost. As my colleague said, we will give careful consideration to how that information can then be shared. Our committee actually has any aspects of that where there could be some type of delegated power aspect or in terms of scrutiny. Could this committee actually be considered to have that information also? I will certainly take note of that, but the analysis that we are talking about is sectoral analysis across the UK economy. I am not sure that that would necessarily be a relevant consideration, but I will certainly take note of that and if that is the case, we will come back to you. Just a couple of questions on scrutiny. Schedule 7 lists specific provisions, which, if included in secondary legislation, were required to be subject to the affirmative procedure. How did you choose the categories? Is there any scope for including additional ones? When it comes to the affirmative procedure for clause 7, we have established a new public authority, transferring functions to newly created public authorities, transferring EU legislative powers, i.e. powers to make delegated or implementing acts to UK body, if it relates to fees, creating or amending criminal offences and creating or amending power to legislate. When it comes to those restrictions on what could be used in the affirmative procedure and what could be used in the negative procedure, that reflects some of the restrictions that are also included in clause 7. In terms of understanding that when we come forward to take forward the secondary legislation or regulations that we have that scrutiny and the affirmative procedure in place, it is a commitment to ensuring that the legislators have that ability to be able and Parliament has that ability to be able to monitor effectively the processes that are taking place. I think that just the other point that I would add in terms of scrutiny is that it is important that the bill before the UK Parliament sets out a scrutiny procedure for the UK Parliament. It echoes that for the approach in the devolved Parliament, but we are very clear that at the end of the day, control of scrutiny procedures in the devolved Parliament is for the devolved Parliament themselves. That is something that, certainly, if the devolved Parliament wants to set out an approach to scrutiny at their level, which is different to that set out in the bill, they are absolutely empowered to do so. We explored that when we had Mr Russell in front of us and discussed the possibility of coming up with the bespoke procedure. You might want to think about that for the UK Parliament. We would be very interested to see your suggestions on that front. I just wanted to finish up on engagement, which links into what Stuart McMillan has been asking about scrutiny. I am aware that there is a high volume of amendments and clauses, and that might just be impeded in their job well. I think that there is a feeling that there was not enough effective consultation with stakeholders during the drafting of the bill. This committee has heard from some stakeholders about the need for early engagement on consultation drafts of regulations to be made under this bill. There has been a strong emphasis on how important it is for stakeholders and Parliament to have opportunities to propose amendments to draft legislation. To address some of those concerns, I am not sure whether the ministers recognise them, but does the minister consider that there is scope for strengthening scrutiny in some areas along the lines of us to put affirmative procedure? Broadly, in terms of engagement, there has been a huge amount of engagement around this bill. We published a white paper and we have been engaging up and down the UK around the whole approach to our EU exit. The approach that was set out in this bill, focusing on certainty and continuity, was very much a response to what we have been hearing from stakeholders about the importance of these matters. That is something, again, which is set out in the Government strategy. We constantly hear about the need for providing the maximum certainty through the process. Therefore, this bill is not what some people might have liked it to be in terms of being a huge departure from the rules that we have worked under previously. It is very much focused on providing that certainty and continuity through the process. I think that there has been a high degree of engagement. Of course, you are right to say that there are a very large number of amendments. The reason why we have such a long committee stage with eight days in committee and eight hours guaranteed for each day is because we want to have the opportunity to properly and fully respond to those. I recognise that some of those amendments have been very carefully drafted. It is worth pointing out that a lot of the large numbers of amendments are because there are consequential amendments on some of the key ones that have effect in different parts of the bill. When we talk about the devolution area, a large number of the amendments are consequential amendments clause 10 or 11, which then pick up the detail in the schedules. With regard to scrutiny, we have to strike a balance. We want to make sure that all the delegated legislation under a bill can be properly scrutinised. Of course, there are procedures in place to do that, but we also need to make clear that there are a very large number of technical changes that need to be got through in the time that we have available. That is where it is so important that we focus on getting the workload done. That is something that is in the interests of each part of the United Kingdom. We will look carefully at all the suggestions for scrutiny procedures, but we need to make sure that there are scrutiny procedures that enable the workload to be got through in time for our exit. That is one of the mechanisms by which we will be judging them. In terms of engagement to date, between 9 August and 24 October, on my list here, when it comes to UK Government engagement, both at official level and at officials talking with either the Scottish Government, Scottish Parliament or Scotland MPs, or with ministers having those discussions, I can count 14 separate occasions. I am keen to ensure that there is further engagement. My door is open to any Scottish MPs who wish to discuss the bill with me. I have met Tommy Shepherd twice, Stephen Gathans, once to discuss Opposition amendments. I hope to meet anyone who has any issues with the bill going forward. It is a wider point around scrutiny once the bill is in place. Obviously, we are seeking less of consent motion for the scrutiny arrangements of the bill, and that is why we have specifically provided for it to be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament to change those arrangements, just as it is for other powers of the Scottish ministers, because that is in the Scotland Act. At the moment, the scrutiny arrangements are simply the equivalent scrutiny procedures that apply in the devolved legislatures as they apply in the UK Parliament. However, as is normal practice, we have invited comments from the Scottish Government on their views of the appropriateness of the current scrutiny arrangements in this bill. We respect the responsibility of the devolved legislatures that they have for how to scrutinise the abornment legislation made by the relevant devolved authorities. We remain open to suggestions on thoughts on how to ensure that the bill works in delivering a function in statute book, including the scrutiny procedures. It is helpful to know that there are lots of conversations taking place between different Parliamentarians and ministers, but what I was thinking more about in my question is some of the stakeholders from outside of Parliament, including some environmental organisations that we heard from in this committee just recently. Although certainty and continuity are quite a nice stat-pline, I do not think that many of those organisations feel that they have certainty in some of their areas of interest. To go back to the question of the superaffirmative procedures, it is not something that the UK Government is considering. How else do you propose to address the real concerns from stakeholders and other politicians that might share those views on their behalf? I think that we have made a number of commitments publicly around the UK Government's position, but we want to be the greenest government ever. We want to leave the environment in a better state than we inherited it in terms of our commitments, both international commitments and existing commitments on the environment. I certainly recognise the importance of the environmental stakeholders in that space. I have been meeting with many of them. My Secretary of State has also been meeting with many of them. I know that you have taken evidence from the RSPB in Scotland. We have had a number of meetings with them. This is an area where we have to make sure that we are taking an approach in the bill, which preserves the existing body of environmental law, which it absolutely does, but we also have to look at what is policy more broadly. As my colleague Steve Baker said to the exiting EU committee in this respect, this is also where there is very important work going on in Bays and in Daffra to look at UK policy going forward. I am sorry if I am getting boring in repeating this, but to return to the basic point of the bill, it is not about making changes in these spaces. It is about writing into place the existing arrangements and protecting those as we exit the European Union. That is, I think, the crucial thing when it comes to our environmental commitments. You will see under clause 8 that there are powers to make sure that we keep up our commitments to international agreements. It would include a number of international environmental commitments, and it is very important that we absolutely protect those as we go through this process. However, what we have said to NGOs is that if they have specific concerns, we want to hear directly from them, but we will absolutely ensure that we respond to those. Brexit is many things, but boring is not one of them. I think that we all agree the importance of UK ministers and Scottish ministers and officials all working together and having lots of dialogue. I think that a point that has been made to us is that there is a potential for overlap and sequencing issues can arise too. Is there an intention to establish a cross-administration steering group? I think that the current process of intergovernment relations is clearly being led through the JMCN process. Having had that concordiat agreed on 16 October, that is stepping up the level of engagement both in terms of the quantity of engagement and also the frequency of engagement. There will be another meeting of the JMCN that will be taking place in December. The processes that have been established and are well used by which engagement takes place. I do not think that I was that clear. I was meaning in relation to secondary legislation. I wonder if there would be a cross-administration steering group in that respect. Is that something that you think could be useful? I think that we can only restate my willingness and the UK Government's willingness to listen to the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament in terms of the appropriateness of scrutiny arrangements when it comes to the bill. We respect the responsibility and we have given the powers within the bill for a later stage. It is within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament to change those arrangements. We want to be in a space where we are listening to ideas that reflect concerns that are raised by the Scottish Government and by Parliamentarians. I think that we are very keen to work constructively throughout this process to make sure that we have a system in place that delivers for each of the Governments and the devolved administrations. Getting the statute books right in time for exit is a very important duty on all of us. Therefore, coordinating the way in which we work on that would be welcome. Of course, all of that requires this bill to move forward and that is something that we need to make sure that we are enabling through all the processes at hand. Jump in there, Monica. It's the same subject. I'm just thinking out loud about this sort of steering group idea. As you know, Mr Walker, I came down to the Lords for a meeting of Parliamentarians from all the devolved nations. I also met myself and the deputy convener, a meeting member of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee tomorrow. So, there is dialogue between Parliamentarians. I wonder if there's a merit in making that more formal, because it's informal at the moment. I think that formal and informal mechanisms both have their place and they both have their value. I think it's important. I've mentioned before, our focus through this process is making sure that we get the statute book into the right shape for exiting the European Union. I think it's important in that that we don't think that we are aiming to rewrite the rules of the UK constitutional settlement, but of course we have to constantly look at how we can make sure that the arrangements between us work better and work properly. If there are ways of doing that, we should be exploring them. Do you have a final question, Monica? I do. I appreciate that we're probably watching the clock now and it's all a race against time. There's going to be a huge amount of information. I wonder what you're able to say about what the UK Government will do to share an early stage about the preparations for the volume and flow of statutory instruments. When can we expect to get some information on that? I think that's a good question, which I think we'll have to look into in terms of when those statutory instruments have been enabled by the bill, the best process to deal with that. Obviously, we are looking at the appropriate mechanisms with the UK Parliament for managing the volume of statutory instruments that we're talking about, and it is a substantial volume, but it is also, as you'll appreciate, under existing arrangements. We have very large numbers of statutory instruments, not least under the 2.2 powers under the European Communities Act. This is something that the arrangements are used to handling a certain amount of delegated legislation. I think that in terms of the approach that we take to the delegated legislation under this bill, it may be that as we move forward we'll want to find new mechanisms for communicating on that. It's something that I think that we have to make sure that we establish the approach with the UK Parliament first, and then follow up on. What information do you think that you'll be in a position to share with devolved legislatures on forthcoming statutory instruments that amend domestic legislation in areas of devolved competence? I think that, understandably, we're actively engaging with the Scottish Government to discuss how best to deliver the secondary legislation required for exit. Behind the scenes of officials building up that shared understanding with the devolved administrations of where those corrections to the statute books will be needed. Obviously, the Scottish Government's best place to assess their capacity and necessary resourcing in order to make all of the secondary legislation required to prepare the statute book for exit. We have that commitment integral in the bill that we believe that when it comes to correcting deficiencies, our best place to be able to know where those deficiencies are. We want to work together and we work together frequently on ensuring that when it comes to statutory instruments and secondary legislation affecting different nations in the UK, we have, as Minister Walker said, powers that are modelled currently on the section 22 of the European Communities Act, and we'll just see a continuation of those working practices. Obviously, the volume that will be needed to be assessed of statutory instruments will be significant, and we want to understand where the Scottish Government will need assistance or where possible. However, we are determined to ensure that we work together because there is a significant volume of legislation that requires deficiencies to be corrected. Many of those will obviously be technical corrections and there may be a process by which technical amendments can be sifted faster, but this is something that engagement has already begun. Mr Skidmore, I think that you probably deserve a medal if you've had two meetings with Tommy Shepherd. He's my counterpart, so we cover all constitutional affairs. We've had very constructive dialogue behind the scenes when it comes to the floor of the house or Westminster hall debates on other matters of constitutional theory. The UK Government's position to the Scottish National Party's own position, but I'm determined to ensure that we can work together because I believe that Mr Shepherd will believe that it's all in our common interests of our constituents that we do so. I'm sure he does. We've got no further questions. Thank you very much for your time today. We'll be reporting by the end of next week. We'll make sure that you get that report. I'll be interested in your response to it, of course. As I said earlier, that will probably be the first of a number of reports. I just, hopefully, will be prepared to come back at some point. If those allow, I'd be very happy to come back and I think it's important for me. I'll suspend the meeting briefly to allow you guys to get on with your day. Thank you. Agender item 3, instruments subject to affirmative procedure. No points have been raised by our legal advisers on the following draft instruments. The Registers of Scotland Digital Registration, etc. regulations 2017. The Land Registration Scotland Act 2012 amendment order 2017. Public Records Scotland Act 2011, authorities amendment order 2018. The first tier tribunal for Scotland transfer of functions of the additional support needs tribunal for Scotland regulations 2018. The first tier tribunal for Scotland transfer of functions of the Scottish charity appeals panel regulations 2018. The first tier tribunal for Scotland health and education chamber and upper tribunal for Scotland composition regulations 2018. The Criminal Justice Scotland Act 2016 modification of part 1 and ancillary provision regulations 2017. The Criminal Justice Scotland Act 2016 consequential and supplementary modifications regulations 2017. Is the committee content with these instruments? Thank you. Agender item 4, instruments subject to negative procedure. The first tier tribunal for Scotland housing and property chamber procedure regulations SSI 2017 328. The Tribunal Scotland Act 2014 under which these regulations are made created a new structure for tribunals dealing with devolved matters and provided for a first tier tribunal and an upper tribunal. Within that structure, the first tier tribunal has been divided into chambers according to subject matter. One of those is the housing and property chamber. These regulations make provision for the rules of procedure for that first tier tribunal. Our legal advisers have drawn our attention to 10 errors within these regulations. Three of the errors are recommended for reporting on significant grounds. The committee may wish to comment that, while it notes the explanation given for each of the errors in the Scottish Government's response, it is highly unsatisfactory for the instrument to have been laid before the Parliament in its present form. The committee's role is not to provide a substitute for internal checking by the relevant Scottish Government department. It is worth noting that the Government has already responded to the questions raised by our legal advisers by laying an amending instrument. I should also wish to point out that the committee expressed considerable concern about the last package of instruments relating to tribunals, and in that context it is very disappointing that an improvement has not been made. We have only just been discussing the likelihood of a substantial increase in statutory instruments. I urge the Government to examine its quality control procedures to avoid laying instruments containing so many errors in the future. I will now set out where our legal advisers considered that there are errors in the rules contained in the schedule to this instrument to which the committee may wish to draw the attention of the Parliament. On reporting ground E, as there appears to be a doubt as to whether rule 373A is introverous, that is, within the scope of powers contained in the Parent Tribunal Scotland Act 2014, in particular rule 373A appears to preclude an appeal permitted by section 46.1 of the 2014 act in relation to a decision arising from a re-decided matter made by the First Theatre Tribunal on review. On reporting ground I, as the instrument appears to be defectively drafted in the following two respects, firstly rule 86 refers to the lesser making an application under section 76 of the Rent Scotland Act 1984 and also requires that the application must be signed and dated by the lesser or a representative of the less e. However, as applications under section 76 are made by the less e, those references to lesser should be less e. Seems a basic point. Secondly, rule 106A 4 and 5 do not make provision in relation to applications made by landlords under section 142 of the private housing Tenancy Scotland Act 2016. On reporting ground H, as the meaning of the instrument could be clearer in the following three respects, firstly the term assured tenancy reference to the First Theatre Tribunal in rule 11 could be more clearly aligned to the words assured tenancy reference used in the remainder of the schedule. Secondly, it could be clearer in rule 104 that anything permitted or required under a practice direction or order may be done by a lay representative on behalf of a party. Thirdly, in rules 44, 4 and 53, 4 it could be clearer that sufficient notice of an inspection should be given in writing by the First Theatre Tribunal to both parties rather than the party. On general reporting ground, the general reporting ground in respect of the following four issues. Firstly, sub paragraph F of the list in rule 43.1 unnecessarily duplicates the requirement in section 17.2 of the Property Facts of Scotland Act 2011, which is already referred to in rule 43.1. Secondly, the reference in rule 69 to an application under section 36, 6a or 6b of the Housing Scotland Act 1988 is incorrect. Thirdly, rule 92g in chapter 8 of the schedule appears to be unnecessary in so far as it refers to an application made under section 92.2 of the Rent Scotland Act 1984 in circumstances where chapter 8 does not make substantive provision in relation to that section. Fourthly, the requirements in rules 97.1 and 97.2 for the First Theatre Tribunal to notify both parties in relation to the variation or revocation of a letting agent enforcement order is inconsistent with rule 96c, which refers to more than two parties. I bet that members are just grateful they are not sitting in my place having to read all these mistakes out. Does the committee wish to draw the instrument to the attention of the Parliament on these grounds? Does the committee wish to welcome that the Scottish Government agreed to make an amending instrument addressing these points? Moving on to the other instruments, no points have been raised by our legal advisers on SSI 2017, 347, 348, 349, 350, 353, 355, 356 and 367. Is the committee content with these instruments? In relation to SSI 346, does the committee wish to welcome that the instrument is not subject to any parliamentary procedure? Does the committee wish to welcome that the Scottish Government has revoked and replaced the private housing tenancy Scotland Act 2016, commencement number 2 and saving provision regulations 2017, which meets the commitment given to the committee in relation to that earlier instrument? Gender Item 6, Housing Amendment Scotland Bill. This is an opportunity to identify matters which the committee may wish to raise with the Scottish Government in relation to delegated powers contained in this bill. The purpose of the bill is to ensure that the influence which the Scottish Housing Regulator and local authorities can exercise over registered social landlords, RSLs, is compatible with RSLs being classified by the office of the Scottish Government. In relation to SSI 346, does the committee wish to welcome that the instrument is not subject to any parliamentary procedure? Does the committee wish to welcome that the instrument is not subject to any parliamentary procedure? Does the committee wish to welcome that the Scottish Housing Regulator and local authorities can exercise over registered social landlords, RSLs, is compatible with RSLs being classified by the office of the Scottish Government? The committee wishes to meet the basis for classifying RSLs as private sector bodies in the national accounts if the bill, when enacted, does not achieve that. However, section 8.1 enables the modification of the functions of the Scottish Housing Regulator, which relates to social landlords, which does not limit the powers by reference to the purpose or aim of securing the reclassification of RSLs to the private sector in the national accounts. Section 8.2A also expressly enables different provision for different purposes. Does the committee wish to ask the Scottish Government for an explanation as to why it has considered it appropriate to draw the scope of the power in section 8.1 and 2 in that more general way, or whether the power could be drawn more narrowly while at the same time implementing the policy intentions? Section 2, the Delegated Powers Memorandum indicates that the power in section 8 would only be used for the purpose of providing the ONS with the basis for classifying RSLs as private sector bodies. Does the committee wish to ask the Scottish Government for an explanation as to why it is appropriate that section 8.1 enables the modification of the functions of the regulator, which relates to social landlords, which includes local authority landlords and local authorities providing housing surfaces. In addition to registered social landlords, may it also be asked how it is anticipated that the power would be used in relation to social landlords apart from registered social landlords? Section 3. The Delegated Powers Memorandum indicates how specifically the Scottish Government intends to use the power in section 9. In the first instance, it intends to specify in regulations that local authorities may only nominate up to a maximum of 24 per cent of the board members of an RSL and may not exercise control over RSLs, for example, through a power to veto changes in an RSL. The Scottish Government intends to use the power subsequently if other forms of local authority control that amount to public sector control over RSLs come to light, or if the criteria that the ONS applies to determine public sector control changes and such changes require the powers of local authorities to be amended further to ensure that RSLs can continue to be classified to the private sector. Section 9.1 enables any provisions for the purpose of limiting or removing the ability of local authorities to exert influence over RSLs through A, appointing or removing officers of RSLs, and B, exercising or controlling voting rights. Section 9.5A also enables different provisions for different purposes. Similarly to the powers in section 8, the powers are not limited by reference to the purpose or aim of securing the reclassification of RSLs to the private sector in the national accounts. Does the committee wish to ask the Scottish Government for an explanation as to why it is considered appropriate to draw the scope of the powers in section 9 in that more general way, or whether the powers could be drawn more narrowly while at the same time implementing the policy intentions? Section 9.5A also asks why it has been considered not appropriate to set out the initial intentions for the exercise of the power on the face of the bill. That is that the regulations may specify that local authorities may nominate up to a maximum of 24 per cent of the board members of an RSL and may not exercise forms of control. Section 10.5A asks the Scottish Government for an explanation of the powers in section 9 in the national accounts. Does the committee wish to ask the Scottish Government for an explanation of the powers in section 9 in the national accounts?