 Let's just start by reflecting on the fact that Miles has just told us that all the heads of state are about to accept the Sustainable Development Goal package, and whatever economists may very reasonably throw at this, I think we should celebrate the fact that against all the expectations, I think, the world has managed to agree on a very complicated set and a much more all-embracing set of objectives to set itself, as Miles says, all countries over the next 15 years. I think it's an extraordinary consensus. To quote a title of a paper I wrote a few years ago on the Millennium Development Goals, I think the question is, can indicators change behavior? And that remains an issue. Where does aid come into this? Well, my starting point is that aid doesn't matter in any significant way for most middle-income countries, but it does still matter for really poor countries. So I've pinched a couple of slides from Dirk Willem van der Velder at ODI, which he put in for a House of Commons committee recently. And as you can see, for middle-income countries, aid is pretty trivial compared to everything else. For low-income countries, even in 2010, it's extremely important. So what's going to happen? The indications I would say are that let's start with Western aid in the sense of wage from OECD DAC members. I don't think there are many indications that it's either going to expand significantly or collapse, but let's just deal with two points there. First of all, I thought it was extremely interesting that the European Union got credit at the financing for development conference for announcing that its members would seek to achieve 0.7% by 2030. Those with memories more than a few weeks would remember that the EU had committed itself a number of years earlier to achieving the same target by 2015, and the fact it recommitted itself to a target it significantly failed to achieve 15 years later. The fact that was seen as positive shows how pessimistic the environment is. And we are here in Finland, of course, where, as we know, the Finnish government has taken some very tough decisions, including a major reduction in its aid program. I regard Finland as an outlier, and I would say the same about the United Kingdom, which is the 1G7 country which has now achieved the 0.7 target for reasons which I think you have to go quite deep into the way the UK works to understand why that has been reached. It's a matter of some congratulation by those of us from that country. But I think the UK, like Finland, is an outlier in this process, and we should expect a roughly flat-ish level of aid from the DAC over the next few years. South-South cooperation I think still has some scope for expansion, but I think we may have seen some of the fastest rates already. China has expanded at a huge rate over the last few years. It must be questionable whether it can continue at quite the same rate. Countries like Brazil have evidently rode back quite a bit from more ambitious plans from earlier. So it's not obvious that there is as much coming forward from that source as one might hope. So at the same time, I'm talking here about official development assistance and highly concessional flows of various kinds. If you look at the same time, if you look at semi-concessional money, I think the situation is quite different as long as interest rates remain broadly speaking low. I was the coordinator of the last replenishment of the African Development Fund. China, in the last three replacements of the African Development Fund, has provided almost exactly the same amount of money, $80 million also for each replenishment, despite the vast growth in the Chinese economy. And I think that reflects two things. First of all, China, like most countries, doesn't have an awful lot of grant money to provide. And secondly, China is woefully badly represented in the African Development Bank because the Europeans are still sitting on far too many votes and far too many board seats. At the same time, China has pledged $2 billion, admittedly over a number of years, in parallel financing with the African Development Bank. And that's money that's coming from its foreign exchange reserves. It gets income on this because it's being lent on the same terms as the bank. And it has the support because it's parallel financing with the bank. It has some comfort from the bank's ability. So that kind of money is much more readily available. And if you look at the Development Finance Institutions, IFC and its bilateral counterparts, there's a huge amount of money in that system, which in my view has not revolved anything like aggressively enough. And there's great scope for more to be done there. Many bilateral donors are seeing also how they can leverage their grant money more effectively. I think there are a number of limits to that process, but nevertheless it remains an important space. And finally, following the cancellation of debt under the HIPIC initiative, there aren't any HIPICs anymore. Instead, there's a group of countries who I've called the LIPICs, the lowly indebted poor countries, who over the last few years have had extraordinarily low levels of indebtedness. Now, nature abhors a vacuum and you can see their debt levels rising quite sharply. So you have this paradoxical situation in which the World Bank wouldn't lend to Ghana at World Bank terms, but Ghana went to the bond market and borrowed at 6% or 7%. And there are a large number of African countries are borrowing at those sort of rates. That is not a sustainable policy unless you're investing that money extremely well. I'm not convinced that all this money is being invested very well, and I think we have to be concerned about a return to the sort of thing that happened in the late 1970s and early 1980s when countries cheerfully borrowed didn't spend the money very effectively and gotten themselves in the difficulty. So let's consider what motivations might encourage donors to sustain and hopefully increase their efforts. And there are sort of three main reasons, I think, where countries may choose to spend their money on improving lives in other countries, each of which has its own legitimacy, but each of which has its problems. I think we all recognize the first of all humanitarian impulse. I work with Paul Collier at Oxford who's taught me that economists talk about a duty to rescue. You see a child in a pool, it's your job to pull the child out of the pond and rescue it. And this idea was not really accepted beyond national borders until after the Second World War when UNICEF was set up and a huge amount of following refugee crises and others have started that. And now there's a generally accepted, if underfunded, international set of norms and standards around humanitarian aid, applying to natural disasters, but often also to the much longer term consequences of conflict. And this core humanitarian motivation has arguably spread beyond that. For example, take the case of HIV. The case has been powerfully made that if you as a citizen, let's say, of Finland are HIV positive, you will receive anti-retroviral treatment, which will be extremely effective. As the price of this has gradually fallen, it's become obvious that working with, say, African countries, it's possible to sustain lives on a big scale by these therapies. It's become the situation that would now be morally repugnant not to keep people on treatment or already on treatment. And we need to push up those who are on treatment further as well. So that is now becoming a more accepted obligation of both the host country, but also the international community. And in a way, the acceptance of the very socially oriented Millennium Development Goals shows that there's a feeling that extreme poverty and deprivation anywhere in the world are becoming, as it were, morally unacceptable across the world. I think Jean-Michel Severino was right to observe on the MDGs that the logic of setting this kind of floor standard was not followed through to their financing, but I think it's the point still stands and the SDGs, if you like, underwrite that. The poorest countries at least will certainly require substantial cross-border transfers on highly concessional terms for a substantial period if SDG targets are to be achieved. It's less obvious to me that substantial, highly concessional transfers, as opposed to finance on World Bank type terms to large, non-fragile middle income countries, are really a priority. I think there are limits to what outside aid can do about inequality within countries. It's more, it's different, I think, for small and fragile states whether low income or middle income country, but the amount of aid for those is very small. I think it's very obvious those who attended the inequality lectures yesterday that the world still faces massive inter-country inequality. It's true that China and India have improved the genie coefficient for the world, but if you look at the incomes between advanced countries and those in Africa whose migrants are crossing the Mediterranean on a daily basis, there's enormous disparity and as long as that enormous disparity exists, some form of concessional transfer has to continue. Secondly, there are national interest objectives which benefit the donor, whether or not they assist the recipient, but they benefit the donor rather than the international community as a whole. You can go back to Miles's Cold War example on the political side, and on the commercial side, I was heavily involved with the British mixed credit program in the 1980s when we were fighting our French friends head-to-head for contracts around the world in a way which meant that the companies essentially were running the governments. Governments were just simply backing companies and the companies might not be doing things that were very valuable. I'm very nervous about this kind of way of using aid programs, because I think it often leads to poor technical choices. And South-South cooperation, which has a slogan of mutual interest, is not, I think, immune to the same problem. There's a scope for capture by companies who want to get contracts, and which may or may not prove to be the most sustainable and developmentally satisfactory thing to do. Symptoms of this kind of, I think there's a danger that under pressure, DAC members are thinking more about a return to this kind of approach. And symptoms of that include a irrational preference for bilateral over multilateral channels, and too much looking at a narrow short-term interest in the whole process. The third motivation, which is the one I'd like to underwrite rather more, is the fact that we've all got a long-term mutual interest in the global problems that will require substantial concessional funding over the next couple of generations, at least, as long as these inter-country income disparities remain so large. We're talking here about climate change, infectious disease, insecurity, but also I would argue extreme poverty, and indeed the whole question of inter-country inequality itself, and migration pressures are only one of the most obvious examples of the difficulty of running a world which has such pressures. So can this international effort be made more effective? I think in all cases, there are things that need to be done. On the humanitarian side, it remains surprising to me that even within the DAC, the amount of aid that goes into humanitarian assistance varies so considerably from one donor to another. I also think that humanitarian aid is still plagued by the need to be seen to be assisting and not listen enough to the recipient. I think over-concentration of aid on the social sectors has also been problematic. It's been easier to sell politically in donor countries, but it's led to not very balanced development, and it's led to an infrastructure deficit, which China and other donors are fortunately beginning to fill, and Richard will talk more about that shortly. On the international objective side, it's often appeared logical to establish large special purpose funds like GAVI, the Global Fund, and the Green Climate Fund to address these issues. Research carried out a few years ago demonstrated that such models work well in countries that are not aid dependent. In countries that are aid dependent, they can skew local priorities to an extent that discourages local ownership and involves bidding scarce resources, such as skilled personnel, away from other areas of development importance. Such funds therefore need to be complemented in aid dependent countries by funds which can be allocated more flexibly to local priorities. The multilateral system is meanwhile undergoing substantial change, as China in particular, but also other rising powers, draw the logical conclusion from Europe's failure to adjust European shareholdings and representation to reflect Europe's diminishing share of world GNI. And finally, the attempt to encourage more effective approaches to aid utilization, with which, as Chiro said, I spent a lot of time, seemed to me to have proved themselves rather ineffective, and I think that's down to the incentives that individual donors face. So we start the SDG era, in my opinion, with neither bilateral nor multilateral systems where they need to be for the effective delivery of what still need to be significant volumes of international concessional aid, and low income aid dependent countries pay the price of this. So, final conclusions. Aid still matters for certain countries. Continued domestic support for it cannot be assumed in any country. I talk here about not just the traditional DAC donors, but countries worldwide. Stronger emphasis needs to be put on sustaining a broad development agenda, a good balance is needed between highly concessional and less concessional assistance reflecting country circumstances. Loans must be used very wisely or debt problems will recur. Special purpose and other similar funds need to be brought together at country level in ways that support country ownership. And aid effectiveness agendas cannot succeed if those agendas are essentially driven by donors. I think the incentives among donors don't achieve that. Rather, they must empower the implementing countries who need to lead this. And successful developing countries all know how to say no to donors, even if they're aid dependent. And you may say it's very hard for an aid dependent country to say no to a donor, but I'd advise you to look at Rwanda for an example of a country that does that. And then over time, my last slide, just to show you how aid and government revenue have moved in Bangladesh over the last few decades. And this is what one would expect to see increasingly in other countries. One would like to see a continuation of aid at high levels as Bangladesh has seen and an explosive growth in government revenue. And I think with wise policies on both sides, that can be achieved. Thank you.