 CHAPTER VI THE LURID INTERVAL We have seen that during Frontenac's first term of office, no urgent danger menaced the colony on the frontier. The missionary and the explorer were steadily pressing forward to the head of the Great Lakes and into the valley of the Mississippi, enlarging the sphere of French influence and rendering the interior tributary to the commerce of Quebec. But this peaceful and silent expansion had not passed unnoticed by those in whose minds it aroused both rivalry and dread. Untroubled from without as New France had been under Frontenac, there were always two lurking perils, the Iroquois and the English. The five nations owed their leadership among the Indian tribes not only to superior discipline and method, but also to their geographical situation. The valley of the St. Lawrence lay within easy reach, either through Lake Champlain or Lake Ontario. On the east at their very door lay the valley of the Mohawk and the Hudson. From the western fringe of their territory they could advance quickly to Lake Erie or descend the Ohio into the valley of the Mississippi. It was doubtless due to their prowess rather than to accident that they originally came into possession of this central and favored position. However, they could now make their force felt throughout the whole northeastern portion of the continent. Over seventy years had now passed since Champlain's attack upon the Iroquois in 1609, but laps of time had not altered the nature of the savage, nor were the causes of mutual hostility less real than at first. A ferocious lust for war remained the deepest passion of the Iroquois to be satisfied at convenient intervals. It was unfortunate in their view that they could not always be at war, but they recognized that there must be breathing times, and that it was important to choose the right moment for massacre and pillage. Daring but sagacious they followed an opportunist policy. At times their warriors delighted to lurk in the outskirts of Montreal with tomahawk and scalping-knife, and to organize great war parties such as that which was arrested by Dolar and his heroic companions at the Long Sioux in 1660. At other times they held fair speech with the governor and permitted the Jesuits to live in their villages, for the French had weapons and means of fighting, which inspired respect. The appearance of the Dutch on the Hudson in 1614 was an event of great importance to the five nations. The Dutch were quite as ready as the French to trade in furs, and it was thus that the Iroquois first procured the firearms which they used in their raids on the French settlements, that the Iroquois rejoiced at having a European colony on the Hudson may be doubted, but as they were unable to prevent it, they drew what profit they could by putting the French and Dutch in competition, both for their alliance and their neutrality. But though the Dutch were heretics and rivals, it was a bad day for New France when the English seized New Amsterdam, 1669, and began to establish themselves from Manhattan to Albany. The inevitable conflict was first foreshadowed in the activities of Sir Edmund Andros, which followed his appointment as governor of New York in 1674. He visited the Mohawks in their own villages, organized a board of Indian commissioners at Albany, and sought to cement an alliance with the whole confederacy of the five nations. In opposition to this, France made the formal claim, 1677, that by actual residence in the Iroquois country the Jesuits had brought the Iroquois under French sovereignty. Iroquois French and English thus formed the points of a political triangle. Foreign politics, however, the friendship of Stuart and Bourbon, tended to postpone the day of reckoning between the English and French in America. England and France were not only at peace but an alliance. The Treaty of Dover had been signed in 1670, and two years later, just as Frontenac had set out for Quebec, Charles II had sent a force of 6,000 English to aid Louis XIV against the Dutch. It was in this war that John Churchill, afterwards Duke of Marlborough, won his burrs, fighting on the French side. Nonetheless, there were premonitions of trouble in America, especially after Thomas Dongin became Governor of New York in 1683. Andrews had shown good judgment in his dealings with the Iroquois, and his successor inheriting his sound policy went even further on the same course. Dongin, an Irishman of high birth and a Catholic, strenuously opposed the pretensions of the French to sovereignty over the Iroquois, when it was urged that religion required the presence of Jesuits among them, he denied the allegation, stating that he would provide English priests to take their place. A New England Calvinist could not have shown more firmness in upholding the English position. Indeed, no Governor of Puritan New England had ever equaled Dongin in hostility to Catholic New France. Frontenac's successor, Lefebvre de la Barre, who had served with distinction in the West Indies, arrived at Quebec in September 1682. By the same ship came the new Intendant, Mill. They found the lower town of Quebec in ruins, for a devastating fire had just swept through it. Hardly anything remained standing saved the buildings on the cliff. Le Barre and Mill were soon at loggerheads. It appears that, instead of striving to repair the effects of the fire, the new Governor busied himself to accumulate fortune. He had indeed promised the king that, unlike his predecessors, he would seek no profit from private trading, and had on this ground requested an increase of salary. Mill presently reported that, far from keeping this promise, Le Barre and his agents had shared ten or twelve thousand crowns of profit, and that unless checked, Governor's revenues would soon exceed those of the king. Mill also accuses Le Barre of sending home deceitful reports regarding the success of his Indian policy. We need not dwell on these reports. They disclose with great clearness the opinion of the Intendant as to the Governor's fitness for his office. Le Barre stands condemned not by the innuendos of Mill, but by his own failure to cope with the Iroquois. The presence of the Dutch and English had stimulated the five nations to enlarge their operations in the fur trade and multiply their profits. The French, from being earliest in the field, had established friendly relations with all the tribes to the north of the Great Lakes, including those who dwelt in the Valley of the Ottawa, and La Salle and Tante had recently penetrated to the Mississippi, and extended French trade to the country of Illinois Indians. The furs from this region were being carried up the Mississippi and forwarded to Quebec by the Lakes and the St. Lawrence. This brought the Illinois within the circle of tribes commercially dependent on Quebec. At the same time, the Iroquois, through the English on the Hudson, now possessed facilities greater than ever for disposing of all the furs they could acquire, and they wanted this trade for themselves. The wholesome respect which the Iroquois entertained for Frontenac kept them from attacking the tribes under the protection of the French on the Great Lakes, but the remote Illinois were thought to be a safe prey. During the autumn of 1680, a war party of more than 600 Iroquois invaded the country of the Illinois. La Salle was then in Montreal, but Tante met the invaders and did all he could to save the Illinois from their clutches. His efforts were in vain. The Illinois suffered all that had befallen the Hurons in 1649. The Iroquois, however, were careful not to harm the French, and to demand from Tante a letter to show Frontenac as proof that he and his companions had been respected. Obviously, this raid was a symptom of danger, and in 1681 Frontenac asked the King to send him five or six hundred troops. A further disturbing incident occurred at the Jesuit Mission of Sault Ste. Marie, where an Illinois Indian murdered a Seneca chieftain. But Frontenac intended to act with firmness toward the Iroquois, while giving them satisfaction for the murder of their chief, is clear from his acts in 1681, no less than from his general record. But his forces were small, and he had received particular instructions to reduce expenditure. And with Dichesneux at hand to place a sinister interpretation upon his every act, the conditions were not favorable for immediate action. Then in 1682 he was recalled. Such in general were the conditions which confronted Le Barre, and in fairness it must be admitted that they were the most serious thus far in the history of Canada. From the first the Iroquois had been a pest and a menace, but now with the English to flatter and encourage them they became a grave peril. The total population of the colony was now about ten thousand, of whom many were women and children. The regular troops were very few, and though the disbanded carrying-in soldiers furnished the groundwork of a valiant militia, the habitants and their seniors alone could not be expected to defend such a territory against such a foe. Above all else the situation demanded strong leadership, and this was precisely what Le Barre failed to supply. He was preoccupied with the profits of the fur-trade, ignorant of Indian character, and passed his physical prime, and his policy toward the Iroquois was a continuous series of blunders. Through the great personal influence of Charlemagne the five nations were induced in 1683 to send representatives to Montreal, where Le Barre met them and gave them lavish presence. The Iroquois, always good judges of character, did not take long to discover in the new governor a very different enantio from the imposing personage who had helped conference with the Matfort Frontenac ten years earlier. The feebleness of Le Barre's effort to maintain French sovereignty over the Iroquois is reflected in his request that they should ask his permission before attacking tribes friendly to the French. When he asked them why they had attacked the Illinois, they gave this ominous answer, because they deserved to die. Le Barre could effect nothing by a display of authority, and even with the help of gifts he could only postpone war against the tribes of the Great Lakes. The Iroquois intimated that for the present they would be content to finish the destruction of the Illinois. A work which would involve the destruction of the French posts in the valley of the Mississippi. Le Barre's chief purpose was to protect his own interests as a traitor, and so far from wishing to strengthen LaSalle's position on the Mississippi, he looked upon that illustrious explorer as a competitor whom it was legitimate to destroy by craft. By an act of poetic justice the Iroquois a few months later plundered a convoy of canoes which Le Barre himself had sent out to the Mississippi for trading purposes. The season of 1684 proved even less prosperous for the French. Not only was Dungen doing his best to make the Iroquois allies of the English, Lord Howard of Effingham, the governor of Virginia, was busy to the same end. For some time past certain tribes of the five nations, though not the Confederacy as a whole, had been making forays upon the English settlers in Maryland and even in Virginia. To adjust this matter Lord Howard came to Albany in person, held a council which was attended by representatives of all the tribes, and succeeded in effecting a peace. Amid the customary ceremonies the five nations buried the hatchet with the English, and stood ready to concentrate their war-parties upon the French. It must not be inferred that by an act of reconciliation these subtle savages threw themselves into the arms of the English, exchanging a new serenity for an old. They always did the best they could for their own hand, seeking to play one white man against the other for their own advantage. It was a situation where, on the part of French and English, individual skill and knowledge of Indian character counted for much. On the one hand Dongin showed great intelligence and activity in making the most of the fact that Albany was nearer to the land of the five nations than Quebec, or even Montreal. On the other hand the French had envoys who stood high in the esteem of the Iroquois, notably Charlemagne of Longlouais and Lamberville, the Jesuit missionary. But for the moment the French were heavily burdened by the venality of Le Barre, whose subordinated public policy to his own gains. We have now to record his most aggregious blunder, an attempt to overall the Iroquois with an insufficient force, an attempt which Schmill declared was a mere piece of acting, not designed for real war on behalf of the colony, but to assist the Governor's private interests as a trader. From whatever side the incident is viewed it illustrates a complete incapacity. On July 10th, 1684, Le Barre left Quebec with a body of 200 troops. In ascending the river they were reinforced by recruits from the Canadian militia and several hundred Indian allies. After much hardship in the rapids the little army reached Fort Frontenac. Here the sanitary conditions proved bad and many died from malarial fever. All thought of attack soon vanished, and Le Barre altered his plans and decided to invite the Iroquois to a council. The degree of his weakness may be seen from the fact that he began with a concession regarding the place of the meeting. An embassy from the Onadegas finally condescended to meet him, but not at Fort Frontenac. Le Barre, with a force such as he could muster, crossed to the south side of Lake Ontario and met the delegates from the Iroquois La Famine at the mouth of the Salmon River, not far from the point where Champlain and the Hurons had left their canoes when they had invaded the Onadega country in 1615. The council, which ensued, was a ghastly joke. Le Barre began his speech by enumerating the wrongs which the French and their dependent tribes had recently suffered from the Iroquois. Among these he included the raid upon the Illinois, the machinations with the English, and the spoilation of French traders. For offenses, so heinous satisfaction must be given. Otherwise Onanteo would declare a war in which the English would join him. These were brave words, but unfortunately the Iroquois had excellent reason to believe that the statement regarding the language was untrue, and could see for themselves the weakness of Le Barre's forces. This conference has been picturesquely described by Baron Le Hanteo, who was present and records the speeches. The chief orator of the Onadegas was a remarkable person, who either for his eloquence or aspect is called by Le Hanteo grandgula, or bigmouth. Having listened to Le Barre's bellicose words and their interpretation, he rose, took five or six turns in the ring that the French and the Savages formed, and returned to his place. Then, standing upright, he spoke after the following manner to the general Le Barre, who sat in his chair of state. Onanteo, I honour you, and all the warriors that accompany me do the same. Your interpreter has made an end of his discourse, and now I come to begin mine. My voice glides to your ear. Pray listen to my words. Onanteo, in setting out from Quebec, you must have fancied that the scorching beams of the sun had burnt down the forests which render our country inaccessible to the French, or else that the inundations of the lake had surrounded our cottages and confined us as prisoners. This certainly was your thought, and it could be nothing else but the curiosity of seeing a burnt or drowned country that moved you to undertake a journey hither. But now you have an opportunity of being undeceived, for I and my warriors come to assure you that the Seneca's, Cuyugas, Onadega's, Onida's, and Mohawks are not yet destroyed. I return you thanks in their name for bringing into their country the Calumet of Peace, which your predecessor received from their hands. At the same time I congratulate you on having left underground the tomahawk which has so often been died with the blood of the French. I must tell you, Onanteo, that I am not asleep. My eyes are open, and the sun which vouchsafes the light gives me a clear view of a great captain at the head of a troop of soldiers who speaks as if he were asleep. He pretends that he does not approach this lake with any other view than to smoke the Calumet with the Onadega's. But Grangula knows better. He sees plainly that Onanteo meant to knock them on the head if the French arms had not been so much weakened. You know, Onanteo, that we have robbed no Frenchman. Save those who supplied the Illinois and the Miami's, our cities, with muskets, powder, and ball. We have conducted the English to our lakes in order to trade with the Ottawa's and the Hurons, just as the Algonquins conducted the French to our five cantons in order to carry on a commerce that the English lay claimed to as their right. We are born freemen and have no dependence either upon the Onanteo or the Corleire, the English governor. We have power to go where we please, to conduct whom we will to the places we resort to, and to buy and sell where we think fit. We fell upon the Illinois and the Miami's, because they cut down the trees of peace that served for boundaries, and came to hunt beavers upon our lands. We have done less than the English and French, who without any right have usurped the lands they are now possessed of. I give you to know, Onanteo, that my voice is the voice of the five Iroquois cantons. This is their answer. Pray and climb your ear, and listen to what they represent. The Seneca's, Cayugas, Onendegas, Onidas, and Mohawks declare that they buried the tomahawk in the presence of your predecessor in the very center of the fort, and planted the tree of peace in the same place. It was then stipulated that the fort should be used as a place of retreat for merchants and not a refuge for soldiers. Be it known to you, Onanteo, that so great a number of soldiers being shut up in so small a fort, do not stifle and choke the tree of peace. Because it took root so easily, it would be evil to stop its growth, and hinder it from shading both your country and ours with its leaves. I assure you in the name of the five nations, that our warriors will dance the calamet dance under its branches, and will never dig up the axe to cut it down, till such time as the Onanteo and the Corleare do separately or together invade the country which the great spirit gave to our ancestors. Footnote. Graagula's speech is an example in part of Indian eloquence, and in part of the eloquence of Baron Lahontan, who contributes many striking passages to our knowledge of frontenac's period. When Lemoine and the Jesuits had interpreted this speech, Le Barre retired to his tent and stormed and blustered. But Graagula favored the spectators with an Iroquois dance, after which he entertained several of the Frenchmen at a banquet. Two days later writes Lahontan. He and his warriors returned to their country, and our army set out for Montreal. As soon as the general was on board, together with the few healthy men that remained, the canoes were dispersed, for the militia straggled here and there, and everyone made the best of his way home. With this ignominious adventure the career of Le Barre ends. The reports which Mill sent to France produced a speedy effect in securing his dismissal from office. I have been informed, politely writes the King, that your years do not permit you to support the fatigues inseparable from your office of governor and lieutenant general in Canada. Le Barre's successor, the Marquis de Denenville, arrived at Quebec in August 1685. Like Le Barre he was a soldier. Like frontenac he was an aristocrat as well. From both these predecessors, however, he differed in being free from the reproach of using his office to secure personal profits through the fur trade. No governor in all the annals of New France was on better terms with the bishop and the Jesuits. He possessed great bravery. There is much to show that he was energetic. Nonetheless he failed, and his failure was more glaring than that of Le Barre. He could not hold his ground against the Iroquois and the English. It has been pointed out already that when Le Barre assumed office the problems arising from these two sources were more difficult than at any previous date. But the situation which was serious in 1682 and had become critical by 1685 grew desperate in the four years of Denenville's sway. The one overshadowing question of this period was the Iroquois peril, rendered more and more acute by the policy of the English. The greatest mistake which Denenville made in his dealings with Iroquois was to act deceitfully. The savages could be perfidious themselves, but they were not without a conception of honour and felt genuine respect for a white man whose word they could trust. Denenville, who in his private life displayed many virtues, seemed to consider that he was justified in acting toward the savages as the exigency of the moment prompted. Apart from all considerations of morality, this was bad judgment. In his dealings with the English, Denenville had little more success than in his dealings with the Indians. Dongin was a thorn in his side from the first, although their correspondence opened on both sides with the language of compliment. A few months later its tone changed, particularly after Dongin heard that Denenville intended to build a fort at Niagara. Against a project so unfriendly, Dongin protested with emphasis. In reply Denenville disclaimed the intention, at the same time alleging that Dongin was giving shelter at Albany to French deserters. A little later they reached the point of sarcasm. Denenville taxes Dongin with selling rum to the Indians. Dongin retorts that at least English rum is less unwholesome than French brandy. Despite these epistolary compliments, there lies the broad fact that Dongin stood firm by his principle that the extension of French rule to the south of Lake Ontario should not be tolerated. He ridicules the basis of French pretensions, saying that Denenville might as well claim China because there are Jesuits at the Chinese court. The French, he adds, have no more right to the country because its streams flow into Lake Ontario than they have to the lands who drink claret or brandy. It is clear that Dongin fretted under the restrictions which were imposed upon him by the friendship between England and France. He would have welcomed in order to support his arguments by force. Denenville on his side with like feelings could not give up the claim to suzerainty over the land of the Iroquois. The domain of the five nations was not the only part of America where French and English clashed. The presence of the English in Hudson Bay excited deeper sentiment at Quebec and Montreal. Here Denenville ventured to break the peace as Dongin had not dared to do. With Denenville's consent and approval, a band of Canadians left Montreal in the spring of 1686, fell upon three of the English posts, Fort Hayes, Fort Rupert, Fort Albany, and with some bloodshed dispossessed their garrisons. Well satisfied with this exploit, Denenville in 1687 turned his attention to the chastisement of the Iroquois. The forces he brought together for this task were greatly superior to any that had been mustered in Canada before. Not only were they adequate in numbers, but they comprised an important band of Courage-bois, headed by Lageronté, Tanti, Delut, and Nicolas Perot, men who equaled the Indians in woodcraft and surpassed them in character. The epitaph of Denenville as a governor is written in the failure of this great expedition to accomplish its purpose. The first blunder occurred at Fort Frontenac before mobilization had been completed. There were on the north shore of Lake Ontario two Iroquois villages, whose inhabitants had been in part baptized by the Sepulsians, and were in excellent terms with the garrison of the fort. In a moment of insane stupidity, Denenville decided that the men of these settlements should be captured and sent to France as galley slaves. Through the ruse of a banquet they were brought together and easily seized. By dint of a little further effort, two hundred Iroquois of all ages in both sexes were collected at Fort Frontenac as prisoners. And some, at least, perished by torture. But when executing this dastardly plot, Denenville did not succeed in catching all the friendly Iroquois who lived in the neighborhood of his fort. Enough escaped to carry the authentic tale to the five nations, and after that there could be no peace till there had been revenge. Worst of all, the French stood convicted of treachery and falseness. Having thus belighted his cause at the outset, Denenville proceeded with his more serious task of smiting the Iroquois in their own country. Considering the extent and expense of his preparations, he should have planned a complete destruction of their power. Instead of this he attempted no more than an attack upon the Seneca's, whose operations against the Illinois and in other quarters had made them especially objectionable. The composite army of French and Indians assembled at Irondequat Bay on July 12th, a force brought together at infinite pains, and under circumstances which might never occur again. Marching southwards they fought a trivial battle with the Seneca's, in which half a dozen on the French side were killed, while the Seneca's are said to have lost about a hundred and killed and wounded. The rest of the tribe took to the woods. As a result of this easy victory the triumphant allies destroyed an Iroquois village in all the corn which it contained, but the political results of the expedition were worse than nothing. Denenville made no attempt to destroy the other nations of Confederacy. Returning to Lake Ontario he built a fort at Niagara, which he had promised Dungen he would not do, and then returned to Montreal. The net results of this portentous effort were a broken promise to the English, an act of perfidy toward the Iroquois, and an insignificant success in battle. In 1688 Denenville's decision to abandon Fort Niagara slightly changed the situation. The garrison had suffered severe losses through illness and the post proved too remote for successful defense. So this matter settled itself. The same season saw the recall of Dungen through the consolidation of New England, New York, and New Jersey under Sir Edmund Andros. But in essentials there was no change. Andros continued Dungen's policy, of which in fact he himself had been the author, and even though no longer threatened by the French from Niagara, the savages had reason enough to hate and distrust Denenville. Yet despite these untoward circumstances all hope of peace between the French and the five nations had not been destroyed. The Iroquois loved their revenge and were willing to wait for it, but caution warned them that it would not be advantageous to destroy the French for the benefit of the English. Moreover in the long course of their relations with the French they had, as already mentioned, formed a high opinion of men like Lemoine and Lamberville, while they viewed with respect the exploits of Tanti, La Durante, and De Lute. And by these considerations and a love of presence, Grangula of the Onedegas was in the midst of negotiations for peace with the French, which might have ended happily but for the stratagem of the Huron chief, Condiaranque, called the Rat. The remnant of Hurons and the other tribes centering at Michela Mackenac did not desire a peace of the French and Iroquois which would not include themselves, for this would be in their own certain destruction. The Iroquois, freed of the French, would surely fall on the Hurons. All the Indians distrusted Denonville, and Condiaranque suspected with good reason that the Hurons were about to be sacrificed. Denonville, however, had assured Condiaranque that there was to be war to the death against the Iroquois, and on this understanding he went with a band of warriors to Fort Frontenac. There he learned that peace would be concluded between Onantio and the Onedegas, in other words that the Iroquois would soon be free to attack the Hurons and their allies. To avert this threatened destruction of his own people, he set out with his warriors and lay in ambush for a party of Onedegas chiefs who were on their way to Montreal. Having killed one and captured almost all the rest, he announced to his Iroquois prisoners that he had received orders from Denonville to destroy them. When they explained that they were ambassadors, he feigned surprise and said he could no longer be an accomplice to the wickedness of the French. Then he released them all, save one, in order that they might carry home this tale of Denonville's second treachery. To one Iroquois, Condiaranque retained on the plea that he wished to adopt him. Arrived at Machilla Mackenac, he handed over the captive to the French there, who having heard nothing of the peace promptly shot him. An Iroquois prisoner, whom Condiaranque secretly released for the purpose, conveyed to the five nations word of this further atrocity. The Iroquois prepared to deliver a hard blow. On August 5th, 1689, they fell in overwhelming force upon the French settlement at Lechine. Those who died by the Tomahawk were the most fortunate. Charlevoix gives the number of victims at 200 killed and 120 taken prisoner. Girard's examination of parish registers results in a lower estimate, namely 24 killed at Lechine and 42 at Lechezny, a short time afterwards. Whatever the number, it was the most dreadful catastrophe which the colony had yet suffered. Such were the events which, in seven years, had brought France to the brink of ruin. But she was not to perish from the Iroquois. In October 1689, Frontenac returned to Tictanamville's place. CHAPTER VII. THE GREAT STRUGGLE During the period which separates his two terms of office, Frontenac's life is almost a blank. His relations with his wife seemed to have been amicable, but they did not live together. His great friend was Marshal de Belfon's, from whom he received many favours of hospitality. In 1685 the king gave him a pension of thirty-five hundred levers, though without assigning him any post of dignity. Already a veteran his record could hardly be called successful. His merits were known to the people of Canada. They believed him to be a tower of strength against the Iroquois. At Versailles the fact stood out most plainly that through infirmities of temper he had lost his post. His pension might save him from penury. It was far too small to give him real independence. Had either Le Barre or Denonvie proved equal to the Government of Canada, it is almost certain that Frontenac would have ended his days ingloriously at Versailles, ascending the stairs of others with all the grief which is the portion of disappointed old age. Their failure was his opportunity, and from the dreary anti-chambers of a court he mounts to sudden glory as the saviour of new France. There is some doubt, as we have seen, concerning the causes which gave Frontenac his appointment in 1672. At that time court favour may have operated on his behalf, or it may have seemed desirable that he should reside for a season out of France. But in 1689 graver considerations came into play. At the moment when the Iroquois were preparing to ravage Canada, the expulsion of James II from his throne had broken the peace between France and England. The Government of New France was now no post for a court favourite. Louis XIV had expended much money and effort on the colony. Through the mismanagement of Le Barre and Denonvie, everything appeared to be on the verge of ruin. It is inconceivable that Frontenac, then in his seventieth year, should have been renominated for any other cause than merit. Times and conditions had changed. The task now was not to work peaceably with bishop and intendant, but to destroy the foe. Brother Goyer, the recollet who delivered Frontenac's funeral oration, states that the king said when renewing his commission, quote, I sent you back to Canada, where I expect you will serve me as well as you did before. I ask for nothing more, unquote. This is a bit of too gorgeous rhetoric, which none the less conveys the truth. The king was not reappointing Frontenac, because he was, on the whole, satisfied with what he had done before. He was reappointing him, because during his former term of office, and throughout his career, he had displayed the qualities which were called for at the present crisis. Thus Frontenac returned to Quebec in the autumn of 1689, just after the Iroquois massacred the people of La Chine, and just before they descended upon those of La Chine. The universal mode was one of terror and despair. If ever Canada needed a Moses, this was the hour. It will be seen from the dates that Denis V's recall was not due to the La Chine massacre and the other raids of the Iroquois in 1689, for these only occurred after Frontenac had been appointed. Denis V's dismissal was justified by the general results of his administration down to the close of 1688. Before Frontenac left France, a plan of campaign had been agreed upon, which it was now his duty to execute. The outlines of this plan were suggested by Calyère, the Governor of Montreal, who had been sent home by Denis V to expound the needs of the colony in person, and to ask for fresh aid. Footnote Louis Hector de Calyère Bonvue was a captain of the French Army, who became Governor of Montreal in 1684, and succeeded Frontenac as Governor of Canada in 1698. He received the Cross of St. Louis for distinguished service against the Iroquois. Frontenac could not have had a better lieutenant. End. Footnote. The idea was to wage vigorous offensive warfare against the English from Albany to New York. This would depend upon swiftness and audacity, both of which Frontenac possessed in full measure, despite his years. Two French warships were to be sent direct to New York in the autumn of 1689, while a raiding party from Canada should set out for the Hudson as soon as Frontenac could organize it. In its original form this plan of campaign was never carried out, for on account of headwinds Frontenac reached Quebec too late in the autumn. However, the central idea remained in full view and suggested the three war parties which were sent out during the winter of 1690 to attack the English colonies. Louis XIV had given Denonvie important reinforcements, and with war clouds gathering in Europe he was unwilling or unable to detach more troops for the defence of Canada. Since in warring against the Iroquois and the English Frontenac had no greater resources than those at the disposal of Denonvie when he attacked the Seneca's. In fact, since 1687 there had been some wastage in the number of the regulars from disease. The result was that Frontenac could not hope for any solid success unless he received support from the Canadian militia. In this crisis the habitants and their seniors accepted with courage the duties laid upon them. In the narrower sense they were fighting for their homes, but the spirit which they displayed under Frontenac's leadership is not merely that which one associates with a war of defence. The French soldier in all ages loved to strike the quick, sharp blow, and it was now necessary for the salvation of Canada that it should be struck. The Iroquois had come to believe that Anontio was losing his power. The English colonies were far more populous than New France. In short the only hope lay in a swift, spectacular campaign which would disorganise the English and regain the respect of the Iroquois. The issue depended on the courage and capacity of the Canadians. It is to their honour and to the credit of Frontenac that they rose to the demand of the hour. The Canadians were a robust, prolific race trained from infancy to woodcraft and all the hardships of the wilderness. Many families contained from eight to fourteen sons who had used the musket and paddle from early boyhood and could endure the long tramps of winter like the Indians themselves. The frontier's man is, and must be, a fighter, but nowhere in the past can one find a braver breed of warriors than mustered to the call of Frontenac. François-Hertel and Hertel de Rueville, Le Moyne de Iberville, with his brothers Bienville and Saint-Hélène de Hailebou, de Monttet, and Repentinier de Montesson, are but a few representatives of the militiamen who sped forth at the call of Frontenac to destroy the settlements of the English. What followed was war in its worst form, including the massacre of women and children. The three bands organized by Frontenac at the beginning of 1690 set out on snowshoes from Montreal, three rivers, and Quebec. The largest party contained 114 French and 96 Indians. It marched from Montreal against Schenectady, commanded by Delbu de Monttet and Le Moyne de Saint-Hélène. The second party, proceeding from three rivers and numbering 26 French and 29 Indians under the command of François Hertel, aimed at Dover, Pemacouid, and other settlements of Maine and New Hampshire. The Quebec party, under Pornouf, comprised 50 French and 60 Indians. Its objective was the English colony on Casco Bay, where the city of Portland now stands. All three were successful in accomplishing what they aimed at, namely the destruction of English settlements amid fire and carnage. All three employed Indians who were suffered, either willingly or unwillingly, to commit barbarities. It is much more the business of history to explain than to condemn or to extenuate. How could a man like François Hertel lead one of these raids without sinking to the moral level of his Indian followers? Some such question may, not unnaturally, rise to the lips of a modern reader, who for the first time comes upon the story of Dover and Salmon Falls. But fuller knowledge breeds respect for François Hertel. When eighteen years old he was captured by the Mohawks and put to the torture. One of his fingers they burned off in the bowl of a pipe. The thumb of the other hand they cut off. In the letter which he wrote on Birchbark to his mother after this dreadful experience there is not a word of his sufferings. He simply sends her his love and asks for her prayers, signing himself by his childish nickname, quote, your poor finchant. As he grew up he won from an admiring community the name of the hero. He was not only brave but religious. In his view it was all legitimate warfare. If he slew others he ran a thousand risks and endured terrible privations for his king and the home he was defending. His stand at the bridge over the Worcester River, sword in hand, when pressed on his retreat by an overwhelming force of English, holding the pass till all his men are over, is worthy of an epic. He was forty-seven years old at the time. The three eldest of his nine sons were with him in that little band of twenty-six Frenchmen and two of his nephews. Quote, to the new England of old, says Parkman, François Urtel was the abhorred chief of Popish malignance and murdering savages. The new England of today will be more just to the brave defender of his country and his faith." The atrocities committed by the French and Indians are enough to make one shudder even at this distance of time. As Frontenac adopted the plan and set forth the war-parties the moral responsibility in large part rests with him. There are, however, some facts to consider before judgment is passed as to the degree of his culpability. The modern distinction between combatants and non-combatants had little meaning in the wilds of America at this period. When France and England were at open war every settler was a soldier, and as such each man's duty was to keep on his guard. If caught napping he must take the consequences, thus to fall upon an unsuspecting hamlet and slay its menfolk with the tomahawk, while brutal was hardly more brutal than under such circumstances we could fairly expect war to be. The massacre of women and children is another matter, not to be excused on any grounds, even though Schenectady and Salmon Falls are paralleled by recent acts of the Germans in Belgium. Still, we should not forget that European warfare in the age of Frontenac abounded with just such atrocities as were committed at Schenectady, Dover, Pomokwood, Salmon Falls, and Casco Bay. The sack of Magdeburg, the wasting of Palatinate, and perhaps the storming of Drogeda, will match whatever was done by the Indian allies of Frontenac. These were unspeakable, but the savage was little worse than his European contemporary. Those killed were in almost all cases killed outright, and the slaughter was not indiscriminate. At Schenectady, John Sandra Glenn, with his whole family and all his relations, were spared, because he and his wife had shown kindness to French prisoners taken by the Mohawks. All together sixty people were killed at Schenectady, February 9, 1690, thirty-eight men, ten women, and twelve children. Nearly ninety were carried captive to Canada, sixty old men, women, and children, were left unharmed. It is not worthwhile to take up the details of the other raids. They were of much the same sort, no better, and no worse. Where a garrison surrendered under promise that it would be spared, the promise was observed so far as the Indians could be controlled, but English and French alike, when they used Indian allies, knew well that their excesses could not be prevented, though they might be moderated. The captives as a rule were treated with kindness and clemency when once the northward march was at an end. Meanwhile Frontenac had little time to reflect upon the probable attitude of posterity towards his political morals. The three war-parties had accomplished their purpose, and in the spring of 1690 the colony was aglow with fresh hope. But the English were not slow to retaliate. That summer New York and Massachusetts decided on an invasion of Canada. It was planned that a fleet from Boston under Sir William Phipps should attack Quebec, while a force of militia from New York in command of John Schuler should advance through Lake Champlain against Montreal. Thus by sea and land Canada soon found herself on the defensive. Of Schuler's raid nothing need be said except that he reached La Prairie opposite Montreal where he killed a few men and destroyed the crops, August 23, 1690. It was a small achievement and produced no result save the disappointment of New York that an undertaking upon which much money and effort had been expended should terminate so ingloriously. But the siege of Quebec by Phipps, though it likewise ended in failure, is a much more famous event, and deserves to be described in some detail. The colony of Massachusetts mustered its forces for a great and unusual exploit. Earlier in the same year a raid upon the coasts of Acadia had yielded gratifying results. The surrender of Port Royal without resistance May 11, 1690 kindled the Puritan hope that a single summer might see the pastiferous Romanists of New France driven from all their strongholds. Thus encouraged Boston put forth its best energies and did not shrink from incurring a debt of fifty thousand pounds, which in the circumstances of Massachusetts was an enormous sum. Help was expected from England, but none came, and the fleet sailed without it in full confidence that Quebec would fall before the assault of the colonists alone. The fleet, which sailed in August, numbered thirty-four ships, carrying twenty-three hundred men, and a considerable equipment. Sir William Phipps, the leader of the expedition, was not an Englishman by birth, but a new Englander of very humble origin who owed his advancement to a robust physique and unlimited assurance. He was unfitted for his command, both because he lacked experience in fighting such foes as he was about to encounter, and because he was completely ignorant of the technical difficulties involved in conducting a large miscellaneous fleet through the torturous channels of the lower St. Lawrence. This ignorance resulted in such loss of time that he arrived before Quebec amid the tokens of approaching winter. It was the sixteenth of October when he rounded the island of Orleans and brought his ships to anchor under the citadel. Victory could only be secured by sudden success. The state of the season forbade siege operations which contemplated starvation of the garrison. Hopeful that the mere sight of his armada would compel surrender, Phipps first sent an envoy to Frontenac under protection of the white flag. This messenger, after being blindfolded, was led to the chateau and brought before the Governor, who had staged for his reception one of the impressive spectacles he loved to prepare. Surrounding Frontenac, as Louis XIV might have been surrounded by the grandees of France, were grouped the aristocracy of New France, the officers of the French regulars, and the Canadian militia. Nothing had been omitted which could create an impression of dignity and strength. Costume, demeanor, and display were all employed to overwhelm the envoy with the insulted majesty of the King of France. Led into this high presence the messenger delivered his letter which, when duly interpreted, was found to convey a summary ultimatum. Phipps began by stating that the war between France and England would have amply warranted this expedition even, quote, without the destruction made by the French and Indians under your command and encouragement, upon the persons and estates of their majesty's subjects of New England, without provocation on their part, unquote. Indeed, quote, the cruelties and barbarities used against them by the French and Indians might, upon the present opportunity, prompt unto a severe revenge, unquote. But seeking to avoid all inhumane and un-christian-like actions, Phipps announces that he will be content with, quote, a present surrender of your forts and castles, undemolished and the kings and other stores, unembezzled with the seasonable delivery of all captives, together with the surrender of all your persons and estates to my dispose, upon the doing whereof you may expect mercy from me, as a Christian, according to what shall be found for their majesty's service and the subject's security. Which if you refuse forthwith to do, I am come provided and am resolved by the help of God in whom I trust, by force of arms, to revenge all wrongs and injuries offered, and to bring you under subjection to the crown of England, and, when too late, make you wish you had accepted of the favor tendered. Your answer positive in an hour, returned by your own trumpet with the return of mine, is required upon the peril that will ensue, unquote. To this challenge Frontenac at once returned the answer which comported with his character. When Phipps's envoy took out his watch to register the hour permitted by the ultimatum, Frontenac rejoined that he required no time for deliberation, but would return his answer by the mouth of the cannon. The ground which he assigned for the invasion of New England was that his people had rebelled against their lawful prince, the ally of France. Other more personal observations were directed towards the manner in which Phipps had behaved at Port Royal. No word in writing would Frontenac send. The envoy, who was only a subaltern, received his conge, was blindfolded, and led back to his boat. Since having been thus exchanged, it remained for Phipps to make good his challenge. If we compare the four English and American sieges of Quebec, the attack by Phipps will be seen to have little in common with those of Kirk and Montgomery, but to resemble rather strikingly the attack by Wolf. Without fighting, Kirk swooped down upon a garrison which was exhausted by starvation. Arnold and Montgomery operated without a fleet. But while Phipps's attempt is unlike Wolf's in that it ended in failure, the presence of the fleet and the attempt to affect a landing below the mouth of the St. Charles present features of real similarity. It is clear that Phipps received intelligence from prisoners of a possible landing above the town of the spot where Wolf carried out his daring and desperate coup de main. But anticipating Wolf in another quarter, he chose to make his first attack on the flats rather than on the heights. The troops ordinarily stationed at Quebec were increased just after Phipps's arrival by a force of seven hundred regulars and militiamen under Calyaires who had come down from Montreal with all possible haste. So agile were the French and so proficient in irregular warfare that Phipps found it difficult to land any considerable detachment in good order. Thirteen hundred of the English did succeed in forming on the Bhoport Flats after wading through a long stretch of mud. There followed a preliminary skirmish in which three hundred French were driven back with no great loss after inflicting considerable damage on the invaders. But though the English reached the East Bank of the St. Charles, they could do no more. Phipps wasted his ammunition on a fruitless and ill-timed ship-embardment which was answered with much spirit from the cliffs. Meanwhile, the musketeers on the Bank of the St. Charles were unable to advance alone and received no proper supply of stores from the ships. Harassed by the Canadians, wet, cold, and starving, they took to the boats, leaving behind them five cannon. After this nothing happened, saved deliberations on the part of Phipps and his officers as to whether there remained anything they could be done other than to sail for home, beaten and humiliated with the heavy burden of debt to hang round the neck of a two ambitious Massachusetts. Thus ended the second siege of Quebec, October 23, 1690. Frontenac had lost two of his best soldiers, Saint Helene, of the fighting Le Monde, and the Chevalier de Clermont. But this notwithstanding, the victory was felt to be complete. The most precious trophy was the flag of Phipps's ship, which is shot from the ramparts had knocked into the river, once it was rescued and brought ashore and triumph. Best of all, the siege had been too short to bring famine in its train. The loss of life was inconsiderable, and in prestige the soldiery of New France now stood on a pinnacle which they had never before attained. When we consider the paucity of the forces engaged, this repulse of the English from Quebec may not seem an imposing military achievement. But Canada had put forth her whole strength, and had succeeded where failure would have been fatal. In the shouts of rejoicing which followed Phipps's withdrawal we hear the cry of a people reborn. The siege of Quebec and Chewler's raid on La Prairie opened up a subject of large and vital moment. The historical antagonism of New France and New England. Whoever wishes to understand the deeper problems of Canada in the age of Frontenac should read John Fisk's volumes on the English colonies. In the rise of Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, one sees the certain doom which was impending over New France. It may be too much to say that Richelieu, by conquering Alsace, threw away America, even had the population of Canada been increased to the extent called for by the obligations of Richelieu's company in 1627, the English might have nevertheless prevailed. But the preoccupation of France with the war against Austria prevented her from giving due attention to the colonial question at the critical moment when colonists should have been sent out in large numbers. And it is certain that by nothing short of a great emigration could France have saved Canada. As it was, the English were bound to prevail by weight of population. When the conflict reached its climax in the days of Montcom and Wolfe, two-and-a-half million English-Americans confronted sixty-five thousand French-Canadians. On such terms the result of the contest could not be doubtful. Even in front next time the French were protected chiefly by the intervening wilderness and the need of the English colonists to develop their own immediate resources. The English were not yet ready for a serious offensive war. In fact they too had their own Indian question. It is a matter of some interest to observe how the conquest of Canada was postponed by the lack of cohesion among the English colonies. Selfishness and mutual jealousy prevented them from combining against the common foe. Save for this disunion the fancied conflict of interest New France must have succumbed long before the time of Montcom. But the vital significance of the conflict between New England and New France lies in the contrast of their spirit and institutions. The English race has extended itself through the world because it possessed the genius of emigration. The French colonist did his work magnificently in the new home. But the conditions in the old home were unfavorable to emigration. The Huguenots, the one class of the population with a strong motive for emigrating, were excluded from Canada in the interest of orthodoxy. The dangers of the Atlantic and the hardships of life in a wintry wilderness might well deter the ordinary French peasant. Moreover it by no means rested with him to say whether he would go or stay. But whatever their nature the French race lost a wonderful opportunity through the causes which prevented a healthy, steady exodus to America. England profited by having classes of people sufficiently well educated to form independent opinions and strong enough to carry out the program dictated by these opinions. While each of the English colonies sprang from a different motive, all had in common the purpose to form an effective settlement. The fur trade did France more harm than good. It deflected her attention from the middle to the northern latitudes and lured her colonists from the land in search of quick profits. It was the enemy to the home. On the other hand the English came to America primarily in search of a home. Thus they sought, like other people, but they sought them chiefly from the soil. Thus English ideas took root in America, gained new vitality, and assumed an importance they had not possessed in England for many centuries. And while for the moment the organization of the English colonies was not well suited to a fence of war, as we may judge from the abortive efforts of Phipps and Shuler, this defect could be corrected. Arising, as it did arise, from a lack of unity among the colonies, it was even indicative of latent strength. From one angle localism seems selfishness and weakness. From another it shows the vigorous life of separate communities, each self-centered and jealous of its authority because the local instinct is so vitally active. It only needed time to broaden the outlook and give the English colonies a sense of their common interest. Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts, by striking their roots each year more deeply into the soil of America, became more and more self-supporting states in everything save name and political allegiance. While New France, which with its austere climate would have developed more slowly in any case, remained dependent on the king's court. Thus Frontenac's task was quite hopeless if we define it as the effort to overthrow English power in America. But neither he nor any one of that age defined his duties so widely. In 1689 Canada was in extremes, with the Iroquois at Lechine and Dungen threatening an attack from New York. Frontenac's policy was defensive, if he struck first, it was because he considered audacity to be his best safeguard. No one knew better than Frontenac that a successful raid does not mean conquest. The Fighting Governor, a Chronicle of Frontenac, by Charles William Colby. CHAPTER VIII. FRONTENAC'S LAST DAYS. Though the English might withdraw from Quebec, New France always had the Iroquois with her. We must now pursue the thread of Frontenac's dealings with the savages, from the moment when he replaced Denonvie. It requires no flight of the imagination to appreciate the rage Frontenac must have felt when, on returning to Canada, he saw before his eyes the effects of Labar's rapacity and Denonvie's perfidy, of which the massacres of Lechine and Lecheney furnished the most ghastly proofs. But in these two cases the element of tragedy was so strong as to efface the mood of exasperation. There remained a third incident which must have provoked pure rage. This was the destruction of Forte-Frontenac, blown up at Denonvie's order by the French themselves, October 1689. The erection and maintenance of this post had been a cardinal point in Frontenac's Indian policy, and, more particularly to aggravate the offence, there was the humiliating fact that Denonvie had ordered it demolished to comply with the demand from the Iroquois. This shameful concession had been made shortly before Frontenac reached Canada. It was Denonvie's last important act in the colony. On the chance that something might have occurred to delay the execution of the order, Frontenac at once countermanded it and sent forward an expedition of three hundred men. But they were too late. His beloved fortress was gone. The only comfort which Frontenac could derive from the incident was that the work of destruction had been carried out imperfectly. There remained a portion of the works which could still be used. Thus with regard to the Iroquois the situation was far worse in 1689 than it had been when Frontenac came to Canada in 1672. Everything which he had done to conciliate the five nations had been undone, and Denonvie's intelligence activities, coinciding with this long series of French mistakes, had helped to make matters worse. Nor was it now merely a question of the Iroquois. The whole Indian world had been convulsed by the renewal of strife between Anantio and the five nations. Tribes long friendly to the French and in constant trade with them were being alienated. The Indian problem as Frontenac saw it in 1690 resolved itself to this. Either peace with the Iroquois on terms which would prove impressive to the Hurons, the Ottawa's, and even to the savages of the Mississippi, or else uncompromising war. For under no circumstances could the French afford to lose their hold upon the tribes from whom they derived their furs. Obviously an honorable peace would be preferable to the horrors of a forest war, and Frontenac did his best to secure it. To undo, as far as possible, Denonvie's treachery at Fort Frontenac and elsewhere, he had brought back with him to Quebec the Iroquois who had been sent to France, or such of them as were still alive. First among these was a Cahillou good chief of great influence named Arahaui, whose friendship Frontenac assiduously cultivated and completely won. After the close of January 1690 an Embassy of Three released Iroquois carried to Onondaga a message from Arahaui that the real Onantio had returned and peace must be made with him if the five nations wished to live. A great council was then held at which the English by invitation were represented, while the French interest founded spokesmen in a Christian Iroquois named Cutnose. Any chance of success was destroyed by the implacable enmity of the Seneca's, who remembered the attempt of the French to check their raids upon the Illinois and the invasion of their own country by Denonvie. Canahout, a Seneca chieftain, rose and stated that the tribes of Michela Mackenac were ready to join the English and the Iroquois for the destruction of New France. And the Assembly decided to enter this triple alliance. Onondaga's envoys returned to Quebec alive but with nothing to show for their pains. A later effort by Frontenac was even less successful. The Iroquois, it was clear, could not be brought back to friendship by fair words. War to the knife, being inevitable, Frontenac promptly took steps to confirm his position with the hitherto friendly savages of the Ottawa and the Great Lakes. When Canahout had said that the tribes of Michela Mackenac were ready to turn against the French, he was not drawing wholly upon his imagination. This statement was confirmed by the report of Nicolas Perrot, who knew the Indians of the West, as no one else knew them, save perhaps Delut and Cargiel. Footnote Etienne de Cargiel was the most active of the Jesuit missionaries in Canada during the period of Frontenac. After fifteen years among the Iroquois at Cayuga, 1668 to 1683, he returned for three years to Quebec. He was then sent to Michela Mackenac, where he remained another fifteen years. Shortly after the founding of Detroit, 1701, he gave up life in the forest. Despite the great hardships which he endured, he lived to be ninety-three. None of the missionaries was more strongly opposed to the brandy trade. The French were now playing a desperate game in the vast region beyond Lake Erie, which they had been the first of Europeans to explore. The Ottawa's and the Huron's, while alike the hereditary foes of the Iroquois, were filled with mutual jealousy which must be composed. The successes of the Iroquois in their raids on the French settlements must be explained and minimized. The Rat Condiaronc, the cleverest of the Western chieftains, must be conciliated, and to compass all these ends Perot found his reliance in the word that Frontenac had returned, and would lead his children against the common foe. Meanwhile, the Iroquois had their own advocates among the more timid and suspicious members of these Western tribes. During the winter of 1689 to 1690, the French and the Iroquois had about an even chance of winning the Indians who centred at Michel Amacanac, but the odds were against the French to this extent. They were working against a time limit. Unless Frontenac could quickly show evidence of strength, the tribes of the West would range with the Iroquois. In the spring of 1690, Frontenac dispatched a force of a hundred and fifty men to reinforce the garrison at Michel Amacanac. On their way westward these troops encountered a band of Iroquois and fortunately killed a number of them. The scalps were an ocular proof of success, and Perot, who was of the party, knew how to turn the victory to its best use by encouraging the Ottawa's to torture an Iroquois prisoner. The breach thus made between the Ottawa's and the five nations, distinctly widened as soon as word came that the French had destroyed Schenectady. Thus, this dreadful raid against the English did not fail of its psychological effect, as may be gathered from one of the immediate consequences. Early in August there appeared on Lake St. Louis a vast flotilla of canoes which at first caused the afflicted habitants to fear that the Iroquois were upon them again. Instead of this, it was a great band of friendly savages from the West, drawn from all the trading tribes and bringing a cargo of furs of far more than the usual value. Frontenac himself chanced to be in Montreal at this fortunate moment. The market was held and concluded to mutual satisfaction, but the crowning event of the meeting was a council, at which, after an exchange of harangues, Frontenac entered into the festivities of the savages, as though he were one of themselves, August 1690. The Governor's example was followed by his leading officers. Amid the chanting of the war song and the swinging of the tomahawk, the French renewed their alliance with the Indians of the West. All were to fight until the Iroquois were destroyed. Even the Ottawa's, who had been coquettting with the Seneca's, now came out squarely and said that they would stand by Anontio. Here at last was a real answer to the Lachine massacre. The challenge had been fairly given, and now it was not a den en vie who made the reply. There followed three years of incessant warfare between the Iroquois and the French, which furnished a fair test of the strength that each side could muster when fighting at its best. The five nations had made up their minds, the cares of diplomacy they threw to the winds. They were on the war-path, united and determined. The French, on their side, had Frontenac for leader, and many outrages to avenge. It was war of the wilderness in its most unrelenting form, with no mercy expected or asked. The general result can be quickly stated. The Iroquois got their fill of war, and Frontenac destroyed their power as a central, dominating, terrorizing Confederacy. The measure of this achievement is to be sought in the difficulties which were overcome. Despite the eighty years of its existence, the colony was still so poor that regularity in the arrival of supplies from France was a matter of vital importance. From the moment war began, English cruisers hovered about the mouth of the St. Lawrence, ready to pounce upon the supply ships as they came up the river. Sometimes the French boats escaped, sometimes they were captured. But from this interruption of peaceful overseas traffic, Canada suffered grievously. Another source of weakness was the interruption of agriculture, which followed in the train of war. As a rule the Iroquois spent the winter in hunting deer, but just as the ground was ready for its crop, they began to show themselves in the parishes near Montreal, picking off the habitats and their farms on the edge of the forest, or driving them to the shelter of the stockade. These forays made it difficult and dangerous to till the soil, with the corresponding shrinkage in the volume of the crop. Almost every winter famine was imminent in some part of the colony, and though spring was welcome for its own sake, it invariably brought the Iroquois. A third calamity was the interruption of the fur trade. Ordinarily, the great cargoes descended the Iroquois in fleets of from one hundred to two hundred canoes. But the savages of the west well knew that when they embarked with their precious bales, upon a route which was infested by the Iroquois, they gave hostages to fortune. In case of a battle the cargo was a handicap, since they must protect it as well as themselves. In case they were forced to flee for their lives, they lost the goods which it had cost so much effort to collect. In these circumstances the tribes of Michela Mackenac would not bring down their furs, unless they felt certain that the whole course of the Ottawa was free from danger. In seasons when they failed to come, the colony had nothing to export, and penury became extreme. At best the returns from the fur trade were precarious. In 1690 and 1693 there were good markets. In 1691 and 1692 there were none at all. From time to time Frontenac received from France both money and troops but neither insufficient quantity to place him where he could deal the Iroquois one final blow. Thus one year after another saw a war of skirmishes and minor raids sufficiently harassing and weakening to both sides, but with results which were disappointing because inconclusive. The hero of this border warfare is the Canadian habitat whose farm becomes a fort and whose gun is never out of reach, nor did the men of the colony display more courage than their wives and daughters. The heroine of New France is the woman who rears from twelve to twenty children, works in the fields, and cooks by day, and makes garments and teaches the catechism in the evening. It was a community which approved of early marriage. A community where boys and girls assumed their responsibilities very young, youths of sixteen shouldered the musket. Madeleine de Vochere was only fourteen when she defended her father's fort against the Iroquois with a garrison of five, which included two boys and a man of eighty. October 1692 A detailed chronicle of these raids and counter-raids would be both long and complicated, but in addition to the incidents which have been mentioned there remain three which deserve separate comment. Peter Schuler's invasion of Canada in 1691, the activities of the Abnakis against New England, and Frontenac's invasion of the Onondaga country in 1696. We have already seen that in 1690 an attempt was made by John Schuler to avenge the massacre at Schenectady. The results of this effort were insignificant, but its purpose was not forgotten, and in 1691 the Anglo-Dutch of the Hudson attempted once more to make their strength felt on the banks of the St. Lawrence. This time the leader was Peter Schuler, whose force included a hundred and twenty English and Dutch as against the forty who had attacked Canada in the previous summer. The number of Indian allies was also larger than on the former occasion, including both Mohawks and Mohigans. Apart from its superior numbers and much harder fighting, the second expedition of the English was similar to the first. Both followed Lake Champlain and the Richelieu. Both reached La Prairie opposite Montreal. Both were forced to retreat without doing any great damage to their enemies. There is this notable difference, however, that the French were in a much better state of preparation than they had been during the previous summer. The garrison at La Prairie now numbered above 700, while a flying squadron of more than 300 stood ready to attack the English on their retreat to the Richelieu. On the whole, Schuler was fortunate to escape as lightly as he did. Forty of his party were killed in a hot battle, but he made his retreat in good order after inflicting some losses on the French, August 1st, 1691. Although Schuler's retreat was skillfully conducted, his original object had been far more ambitious than to save his men from extermination. The French missed a chance to injure their foe more seriously than they had done at Schenectady. At the same time the second English invasion was so far from successful that the new France of Frontenac suffered no further attack from the side of Albany. While Calier and Valrene were repulsing Peter Schuler from La Prairie, the French in another part of Frontenac's jurisdiction were preparing for the offensive. The center of this activity was the western part of Acadia, that is, the large and rugged region which is watered by the Penobscot and the Kennebec. Here dwelt the Abnakis, a tribe of Algonquin origin, among whom the Jesuits had established a mission and made many converts. Throughout Acadia the French had established friendly relations with the Indians, and as the English settlements began to creep from New Hampshire to the mouth of the Kennebec, the interval between the rival zones of occupation became so narrow as to admit of raiding. Vips' capture of Port Royal had alarmed some of the Abnakis, but most of them held fast to the French connection and were amenable to presence. It soon proved that all they needed was leadership, which was amply furnished by the baron de Saint-Castine and Father Thurie. Saint-Castin was a very energetic French trader of noble birth who had established himself a ptenguit on Penobscot Bay, a point which after him is now called Castine. Father Thurie was the chief of the mission priests in the western part of Acadia, but though an ecclesiastic he seems to have exalted patriotism above religion, that he did his best to incite his converts against the English as beyond question. Urged on by him and Saint-Castine, the savages of the Penobscot and the Kennebec proceeded with enthusiasm to destroy the English settlements which lay within their reach. In the course of successive raids which extended from 1692 to 1694 they descended upon York, Wells, and Oyster Bay, always with the stealth and swiftness which marked joint operations of the French and Indians. The settlements of the English were sacked, the inhabitants were either massacred or carried into captivity, and all those scenes were reenacted which had marked the success of Frontenac's three war parties in 1690. Thus New England was exposed to attack from the side of Acadia no less than from that of Canada. Incidentally, Canada and Acadia were drawn into closer connection by the vigor which Frontenac communicated to the war throughout all parts of his government. But the most vivid event of Frontenac's life after the defense of Quebec against Phipps was the great expedition which he led in person against the Onondagas. It was an exploit which resembles Denonvy's attack upon the Seneca's, with the added interest that Frontenac was in his seventy-seventh year when he thus carried the war into the heart of the enemy's country. As a physical tour de force this campaign was splendid, and it enables us, better than any other event, to appreciate the magnificent energy which Frontenac threw into the fulfilment of his task. With over two thousand men and an equipment that included cannon and mortars he advanced from the south shore of Lake Ontario against the chief stronghold of the Iroquois. At the portage the Indians would not permit their aged, indomitable annoncio to walk, but insisted that he should remain seated in his canoe, while they carried it from the pool below the fall to the dead water above. All the French saw of the stronghold they had come to attack was the flame which consumed it. Following the example of the Seneca's, the Onondagas, when they saw that the invader was at hand, set fire to their palisade and wigwams, gathered up what property was portable, and took to the woods. Pursuit was impossible. All that could be done was to destroy the corn and proceed against the settlement of the Onidas. After this, with its maize had been consumed, Frontenac considered whether he should attack the Cayugas, but he decided against this extension of the campaign. Unlike Denonvie, he was at war with the English as well as with the Iroquois, and may have thought it imprudent to risk surprise at a point so far from his base. While it was disappointing that the Onondagas did not wait to be destroyed by the cannon, which, with so much effort, had been brought against them, this expedition was a useful proof of strength, and produced a good moral effect throughout the colony, as well as among the Western tribes. The events of William and Mary's War, as it was known in New England, show how wide the French zone in North America had come to be. Frontenac's province extended from Newfoundland to the Mississippi, from Onondaga to Hudson Bay. The rarest quality of a ruler is the power to select good subordinates and fill them with his own high spirit. Charged by this standard Frontenac deserves great praise, for he never lacked capable and loyal lieutenants. With Caliere at Montreal, Tanti on the Mississippi, Perot and Delut at Michelin Mackenac, Villabon and St. Castin in Acadia, St. Helene at the Siege of Quebec, and Ibervie at Hudson Bay, he was well supported by his staff. At this critical moment the shortcomings of the French in America were certainly not due to lack of purpose or driving power. The system under which they worked was faulty, and in their extremity they resorted to harsh expedience, but there were heroes in New France if courage and self-sacrifice are the essence of heroism. The peace of Rizwick, which was signed in the year after Frontenac's campaign against the Onondagas, came as a happy release to Canada, 1697. For nine years the colony had been hard-pressed, and a breathing space was needed. The Iroquois still remained apparel, but proportionately their losses since 1689 had been far heavier than those of the French and English. Left to carry on the war by themselves they soon saw the hopelessness of their project to drive the French from the St. Lawrence. The English were ready to give them defensive assistance, even after word came from Europe that peace had been signed. In 1698 the Earl of Bellamont, then Governor of New York, wrote Frontenac that he would arm every man in his province to aid the Iroquois if the French made good their threat to invade once more the land of the five nations. Frontenac, then almost on his deathbed, sent back the characteristic reply that this kind of language would only encourage him to attack the Iroquois with more vigor. The sequel shows that the English at Albany overplayed their part. The reward of their protection was to be suzerainty, and at this price protection proved unacceptable to the Iroquois, whose safety lay in the equipoise of power between the rival whites. Three years later the five nations renewed peace with Anantio, and though Frontenac did not live to see the day, he it was who had brought it to pass. His daring and energy had broken the spirit of the red man. In 1701, Kelliers, then Governor of New France, held a great council at Montreal, which was attended by representatives from all the Indian tribes of the West, as well as from the Iroquois. There amid all the ceremonies of the wilderness, the calamet was smoked and the hatchet was interred. But the old warrior was then no more. On returning to Quebec from his war against the Anandogas, he had thrown himself into an act of quarrel with Champigny, the intendant, as to the establishment and maintenance of French posts throughout the West. To the last Frontenac remained an advocate of the policy which sought to place France in control of the Great Lakes and the Mississippi. Champigny complained of the expense and the Jesuits lamented the immorality which life in the forest encouraged among young men. It was an old quarrel renewed under conditions which made the issue more important than ever, for with open war between French and English it became a vital moment to control points which were or might be strategic. This dispute with Champigny was the last incident in Frontenac's stormy life. It remains to the credit of both Governor and Intendant that their differences on matters of policy did not make them irreconcilable enemies. On the 28th of November 1698 Frontenac died at the Chateau Saint-Louis after an illness of less than a month. He had long been a hero of the people, and his friendship with the Recolais showed that he had some true allies among the clergy. No one in Canada could deny the value of his services at the time of crisis, which was not a matter of months but of years. Father Goyer of the Recolais delivered a eulogy which in fervor recalls Voset's funeral orations over members of the royal family. But the most touching valedictory was that from Champigny, who after many differences had become Frontenac's friend. In communicating to the colonial office tidings of the Governor's death Champigny says, quote, on the 28th of last month M. Le Compte de Frontenac died with the sentiments of a true Christian. After all our disputes you will hardly believe Montigny how truly and deeply I am touched by his death. He treated me during his illness in a manner so obliging that I should be utterly devoid of gratitude if I did not feel thankful to him." There is a well-known portrait of Madame de Frontenac which may still be seen at Versailles. Of Frontenac himself no portrait whatever exists. Failing his likeness from brush or pencil we must image to ourselves as best we may the choleric old warrior who rescued New France in her hour of need. In seeking to portray his character the historian has abundant materials for the period of his life in Canada. Though we must regret the dearth of information for the years which separate his two terms of office. There is also a bad gap in our sources for the period which precedes his first appointment as Governor, what we have from Madame de Montpensier and Saint-Sommant is useful but their statements are far from complete and provoke many questions which must remain unanswered. His letters and reports as Governor of Canada exist in considerable numbers, but it must remain a source of lasting regret that his private correspondence has perished. Someone has said the talent should be judged at its best and character at its worst, but this is a phrase which does not help us to form a true estimate of frontenac. He touched no heights of genius and he sank to no depths of crime. In essential respects his qualities lie upon the surface depicted by his acts and illustrated by his own words or those of men who knew him well. Were we seeking to set his good traits against his bad we should style him in one column, brave, steadfast, daring, ambitious of greatness, far-sighted in policy, and in the other, prodigal, boastful, haughty, unfair in argument, ruthless in war. This method of portraiture, however, is not very helpful. We can form a much better idea of frontenac's nature by discussing his acts than by throwing adjectives at him. As an administrator he appears to least advantage during his first term of office when in the absence of war his energies were directed against the adversaries within the colony. Had he not been sent to Canada a second time his feud with the Laval, de Cheneau, and the Jesuits would fill a much larger space in the canvas than it occupies at present. For in the absence of great deeds to his credit obstinacy and truculence might have been thought at the essentials rather than the accidents of his character. Monsieur Lorin, who writes in great detail, finds much to say on behalf of frontenac's motives, if not of his conduct, in these controversies. But viewing his career broadly it must be held that, at best, he lost a chance for useful cooperation by hugging prejudices and prepossessions which sprang in part from his own love of power and in part from antipathy towards the Jesuits in France. He might not like the Jesuits, but they were a great force in Canada, and had done things which should have provoked his admiration. In any case it was his duty to work with them on some basis and not dislocate the whole administration by brawling. As to de Cheneau, frontenac was the broader man of the two, and may be excused some of the petulance which the intendants pinpricks called forth. Frontenac's enemies were fond of saying that he used his position to make illicit profits from the fur trade. And question he traded to some extent, but it would be harsh to accuse him of venality or peculation on the strength of such evidence as exists. There is a strong probability that the king appointed him in the expectation that he would augment his income from sources which lay outside his salary. Public opinion varies from age to age regarding the latitude which may be allowed a public servant in such matters. Under a democratic regime the standard is very different from that which has existed for the most part under autocracies in past ages. Frontenac was a man of distinction who accepted an important post at a small salary. We may infer that the king was willing to allow him something from perquisites. If so, his profits from the fur trade become a matter of degree. So long as he kept within the bounds of reason and decency the government raised no objection. Frontenac certainly was not a governor who pillaged the colony to feather his own nest. If he took profits they were not thought excessive by any one except Gichinot. The king recalled him not because he was venal, but because he was quarrelsome. Assuming the standards of his own age a reasonable plea can also be made on Frontenac's behalf respecting the conduct of his wars. Quote, man's inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn. In our own day no less than in the seventeenth century, while certain facts of recent memory are quite lurid enough to be placed in comparison with the border raids which under Frontenac were made by the French and their Indian allies. It is dreadful to know that captured Iroquois were burned alive by the French, but after the Lachine massacre and the tortures which French captives endured this was an almost inevitable retaliation. The concluding scenes of King Philip's War prove at any rate that the men of New England exercised little more clemency towards their Indian foes than was displayed by the French. The Puritans justified their acts of carnage by citations from the Old Testament regarding the Canaanites and the Philistines. The most bitter chronicler of King Philip's War is William Hubbard, a Calvinist pastor of Ipswich. On December 19th, 1675, the English of Massachusetts and Connecticut stormed the great stronghold of the Narragansets to quote John Fisk, quote, in the slaughter which filled the rest of that Sunday afternoon till the sun went down behind a dull gray cloud, the grim and wrathful Puritan as he swung his heavy cutlass, thought of Saul and a gag, and spared not, the Lord had delivered up to him the heathen as stubble to his sword. As usual the number of the slain is variously estimated, of the Indians, probably not less than a thousand, perished, unquote. For the slaughter of English women and children by French raiders there was no precedent or just provocation. Here Frontenac must be deemed more culpable than the Puritans. The only extenuating circumstance is that those who survived the first moments of attack were in almost all cases spared, taken to Canada, and they are treated with kindness. Writers of the lighter drama have long found a subject in the old man whose irascibility is but a cloak for goodness of heart. It would be an exaggeration to describe Frontenac as a character of this type, for his wrath could be vehement, and benevolence was not the essential strain in his disposition. At the same time he had many warm impulses to his credit, his loyalty to friends stands above reproach, and there are little incidents which show his sense of humor. For instance he once find a woman for lampooning him, but caused the money to be given to her children. Though often unfair an argument he was by nature neither mean nor petty. In ordinary circumstances he remembered no bless oblige, and though boastfulness may have been among his failings he had a love of greatness which preserved him from sordid misdemeanors. Even if we agree with Parkman that greatness must be denied him it yet remains to be pointed out that absolute greatness is a high standard attained by few. Frontenac was a greater man than most by virtue of robustness, fire, and a sincere aspiration to discharge his duty as a lieutenant of the king. He doubtless thought himself ill-used in that he lacked the wealth which was needed to accomplish his ambitions at court. But if Fortune frowned upon him at Versailles she made full compensation by granting him the opportunity to govern Canada a second time. As he advanced in years his higher qualities became more conspicuous. His vision cleared, his vanities fell away, there remained traces of the old petulance, but with graver duties his stature increased and the strong fibre of his nature was disclosed. For his foibles he had suffered much throughout his whole life, but beneath the foibles lay courage and resolve. It was his reward that in the hour of trial when upon his shoulders rested the fate of France and America he was not found wanting.