 Hello everyone. Welcome to another international capsule for the Shankar IAS Academy. Today our topic is the visit to India by Anthony Blinken, the Secretary of State of the United States. He was here just for over a day and on the whole the visit was disappointing in the sense that many of us had expected that he had come to the region at a time when the situation in Afghanistan was critical. Because we all know that the United States forces had withdrawn and they are committed to completely withdrawing by the end of August and that they had left it to the parties in Afghanistan to find a solution for all the problems that are plaguing that country. But after our foreign ministers visit to some other countries including Russia, Iran, Tashkent, Uzbekistan and some of these regional countries, it appeared as though the announcement of the Secretary of State's visit came as though he had a formula to offer. So most of us who expected Blinken to announce a new formula to bring peace to Afghanistan without it being overtaken by the Taliban were disappointed by his visit. It was obvious that the United States did not want to go back to Afghanistan in any particular way. But more than that, it did not appear that they had a contingency plan to help out the Ghani government in Afghanistan to find the Taliban and continue in power for some more time. We know that American forces not on the ground but have been giving air support to the Afghan army. But beyond that, they were not doing anything to prevent the movement of the Taliban towards Kabul. So instead of putting forward a particular plan, what Mr. Blinken was simply to repeat the biased hopes and also expectations as to how things should turn out in Afghanistan. He agreed with us that Afghanistan should have a democratic, inclusive, non-aligned independent government. And India and the United States were agreed on this. But what would be the steps that the United States and India could do to help the Afghan government? There was no proposal. Ironically, when Mr. Blinken was in India, we were also seeing a Taliban, a high-powered Taliban delegation being received in China. And declarations were being made by the Taliban that they would welcome China to participate in the development of Afghanistan. And that Taliban would make sure that they are safe and that properties will be safe, etc. Preparing the ground for what I think, massive induction of the BRI into Afghanistan and then through Pakistan. So, but Mr. Blinken did not seem to question that or even suggest that this was not going to be very healthy for Afghanistan. And moreover, after a couple of days, he said that Chinese involvement in Afghanistan may not be altogether undesirable. Perhaps there may be something good in China's approach to Afghanistan. This was even more disappointing. Because while talking to China, he had a different approach talking to China with India. He talked about the principles that the United States and India share, the kind of democratic background, human rights, so many principles that the United States and India share. And made it clear that the Quad, about which he was very positive, would provide the framework for the United States and India to cooperate in bringing stability in the India-Pacific future. So, when he was independently talking about China, his position was very clear that he was looking at India as a democracy to support the American efforts to contain China. But unlike Mr. Pompeo, his predecessor, who was Mr. Trump's secretary of state, he did not make any commitment to standing by India in the context of the Chinese Moves in Ladakh. There is no particular concern was expressed that disengagement was not taking place. It is true that some discussions had started when Mr. Blinken was here. And there are some indications that there might be some disengagement in the next few days. But the kind of support that this predecessor had declared for India in the context of China, I did not see. It is possible that they might have been ascertained in the official private conversations. But on China, he was very specific and very clear that India and China should work together. So, if you look at Mr. Blinken's visit in a traditional bilateral visit, there are quite enough positive points about his approach to the United States. But I may be wrong. The impression I gained from your overall visit and the outcome of it, I felt that the Biden administration was still very tentative about China and India. It seemed that they were still in the process of analyzing the situation and coming to a conclusion as well as China is concerned. So, they do envisage some amount of cooperation with China. But at the same time, they were quite clear that they would not allow China to dominate the world. And that is a matter of some comfort to us. And to make us even more comfortable, Mr. Blinken talked about squad not being a military alias. This is our requirement because we do not want to call it a military alias. So, at one stage, he said that the squad was not a military alias. But at the same time, he made it very clear that India, US partnership, the cooperation in dealing with China is a major factor in that. But to say that China's activities, if any, in Afghanistan may not be undesirable, leaves a bit of suspicion as to why he has taken that position. India, US relations, he characterized this as work in progress. And this he was saying in the context of some of the concerns that he expressed before he came to India about the human rights situation in India. So, he had said quite formally before he left that one of the things that he was going to raise in India was the reported deterioration of democracy in India and the growth of authoritarianism, etc. So, when he said that even our two democracies are work in progress, what he was saying that maybe the Indian democracy is not mature enough and seem to be the suggestion. So, on the so-called vital India-US relationship and the Indo-Pacific strategy, the Quad and COVID-19, these were the issues which were discussed, everything seemed to be tentative. As far as COVID is concerned, he declared that some $25 million will be available for vaccination. He reiterated that the United States was most grateful to India for the support it gave to the United States at the initial stages of the pandemic and that the future also the cooperation will continue. He did not say so, but it seemed as though the intellectual property rights related to some of the vaccines and the components of vaccines which have to be sent to India, United States will have an open mind. So, as a bilateral visit, yes, the ingredients were there. In fact, the Chinese criticized Blinken's visit as proclaiming that United States and India were such close friends and their shared ideals, etc. So, they criticized both saying that democracy in the western sense is not the answer for cooperation and they criticized the whole concept that democratic principles are which guide India and the United States and their relationship is based on these principles. So, they said one man, one vote democracy is not necessarily the most comfortable and most suitable form of government. So, his assertion about the relationship between India and the United States being very principled was called into question by the Chinese. But two very interesting things that Secretary Clinton did in India surprised everybody. One is he called a meeting or he met the representatives of the Dalai Lama as the Tibet government in exile. This is a very, very unprecedented meeting. Of course, United States had its own plans for Tibet and President Trump himself had enacted a Tibet assistance plan to provide some funding for the Tibetan refugees or scholarships. And in addition to that, they said they would want to open a consulate in Lhasa and if the Chinese did not allow United States to open a consulate in Lhasa, no Chinese consulate will be allowed in any of the states of the United States. They had also said that no outside forces should intervene in the matter of the succession of the Dalai Lama and if anybody intervened, action will be taken by them by the United States. So, we know that the American position had become tough on Tibet and particularly in the context of Xi Jinping's visit to Tibet just a few days earlier than that, which we think had implications for India meant for the Chinese position on the border This toughening of the position was significant. But the fact that he met the Tibetan leaders on Indian soil was something new because in the past, we have not allowed even the official representatives of the US government to have meetings with Tibetans in India. In fact, we have an understanding with the Dalai Lama that he will not engage in any political activities here. And if he wanted to do that, he had to go to Europe, he had to go to Austria, he had to go to the United States, he had somewhere with countries where he used to go and make speeches and so on, but not in India. And what was the purpose of that? The purpose was that we do not provoke China unnecessarily. The Dalai Lama's presence here itself is a provocation and therefore we didn't want to press it to a point. And after Mr Modi's visit to Wuhan, we had even softened our position in the sense that we did not participate in the Dalai Lama's but their celebrations officially and did not participate in any protest activities inside India. So towards China on Tibet, we are becoming a bit soft. But his meeting here was certainly a provocation, although I have not seen any reaction by the Chinese to this nor from our side. And so this was a point to be noted. But he did do something more, which is a meeting he held for some activists, human rights activists, journalists and others who are critical of the Modi government as though it was a kind of fact-finding mission as to where democracy is in order in India. This American presidents do all the time because they have a mandate from the US Congress to look at democracies and minority situations even with the most friendly countries. So that is why before Secretary of State President Obama, when he came here, it was a fantastic visit. But after the bilateral visit, he went to a halt and spoke about value of democracy and how India should not divert from its democratic principles. And we ignored it. And similarly, this time also, it seems that India has not questioned this meeting. So because he said, for example, one of the elements that Americans admire most about India is the steadfast commitment to its people to democracy, pluralism, human rights and fundamental freedoms. And he went on to examining the way India functions in a quest for self-correcting mechanisms, to prepare the challenges to democracy. So all these statements appear to confirm the impression that the Biden administration was still very tentative about its judgment and it is also quite clear that in settling the Afghanistan situation, they would rather depend on Pakistan rather than India. So on bilateral relationship, which is being called vital, earlier President Obama used to say it is the most defining relationship in the 21st century. It appeared that there is a slight decline or shall be saying certain caution about India and its democracy. As far as the Quad is concerned, he announced President Biden's intention to convene a face-to-face meeting of the Quad at the summit level later this year. And there was also some discussion about Prime Minister visiting Washington later this year. So it could perhaps be an occasion where Prime Minister Modi will be in Washington to attend the Quad summit. And that shows the further strengthening of the Quad partnership. But as I said, he repeated that Quad was not a military alliance or India's sick. Our external affairs minister Jai Shankar responded to all this in his usual philosophical manner without showing any kind of emotions on this, whether it is the disappointment or happiness. But he added in good measure that China should not see any action by other countries as being aimed at China. So this was his sole motto statement he said. While Mr. Blinken was talking about the Quad, he slipped in this sentence that when other countries do things, China should not think that this is aimed at them. In other sense, in other words, India's position that Quad is not an anti-China grouping, not an Asian network, etc. But again, there was no indication, however, that the line of actual control situation was serious. Because when Mr. Blinken was in India, there was concern that disengagement in remaining sectors in Iraq has not taken place. And in a sense, Mr. Blinken's visit to the Tibetan leaders may have aggravated the Chinese attitude towards the line of actual control. Because our intention not to play the Tibetan card or the Dalai Lama card was intended to solve our mutual problems, particularly the border peacefully. But this may have been a provocation for Tibet, together with all that the Trump administration had done, providing financial provision for support to the Tibetan community, a keep of camps in India. So meeting with the Tibetans was probably in connection with this proactive position with regard to Tibetan exile in India. And India did not seem to question that initiative. Of course, COVID-19 occupied a good part of the discussion and there was a specific comment of US dollars, 25 million to provide for vaccination in India. As I said, it was explained that this was basically reciprocity towards India's own assistance in the early part of the pandemic. But here again, no multilateral effort was indicated. Because the failure of the United Nations to deal with the pandemic in the United manner because of the Chinese position remained so. Even today, there are no efforts to have a multilateral effort to take this forward to the pandemic cooperation. But it was clear that US would not be lacking in the case of extending support to India. We should expect that the US would be liberal about intellectual property rights and vaccines. The competition with China is also an element in the COVID issue. The US is still pressing for investigating the origins of the so-called Wuhan virus. So to summarize all that had happened that we know about, of course, he met the Prime Minister or may have been very important discussions. But we didn't find any, any readout on that. And my own feeling is that the general approach is very positive, particularly in the context of China. But the contrary to the position of President Trump, there was no clear commitment on the part of President Biden to stand by China in the event of a deterioration of the border situation. This may have to do with the fact that the US has not yet reached a definitive conclusion about the deteriorations with China itself and India's role in it. So it's quite possible that these matters will be further discussed in Washington when the Quad meets and hopefully at that time the Prime Minister would be personally there. And the developments after that are not at all encouraging. The situation in Afghanistan has further deteriorated. Taliban is moving forcefully to occupy the towns. Earlier they were only in the suburbs and the villages etc. And now they are closing in on Afghanistan. There are reports that Taliban suffered some casualties inflicted by the Afghan forces. But the trend definitely, according to all the news sources, is that there is no letdown in Taliban movement towards Kabul. We do not know what discussions have taken place in Doha after the Americans had left. And the American assurance in that context is only that if they don't follow, if they don't keep the promises they have given in Doha, United States would not recognize the whatever regime comes up in Kabul. And as I said last time, that is not a big issue for Taliban because last time also they had no recognition from most of the states of the world. Their focus is on developing a fundamentalist government, support Pakistan, get support from China, and in the process create more problems for us in Jammu and Kashmir. So that movement has not been stopped by Mr. Blinken's visit or anything else they are managing for time. So as a bilateral visit, it was a good beginning. This was the first time that Mr. Blinken was in India. And all the right noises were made. And there was clear transparency in its dependence on India or cooperation within India in meeting the Chinese threat. But since they have not yet decided on their real strategy with China, and they still have some interest in Pakistan, China, etc., sort of operating as a stabilizing force in the whole of this region, we have some concerns. But I'm sure during the prime minister's visit, by then of course the situation in Afghanistan would have stabilized one way or the other. And that would be the time we would have a chance to compare notes to the United States and see where we go. We have no news from Iran or from Russia as to what they would be doing. But nothing helpful has been said. Some observers still believe that Iran may play a role in consolidating the Shia elements in the northern part of Afghanistan. And that may create some problems for the Taliban. But we have not heard anything to indicate that Iran had an intervention, intention to intervene. So this in some is what has happened. And we simply have to watch and wait for what's happening as far as India is concerned. We have no role. We have no intention to put our boots into Afghanistan. But we'll probably continue to support the Ghani government in whichever way we can without direct intervention. Thank you very much. I suppose we think in terms of all kinds of contingencies, because on Biden's son, we know he declared he changed policy towards Ukraine. So that is the idea is already burnt by getting involved in his business. But China's policy is much bigger than any involvement of Mr. Biden's son in China. Because China's US cooperation is very extensive. Even if Biden had no son, I think he would have been softer towards China. Because like we discovered, it is very difficult to decouple China from our economic and political relationships. And then they also see, Trump was a little bit adventurous in these matters and he took very forward positions. But Clinton did not do that. Obama did not do that. So Democrats generally have a soft corner to a stand. But in the actions of the Chinese during the pandemic, must have made the Americans realize that these soft kind of approachmen would help. But that's why I said they are still tentative on their China policy. And tentative on India policy. They are still making soundings. And that is how we have to see this visit. As far as the government of India's calculations are concerned, I'm sure they have all the information that they are analyzing and dealing with it. At the moment, they seem to be focusing on disengagement on the border. Yes, the options are open. But look at our situation today with the Chinese pressurizing us from one side and not having what shall we say, as opposed to we have our own plans to meet the Chinese threat. But we need powerful friends in this particular situation. And the only powerful friend who is willing to be with you is only the United States. Russia is not doing that. Europeans are not doing that. So our options are also limited. And we have to operate within that. So if we are able to disengage the Chinese troops someday, we are able to reinstate our patrolling, because that's an important aspect of this engagement. Because in actual situation, we say nothing has changed because the border has not been changed. But we have been stopped from areas where we used to patrol earlier. Because we have stopped the Chinese from patrolling the areas where they used to do that. It's true. In terms of non-patrolling, we seem to have lost land. And that is the issue which is to be, even after these people withdraw, you might have noticed reports as to the day before that India is pressing for the right to patrol the same areas that we used to do as part of the disengagement. Thank you. So these are all options. We are playing a chess game. You have to see what assets you have and what the enemy has. And that skill depends on how you move your pawns. That's how it is. Well, I don't know really the interconnection between these tribes etc. But we know that Pakistan is not entirely united with everything that the Taliban does. There is a difference between the Pakistani extremists and the Taliban extremists. And so each will also try to see that the other one dominates, does not dominate them. So there must be a kind of underlying currents of difference. And that may have something to do with the composition of the tribes also. So that's how I understand it. And therefore, I cannot say clearly as to how this chemistry will develop. But it's quite obvious that there will be differences. And those differences may surface when the Taliban is ready to form a government, whether they will be willing to share power with others. So it will depend on that. These are all several imponderables. But somehow I feel right from the beginning and even now that the Taliban government is likely to come about at least for a short period at the time which when India and Pakistan and the Taliban would work out their relationship and see what they will do for each other, whether they will work together. When Chinese, if they are involved, they will try to keep them together so that the opposition to India does not get that into it. And that's all I can see in the nearest future. When I say Mr. Blinken, so we said, did not give me any recent to feel comfortable about this. Thank you very much. I'll see you next week. Bye-bye.