 Welcome to this webinar. My name is Catherine Meenan and I'm chair of the Germany group. And it's a great pleasure for us today to be joined by Catherine Glover Ashbrook, who's the director and CEO of the German Council on Foreign Relations. And she's, she's very under a lot of pressure at the moment in the process of moving from from the States to Berlin, but she has very generously agreed to speak to us today. Just on the housekeeping, she'll talk for about 20 minutes and then we move into discussion. Both her talk and the question and answer with the audience will be on the record. You'll be able to join the discussion using question and answer function on zoom, which as everybody knows by now you will be on your screen. Please send in your questions throughout the event, and please identify yourself and your affiliation if there is one. Please join in on Twitter to with the hashtag. So we're very happy to have Catherine here today. She's director and CEO of the German Council on Foreign Relations. For over a decade, she served as executive director of the future of diplomacy project at the Harvard Kennedy School. And before that she was a member of the management board of the European Policy Center and worked as a consultant and senior journalist and Roland Berger strategy consultants, having begun her career as a TV journalist at CNN International. So Catherine we're looking forward to this very much and the floor is yours. Thank you Catherine it is such a pleasure to be with you even virtually in Dublin. I was just saying in our earlier green room conversation how much I would prefer to be frankly with you physically in Dublin and having this conversation on what I consider sacred ground in Ireland, where I had a very formative time of my own use so thank you to the Institute of International and European Affairs, thank you to you Catherine to Michael Collins to Emily Benchy for putting this entire seven aren't together and I really look forward to this conversation. So as Catherine mentioned it's true I've been not only leading a transatlantic life in my own sort of genetic makeup and the product of a transatlantic marriage but more recently I am moving myself my family my career back to Germany. It's been over 13 years and in so doing. I did something that many of us might do you stop off at your parental homestead, which to many a political scientist becomes the storage and repository of your many intellectual papers. And in that process I found what clearly in 1997 I found to be a prized possession. It was an issue of Foreign Affairs magazine published by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York with the grand title right on the cover life after call will always be published in Germany. And I bring this up because I of course thumbed this issue because we are again at an inflection point in German contemporary history. When this article was published in 1997 we assume that Helmut Cole would be the longest serving Chancellor in German history. As sort of recent history shows us because the Chancellor remains in place in situ until a new government is formed and as we know about German coalition agreements they take a while to come into fruition. It is more likely that Angela Merkel will end up outlasting politically, the man who was her mentor who brought her into politics but then who she. I'm going to talk about this probably in honest terms in almost a Judean Judas kind of coup sort of laid bare in front of his party in the in the later 90s so an interesting political dynamic there, but I thought it might be interesting to begin with the comparison of these two leaders because I do think that it says something about the political and foreign policy DNA of my native country and I think it says something or it helps us understand what we might expect as we move into what I think would be a new era in German foreign policy, because as much as the both of these figures symbolize a certain stability of the German political class nobody stays around for 16 plus years. If that is not something that a country desires and a constitutional system allows. We're not a hallmark of something deeper within how a country positions itself thinks of itself in the world. And yet I don't have to tell you at the IE a how much the world has changed, not least over this past decade, the rapid catalyzing effects of how global competition plays out over the shores of Europe, how critical issues of transnational challenges frankly impact the way that we view the blurring of lines between domestic and foreign policy. And then the question becomes is this country is Germany with its desire to feel that sort of stability that couching that protection adequately prepared for what the Munich security call a Munich security conference has referred to as a very exciting vendor, a fundamental time of change. They called helmet Cole, the his eternality. And when you look at Angela Merkel and what she has been able to achieve. And again, I don't need to remind you she was seen as certainly during these last four fraud years for the transatlantic relationship. The leader, the undeniable leader of the West was she seen as such because of the policies that she put forward and the strength of line that she held respected to Western values. Yes, certainly up to a point, but also again because of her longevity, and because of her consistency, frankly, she was seen, she's seen, you know, by by Forbes magazine as the most influential most powerful person in the world. The leader of the free world was sort of a moniker that she never fully embraced. But where does it leave the country at this very moment. It's an interesting time to think of also the domestic policy context in relation to foreign policy what brought down, ultimately or what weakened the legacy of helmet Cole were a number of internal challenges economic challenges that the country had not tackled for years that he had sort of kept steadily under the rug. We know in Germany that although it has prospered enormously since the critical moment of the financial crisis in 2008. And again, it is, you know, among the lead export nations in the world we know that Germany sees itself as the export champion of the world but with us, the United States and China it is among the biggest trading powers individual trading powers to say nothing of the power that the European Union brings to the trading to the global trading floor. It has been able to profit enormously. Unlike almost any other country in the world of its sort of middle power standing from that dual security blanket if you will embedded deeply in a multilateralist institutional framing of globalization. And of course by the American security umbrella provided through NATO, and we know the criticism of German attitudes toward particularly and commitment to particularly the sort of the NATO alliance its lack of living up fully to the NATO 2% that was made at the NATO summit in Wales. Now again that's something that has improved over the tenure of Angela Merkel but hasn't improved because of this particular chancellor have attitudes shifted within Europe and within Germany to understand the greater degree to which Europe needs to present itself with a well, some say sovereign but at least distinct voice on the international stage and that's what I would posit as a question. What you have had in these two leaders and have in these two leaders. People who were able to push out sort of descent within own party ranks within the sort of political climate and the party political dynamic, you saw that both with cool, and even more so with Angela Merkel. Her domestic standing and her capacity to retain this sort of unfettered leadership position have been attributed to various personal capacities over the over the years, but she has been rather ruthless at suppressing the opposition within her own country, and conversely, is zirping like few other German politicians certainly of her generation but also historically. Effectively, those points that from the opposition and you'll remember that she has governed in a grand coalition for decades now that have fundamentally weakened and forced into a position of atrophy the other large German people's party in the country which is to say the social democratic party. And yet if you look just at the domestic numbers of what we might see in September. Merkel's legacy is tainted by the outcome of her own policies. If you trust the polling and of course the Germans are very closely monitoring the polling ahead of the September 26 election. We have what I think called the Zontags faga the Sunday question if the election were on Sunday, how would you cast your vote. The Christian Democratic Union has its worst result or brings home its worst result historically in the history of the party hovering somewhere around between 26 and 28% and in 2017 already the last federal election where you'll recall Merkel ran reluctantly in part because President Obama pushed her to as a stalwart figure of the West brought home a result of only 33% and already that said something about her capacity to move this country forward, which is to say her lack, ultimately, of capacity of addressing the deep internal issues that will would make Germany more resilient, a larger and more capable player internationally, and certainly, you know with deeper deeper reaching reforms within the country that are needed, but that she consistently shied away from. So her capacity, and this is again as a continuation of coal is to read a situation, and you see I'm making the Merkel hand gestures comes almost naturally in that moment to sit to wait out a situation to read the political tea leaves. And critical decisions, like the, the decision to open the country to to migrants in 2015, which was interpreted as a large humanitarian gesture that the country ultimately was not ready from, and that begat a number of internal problems in the country of the rise, the drastic and frankly, catalytic rise of the far right party, I don't know TV for Deutschland, think only of the issues that it caused communal financing for cities for a number of other things. Now, did the country ultimately manage in this idea of the shop and that's yes it did. She took polling she read polling strategically, and she felt that this coupled with some of those those sort of basic tenants of her moral conviction were something that she could put forth to the German public. Much like that decision, much like her decisions and her slow decision making in the euro crisis in 2008, and some of the hesitancy now in this covert crisis means that ultimately she can read a situation in the moment, hold the political tension in the moment, but and I think this is something that is critical for Germany going forward does not yet speaks to sort of a lack of strategic foresight culture in the country, the anticipatory capacities of German foreign policy and of German Chancellor's in the past historically and today is in fact actually quite low is just to say the diagnostic capacity to anticipate the knock on effects both within the European Union think again of the dramatic effect that her laggard decision in 2008 had on inter European solidarity on ultimate functionality and recovery think of the speed or rather the slowness of recovery of the Greek and Italian economies were still battling those issues. And look at how she didn't fully and the country didn't fully embrace the kind of structural reforms within the eurozone that would have had to come out of the 2008 financial crisis which means that still now in 2021 we're asking us ourselves can the eurozone survive if, in fact, and this is true of the party political programs, almost across the board as we look towards September, Germany decides to default back to its constitutional mandate to go back to its attitude of savings this almost Christian attitude and conviction around the balance budgets and what the Germans call the Schwarz neul. So what you see in the consistency or what you see is a consistent element between coal and Merkel certainly in their foreign policy line is yes, the long conviction and long ties to German chancellors and historic German chancellors with long serving terms before them which is yes a commitment to the anchoring in the transatlantic relationship, and what Conrad Adenauer termed as best. Yes, their own interpretation of what Billy Brant's auspolitik would mean in a modern context so the positioning of themselves both coal and Merkel, as the main interlocutors toward the key figures in the Soviet Union. And again, in Cole's case, he and Gorbachev of course, critical for the reunification that relationship critical for the reunification of Germany, Merkel, frankly, the only leader capable of holding Putin's feet to the fire but then again, to what is great because Nord Stream two is still very much a project that the Chancellor has guilty to, and that those who are in this governing coalition have guilty to. You might see an ability to address the issues but only at the last minute, and to fail to give to the German people but also to the political elite and idea of long term strategic ideas, political foresight, and sort of anticipatory action. You might ask if that's part and parcel of European or of German political DNA. I don't think so. I think in that sense you have had the German people have been fought or insufficiently served by their political leadership to look at the critical challenges that are coming at Germany in the next few years and I mean what are they, we obviously are looking very closely at the electoral calendar not only in Germany but in France France, you have an embattled president in Emmanuel Macron who put forth, frankly, quite provocative ideas on the future of Europe think only at his speech in Aachen and in other places to say look we need to rethink the European project from the ground up. Was he met by the Chancellor in the sort of classical European tandem structure. No, he was not for that the Chancellor is far too cautious, and she is far too tied by the purse strings that are dictate if you will, of the German economic model. Look at China. She said she avowed, of course that Germany would take a harder stance on human rights issues on Hong Kong on Xinjiang. And yet at the tail end of the German presidency of the German of the European Council. It was it was Angela Merkel who took the lead and bringing home the Chinese investment agreement, which is now so embattled frankly rightly for all of the not only the fine print in the latter parts of the intellectual control agreements that the Chinese snuck into this deal, but also in their functionality and what it might do to the integrity of the European economic system and model. At Russia, she was willing and able to push the Ukraine format through earth push issues on Ukraine through the Normandy format in a way and you remember visually how she led the the the delegation the negotiation delegation out of that initial negotiation room around Minsk one and yet the situation in Ukraine continues to be just as dire if not more so in the sort of prolonged frozen conflict that Russia uses for its strategic and tactical. So there are a number of key issues and I already mentioned the Eurozone. If France goes another way, if we have a French election that either weakens the political situation of Emmanuel Macron such that it binds him in to in action and political inability in France, then what of the partnership that has so long driven the future of the European Union. If, in fact, as the party political programs map out Germany insists on by 2023 rolling back some of the innovative financial capacities embedded in the European reform and rescue package among COVID what does that do to again the internal solidarity, the integrity and functionality and frankly the innovative capacities that European Union needs, and that the American president called for in his four day summit tree here in in on the continental in continental Europe and in the UK. What happens of you know what what can what might happen to German industry going forward if it's two three of its key industries are so bound in fact, codependent on the Chinese economy. What does that say about the robustness of the German economic model, when in fact you know if you take things like machine building still a key industry within the German economic context. The Chinese overtake German capacities very quickly is in fact German economy is in fact the economic system prepared to accept the blow that China could very easily deal to what is still now a codependent relationship. China is a very marked danger for what Angela Merkel what helmet coal and what traditional conservative German chancellors have tried to protect, which is to say, insulate the country from these global shocks I think that is no more. The shocks could come quickly and they could come a pace, frankly over the next roughly five years. And this is where I, I'll get to my concluding points because we can talk about details in a second, where I'm concerned when I read the party political programs of the leading candidates and parties in the race for this election on September 26. Largely grandest failure, frankly, is her inability to cultivate mentor and bring along a successor, not only in her model but someone who is frankly able to see the challenges that Germany faces and transmit those in a functional responsible way to the population. The party, the CDU, the conservatives, and the Christian Socialist Union, their sister party did themselves no favors toward the latter part of the pandemic, when it came to the real. When the rubber hit the road as we say or the syringes had to hit the arms in the execution of, of the immunization campaign, but also a number of grift scandals within the party exposed the fact that this stalwart protectiveness around the party and around German political and economic function had led to, well, frankly, greedy overreach and we can talk about that scandal and the impact it had on the party. You then had very public infighting between the two candidates running to succeed her after over the past years, either people had vacated the possibility of that slot think of a KK and a group come come on the current Minister of Defense had pulled back because of their well fear frankly of that kind of responsibility, or had been taken out of the running by Merkel's cunning work within the party. And then on the other hand, you don't have sufficiently an opposition least not in the traditional sense, because of course this grand coalition has ruled for frankly far too long, where a discernible or strong opposition policy line is visible. And that leads us to very quickly, the role of the Green Party, who might very well be the kingmaker in the selection in September, and where in fact I do see a number of new impulses coming out because there is a much stronger line coming out of the Green Party and their young candidate Annalena Baerbock, who is 40 years old and frankly embattled in what my, in British politics we would just term as a, frankly, a smear campaign, a sequential smear campaign by other components of the political system which shows the degree to which sort of the more stalwart, stolid partners or parties in the German political system see a new approach as a danger to the status quo when in fact, and I'll say this again the status quo in German politics, no longer and can no longer exist in terms of the demands upon the country, moving into this next decade. She has made clear that her party is willing and able, well, committed to taking a new stance on Russia on China, and finding more compatible ways of concretely working and financially investing in a transatlantic relationship and in a different form of military and capacity building components within NATO, and that is truly something to watch because that will give that will offer up some friction in the coalition negotiations which will likely if you again believe the polling that we're looking at now take place between the Green Party and the Christian Democratic Christian Socialist Union come September 27. And so there are new impulses in German foreign policy there are, there is some new thinking. The question is, whether or not the strength of the German DNA, its inability to think strategically in a more nimble four sided way to bring along the domestic political dialogue will hamper the kind of quick progress that Germany truly needs, because and I say this to all of my fellow German citizens, not only does Europe need Germany's intellectual strategic foreign political foresight, but it also needs its financial capacity strength and commitment. And if you think back to the Munich Security Conference of 2014 where German lead politicians formulated what was the call that dubbed the Munich consensus, which is that Germany needed a new, a rethought process of German international responsibility. That is what I think of that is what we think of at the German Council on Foreign Relations, when it comes to German foreign policy responsibility. It's both the ability to set a strategic tone to know what tactics are usable in tandem with the United States, and looking very critically into the world and using tactic strengths that Germany has in its ability to sequence its diplomacy and force the hand of others because let's remember negotiation is getting the other side to have it your way, which Germany is capable of doing, and then frankly paying for it, because the moment is too critical. It's too pertinent, and it's too ripe for Germany to consider to do to consider moving on the way that it has under or had under these two long serving conservative chancellors, which is solid middle ground, immovable and stable stability is no more changes everywhere changes now. And so it's an exciting time to watch German politics I really look forward to your questions we can lean into any of the specific ideas party you have this Merkel's legacy, whatever is on your mind. I'm here for you, but thank you for being here, and thank you for paying attention to what will be an exciting a challenging and a demanding time for German foreign policy.