 Let's first allow a couple of questions related to Marika Speyddo. Andy, okay please. Okay, as Marika said, I worked on the consumption poverty story. There is no doubt that this is a sort of Madagascar type problem as well. It really depends on particularly years when the service happened to take place and the harvest was not good in the last time of the second survey in 2006 and was significantly better in 2011. Price changes were another factor. These things won't necessarily be the same in future. You're just comparing two points in time. The DHS may give you more of a sense of longer term change but the poverty comparisons are just comparisons of the points that you have. Philip Renshens by the way also called me to Antwerp to explain the story and talk about the story. I know that the realities that Marek is describing there of Rwanda and she knows it very, very well, extremely accurate and these are real important issues. Thanks. Okay, there's another comment with a question on related to Marika. Yeah, thanks. Omar McDewm from the London School of Economics. So I also agree that the conclusion is largely right, that there is a mismatch between how people feel in Rwanda and what it is that the objective verifiable data is saying. And I think you're right that you are right to point to the role of the state and the authoritarian character of the regime that explains why it is that you do have some of these changes. I didn't want to ask though about inequality and I know that you're measuring vertical inequality here but I wondered what your sense was, at least from talking with your colleagues about inequality between groups and I don't just mean between Hutu and Tootsie between, for example, attorneys and people who were there from before and after the genocide. And I wondered to what extent some of these findings are picking up the fact that some of the diaspora, the Tootsie diaspora who returned from Uganda, from Tanzania, from the DRC who have a much different perspective and may also have better opportunities in Rwanda coming back to a regime that is largely pro-Tootsie and perception, whether in fact the data are picking up some of these trends. Okay, thank you. Marike. Thanks so much for this question. Well, when I talk to people in Rwanda, there's certainly still a feeling that there are different groups and that some groups are receiving favors compared to other groups. So I think that this inequality certainly, to some extent, relates to group identity and probably the group you mentioned. So the old case with returnees, so those who returned from Uganda are in a good position to take advantage of opportunities compared to other groups. And I think that's something that I will add to the list of future research. It's there actually, but in less overt terms. Because I think it's certainly possible to look at the DHS data and the ICV data, and not look at the ethnicity per se, because that's of course not in there, but look at other characteristics that relate to group identity, such as the place where you were born, or the languages that you speak. Okay, thank you so much. And surprisingly we do have some time now for the general discussion related to any of these four papers. So let's take a couple of questions first and then allow the paper presenters to respond. Yes. Okay. I'm Yun Fw Fong from wider. My first question goes to Charlie. I think Yun Fw Fong work is very attractive, but what I'm concerned is the assumptions you are using. As we know, traditional micro theories suggest when we look at the substitution effect, we basically look at two bundles within the same location, same time period. And also with the assumption of this, there are no external shocks and there's no technical progress in other assumptions. Now you're looking at the substitution effect between two bundles across space over time. I suppose you must using some specific assumptions and also very strong assumptions. So I wonder if you could discuss the assumptions you are using and why using the assumptions you are using are valid in the current context of globalization and financial crisis. I'm not working on these areas specifically. Sorry. Please excuse me if I'm wrong. My second question goes to second speakers. Basically, you decompose the inequality into lower inequality and nominal inequality by looking at the inflation. However, the inflation is some kind of shock which is homogeneous for all people. Basically, inflation represents some kind of equal opportunity for all people. However, inequality is something about an unequal opportunity. So I wonder if you could comment on the justification of your approach by looking at the inflation to decompose inequality. My third question goes to third speakers. You basically study the poverty in the presence of external shocks. Actually, external shocks will have negative impact on growth and welfare. However, the external shocks will also have negative impact on utility. It is just a bit strange for me to see your look at the utility which is consistent over time. Could you comment on that? Thank you. Okay. The next question. Please be brief in the interest of time. This gentleman at the back and then Finn. Alan Thomas from the IMF. Just a point on vice accountability. We just done some recent work on six non-resourced countries in Africa to show that their growth has been very strong and so the Africa story is not just commodities. It's Ethiopia, Rwanda, Mozambique and a few others. For all those countries, vice accountability has hardly changed over the last 15 years. So I guess I'm a bit more into the camp of Martin Levin this morning but it's not clear to me that change's advice and accountability are essential for growth. Obviously, in the very long run, people may not be too thrilled about their situation but if you're going to make a big pitch about what's happening advice and accountability, it might be good then to have surveys that people actually show that they're very unhappy with the current leadership. It's not clear to me from what you've presented that that's actually the case here. And certainly, in terms of what's happened the last 20 years, the correlation between vice accountability, changes and growth is probably zero. Okay, Fin? Thank you very much, Fin Ta, for being on your wire. I thought the last paper sort of got me thinking about this sort of issue that okay, you have objective, in quote, material progress and then still people feel sort of worse off. I was attacked viciously in the Danish press the day before yesterday because I have allowed myself to say that I think that the progress in Vietnam has been very significant and very substantial and then there was a sociologist getting out there saying oh, you haven't understood a thing because people are feeling worse off. Now, it does sort of, I mean obviously then these research topics are obviously relevant for us to pursue, but I think we might want to just reflect on and more immediate things. What do we really recommend to policymakers that we should push on with the material stuff or what? I mean, I have my own preferences, but I was just wondering whether you had any reflections on that. And one final question. I also wanted to ask a non-empirical question that builds on what Fin just said. And it's almost a normative, almost epistemological question which is if we ask ourselves the question what are the normative foundations of why we think that inclusion and equality are important, then this helps us to understand better what it is that we are trying to measure and how we go about trying to measure it. So the epistemological dimension then becomes not allowing the data or the availability of the data to determine what it is that we measure and how we measure it, but our theory to determine what it is that we do. So to push it just a little bit further, normatively we have to ask ourselves why do we think these things matter. If the answer is simply because we think it's fair because its equity is desirable, consistent with liberal theory, then fine. You can go about measuring it any way you want. If the answer is however that it has something to do with say improving social stability in countries, then we do have to ask ourselves a different set of questions. So the three things I suppose, and I think Marika and Finn picked this out. First of all whether we want to look at subjective versus objective measures of well-being and welfare, whether we want to look just at the quality of outcomes which is what some of you have looked at, but also a quality of opportunity and I know you looked at non-monetary measures here, and also lastly at differences between groups, not just vertical inequality, but horizontal inequalities as well, if they are in fact tied to the grievances and the sense of frustration within societies. So that question I suppose is to anybody who wants to tackle the momentary foundations of this project. Okay, excellent. Now we have tough questions to ask for in two minutes' time, but let's now invest. So what if we take in the terms we had the papers presented? So it's running, do you want to start? I'll start. There was a comment by Martin with respect to David which was this iterative procedure and in fact we do that. That's the first thing we do is the iterative procedure and then we still end up with, and we do that iterative procedure with great pain I would have, and then we go on and correct. So the iterative procedure is nice, but it doesn't get you to not have reveal preference violations. On preferences, you know, preferences are preferences. They're not a function of technology. They're out there, at least not in theory. In practice, we have to be clear on what we're talking about. We're talking about pumpkin leaves, cassava, some dried fish, some maize meal, and few vegetables and some fruit, and people making substitutions across these in order to be able to basically eat enough. There are preferences that are going on here, but it's quite clear that people at these levels of income will substitute when a cheaper calorie source that's good enough becomes available. The willingness of Mozambicans to eat a lot of yellow maize is a pretty good example of that. It's just not that desirable, but they will do it if it's a cheap source of food. I wanted to mention something on these perceptions. I've run into this as well. I think this is really common, and it develops some views. For example, Mozambique in 96-2003, we had a lot of poverty reduction, but lots of people stating that they feel worse off. A couple of reasons for that are, one, that the time frame is different. Normally, when they're asking these perception questions, it's relative to last year, and we're measuring more over time. The other is, I think that there is a... It's just in human psychology. We are relative... We work in relatives. We don't think in absolute terms, and so this is, I think, another reason, and this is exactly what Mozambique was saying. So I'll end it there. Okay, excellent. Then perhaps we should incorporate those relative terms into our measurement as well. So that's one potential avenue. Murray? So a simpler question, I think, was really about what's... As I understood the question, was really about why bother with these adjustments as I understood the question, and I can answer pretty strongly that isn't it worthwhile actually looking at what people are consuming? So consumption and expenditures are a very important measure of wellbeing, the preferred measure in the money metric world. So actually understanding what people are consuming and how their prices have moved would seem to me to be extraordinarily important. So finding out that in our case, for example, that... So you can find anything, right? But in our case we find that food prices, and which are very, very important to those at the bottom end of the income distribution, and even things like electricity and housing, which have come as public delivery items from government, have... The prices of those things have moved in a way that's detrimental to the guys right at the bottom of the distribution. Why is that any less important a negative impact on the people that we're supposed to be trying to help, I guess? Okay, okay. David? I have to admit I didn't quite catch the question. You asked the negative effects, negative shocks effect on... I missed that last part. I have to admit, sorry. Okay. We'll just pass it on. Do you want to respond to the broader questions? Okay. You need more time to answer. Marike? Yeah, so I received a question or a comment from the servitor yellow shirt in the back and from Fin and also from Omar, and I think it's all boiled down to voice and accountability. Now, I don't think that in the case of Rwanda, voice and accountability is a necessary condition for economic growth. We have seen that very, very clearly. At the same time, a lack of voice and accountability also allows the government to implement transformative changes in a very rapid way, and these transformative changes are arguably very necessary. So I think if you care about growth alone and growth in the short run or in the medium run, I don't think voice and accountability is a constraint, but I think one needs to reflect on other measures also and whether we want to care about them or whether we care about them and also about the long term. I think here Omar's comment about group identity and horizontal inequality is very important, and I also point out to the fact that many historical and political scientists working on Rwanda say that there is a strange and disturbing continuation of policies economic and political in Rwanda prior to the genocide and now in the sense that also prior to the genocide the donor community was excited about Rwanda and there was also no voice and accountability and they were excited about the development progress in Rwanda. I'm not yet convinced that there is a perfect continuation. I still reflect on that and I think that there are also many, many differences which are very important and let's not forget that the genocide was a huge shock that affected all aspects of the society and maybe I've changed the mindset of people so I'm not convinced that there is just a simple continuation and so for me it's very difficult that at this point to say whether one should oppose the lack of force and accountability in Rwanda or not, I'm still working on that, reflecting on that and so I'm prepared to have a discussion about it later on with you. Okay, thank you so much once again and now it's time to proceed for the lens.