 Thank you. The International Monetary System has been one of my most favorite topics of discussion since the 1980s, when I was an economist at the BIS. Actually, I published a paper, BIS Economic Paper, entitled Reserve Currency Diversification in 1986. And things have hardly changed over the decades. So, let me explain. And some of the statistics have already been mentioned by John and partly Jeff. I hope you can read the table, maybe too small for you. That table is taken up from the central bank survey conducted by 53 central banks and aggregated by the BIS every three years. And as John said a few minutes ago, daily turnover of global forex market amounted to 6.6 trillion dollars. And the BIS shows its currency distribution by percentages whose total being 200% rather than 100% because exchange takes a pair. On that basis, because the table is so small, let me pick up some statistics. As John said, the dollar captures 88% in the 2019 survey, this year's survey. The dollar's proportion remained virtually unchanged at 90 or a little less since the BIS began its survey in 1989. The first column says what, 88 or 89 or something. The second and third currencies actively traded on the forex market, the euro and the Japanese yen. To the left and in 1989, there was no euro, of course. I combined the Deutsche Mark, French franc and other EMS currencies to come up with a number of hypothetical euro in 1989, 33%. While the euro actually captured 32% in 2019, big change by one percentage point. The yen had a share of 27% in 1989, the peak of the bubble economy of Japan, which dropped to 17% by 2007. That is not shown in that table, but Japanese yen's number has since fluctuated around 20%. In short, the currency market hardly changed as far as distribution of major currencies are concerned. Now, let's look at the emerging markets' economies' currencies. In 2001, the renminbi ranked 35 on the currency league table with a negligible percentage share, but moved up to 8 with 4.3% share in 2019. Big increase. Other emerging economies also increased percentage shares as illustrated on the graph on the right bottom panel. Big increase, but the numbers are small anyway. So, despite these salient increases, however, the presence of emerging market currencies is still pretty small in contrast to the size of their GDP and international trade of goods and services. Now, let's discuss the qualifications of the international currency. Jeff Frankel, Peter Kennan and all those economic experts pointed out several conditions. Number one, economic size, number two, developed financial markets, number three, confidence in the value of the currency, number four, inertia. First of all, the economic size, but economic size does not immediately entail a wide international role of the use of the currency. The US dollar, for example, it was in the late 19th century that the US economy overtook the UK economy and so did the German economy actually. But both the US dollar and Reihismach failed to impress the market and at that time Pound sterling continued to be the international currency. Jeff pointed out the US politics mattered in the regard because of US isolation policy. It may be true. Here's a point, but I think demand side elements also matter. In my opinion, market confidence matters a lot for an actively used international currency. It's not only a confidence in the value of the currency, but confidence in its integrity that matters. The integrity of a currency is maintained only when it functions properly as a means of exchange, unit of account, and store value. To be a little more specific, the monetary authorities have to create and maintain a system so as to ensure reliable means of payment, wide, deep financial markets supported by many down to earth elements. For example, banknote counterfeit deterrence capabilities, legal stability, and the transparency of rules and regulations. As well as law enforcement capability over financial fraud and wrongdoings. And last but not least, the political and economic independence of the central bank from both domestic and international pressures. So now let me turn to potential competitors of the US dollar. First, the renminbi. It's so obvious to me that there is a long, long way for the Chinese currency to go before it gains confidence in the market on all the accounts I discussed. In my opinion, it is highly unlikely that the renminbi becomes the, you know, a weaker currency in the market this century, maybe next century. Okay, what about the euro? Of course, the euro has a natural appeal, and in fact it's the second international currency. But in order for the euro to play a bigger role, its financial markets need to become much wider and deeper. German bonds markets, French Trezor market are the most actively traded markets in euros at the moment, but their sizes are small. And liquidity are a thing in comparison with the US Treasury market and GGB's market. I think governments within the EU could begin to appeal the market by issuing common euro bond, of course. They don't have to create a big project of consolidation of all individual countries of budget, whatever. I think they could begin by, say, issuing, you know, euro-denominated bond collectively, covering a small part of EU common budgets, like, you know, common defense or refugees assistance or space program, whatever, you know. Before encompassing a wide array of the budgets, okay, I have actually argued this point for a long, long time with my colleagues in the European central banking circles. But to our regret, little progress has been made. I'm sorry. What about the SDR and others? I suffice it to quote Charles Kindleberger, who I remember referred to the SDR as the artificial language Esperanto in finance. And, okay, gold he compared with Latin, okay, and US dollar with English, okay. So I thought that that analogy was pithy and I continue to do so after three decades. I'm afraid I'm, you know, spent most of the time, but last word for maybe 30 seconds. I'd like to discuss what Geoff Reardon discussed a few minutes ago. It's not, Mr. Trump, several years ago, the US government under President Obama tried to use its clout over a global financial system as economic sanction against Russia and Iran. It was reported then that the US might even try to limit Russian banks' access to Swift, the global message transfer system. Even before Mr. Trump became potus, the Chinese began to worry about the possibility of its application to China and tried to modernize renminbi payment and settlement systems and widening the scope for international use of the renminbi. In recent years, Chinese concerns have become greater. For example, Yu Yongding, my friend and former member of the PBOC monetary committee, wrote an article on a Japanese magazine in July this year saying that the US might deprive Chinese banks of their access to Swift or chips in New York. So he said China should be internationalized with renminbi, okay. So let me stop here.