 Question 50 of Summa Theologica, Paras Prima, on the Angels and on the Six Days. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Paras Prima, on the Angels and on the Six Days by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province. Question 50 of the substance of the Angels absolutely considered. Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures. Firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is called Angel. Secondly, the creature holy corporeal. Thirdly, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man. Concerning the Angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance. Secondly, what belongs to their intellect. Thirdly, what belongs to their will. Fourthly, what belongs to their creation. Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things. Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry. Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature altogether in corporeal. Supposing that an Angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form. We ask concerning their number of their difference from each other and of their immortality or incorruptibility. First article, whether an Angel is altogether in corporeal. Objection one, it would seem that an Angel is not entirely in corporeal for what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves and not in relation to God is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says that an Angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as regards us but compared to God it is corporeal and material therefore he is not simply incorporeal. Objection two, further nothing is moved except a body as the philosopher says. But Damascene says that an Angel is an ever-movable intellectual substance therefore an Angel is a corporeal substance. Objection three, further Ambrose says every creature is limited within its own nature but to be limited belongs to bodies therefore every creature is corporeal. Now Angels are God's creatures as appears from the Psalms. Praise ye the Lord all his Angels and Father on for he spoke and they were made. He commanded and they were created therefore Angels are corporeal. On the contrary it is said who makes his Angels spirits. I answer that there must be some incorporeal creatures for what is principally intended by God in creatures is good and this consists in assimilation to God himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect as heat makes heat. Now God produces the creature by his intellect and will hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action of a body nor of any corporeal faculty for every body is limited to here and now hence the perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature. The Angels however not properly realizing the force of intelligence and failing to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and imagination and because bodies alone fall under imagination they suppose that no being existed except bodies as the philosopher observes then came the error of the Sadducees who said there was no spirit but the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect alone. Reply to Objection 1 Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the other extreme as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold and thus it is said that Angels compared to God are material and corporeal not however as if anything corporeal existed in them. Reply to Objection 2 Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an ever mobile substance because he is ever actually intelligent and not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially as we are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation. Reply to Objection 3 To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures both corporeal and spiritual. Ensambrose says that although some things are not contained in corporeal place still they are nonetheless circumscribed by their substance. Second article whether an angel is composed of matter and form. Objection 1 it would seem that an angel is composed of matter and form for everything which is contained under any genus is composed of the genus and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species but the genus comes from the matter and the difference from the form therefore everything which is in a genus is composed of matter and form but an angel is in the genus of substance therefore he is composed of matter and form. Objection 2 Further wherever the properties of matter exist there is matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand when Spuethius says that a simple form cannot be a subject and the above properties are found in the angel therefore an angel is composed of matter and form. Objection 3 Further form is act. So what is form only is pure act but an angel is not pure act for this belongs to God alone therefore an angel is not form only but has a form in matter. Objection 4 Further form is properly limited and perfected by matter so the form which is not in matter is an infinite form but the form of an angel is not infinite for every creature is finite therefore the form of an angel is in matter. On the contrary Dionysius says that the first creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal. I answer that some assert that the angels are composed of matter and form which opinion Avise Brun endeavored to establish in his book of the Fount of Life for he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards incorporeal substance the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal substance and that which it has in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form as it were something common is its matter. Therefore he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and corporeal things is the same so that it must be understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual things in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things but one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things therefore it is not possible that a spiritual and corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form and another receives the spiritual form. Matter however is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity and without quantity substances indivisible as Aristotle says therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual things is subject to quantity which cannot be therefore it is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same matter. It is further impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter for the operation belonging to anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether immaterial operation as appears from its object once any act receives its species and nature for a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality because forms that exist in matter are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such hence it must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial but things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily distinguished in reality because the intellect does not apprehend things according to their mode but according to its own mode hence material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves angelic substances on the other hand are above our intellect and hence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them as they are in themselves but by its own mode according as it apprehends composite things and in this way also it apprehends God. Reply to Objection 1 it is difference which constitutes the species now everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined to some special grade of being because the species of things are like numbers which differ by addition and subtraction of unity as the philosopher says but in material things there is one thing which determines to a special grade and that is the form and another thing which is determined and this is the matter and hence from the latter the genus is derived and from the former the difference whereas in immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing determined each thing by its own self holds a determinant grade in being and therefore in them genus and difference are not derived from different things but from one and the same nevertheless this differs in our mode of conception for in as much as our intellect considers it as indeterminate it derives the idea of their genus and in as much as it considers it determinately it derives the idea of their difference. Reply to Objection 2 this reason is given in the book on the Fount of Life and it would be cogent supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect and of matter were the same but this is clearly false for matter receives the form that thereby it may be constituted in some species either of air or of fire or of something else but the intellect does not receive the form in the same way as the opinion of empedocles would be true to the effect that we know earth by earth and fire by fire but the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a form for as such it is so known by the intellect hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter but of an immaterial substance. Reply to Objection 3 although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel yet there is act and potentiality and this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter whereby the nature is constituted such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act therefore if there be no matter and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence as a potentiality to act and such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels and this is what some say that an angel is composed of whereby he is and what is or existence and what is as Boethius says for what is is the form itself subsisting and the existence itself is whereby the substance is as the running is whereby the runner runs but in God existence and what is are not different as was explained above hence God alone is pure act reply to objection for every creature is simply finite in as much as its existence is not absolutely subsisting but is limited to some nature to which it belongs but there is nothing against a creature being considered relatively infinite material creatures are infinite on the part of matter but finite in their form which is limited by the matter which receives it but immaterial created substances are finite in their being whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms are not received in anything else as if we were to say for example that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of whiteness for as much as it is not contracted to any one subject while its being is finite as determined to some one special nature whence it is said that intelligence is finite from above as receiving its being from above itself and as infinite from below as not received in any matter third article whether the angels exist in any great number objection one it would seem that the angels are not in great numbers for number is a species of quantity and follows the division of a continuous body but this cannot be in the angels since they are incorporeal as was shown above therefore the angels cannot exist in any great number objection two further among other things approaches to unity so much the less is it multiplied as is evident in numbers but among other created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God therefore since God is supremely one it seems that there is the least possible number in the angelic nature objection three further the proper effect of the separate substances of the heavenly bodies but the movements of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number which we can apprehend therefore the angels are not in greater number than the movements of the heavenly bodies objection four Dionysius says that all intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine goodness multiplied according to the different things that receive it now it cannot be said that their matter is receptive of an intelligible ray since intellectual substances are immaterial as was shown above therefore it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the requirements of the first bodies that is of the heavenly ones so that in some way the said rays may be terminated in them and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as before on the contrary it is said thousands of thousands ministered to him and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood before him I answer that there have been various opinions with regard to the number of the separate substances Plato contended that the separate substances are the species of sensible things as if we were to maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself and according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible things Aristotle however rejects this view because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar species of these sensible things but have their own fixed natures which are higher than the natures of sensible things nevertheless Aristotle held that those more perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things as that of mover and end and therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to the number of the first movements but since this appears to militate against the teachings of sacred scripture Rabbi Moses the Jew wishing to bring both into harmony held that the angels insofar as they are styled in material substances are multiplied according to the number of heavenly movements or bodies as Aristotle held while he contended that in the scriptures even men bearing a divine message are styled angels and again even the powers of natural things which manifest God's almighty power it is however quite foreign to the custom of the scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be designated as angels hence it must be said that the angels even in as much as they are immaterial substances exist in exceeding great number far beyond all material multitude this is what Dionysius says there are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers the reason whereof is this because it is the perfection of the universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things the more perfect some things are in so much greater an excess are they created by God now as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their magnitude so in things incorporeal it is observed in regard to their multitude we see in fact that incorruptible bodies exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude where the entire sphere of things active and passive is something very small in comparison with the heavenly bodies hence it is reasonable to conclude that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably exceed material substances as to multitude replied to objection one in the angels number is not that of discrete quantity brought about by division of what is continuous but that which is caused by distinction of forms according as multitude is reckoned among the transcendentals as was said above replied to objection two from the angelic nature in Banias unto God it must needs have least of multitude in its composition but not so as to be found in few subjects reply to objection three this is Aristotle's argument and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were made for corporeal substances for thus the immaterial substances would exist to no purpose unless some movement from them were to appear in corporeal things but it is not true that the immaterial substances exist on account of the corporeal because the end is nobler than the means to the end hence Aristotle says that this is not a necessary argument but a probable one he was forced to make use of this argument since only through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones reply to objection four this argument comes from the opinion of such as whole that matter is the cause of the distinction of things but this was refuted above accordingly the multiplication of the angels is not to be taken according to matter nor according to bodies but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial substances fourth article whether the angels differ in species objection one it would seem that the angels do not differ in species for since the difference is nobler than the genus all things which agree in what is noblest in them agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive difference and so they are the same according to species but all angels agree in what is noblest in them that is to say in intellectuality therefore all the angels are of one species objection two further more and less do not change a species but the angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and less namely as one is simpler than another and of keener intellect therefore the angels do not differ specifically objection three further soul and angel are contra distinguished mutually from each other but all souls are of the one species so therefore are the angels objection four further the more perfect a thing is in nature the more odd it to be multiplied but this would not be so if there were but one individual under one species therefore there are many angels of one species on the contrary in things of one species there is no such thing as first and second as the philosopher says but in the angels even of the one order there are first middle and last as Dionysius says therefore the angels are not of the same species I answer that some have said that all spiritual substances even souls are of the one species again that all the angels are of the one species but not souls while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy or even of one order are of the one species but this is impossible for such things as agree in species but differ in number agree in form but are distinguished materially if therefore the angels be not composed of matter and form as was said above it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species just as it would be impossible for there to be several whitenesses apart or several humanities since whitenesses are not several except in so far as they are in several substances and if the angels had matter not even then could there be several angels of one species for it would be necessary for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other not indeed according to the division of quantity since they are incorporeal but according to the diversity of their powers and such diversity of matter causes diversity not merely of species but of genus reply to objection one difference is nobler than genus as the determined is more noble than the undetermined and the proper than the common but not as one nature is nobler than another otherwise it would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature and in like manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature reply to objection two more and less change the species not according as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form but according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees for instance if we say that fire is more perfect than air and in this way the angels are diversified according to more or less reply to objection three the good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species reply to objection four numerical multiplication can be drawn out infinitely is not intended by the agent but only specific multiplication as was said above hence the perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species fifth article whether the angels are incorruptible objection one it would seem that the angels are not incorruptible for Damascene speaking of the angel says that he is an intellectual substance partaking of immortality by favor and not by nature objection two further Plato says in the Tameas oh gods of gods whose maker and father am I you are indeed my works desolable by nature yet indesolable because I so will it but gods such as these will not only be understood to be the angels therefore the angels are corruptible by their nature objection three further according to Gregory all things would tend toward nothing unless the hand of the almighty preserved them but what can be brought to nothing is corruptible therefore since the angels were made by god it would appear that they are corruptible of their own nature on the contrary Dionysius says that the intellectual substances have unfailing life being free from all corruption death matter and generation I answer that it must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature the reason for this is that nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter hence since an angel is a subsisting form as is clear from what was said above it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible for what belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated from it but what belongs to a thing considered in relation to something else can be separated when that something else is taken away in view of which it belong to it roundness can never be taken of its circle because it belongs to it of itself but a bronze circle can lose roundness if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape now to be belongs to a form considered in itself where everything is an actual being according to its form whereas matter is an actual being by the form consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be when the form is separated from the matter but if the form subsists in its own being as happens in the angels as was said above it cannot lose its being therefore the angels immateriality is the cause why it is incorruptible by its own nature a token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation for since everything acts as it is actual the operation of the thing indicates its mode of being now the species and nature of the operation is understood from the object but an intelligible object being above time is everlasting hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature reply to objection one Damocene is dealing with perfect which includes complete immutability since every change is a kind of death as Augustine says the angels obtain perfect immutability only by favor as will appear later on reply to objection two by the expression gods Plato understands the heavenly bodies which he supposed to be made up of elements and therefore desirable of their own nature yet they are forever preserved in existence by the divine will reply to objection three as was observed above there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its existence on another as its cause therefore when it is said that all things even the angels would lapse to nothing unless preserved by God it is not to be gathered there from that there is any principle of corruption in the angels but that the nature of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause for a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence by withdrawing his act of preservation but also because it has some principle of corruption in itself or some contrariety or at least the potentiality of matter end of question 50 question 51 of Summa Theologica Paras Prima on the angels and on the six days this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Paras Prima on the angels and on the six days by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 51 of the angels in comparison with bodies we next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things and in the first place about their comparison with bodies secondly of the angels in comparison with corporeal places and thirdly of their comparison with local movement under the first heading there are three points of inquiry whether angels have bodies naturally united to them whether they assume bodies and whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed first article whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them it would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them for origin says it is God's attributes alone that is it belongs to the father the son and the holy ghost as a property of nature that he is understood to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal addition Bernard likewise says let us assign in corporeal to God alone even as we do immortality whose nature alone neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else needs the help of any corporeal organ but it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal substance Augustine also says the demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies but the nature of demons and angels is the same angels have bodies naturally united to them objection 2 further Gregory calls an angel a rational animal but every animal is composed of body and soul therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them objection 3 further life is more perfect in the angels than in souls but the soul not only lives but gives life to the body therefore the angels animate bodies naturally united to them on the contrary Dionysius says the angels are understood to be in corporeal I answer that the angels have not bodies naturally united to them for whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally in that nature thus for instance to have wings because it is not of the essence of an animal does not belong to every animal now since to understand is not the act of a body nor of any corporeal energy as will be shown later it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance as such but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances not having the fullness of knowledge in its own nature but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses as will be explained later on now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus therefore in the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances which do not in need to acquire knowledge from sensible things consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies but some are quite separated from bodies and these we call angels reply to objection one as was said above it was the opinion of some that every being is a body and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as united to bodies so much so that some even held that God was the soul of the world as Augustine tells us as this is contrary to Catholic faith which asserts that God is exalted above all things according to the Psalms thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens origin while refusing to say such a thing of God followed the above opinion of others regarding the other substances being deceived here as he was also in many other points by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers Bernard's expression can be explained that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument which is not naturally united to it but assumed for some purpose as will be explained Augustine speaks not as asserting the fact but merely using the opinion of the Platonists who maintained that there are some aerial animals which they termed demons in section 2 Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically on account of the likeness to the rational nature replied to objection 3 to give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking hence it belongs to God as he has said the Lord killeth and maketh alive but to give life formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature and which has not within itself the full nature of the species hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a body second article whether angels assume bodies Objection 1 it would seem that angels do not assume bodies for there is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel as there is nothing of the kind in the work of nature but it would be superfluous because an angel has no need for a body since his own power exceeds all bodily power therefore an angel does not assume a body objection 2 further every assumption is terminated in some union because to assume implies a taking to oneself but a body is not united to an angel as to a form as stated well in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover it is not said to be assumed otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the angels are assumed by them therefore the angels do not assume bodies objection 3 further angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water or they could not suddenly disappear nor again from fire otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched nor again from air because air is without shape or color angels do not assume bodies on the contrary Augustine says that angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies I answer that some have maintained that the angels never assume bodies but that all that we read in scripture of apparitions of angels happened in prophetic vision that is according to imagination but this is contrary to the intent of scripture for whatever is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder's imagination and consequently is not seen by everybody yet divine scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family by lot and by the citizens of Sodom in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present from all this clearly shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it and can accordingly be seen by all now by such a vision only a body can be beheld consequently since the angels are not bodies nor have they bodies naturally united with them as is clear from what has been said it follows that they sometimes assume bodies replied to objection one angels need an assumed body not for themselves but on our account that by conversing familiarly with men they may give evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have with them in the life to come moreover that angels assumed bodies under the old law was a figurative indication that the word of God would take a human body because all the apparitions in the Old Testament were ordained to that one whereby the son of God appeared in the flesh replied to objection two the body assumed is united to the angel not as its form nor merely as its mover but as its mover represented by the assumed movable body for as in the sacred scripture the properties of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible in the same way by divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an angel and this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body replied to objection three although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction has neither shape nor color yet when condensed it can both be shaped and colored as appears in the clouds even so whether the angels assumed bodies of air condensing it by the divine power in so far as it is needful for forming the assumed body third article whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed objection one it would seem that the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies for pretenses unbecoming in angels of truth would be pretence if the body assumed by them which seems to live and to exercise vital functions did not possess these functions therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body objection two further in the works of the angels there is nothing without a purpose but eyes nostrils and the other instruments of the senses would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel if he perceived nothing by their means consequently the angel perceives by the assumed body and this is the most special function of life objection three further to move hither and thither is one of the functions of life as the philosopher says but the angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies for it was said that Abraham walked with the angels who had appeared to him bringing them on the way and when Tobias said to the angel noest thou the way that leadeth to the city of Meads he answered I know it and I have often walked through all the ways thereof therefore the angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies objection four further speeches the function of a living subject for it is produced by the voice while the voice itself is a sound conveyed from the mouth but it is evident from many passages of sacred scripture that the angels spoke in assumed bodies therefore in their assumed bodies they exercise functions of life objection five further eating is a purely animal function hence the lord after his resurrection ate with his disciples in proof of having resumed life now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate and Abraham offered them food after having previously adored them as God therefore the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies objection six further to picket offspring is a vital act but this has befallen the angels in their assumed bodies for it is related after the sons of God went into the daughters of men and they brought forth children these are the mighty men of old men of renown consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed bodies on the contrary the bodies assumed by angels have no life as was stated in the previous article therefore they cannot exercise functions of life through assumed bodies I answer that some functions of living subjects have something in common with other operations just a speech which is the function of a living creature agrees with other sounds of inanimate things and so far as it is sound and walking agrees with other movements in so far as it is movement consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed bodies by the angels as to that which is common in such operations but not as to that which is special to living subjects because according to the philosopher that which has the faculty has the action hence nothing can have a function of life except what has life which is the potential principle of such action reply to objection one as it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible things to be set forth in scripture under sensible figures since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible but in order that properties of intelligible things may be understood according to similitude through sensible figures so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men although they are really not for the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the properties of man and of his works this could not so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men because the properties of such men would lead us to men and not to angels reply to objection two sensation is entirely a vital function consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of their assumed bodies yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them but to this end that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be made manifest just as by the eye the power of the angels knowledge is pointed out and other powers by the other members as Dionysius teaches reply to objection three movement coming from a united mover is a proper function of life but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus moved since the angels are not their forms yet the angels are moved accidentally when such bodies are moved since they are in them as movers are in the moved and they are here in such a way as not to be elsewhere which cannot be said of God accordingly although God is not moved when the things are moved in which he exists since he is everywhere yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the movement of the bodies assumed but they are not moved according to the movement of the heavenly bodies even though they be in them as the movers in the things moved because the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the world's substance which now is in the east and now in the west but according to a fixed quarter because the moving energy is always in the east as stated in the physics reply to objection four properly speaking the angels do not talk through their assumed bodies yet there is a semblance of speech in so far as they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices reply to objection five properly speaking the angels cannot be said to eat because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the substance of the eater although after the resurrection food was not converted into the substance of Christ's body but resolved into pre-existing matter nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be changed into it consequently it was not a true eating but figurative of spiritual eating this is what the angel said to Tobias when I was with you I seemed indeed to eat and to drink but I use an invisible meat and drink Abraham offered them food deeming them to be men in whom the food was not a true eating but figurative of spiritual eating this is what the angel offered deeming them to be men in whom nevertheless he worshiped God as God is want to be in the prophets as Augustine says reply to objection six as Augustine says many persons affirm that they have had the experience or have heard from such as have experienced it that the satyrs and fawns whom they common folk call incubi have often presented themselves before women and have sought intercourse with them hence it is folly to deny it but God's holy angels could not fall in such a fashion before the deluge hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth who were good while by the daughters of men the scripture designates those who sprang from the race of Cain nor is it to be wondered at that giants should be born of them for they were not all giants albeit there were many more before than after the deluge still if some are occasionally begotten from demons it is not from the seed of such demons nor from their assumed bodies but from the seed of men taken for the purpose as when the demon assumes first the form of a woman and afterwards of a man just as they take the seed of other things for other generating purposes as Augustine says so that the person born is not born but of a man the end of question 51 question 52 of Summa Theologica Paras Prima on the angels and on the six days this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Paras Prima on the angels and on the six days by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 52 of the angels in relation to place we now inquire into the place of the angels touching this there are three subjects of inquiry is the angel in a place is the angel in a place can he be in several places at once and can several angels be in the same place first article whether an angel is in a place objection one it would seem that an angel is not in a place for Boethius says the common opinion of the learned is that things in corporeal are not in a place and again Aristotle observes that it is not everything existing which is in a place but only a movable body but an angel is not a body as was shown above therefore an angel is not in a place objection two further place is a quantity having position but everything which is in a place has some position now to have a position cannot be fit an angel since his substance trade of quantity the proper difference of which is to have a position therefore an angel is not in a place objection three further to be in a place is to be measured and to be contained by such a place as is evident from the philosopher but an angel can either be measured nor contained by a place because the container is more formal than the contained as air with regard to water therefore an angel is not in a place on the contrary it is said in the collect let thy holy angels who dwell herein keep us in peace I answer that it is befitting an angel to be in a place yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense a body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of defensive quantity but there is no such quantity in the angels for theirs is a virtual one consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with the place or that he occupies a space in the continuous for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with defensive quantity in a similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place because an incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes into contact and is not contained by it for the soul is in the body as containing it not as contained by it in the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal not as the thing contained but as somehow containing it and hereby we have the answer to the objections second article whether an angel can be in several places at once objection one it would seem that an angel can be in several places at once for an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul but the soul is in several places at once for it is entirely in every part of the body as Augustine says therefore an angel can be in several places at once objection two further an angel is in the body which he assumes and since the body which he assumes is continuous it would appear that he is in every part thereof but according to the various parts is at one time in various places objection three further Damascene says that where the angel operates there he is but occasionally he operates in several places at one time as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time on the contrary Damascene says that while the angels are in heaven they are not on earth I answer that an angels power and nature are finite whereas the divine power and essence which is the universal cause of all things is infinite consequently God through his power touches all things and is not merely present in some places but is everywhere now since the angels power is finite it does not extend to all things but to one determined thing whatever is compared with one power must be compared therewith as one determined thing consequently since all being is compared as one thing to God's universal power so is one particular being compared as one with the angelic power hence since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place it follows that he is not everywhere nor in several places to be one place some however have been deceived in this matter for some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations suppose the indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point consequently they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point but they were manifestly deceived because a point is something indivisible yet having its situation whereas the angel is indivisible and beyond the genus of quantity and situation consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one indivisible place as the situation any place which is either divisible or indivisible great or small suffices according as to his own free will he applies his power to a great or to a small body so the entire body to which he is applied by his power corresponds as one place to him neither if any angel moves the heavens is it necessary for him to be everywhere first of all because his power is applied only to what is first moved by him now there is one part of the heavens in which there is movement first of all namely the part to the east hence the philosopher attributes the power of the heavenly mover to the part which is in the east secondly because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres immediately hence it need not be everywhere so then it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body to an angel and to god for a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion since it is measured by the place an angel however is not there in a circumscribed fashion since he is not measured by the place but definitively because he is in a place in such a manner that he is not in another but god is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there because he is everywhere from this we can easily gather an answer to the objections because the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied is reputed as one place even though it be continuous third article whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place objection one it would seem that several angels can be at the same time in the same place for several bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place because they fill the place but the angels do not fill a place because only a body fills a place so that it be not empty as appears from the philosopher therefore several angels can be in the one place objection two further there is a greater difference between an angel and a body than there is between two angels but an angel and a body are at the one time in the one place because there is no place which is not filled with a sensible body which is not filled in physics much more than can two angels be in the same place objection three further the soul is in every part of the body according to Augustine but demons although they do not obsess souls do obsess bodies occasionally and thus the soul and the demon are at the one time in the same place and consequently for the same reason all other spiritual substances on the contrary there are not two souls in the same body therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place I answer that there are not two angels in the same place the reason of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be the causes immediately of one and the same thing this is evident in every class of causes there is one principle form of one thing and there is one proximate mover although there may be several remote movers nor can it be objected that several individuals may row a boat since no one of them is a perfect mover because no one man's strength is sufficient for moving the boat while altogether are as one mover insofar as their united strengths all combine in producing the one movement hence since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches the place immediately by way of a perfect container as was said there can be but one angel in one place reply to objection one several angels are not hindered from being in the same place because of their filling the place but for another reason as has been said reply to objection two an angel and a body are not in a place in the same way hence the conclusion does not follow reply to objection three not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body according to the same relation of causality since the soul is its form while the demon is not hence the inference does not follow the end of question 52 question 53 of summa theologica powers prima on the angels and on the six days this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica powers prima on the angels and on the six days by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 53 of the local movement of the angels we must next consider the local movement of the angels under which heading there are three points of inquiry whether an angel can be moved locally whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening space whether the angels movement is in time or instantaneous first article whether an angel can be moved locally objection one it seems that an angel cannot be moved locally for as the philosopher proves nothing which is devoid of parts is moved because while it is in the term where from it is not moved nor while it is in the term where to it is not already moved consequently it remains that everything which is moved while it is being moved is partly in the term where from and partly in the term where to but an angel is without parts therefore an angel cannot be moved locally objection two further movement is the act of an imperfect being as the philosopher says but a beatified angel is not imperfect but an angel is not moved locally objection three further movement is simply because of want but the holy angels have no want therefore the holy angels are not moved locally on the contrary it is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved but it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally because it is an article of faith that Christ's soul descended into hell therefore a beatified angel is moved locally I answer that a beatified angel can be moved locally as however to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel so likewise does local movement for a body is in place and so far as it is contained under the place and is commensurate with the place it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place and according to its exigency hence it is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude and according to priority and posteriority of local movement as the philosopher says but an angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained but rather as containing it hence it is not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate with the place nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place so as to have continuity therefrom but it is a non-continuous movement for since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact as was said above it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else but various contacts of various places successively and not at once because an angel cannot be in several places at one time as was said above nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such contacts because as was said above there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place according to virtual contact just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude hence as a body successively and not all at once quits the place in which it was before and then surrises continuity in its local movement so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which he was before and so his movement will not be continuous and he can all at once quit the whole place and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place and thus his movement will not be continuous reply to objection one this argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason first of all because Aristotle's demonstration deals with divisible and this cannot be said of an angel secondly because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which is continuous for if the movement were not continuous it might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term where from and while it is in the term where to because the very succession of where's regarding the same thing would be called movement hence in whichever those where's the thing might be it could be said to be moved but the continuity of movement prevents this because nothing which is continuous is in its term as is clear because the line is not in the point therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved but partly in the one and partly in the other therefore according as the angels movement is not continuous Aristotle's demonstration does not hold good but according as the angels movement is held to be continuous it can be so granted that while an angel is in movement he is partly in the term where from and partly in the term where to yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angels substance but to the place because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved but while he is actually in movement he is in part of the first place which he quits and in part of the second place which he occupies this very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power as a body does by application of magnitude hence it follows regarding a body which is movable according to place that it is divisible according to magnitude but regarding an angel that his power can be applied to something which is divisible reply to objection to the movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent but the movement which is by application of energy is the act of one in act because energy implies actuality is applied to objection three the movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any need of its own but for another's need in this way because of our need the angel is moved locally according to Hebrews they are all ministering spirits sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation second article whether an angel passes through intermediate space objection one it would seem that an angel does not pass through intermediate space for everything that passes through a middle space first travels along a place of its own dimensions before passing through a greater but the place responding to an angel who is indivisible is confined to a point therefore if the angel passes through middle space we must break an infinite points in his movement which is not possible objection two further an angel is of simpler substance than the soul but our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria without ever thinking of Italy which stands between them therefore much more can an angel rather without going through the middle on the contrary if the angel be moved from one place to another then when he is in the term wither he is no longer in motion but is changed but a process of changing precedes every actual change consequently he was being moved while existing in some place but he was not moved so long as he was in the term whence therefore he was moved while he was in mid space and so it was necessary for him to pass through intervening space I answer that as was observed above in the preceding article the local motion of an angel can be continuous and non continuous if it be continuous the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing through the mid space because as is said by the philosopher the middle is that into which a thing which is continually moved comes before arriving at the last into which it is moved because the order of first and last in continuous movement is according to the order of the first and last in magnitude as he says but if an angel's movement be not continuous it is possible for him to pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle which is evident between the two extreme limits there are infinite intermediate places whether the places be taken as divisible or as indivisible this is clearly evident with regard to places which are indivisible because between every two points that are infinite intermediate points since no two points follow one another without a middle as is proved in the physics and the same most of necessity be said of divisible places and this is shown from the continuous movement of a body for a body is not moved from place to place except in time but in the whole time which measures the movement of a body there are not two nows in which the body moved is not in one place and in another for if it were in one and the same place in the two nows it would follow that it would be at rest there since to be at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now and previously therefore since there are infinite nows between the first and the last now of the time which measures the movement there must be infinite places between the first from which the movement begins and the last where the movement ceases this again is made evident from sensible experience let there be a body of a palms length and let there be a plane measuring two palms along which it travels it is evident that the first place from the movement starts is that of the one palm and the place where in the movement ends is that of the other palm now it is clear that when it begins to move it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second according then as the magnitude of the palm is divided even so are the intermediate places multiplied because every distinct point in the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place and a distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the same accordingly since the magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality it follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate places now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate places by the continuity of its movement because as the intermediate places are infinite in potentiality so likewise must there be a second some infinitudes in movement which is continuous consequently if the movement be not continuous then all the parts of the movement will be actually numbered if therefore any movable body be moved but not by continuous movement it follows either that it does not pass through all the intermediate places or else that it actually numbers infinite places which is not possible accordingly then as the angels movement is not continuous he does not pass through all intermediate places now the actual passing from one extreme to the other without going through the mid space is quite in keeping with an angels nature but not with that of a body because a body is measured by and contained under a place and so it is bound to follow the laws of place and its movement but an angels substance is not subject to place as contained thereby but is above it as containing it hence it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills either through or without the intervening place reply to objection one the place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude but according to contact of power and so the angels place can be divisible and is not always a mere point yet even the immediate divisible places are infinite as was said above but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement as is evident from the foregoing reply to objection two while an angel is moved locally his essence is applied to various places but the soul's essence is not applied to the things thought of but rather the things thought of are in it so there is no comparison reply to objection three in continuous movement the actual change is not a part of the movement but its conclusion hence movement must precede change accordingly such movement is through the midspace but in movement which is not continuous the change is a part as a unit is a part of number hence the succession of the various places even without the midspace constitutes such movement third article whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous objection one it would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous for the greater the power of the mover and the less the move resists the mover the more rapid is the movement but the power of an angel moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves the body now the proportion of velocities to the lessening of the time but between one length of time and any other length of time there is proportion if therefore a body is moved in time an angel is moved in an instant objection two further the angels movement is simpler than any bodily change but some bodily change is effected in an instant such as illumination both because the subject is not illuminated successively as it gets hot successively and because a ray does not reach sooner what is near than what is remote much more therefore is the angels movement instantaneous objection three further if an angel be moved from place to place in time it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term where to but in the whole of the preceding time he is either in the place immediately preceding taken as the term where from or else he is partly in the one and partly in the other it follows that he is divisible which is impossible therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term where from therefore he rests there since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously as was said therefore it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time on the contrary in every change there is a before and after now the before and after of movement is reckoned by time consequently every movement even of an angel is in time since there is a before and after in it I answer that some have maintained that the local movement of an angel is instantaneous they said that when an angel is moved from place to place during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term but in the last instant of such time he is in the term where to nor is there any need for a medium between the terms just as there is no medium between time and the limit of time but there is a mid time between two nows of time hence they say that a last now cannot be assigned in which it was in the term where from just as in illumination and in the substantial generation of fire there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark or in which the matter was under the probation of the form of fire but a last time can be assigned so that in the last instant of such time there is light in the air or the form of fire in the matter and so illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous movements but this does not hold good in the present case and it is shown thus it is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise disposed now than it was before and therefore in every now of time which measures rest the subject reposing is in the same where in the first in the middle and in the last now on the other hand it is of the very nature of movement for the subject move to be otherwise now than it was before and therefore in every now of time which measures movement the movable subject is in various dispositions hence in the last now it must have a different form from what it had before so it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some disposition for instance in whiteness is to be in it in every instant of such time hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the preceding time and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be in the other term but this is possible in movement because to be moved in any whole time is not to be in the same disposition in every instant of that time therefore all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter and illumination is the term of the local movement of the illuminating body now the local movement of an angel is not the term of any other continuous movement but is of itself depending upon no other movement consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time and that in the last now he is in another place but some now must be assigned in which he was last in the preceding place but where there are many now succeeding one another there is necessarily time since time is than the reckoning of before and after in movement it remains then that the movement of an angel is in time it is in continuous time of his movement be continuous and in non-continuous time of his movement is non- continuous for as was said his movement can be of either kind since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of movement as the philosopher says but that time whether it be continuous or not is not the same as the time which measures the movement of the heavens and whereby all corporeal things are measured which have their changeableness from the movement of the heavens because the angels movement does not depend upon the movement of the heavens reply to objection one if the time of the angels movement be not continuous but a kind of succession of nows it will have no proportion to the time which measures the movement of corporeal things which is continuous since it is not of the same nature if however it be continuous it is indeed proportionable not indeed because of the proportion of the mover and the movable but on account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists besides the swiftness of the angels movement is not measured by the quantity of his power but according to the determination of his will reply to objection two illumination is the term of a movement and is an alteration not a local movement as though the light were understood to be moved to what is near before being moved to what is remote but the angels movement is local and besides it is not the term of movement hence there is no comparison reply to objection three this objection is based on continuous time of an angels movement can be non-continuous so an angel can be in one place in one instant and in another place in the next instant without any time intervening if the time of the angels movement be continuous he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole time which proceeds the last now as was already shown nevertheless he is partly in one of the continuous places and partly in another not because hence is susceptible of parts but because his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the second as was said above the end of question 53 question 54 of Summa Theologica Paras Prima on the angels and on the six days this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Paras Prima on the angels and on the six days by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 54 of the knowledge of the angels after considering what belongs to the angels substance we now proceed to his knowledge this investigation will be fourfold in the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge secondly into his medium of knowledge thirdly into the objects known and fourthly into the manner whereby he knows them under the first heading there are five points of inquiry is the angels understanding his substance is his being his understanding is his substance his power of intelligence is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect and is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect first article whether an angels act of understanding is his substance objection one it would seem that the angels act of understanding is his substance for the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect of a soul but the substance of the active intellect is its own action as is evident from Aristotle and from his commentator therefore much more as the angels substance his action that is his act of understanding objection two further the philosopher says that the action of the intellect is life but since in living things to live is to be as he says it seems that life is essence therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who understands objection three further if the extremes be one then the middle does not differ from them because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is but in an angel the intellect understood are the same at least insofar as he understands his own essence therefore the act of understanding which is between the intellect and the thing understood is one with the substance of the angel who understands on the contrary the action of anything differs more from its substance than does its existence but no creature's existence is its substance where this belongs as is evident from what was said above therefore neither the action of an angel nor of any other creature is its substance I answer that it is impossible for the action of an angel or of any creature to be its own substance for an action is properly the actuality of a power just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure act but which has some a mixture of potentiality to be its own actuality because actuality is opposed to potentiality but God alone is pure act hence only in God is his substance the same as his existence and his action besides if an angel's act of understanding were his substance it would be necessary for it to be subsisting now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one just as an abstract thing that subsists consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from God's substance which is his very act of understanding subsisting in itself nor from the substance of another angel also if the angel were his own act of understanding there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly where this comes about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding reply to objection one when the act of intellect is said to be its own action such predication is not essential but concomitant since its very nature consists an act so far as lies in itself action accompanies it which cannot be said of the passive intellect for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act reply to objection two the relation between life and to live is not the same as that between essence and to be but rather as that between essence and to run one of which signifies the act in the abstract and the other in the concrete hence it does not follow if to live is to be that life is then essence although life is sometimes put for the essence as Augustine says memory and understanding and will are one essence one life yet it is not taken in this sense by the philosopher when he says that the act is life reply to objection three the action which is transient passing to some extrinsic object is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving the action the action which remains within the agent is not really a medium between the agent and the object but only according to the manner of expression for it really follows the union of the object with the agent for the act of understanding about by the union of the object understood with the one who understands it as an effect which differs from both second article whether in the angel to understand is to exist objection one it would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist for in living things to live is to be as the philosopher says but to understand is in a sense to live therefore in the angel to understand is to exist objection two further cause bears the same relation to cause as effect to effect but the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form by which he understands at least himself therefore in the angel to understand is to exist on the contrary the angels act of understanding is of movement as is clear from Dionysius but to exist is not movement therefore in the angel to be is not to understand I answer that the action of the angel as also the action of any creature is not his existence for as it is said there is a two fold class of action one which passes out to something beyond and causes passion in it as burning and cutting and another which does not pass outwards but which remains within the agent as to feel to understand to will by such actions nothing outside is changed but the whole action takes place within the agent it is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agents very existence because the agents existence is signified as within him while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done but the second action its own nature has infinity either simple or relative as an example of simple infinity we have the act to understand of which the object is the true and the act to will of which the object is the good each of which is convertible with being and so to understand and to will of themselves their relation to all things and each receives its species from its object but the active sensation is relatively infinite for it bears relation to all sensible things as sight does to all things visible now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species God's being alone is simply infinite comprehending all things in itself as Dionysius says hence the divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act of will reply to objection one life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living subject sometimes also for a vital operation that is for one whereby something is shown to be living in this way the philosopher says that to understand is in a sense to live for there he distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the various functions of life reply to objection to the essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence but not the reason of his whole act of understanding since he cannot understand everything by his essence consequently in its own specific nature as such an essence it is compared to the existence of the angel whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal object namely truth and being thus it is evident that although the form is the same yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding according to the same formality on this account it does not follow that in the angel to be is the same as to understand third article whether an angel's power of intelligence is his essence objection one it would seem that in the angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his essence for mind and intellect express the power of understanding but in many passages of his writings Dainese styles angels intellects and minds therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence objection two further if the angels power of intelligence be anything besides his essence then it must needs be an accident for that which is besides the essence of anything we call it accident but a simple form cannot be a subject as Boethi states thus an angel would not be a simple form which is contrary to what has been previously said objection three further Augustine says that God made the angelic nature nigh unto himself while he made primary matter nigh unto nothing from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler primary matter as being closer to God but primary matter is its own power therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence on the contrary Dainese says that the angels are divided into substance power and operation therefore substance power and operation are all distinct in them I answer that neither in an angel nor in any creature is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence which is made evident thus since every power is ordained to an act then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers and on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power but in every creature the essence differs from the existence and is compared to it as potentiality is to act as is evident from what has been already said now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation but in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist nor is any operation in him nor in any other created thing the same as his existence hence the angels essence is not his power of intelligence nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation replied to objection one an angel is called intellect and mind because all his knowledge is intellectual whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive replied to objection two a simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of an accident because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to act God alone is such a form and of such is Boethie speaking there but a simple form which is not its own existence but is compared to it as potentiality is to act can be the subject of an accident and especially of such accident as follows the species for such accident belongs to the form whereas an accident which belongs to the individual and which does not belong to the whole species results from the matter which is the principle of individuation and such a simple form is an angel replied to objection three the power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself whereas the power of operation regards accidental being hence there is no comparison fourth article whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel objection one it would seem that there is an active and passive intellect in an angel the philosopher says that in the soul just as in every nature there is something whereby it can become all things and there is something whereby it can make all things but an angel is a kind of nature therefore there is an active and passive intellect in an angel objection two further the proper function of the passive intellect is to receive whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active intellect as is made clear in De Anima but an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel and enlightens a lower one therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect on the contrary this distinction of active and passive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms which are compared to the passive intellect as colors to the sight but to the active intellect as colors to the light as is clear from De Anima but this is not so in the angel therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the angel I answer that the necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality and not actually hence there must exist some power which previous to the act of understanding is in potentiality to intelligible things becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them and still more when it reflects upon them this is the power which is denominated the passive intellect the necessity for admitting an active intellect is due to this that the natures of material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul as immaterial and actually intelligible but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the soul consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible and this power in us is called the active intellect but each of these necessities is absent from the angels they are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality with regard to such things as they naturally apprehend nor again are their intelligible objects intelligible in potentiality but they are actually such for they first and principally understand immaterial things as will appear later therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them except equivocally reply to objection one as the words themselves show the philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there are chances to be generation or making knowledge however is not generated in the angels but is present naturally hence there is no need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them reply to objection two it is the function of the active intellect to enlighten not another intellect but things which are intelligible in potentiality insofar as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible it belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known and sometimes to apprehend them actually hence for one angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active intellect neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality but if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect he will then be speaking equivocally and it is not about names we need trouble fifth article whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels objection one it would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively intellectual for Augustine says that in the angels there is life which understands and feels therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well objection two further Isidor says that the angels have learned many things by experience but experience comes of many remembrances as stated in the metaphysics consequently they have likewise a power of memory objection three further Dionysia says that there is a sort of perverted fantasy in the demons but fantasy belongs to the imaginative faculty therefore the power of the imagination is in the demons and for the same reason it is in the angels since they are of the same nature on the contrary Gregory says that man senses in common with the brutes and understands with the angels I answer that in our souls there are certain powers whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs such powers are acts of sundry parts of the body as sight of the eye and hearing of the ear there are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through bodily organs as intellect and will these are not acts of any parts of the body now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them as is manifest from what has been said already hence of the souls powers only intellect and will can belong to them the commentator says the same thing namely that the separated substances are divided into intellect and will and it is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent and not in part as is our soul for this reason the angels are called intellects and minds as was said above a twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections first it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them Augustinoff makes use of this opinion in his books although he does not mean to assert it hence he says that such an inquiry does not call for much labor secondly it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be understood by way of similitude because since has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object it is a common usage of speech when we understand something for certain to say that we sense it and hence it is that we use the word sentence experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things known although not by likeness of the faculty knowing them we have experience when we know single objects through the senses the angels likewise no single objects as we shall show yet not through the senses but memory can be allowed in the angels according as Augustin puts it in the mind although it cannot belong to them insofar as it is a part of the sensitive soul in like fashion a perverted fantasy is attributed to demons since they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good while deception in us comes properly from the fantasy whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things themselves as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics at the end of question 54