 Okay, this second panel is on lessons from the past and policy issues for the new administration. I'm always glad to hear about lessons from the past being a historian myself. Not enough people talk about the past and its relevance for the future. And I wanna just take a couple of seconds before I introduce our panelists to say just a quick word about lessons of the past. It seems to me the most important one that we've seen is that democracy in Taiwan works. I think if you look back at some past elections we've had, everybody was terribly worried. Would people behave themselves? Would they accept the results? Would somebody in power stay in power even if he didn't win? You didn't hear any of that kind of thing. I think everybody expects Taiwan elections now to work smoothly and they do, which I think is encouraging and exciting for it's all. I think there were just a couple of other things came to mind in terms of lessons of the past. I think China was extraordinarily quiet. It did try to coerce people but in a far more civilized fashion than in the past there wasn't a lot of fire and brimstone around. And so I think we did see change and historians don't forecast but I would forecast that China having learned that their candidate can win even if they're not threatening may do that on into the future. I think we also saw, I think Taiwan will not have the problem of leadership transitions but as we look at what the policies of this administration may be in its second term we must not forget that there will be leadership transitions around the region and that 2012 may well be a period of great caution. Chinese leaders don't like to do much before party congresses and even perhaps paralysis but we are gonna see elections in South Korea, a sort of election in Hong Kong, Japan's governments rise and fall quickly and of course we're going to have an election here so it will continue to be a challenging year but perhaps one in which everybody can step back and look at the stabilization of relations and along those lines it seemed to me that the new administration in Taiwan does need as some people were suggesting in the last panel and I'm sure my colleagues will hear to reach out to those that didn't vote blue and particularly on economic issues to do something about economic reform, the wealth gap and some of the social justice issues which didn't turn the election but nevertheless are terribly important that there's also a critical issue of saying clearly to China that expectations for what is going to happen in a second law administration and cross-trace relations shouldn't be too high that China did not win the election for Maying Zhou that lots of other things were going on and then as far as the United States goes I think there's gonna have to be a real active effort to prolong the kind of gains that Taiwan made in the run up to the election that just because the election season is now over doesn't mean that the United States should not follow through and indeed add to things like visa waiver and high level visits, there are Tifa talks and other things that need to be done and once the attention of the election fades I hope that the administration will not fade along with it and go back to a distant relationship with Taipei. Okay, having done my editorial comments I want to go ahead and introduce briefly our very prestigious panel. We have three very important people and interesting people to hear. First of all, David Wong who is an Associate Research Fellow of the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Seneca and Adjunct Associate Professor in the Graduate Institute of National Development at National Taiwan University. His current research focuses on electoral studies, US and European politics and comparative regionalism and many of us in the room know him from the time that he spent on the Mainland Affairs Council and with Tech Row here in Washington. Gao Suboa is currently the Executive Director of the 21st Century Foundation, a leading policy think tank in Taiwan. He served in the administration of President Maying Zhou as a minister without portfolio in charge of legal affairs, served in the Taiwan Legislative Yuan and is a faculty member at Shershin University Law School. So he's gonna be our legal advisor perhaps. And finally, but not least of course, Douglas Paul, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and of course again as we most know him as Director of the American Institute in Taiwan in Taiwan, previously on the National Security Council staffs of the Reagan and Bush HW administration and director, and there he was, Director of Asian Affairs and then Senior Director and Special Assistant to the President. Why don't we go ahead? Thank you, Professor Tucker's kind introductions. Ladies and gentlemen, my name is David Huang. I would like to first thank the Dr. Richard Bush of the Brookings and Dr. Bonne-Gracias of the CSIS for kind invitation allowed me to share my idea and some view about the 2012 election in Taiwan. I heard something about the Taiwan election result from Professor Zhu. I think he already still some of my lines in the following representations. So I've been pretty timid to present my view but in any case, I will skip the highlights of election result and go into directly to the interpretations. So one quick point about the turnout. I think it is generally agreed that the 2012 presidential elections is vest with the negative campaign which leave no rooms for policy debate. For example, Mara Q Tsai on Yuchang Gen Tech case, Chen Xiebian scandals where Tsai accused Mara met local gangster to fix elections and his improper acceptance of illegal donations of a big corporations. Such negative campaigns tend to depress the turnout and I think according to voting behavior, this is the case. And this may explain why turnout rate is the lowest one even though the election is considered to be the very close which should promote the turnout. Moreover, negative campaigns are more likely to depress turnout of the young voters. First time voters and those who do not have strong party IDs. And you know that these voters tend to be more or less in favor of the DPP. And given that the number of KMT supporters is larger than the DPP, then selectively depressing turnout would work for the KMT. Another popular interpretations of the 2012 elections regarded as a referendum of 1992 consensus. For example, United Daily editorial in the, I think the next day of the elections, it said that the victory, this election is the victory of economic voters and the endorsement of 1992 consensus. I think they are good reason to resist such interpretations. Presidential elections always won and lost by many factors including the party trends, candidate qualities, campaign dynamics and policy standards I think Professor Xu just mentioned. A lot of the factors that would influence the election result. Voters vote for Mara and Tsai for various reasons. The perception of 1992 consensus may be the only one of them. But poll after poll show that more than 60% of Taiwanese people do not know what the, what is the content of 1992 consensus. The debate always simply confused the voter perception on it. Most people take it as a cue, as a cue for the stability is close to Taiwan Strait. And some refuse to hear the debate and did not vote at all. Therefore it would be more accurate to say that Mara's win is an endorsement of cross-trade stability whereas Tsai failed to convince the people that she can. But here, Beijing serve as a veto player in the sense that whatever Tsai proposed need Beijing's approval, at least consent. If you still insist that, you know, I know audience may still think that the Mara's win is an endorsement of 1990 consensus. Then take this. One can argue that such endorsement is in fact in decline since 2008. Given that 1.4 million less of Taiwanese people vote for Mara in 2012. Moreover, despite in the campaign, DPP tried to doge the issues of 1990 consensus, a double moderate concept of Taiwan consensus, declare Taiwan is ROC. Still, Taiwan Solidarity Union, TSU, which campaigned against ECFA, against Mara, against 1990 consensus managed to win 9% of the votes. And such vote for the party list carry a clear message for policy preference, which will be duly noted by Beijing. Okay, if the so-called peace bonus as a result of the 1990 consensus continue not to trickle down to the average Taiwanese people, then it would not be surprised that 1990 consensus be rejected in the future Taiwan elections. In other words, among Taiwanese people, the term 1990 consensus serve only with instrumental values, which is tied up with the promise of a stability and delivery of economic benefits. Can 2012 election be explained by economic votings? I think it can, to some extent it can. But unlike the electoral behavior in Western democracy, where we usually find it to be a sociotropical and retrospective votings, the Taiwanese voters seem to embrace the pocketbook and the prospective voting in 2012. Even though people does not feel national economy is in a good shape, and maybe people feel that mass performance is not up to their expectations, people still vote for continuity and more certain futures against the change and uncertain future of the Tsai's government. So Tsai's campaign on mass incompetence and his records of economic inequalities, hoping that the test of a mass would win her the presidencies. However, during a period of great uncertainties in economic downturns, people may feel that she does not provide convincing policies that would eliminate uncertain futures. If the bulk analysis is correct, then Tsai could well be defeated simply by the uncertain nature of any challenges. Given that the 2012 elections, Taiwanese voters are prospective and pocketbook-oriented, it would not be surprised that money pull the strings. So you'll see that you have the one party like KMT with a massive amount of party asset, and then you have the party with no party asset rely on piggy-bands, small amount of donations, raise only 200 million anti-dollars, whereas KMT, last year, reported to the, to the, by the media, that the star market operations make the KMT through the star market operations, they earn the 2.9 billion anti-dollars. So you see that there's a lot of differences. Of course, the KMT is incumbent. They have always administrative resources to devote in the elections. But you know, this is not the excuse to say, we just want to keep, it's not the excuse for the DPP defeat, just want to put you into some perspectives. Elections itself, you have differential resources. And then this is actually also shows that Beijing's influence successfully penetrates into the KMT's local party machines. For example, Hualien County magistrate Fukunqi. Fukunqi, I believe he's no friend of President Ma. He's a very close ally to Jamsong. But in the end, he come up to support the mass campaign is because that he, according to him, is that because Beijing said that the Chinese tourist is critical for, Chinese tourist are critical for Hualien's economies. So I think Beijing's influence is subtly inferences. Even though Professor Tucker just said that Beijing leadership did not articulate or use a very strong rhetoric or threat against Taiwanese voters, but I think the subtle operations seems to work pretty well. Again, that you will see that the CEOs of the big cooperation in Taiwan endorse Ma publicly. But I think that if you read their message carefully, I think that most of the big cooperation CEOs seem to say that they endorse 992 consensus. Try to refrain from endorsing particular candidates. I think this is following the trend of the businessmen don't like to endorse either side. They would like to be more neutral. But then this time, obviously, the endorsement of the 992 consensus is very important for them to show the flags to Beijing and then make their business in China a lot easier to do. So this is generally an interpretation of election result. Then if you think that in this way, this campaign is more about economics and I think in the future, Professor Su just said the mass administration will be occupied, preoccupied with all kind of economic issues in Taiwan. But if you compare the 10 year party plan of DPP and the golden 10 year and national prospect of the KMTs, there are a lot of similarities. On economics, on social issues, on agriculture and environmental and regional policies, there are a lot of similarities between mass and size campaign pledges which should be sorted out as mass policy priorities. For example, FTA with trade partners, both DPP and KMT agree. We should have more FTAs without major trade partners. Fair taxations also mentioned in the mass campaign pledge as well as the size campaign pledge of affordable housing, income equality, structural reform, SME assistance, promote green technology, industrial innovations, regional balance, food security mechanism. In fact, all these issues are mentioned. If you compare mass and size campaign pledges, it's exactly the same. So I think in fact, this is not a bad idea. I would suggest that in fact, the trial of DPP policy simply does not necessarily show the weakness of the KMT. Rather, it would enhance the cross-party co-operations, FTA elections. New administration should also promote more liberalized region for business with Taiwan. That is to eliminate red tabs, regulating multinational co-operations to do business and foreign expatriate to stay in Taiwan. Even later, the regulations is one way to encourage FTAs. Mass administration may need to speed up the negotiation over the FTA with major trade partner. Currently, I think everybody know that in this room that we have some progress with the negotiation on FTA with Singapore. But major trade partner like Japan, United States, and maybe EU should be our own focus because the Korea already signed an FTA with the United States and EU. So I think it's very important for Taiwan to do so as well. It should be declared witness to engage TPP negotiation immediately rather than waiting for or preparing for 10 years to join. I think United States government is very, very ambitious to take the leaderships over the TPP negotiations. I believe that by the 2012 this year, by the end of 2012, there will be some format or agreement of the TPP between the United States and other eight partners, trade partners. So Taiwan should try to engage TPP negotiation as soon as possible rather than preparing it for 10 years. One way to show the Taiwan's determination to negotiate TPP is to follow Japan examples by showing the intention to resolve the beef disputes with the United States. TIFAR talks between the US and Taiwan can also include a potential content of the TPP format currently under negotiations among the P9s. There's another important idea in the mass campaigns. Free economic demonstration zone is a good start to promote regional liberalization among specific regions in Taiwan. But it should not be used as a substitute for Taiwan's global strategy. Trade confiscations remains a priorities. Man should waste no time to implement a structural reform by promoting balance between the manufacturers and service sector. That's also in the Mars campaign pledges. For example, promote high tech value added at traditional industries. Strengthen R&D, enhance IPR protections. And most importantly, create a tougher region to punish illegal technology transfer from Taiwan to elsewhere. Man needs to recognize his promise to raise the basic level of wages and shorten the weekly working hours with his promise to encourage private investment and FDIs. During the economic downturns, of course, Man promised to establish a much better social safety net for poor people and those unemployed. But at the same time, he also pledged to improve income equality by reforming taxation system. But above policy are also likely to increase tax and spendings which could potentially increase national debt and tax burdens. If Man is sincere to deliver this kind of promise, he should work closely with DPP and other opposition parties. In short, Man's policy should be domestic grievance and soft, domestic driven and soft. Though some solutions may require external help, but Man could wrongly consider domestic, especially economic problem, can only be solved by external policies. If that is the case, then China, as usual, could be considered as the savior of Taiwan's economic by Man. And closer economic gains may well be masked up concerns and this concern would inevitably force Man to make concession to China in other policy areas, such as social, cultural framework agreements. This topic will be discussed in the next panels. On policies that KMT and DPP diverged, perhaps Man should consult the opposition first before implementing it after all. DPP still retained 46% of the vote shares. Even though KMT has the majority in the LOI and the presidency, KMT can push its own policies single-handedly, but the social cost will be very high. For example, it is about time to consolidate and refine cross-strait policies rather than venturing into new policy territories, raise the expulsion among the peoples without delivering and trickle down the benefits to the average Taiwanese people. That would be a disaster again for Man. Energy policy regarding nuclear powers should be more transparent debated in Taiwan. For DPP, I think that it needs to develop a set of coherent policies performed which would mitigate Taiwan's voters' anxiety over the uncertain futures. It need to focus on LOI and players and effective opposition parties. With 40 MPs in LOI and DPP party caucus can initiate its own legislations as well as scrutiny and monitor the legislation in a constructive way. DPP should ensure the KMT policy are properly debated in the civil society and hold KMT responsible for any abuse of human rights. Thank you. Well, thank you, Professor Tucker and my colleagues, panelists. I'm very glad and actually it's my pleasure to be here. And I want to thank you Dr. Richard Bush and Bonnie to bring me here in Washington just before the Chinese New Year. I think at first I want to echo that Professor Tucker just mentioned in her introductory remarks that for the people and I should say friends concerned and care about Taiwan here, we should first report to you that the democracy in Taiwan works again. And the legitimacy of the election process and of the result of people's choice are well accepted. It is on this solid basis that we can look forward for the future policy challenges for the new administrations. I think before I left for Washington, my affiliate institute, that is the 21st Century Foundation, we host a lunch for a group of international delegates who came to observe the elections in Taiwan. And actually that group of delegates include our panelists and the moderator of the first panel. And according to actually their observation, and I think all you can hear up to now, many of our panelists, they have a different idea about the reasons for winning and losing of the election. But they agree on one thing. And actually that also echoes many of the commentaries of domestic or international medias. That is it's a clear win for Ma by his stability and the predictable approach over uncertainty. That's, I think, a consensus that no matter what's the interpretation of the winning and losing reasons of the election, but it seems that most people tend to agree and conquer on this reason behind various other things. That is, this is a stability approach and wins over uncertainty. And I think, in other words, there are, I mean, our topic, our title of this panel, it's less than from the past and the challenge, the policy implication for the future. I think, in other words, I don't want to explore more about the election itself, but I want to put more emphasis on that according to this, the topic and the stability and predictability approach, I think there are these stabilizing factors that we can recognize from the past experience. And therefore, we need to deal with those destabilizing factors. And this is actually my understanding of the title of this panel. And I will try to point out two issues that I think will be most destabilizing factors in the future and which also happen to clearly follow the battle lines of the blue and the green camps in the campaign. I will say two major destabilizing factors and as two issues, I think the first issues, I should call it distribution issues or the issue of the imbalance of regional development. And this is, I think, most of the friends here are aware of the byproducts of the globalization. And the second destabilizing factors that I want to mention about, actually, I think it's the approach of the open up society, the approach of the issue of the open up society. And certainly, it's an open up Taiwanese society toward mainland China. This is the second issue I want to talk about. I think I'll return to the first one, that the distribution issue or, in other words, the imbalance of the regional development. Some economists actually have argued that the worldwide phenomena of distribution inequality as a byproduct of the globalization, that is the famous saying after the occupying Wall Street movement, that the 1% the famous somebody, that the 1% versus the 99%. This distribution equality actually has a very stunning parallel phenomena of imbalance of regional development, I mean, in Taiwan. One famous economist advances this theory. It's actually Professor Zhu Yunheng's brother. That is Professor Zhu Yunpeng. And according to his theory, he said, down till the central part of Taiwan, actually, the Taizhong-Zhanghua-Nantou areas are included within the radius of the globalization force and are by a large benefit by this process. But the southern part, that means Yunjia-Nan and the Gaoping. The southern part is generally left out and suffer in this process. Though this actually is a phenomena, it's a worldwide phenomena, it's a global phenomena, and the byproduct of the globalization. But in Taiwan, it is coupling with another things that make this very serious and very difficult to deal with. That is, in Taiwan, when we talk about globalization, actually, to a very large extent, we actually are talking about a further economic integration with men in China. So this coupling with the phenomena of distribution issues becomes very difficult to deal with, especially in Taiwan, because it turns it into a highly political or ideological issue. So this is the first thing, I think, after this election, actually, the Mao administration need to deal with this situation. And I think this is a well-argued issues during the whole campaign. And we should say that, actually, DPP, to some extent, successfully raised up these issues and put it into a political agenda. So this is the issues, relatively domestic one. But I think this is the issues that in the new administrations, that person might need to deal with it in a very technical way, and in a very sophisticated way. This is the first thing that I would like to share with our audience that is the first issue that we need to face in the new administration. And let me turn to the second one. The second issue that, actually, I call it the issue of open-up society. This is the second destabilizing factors. We call it the issue of open-up Taiwanese society, Torah, men in China. There are a lot of examples to demonstrate the difference between the blue camp and the green camp on these issues. For example, whether opening up the higher education system toward the students from men in China in a larger scale, is it a good thing or a bad thing? Whether it is a platform for building up a common empathy, or like other people, some friends in a green camp, they argue, it will be a story of joy. I think everyone here understand the energy, the story of joy. So this is one example. And another example is, for example, like foreign direct investment. Does the foreign direct investment in the high tech sector say whether Taiwan semiconductor manufacturing company build up a high-end capacity in mainland or the other very similar example, the incoming capital from mainland investing into the Taiwan infrastructure, let's say, like telecom? Is it a good thing or a bad thing? Is this a chance for a bond for common interest or a weakness while resulting from dependence? This is all arguable. This is arguable. But I shall very sincerely report to you that in general, I do believe that the open up approach is beneficial to both sides in terms of real interest as well as common empathy. This is actually an experiment the mass administration implement in the past few years, although in not a very big scale, but it tries to move forward to open up Taiwan society to mainland China. And I think the good effect of this approach will gradually flourish and appear to many sectors of the society. But there is a real challenge or real dilemma for this open up approach. I think after this election, we already hear that some of our friends, domestic or inside in Taiwan or abroad, they begin to argue that the ultimate Trump card of the open up approach is the inspiration and potential pressure of Taiwan's democracy upon mainland China authoritarian rule. I really believe that democracy is more desirable, and democracy is safer neighboring another democracy, especially this neighbor is huge. But this also means that Taiwan's democracy is potentially challenged to the nature of the authoritarian rule in mainland China. And this in turn indicates two things. The first, Taiwan's democracy is attractive so long as it is an unique achievement among Chinese society. The emphasize here is on Chinese. And this means that the Niteukul consensus based on the ROC constitution, it's a very useful tool. And the second thing, the second indication is the short term real interest, which is dependent on the good will, party dependent on good will of mainland authority make conflict with the long term strategic interest, which is potentially challenged to the legitimacy of the mainland authority. So this means when we want to talk about the democracy inspiration from Taiwan, actually this will put Taiwan in a dilemma that I think they will need to be addressed in the second term. We have a chance to address it. We need a synthetic strategy that can balance this short term real interest and against this long term strategic interest. I think this is the conclusion that I think we want to keep this going for a longer period of time. We need to deal with the two issues that I just mentioned about. The first is the distribution issues. And the second is this a synthetic strategy between the short term real interest and the long term strategic interest. And this concludes my presentation. Thank you very much. Well, good morning, everyone. I want to start by expressing my thanks to Richard Bush and Bonnie Glazer and Brookings and CSIS for organizing this event. You brought together, at a time of high interest, a really impressive group of people from the Washington area, as well as across from Taiwan and the mainland. A lot has been said this morning about the election. I want to subscribe entirely to the very fine remarks of our good friend, Zhu Yunhan's presentation on what has been observable about the election over the last few weeks and the conclusions he's drawn. But more importantly, I want to, in a personal capacity, express my heartfelt congratulations to the people of Taiwan for a very successfully conducted election campaign and election outcome. Most of you have a good memory. If you look back a few years, we've had some pretty contentious elections and pretty unhappy outcomes in the view of many voters in Taiwan over the two bullets and what consequences they may or may not have had in 2004. Many people in 2008 at the DPP camp thought it would be the end of their party if they were defeated in that election and they were heavily defeated. And yet here we are just having a very vibrant campaign with a multi-party system and a DPP that really resuscitated itself impressively. The observations on the street when you saw the election taking place this last weekend were entirely of a different kind. It was a quiet, a calm, an acceptance, and a participation level that really, I think, is world-class and really impressive and deserves full congratulations. The election marks the first of the important thresholds of 2012 that we're going to have to cross electorally. We've got elections coming up through the year, as has been mentioned earlier in the previous panel, in Korea, Malaysia, Russia, a kind of election in China or a selection process in China. And our own election, which is going to distract us more and more as the year goes on. I'm not of the school that the election of Miss Tsai Ing-Wen would have somehow put us in a perilous position. But I do think the message of stability and continuity is one that can be welcomed by Taiwan's neighbors and by the United States. One of the important outcomes after the election, and it was referenced in the earlier panel, was that indirectly referenced. President Ma has offered in the years of his four years return ahead to meet every six months or so with the opposition now. I'm sure between now and the first such meeting, there'll be all kinds of ups and downs politically. But I think the gesture is an appropriate one. When the election result is good for the winner, but not overwhelming. And when the issues that Taiwan faces are of the nature that they are, that kind of consultative mechanism will be really important to sustaining public support for the challenges that Taiwan faces. Among the challenges they face are the two parties. We've just had speakers who represent youth in both wings of the KMT and DPP relative to the leadership generally. KMT is long on experience and short on youth, if you look at it from a distance. They seem to know that the KMT headquarters was full of young people who are getting involved in the process, lots of 20-somethings and 30-somethings which augurs well for their future. The DPP, by contrast, has always been long on youth and short on experience, and they're going to be short of experience for another few years. But I think they have been very conscientiously trying to develop talent that can put themselves forward in the coming elections. Because we will be leaving behind a very veteran generation going into the next four years and cultivating new talent in both parties, not to mention if TSU and PFP find some way to reinvigorate themselves, it will be an important challenge as an issue going forward. Much of the foreign interest in Taiwan's election has focused on the cross-strait implications, as you all know. I was sort of distressed to see that a number of media outlets, to include Larry News Hour last night, referred to Mr. Ma as the pro-China candidate. Shorthand is inevitable in journalism, but that's a little bit too short. I think Mr. Ma has a different view about China, but it doesn't make him pro-China. And I don't think you would say the same thing about Dr. Tsai being anti-China. I think we need to raise the level of our discourse a little bit, even when we're trying to be concise and quick. The, they do, however, the new Ma administration and their counterparts that you have to work with in the legislative union face a lot of issues in the cross-strait area. Mr. Ma kept his agenda modest for the future, and I think it remains modest in the aftermath of the election. He knows that from all that he's said and done, you can sense that he knows there's a constraint on how far he can go with the public. He made it clear with his statement about the possibility of political dialogue with the mainland, that it would be beyond his term in office, that any kind of agreement could be reached. And that Taiwan is not ready for it. And when that time comes, in his view, he stated that Taiwan would need both legislative action and a referendum to support any kind of political agreement with the mainland. So I think it's not gonna be where the political dialogue is that focuses attention for the next four years. It's gonna be on cross-strait economic and cultural issues. There is a full agenda that gets down into the weeds very quickly, some of these issues, but they're very important to Taiwan's economic future and to the stability of their obviously ambiguous, complex relationship with the mainland and with their neighbors. One of the big challenges that Taiwan faces as it tries to deal with economics and the mainland is that the outlook for economic growth and export markets worldwide is clouded by the future of the European Union's internal financial problems. That's been a big market for Chinese product and Taiwan product to China and then onward to the European market. And I say that I'm on the gloomy side of the forecasters on the outlook for Europe being able to provide a lot of growth to help Taiwan deal with its domestic economic challenges that have been outlined in the campaign and in this morning about inequality and income gap and joblessness and low incomes for students starting out trying to find jobs. I would add to that that I have my own doubts about the PRC's own economic future over the medium to longer term. They have to make a transition which Japan made in a way from the 80s to the 90s when they went from a very high availability of low cost or free investment capacity capital to having to rely more on consumption-led economy. China knows it has to move in that direction. It's found it difficult to make that step to consumption-driven economics, but that's in the future. And that will change the way Taiwan producers and whether the agricultural or industrial relate to the mainland and the more distant markets. There's also, as was referenced earlier by Dr. Gao, need to address the framework and the modalities within which Taiwan will expand its educational and cultural exchanges with the mainland. The current number is something like 1,000 officially registered students and 10,000 informal students from the mainland for the 10,000 being in Taiwan for short durations and informal programs. That obviously has a great capacity to grow, but it'll be of social sensitivity. Anybody who's read the reports here about how Chinese students are taking places in American public universities that local Asian Americans think they have a right to can understand that in a Taiwan environment with a cross-strait weight feeling so heavily that it would be a sensitive political issue and require quite a bit of internal consultation before outcomes can be arrived at. There is a long list of issues that will be on the agenda for U.S. relations with Taiwan. The administration in the last months of the campaign sent over some representatives of the U.S. Trade Representatives Office, USAID, and the Energy Department. And in each case, the conversation sort of bumped up against the need to get on with the trade and investment framework agreement as a step toward ultimately a higher level of trade integration between the U.S. and Taiwan and greater integration of Taiwan into the regional economic liberalization that's taking place leading up to trade trans-Pacific partnership participation by many neighbors and perhaps even by Taiwan in a decade or so. And to get to that trade and investment framework agreement, we got a couple of immediate problems. First of which, of course, is the well-known one of beef, which was the doors on beef trade have been opened and shot and opened and shot and they're shut right now. Now that Mr. Ma has this election behind him, he doesn't have to cater to quite so many interests. One would hope that he would be able to have a freer hand to try to lead Taiwan and its political system toward accepting the resumption of a much more liberal trade in beef and with that dealing with the rectopamine issue and the trade in pork. If we can get those out of the way, the doors to a Tifa will come, I believe, wide open. The addressing the internal imbalances in Taiwan is a huge challenge. How you, as I think it was Professor Gao said, this is a phenomenon of global characterization, of global character produced by the politics and economics of globalization, the byproduct of globalization. We're having the same problem in this country as many of you know, CEO salaries as their companies go global, keep rising, but the pressure on the local employees keeps their incomes down and their benefits limited. And that's not just the US, it's just about anybody who's involved in global trade. And if you're, of course, an entry into globalization, you're a new participant, you see the benefits and you're not likely to want to change your behavior to accommodate people who've been benefiting from this system for a long time. So the different starting points for those who have to negotiate outcomes that are more equitable for both sides. The demographics are an issue that has been touched upon as well. I don't think there's much Taiwan can do about that. I mean, you can create a number of incentives to help people make a decision to have more children. But Singapore has shown over and over again, no matter how many schemes you come up with, people seem to want one child when they live in small apartments and have two working parents and having more children is a burden because of the cost of education and like. I would expect Taiwan would attempt to address the costs of education, improve the adequacy of housing, and try to get the income levels of four people who are entering into the workforce. They have been falling and it's a concern. But Taiwan also has to watch out not to let this attention to demographics and economic inequality hurt competitiveness in the long run. It's a tough balance to strike. Those are the major issues as I see them. Obviously, Taiwan also has, as a final point, Taiwan has a lot of space to occupy in the international world. The International Civil Aviation Organization, the UN framework on climate change. And I would add Taiwan participation in international financial swap mechanisms that are already taking place in East Asia. If that can be arranged in a way that deals with the question of unofficiality, I think would be very beneficial as we look at a three to five year time horizon with potential financial crises awaiting. Thank you very much. Okay, the floor, excuse me, the floor is now open for questions as you have seen there is a roving mic, so please wait for that. Please identify yourself and please don't make any speeches because we don't have much time and we want a lot of questions. I'll start over in the back there. Thank you. Dong Hui Yu with the China Reviews News Agency. My question is for Mr. Powell. The DPP seems to be very angry with what you were talking about in Taiwan before the election. Would you like to clarify your position that you were not interfering with Taiwan's election, but the stability across the Taiwan Strait is beneficial for everyone in this region? Thank you very much. Does anybody want to take this question? I'm sorry, I didn't hear the very end of your question that Taiwan, something is beneficial to the region. What was that? Oh, cross it. Well, when I got to Taiwan, shortly after getting off the plane, an old friend asked if he could interview me and asked me a few questions that had been asked repeatedly over the last five months, and I answered them in the same way I've been answering them for five months and have written in several articles, all of which are on the website at Carnegie Endowment if you want to have a reference to them. It just happened that, according to some people who've talked to me afterwards, they felt that we had a down news cycle at that point and the candidates weren't saying anything new, there were no new polls and so something I said that was all got to be the news, was never intended, was said in a private, you know, not in a public setting, not in a speech, it was with a standard media interview, but it got played up in ways that were quite unanticipated. Joe Bosco, National Security Consultant, may I ask a question of the moderator? Nancy, you made the point that you thought it would be advisable for the administration to continue the high level of visits and contacts that it initiated during the campaign and I wonder if you would envision that going as far as Secretary Clinton attending the inaugural of President Ma. And a question for Doug, you thought that Ma would not emphasize the political integration issues with China during the second term, but will that be acceptable to Beijing? After all, the anti-succession law talks about exhausting the possibilities of peaceful unification, there couldn't be a more opportune time for that scenario than a Ma second term and he is at least perceived by many, perhaps in China, as being pro-China. Before I turn it over for the real answer, I would just say I would certainly be delighted if Secretary Clinton wanted to go to Taiwan and as I started out by saying I'm a historian and I remember when Dwight Eisenhower, our president went to Taiwan and I found in the records evidence that John F. Kennedy was planning to go to Taiwan so it would not be totally unprecedented for a very high level American official to go, but I guess I would doubt it. The answer to Nancy's question is, your question to Nancy is, would be directly related to how you could answer the question, you've asked me, I agree with her, I don't think it's gonna happen, it's not gonna be a factor, but the PRC clearly has different views within its vast official and unofficial commentariat. Some of the first questions I got from PRC media outlets were isn't it time now to push ahead and I was delighted to have the opportunity to respond, that definitely is not the time to push ahead, that the split of the vote in Taiwan shows you there is no clear consensus to go toward a closer political alignment with the PRC or to rupture that and to take risks with something new. The PRC needs to show additional patience and cannot expect Mr. Ma to violate his promise not to address this during his next term of office. And I think it's important for those people interested in Taiwan to express clearly to the PRC about every opportunity that rushing this will have no good outcome. And when I say rushing, that doesn't mean the outcome must necessarily be the PRC's outcome. It's just, it's gonna take decades to sort out what the people of Taiwan want to know about their future and to see what the future of China brings. Eric McVade in the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Doug, I'm surprised you didn't mention arm sales. Are you saving it for the third panel and if so, I'm trying to keep you from having to do that. Well arm sales were on my talks but I got a two minute bullet fired at me so I skipped over the arms sales portion. Obviously there will be additional arms sales by the United States to Taiwan. What they are, when they are, those are all issues for administration, consideration down the road as Taiwan brings its needs to the table with the US. But the need for Taiwan to maintain an adequate defense against the still large threat from the PRC is undiminished. I would throw two questions to China at this point. For years Chinese have said we cannot restrain our arms build up opposite Taiwan because the DPP might come back. Well they didn't. This is a testing moment. For years they said we could not expand Taiwan's international space because the DPP might come back, pocket that and then China will have lost some leverage. Well the DPP is not coming back for a while. So it's time for China to be asked the question what about international space and what about reducing the threat to Taiwan? John Zan with CTI TV of Taiwan. The question is for both Doug and for David. David mentioned that the acceptance or rejection of the 92 consensus was only one of the factors impacting the outcome of the elections. You didn't tell us what it was that you said that you know around the eyeballs of so many people. The my question is given the kind of change, the kind of coming around in terms of the DPP position on ECFA, do you foresee a day when the DPP added attitude towards the 92 consensus might change because in four years or in eight years when the DPP fills another candidate, he or she may still have to face the 92 consensus being one of the factors or the factor affecting the election outcome, it would not be good for the DPP. So do you see a day when its attitude towards the 92 consensus may come around, may change or may soften for both of you, thank you. Well, thank you Mr. John's questions. I think I have in my presentation saying that the election result should be interpreted by many manufacturers. 92 consensus obviously is the main campaign themes of the mass campaign. Obviously, Taiwan responded directly. Taiwan's campaign is on social justice, income equalities and a domestic issue, all sort of domestic issues. So I think there are no intersections between these two campaigns. And that's why it's very, very difficult for us to jump into the conclusion that this election is a referendum of the 92 consensus. However, in my presentation, I also said that 92 consensus may be taken as a heuristic queue by the ordinary people as a stand for some stabilities across the Taiwan Strait. So I think the more accurate interpretation is more about the stabilities of cross-strait relations rather than the 99 consensus. Whatever 99 consensus can do, as our panelists said, that is a service tool, as an instrument to facilitate a cross-strait negotiation or cross-strait dialogues. It does not have any inherent values. That is a very important distinction. DPP of course, Tsai Ing-wen said that she would like to inform the Taiwan consensus after her sooner office. But then, through the democratic process, anything could happen. So I don't know whether in the futures that the DPP in the future will accept the Taiwan Strait, maybe come up with some other terms. But vitally, I think it's very important that, for any terms, Beijing will serve as a veto players. Even DPP come up with some terms, which maybe closely resemble the 90 consensus, but Beijing may disapprove it. Then everything falls. So this is the situation is that, I think that we should think about, as Dr. said, that it's still very divided in Taiwan, divisive in Taiwan. We have a 46% versus 52%. And on this issue, on the issue toward China, it's quite divisive. And forming a Taiwan consensus through the democratic position seems to be quite a good way to do so. Of course, that now KMT and the CCP already find a way to do so. Carry on based on this process, based on these premises. But I mean, for the DPP, they may find the other way to get on negotiation table. The 92 consensus is a fiction, but it's been a useful fiction. It's permitted things to go forward. I think one of, in talking to people after the election in Taipei, several of my contacts said that there was a contradiction in Ms. Tsai's campaign. On the one hand, she wanted to replace the 92 consensus and criticized it. On the other hand, she wanted to maintain the benefits of ECFA, which could not have been achieved without the 92 consensus. And because she was unable to construct a characterization of the Taiwan consensus that would practically replace the one of the 92 consensus, she was left with a talking point too short in her campaign, in our view. And I tend to agree with that assessment, but I would leave it to the political scientists who are gonna pour over the data and the campaigns up and downs to see whether that is true, in fact, over time. Hi, Nadia Chow with Liberty Times. I have a two question. First one is about the dialogue with the opposition party that President Ma proposed. It sounds like it's too good to be true, since it never happened before. What will be the incentive for the two party to cooperate in the following four years? Instead of game from the other party's failure, why they want to cooperate? And the other question is, DPP might be the most pro-U.S. party in Taiwan. They always emphasize the importance with the U.S., but this time we didn't really see, you know, DPP became any favor from the U.S. government. Officially, even though U.S. government maintained claim to be neutral, but we saw a lot of other signs that indicated that they prefer Ma to get elected. So what do you think, you know, what went wrong with the DPP's policy? Does that mean that U.S. want to see DPP be more broad, you know, to open up to China more and take more aggressive, you know, steps to reach out to China? Thank you. Well, it all depends on the ruling party's mentality. So if you think that the elections will not take so long, of course, you carry the majority, you can do whatever you want in the L.O.I. and pass any legislations, but I think this would fall into a trap of the opposition parties because opposition party may well hand you a rope and ask you to hand yourself. So I think the best way for the DPP, for the KMT is try to consult DPP, even though on those issue, that especially on those issue, that both party have diverged views. I mentioned that, you know, nuclear power plan is the one that would be potentially diverging issues that both sides can sit down to debate and maybe to talk. But if you don't talk, of course, you can carry on and then once there's something, some accident happened, then you have to take the full responsibilities. I think over the years, voters are more or less detest of all kind of party struggles based on the pedagogical ideologies. I personally believe that the Taiwanese voter would like to have some more, you know, corporations between the parties, show some, show the people that they can cooperate for the benefit of the common peoples. What's the second question? Second question. What's your second question? The US policy toward the team defeat. US policies, you know, specialties. No, no, no. US policies, you know, specialties. Well, I think during the election campaign that I think there are a lot of rumors that US officials seems to try to use other way to inference the elections, but then officially, time after time, that officially that US government come out to say that the US would like to maintain the neutral stance and they would like to cooperate with the whatever government elected, whatever party elected as a government, duty elected as a government in Taiwan. So I think that there's always misperceptions and the perception that whether US government really would like to set any fingers or inference the Taiwanese politics. But I sincerely believe that the US government probably as a fellow democracy don't want to interfere with the domestic politics. The Taiwan side, I think the DPP would like to put more and more cautious approach toward China, that's understandable because you know that it's already, we have the 41% of total export go to China through Hong Kong and include Hong Kong, Macau. We have last year, we have 12 billions, more than 12 billions US dollars investment in China over the last years, which more than 85% of our FDI go to China. So I think DPP would like to put more cautious approach. I think KMT also have such incentive to do so because you know that you have a 16 agreements signed between the self and the errors, you have a three memorandum signed between self and errors, but then the implementation seems not up to the standards. So I think there's most party have some way to address these issues more cautiously. And the worst things for the KMT I think for the mouse government is to think that they have the mandate so they can push forward all kinds of policy they want with China. And Doc just said that would not be the wise because for the Beijing to push forward the political negotiation with Taiwan. And that I think is very, very, very bad. But I think there's another issue that probably you have to think carefully. In mouse campaign pledge, in mouse campaign pledge, Mao said that it would like to step by step to set up, mutually set up the official representative office in China and in Taiwan. That exchange of official representative office is quite a lot of symbol in theirs. It remind me that in Hong Kong, if you have the Zhonglian Ban in Hong Kong and Macau, that would be very, very easy for China's inference to coordinate within Taiwan. And that would consolidate Chinese inference in Taiwan elections. As I said that in, you probably wouldn't believe that Southern part of Taiwan, there are a lot of business, for example, in the Jia Yi, you have the orchid flowers, China would like to buy it. You have the sea bass in Kaohsiung, China would like to buy it. I think there are a lot of penetrations and the grass through the interactions between China and Taiwan. And that ultimately will inference the election result. And I just show you the two example. One is the CEO, another is the Hualian county magistrate. So these sort of things that would, I think, increase Chinese inference in Taiwanese elections, not necessarily through the threat, but through very, very subtle way, inference of Taiwan voters' mind. Let me respond to the first question. I think we should distinguish between two things, two levels of corporations. First, I think the basic step is to agree to have a platform and have dialogue toward each other. And I think most of our friends here remember that there is a debate between President Ma and Chairman Cai on ECFA. So at least don't just talk to your own believers or your own supporters. You will have a platform to talk to each other. And after this step, then we can talk about is it possible to reach some consensus despite other disagreement? So the first thing is to have this kind of platform to talk to each others. And then there is a second level. Then we have some consensus despite the disagreement. And I think the President Ma is referred to this. That is, he would like to have a platform to talk to each other and the regular ones. So I think this is a basic point to mention. And also another thing is that it will push the two sides to cooperate. Actually it's the internal operation or internal rules inside the legislative end. And actually because the inside rule of the legislative end, it's very consensus driven. That means if you know there is a mechanism called Zheng Dang Xie Shang or Dang Thuan Xie Shang, actually you have three members in the legislative end. You can form a group and actually veto any legislative bills you don't like and prolong it to another several months and until the speakers who want to put forward the frozen legislative bills. So this mechanism actually in legislative end in the past drive many corporations between political parties. But the problem is everyone knows we need to cooperate but no one wants to sincerely say that we need to share the political cost fairly. Everyone want to say that we want to cooperate but they want to show to their own supporters that we are very insistent. But they are really behind doors. They want to cooperate. So it become a very strategic behavior. That is in fact they will be compelled to cooperate by the internal operation and internal rules of the legislative end. But no one want to admit it publicly. That's the situations. Okay, one final. Yohan, you wanna? No, just okay. No, I just want to clarify one point. But David mentioned that, you know, mod and creation during the second term might establish the official representative office, you know, on both sides. I don't think that's an exact, you know, correct statement. I think what has been mentioned by some official is a two-steps approach. Number one, some semi-government or government sponsor trade association, trade promotion association and industrial association. They might be able to set up liaison office okay, on each side of the street. That would be the first step. And the possibility that the SAF and ERIP, you know, the two semi-official organization, I think they might also explore the possibility. But actually I wonder, Beijing really is actually open to that idea because if you have ERIP, you know, the office in Taipei can easily become the target of protest demonstration. You know, it might not be, you know, you know, the most fruitful way for a very smooth cross-privileged relationship, yeah. So I don't think that would happen very soon, yeah. Okay, I've been told I can take one more. Even though the food is getting cold back there. Yes, please. I'm Tony from Central News Agency, Taiwan. And last question will be for Nancy and Douglas. What do you think is the American factor is really essential for Taiwanese to make the decision of their leadership, such like a visa waiver program or sales, even Douglas commentary on the local media. Do you think it really important for Taiwanese to make the decision of their leader based on American factor, thank you. Well, the polls that were published by Zyosher Bao, as was mentioned earlier, 10 days before the election seemed to show pretty accurate results, they didn't, and it doesn't appear that there was a big change between in that 10 day period. I suggest that outside actors didn't have much effect on the outcome of the vote. Yeah, I would simply add that the United States I think plays an important role in terms of demonstrating how a democracy works well. And we've long been a model in Taiwan. And therefore I would say this should give us some incentive here to do a better job with bipartisanship, which is what we've just been talking about so that we can continue to be a model. In any case, I'd like to thank our panelists and ask all of you to do so as well. And Bonnie's gonna talk about lunch in just a moment.