 Good afternoon, everyone, and I'm very pleased to welcome you to this Institute of International and European Affairs webinar. My name is David O'Sullivan, I'm the newly appointed director general of the Institute and in fact this is my first chairing event as director general, and I could not be more delighted to be doing so with our distinguished guest today Ambassador Hoysken I'll come back to him in a moment. He will, he is of course currently chairman of the Munich Security Conference, and he has taken time out from his schedule to discuss today. A very important issue of the German foreign policy, particularly in the context of Ukraine. He will speak for about 20 minutes or so we will then move to a Q&A session with our audience, both of which are on the record. You'll be able to join the discussion using the Q&A function on Zoom, which you should see on your screen, and please feel free to send your questions in throughout the session, as they occur to you and we will get to them once we move to the question and answer session. I also encourage you to join the discussion on Twitter using the hashtag IEEA. Let me now briefly say a few words about Ambassador Hoysken who really needs no introduction. He's one of Germany's most distinguished diplomats, and also a European diplomat. He was for nearly 12 years the diplomatic advisor to Chancellor Merkel. He was also a German ambassador to the United Nations. And since retiring has now taken over, if that will be the right word Ambassador from Wolfgang Issue, anyone can replace him. It is you as chairman of the Munich Security Conference, which of course is one of the must must go to events, annual events on security and foreign policy. And the theme, as we know is German foreign policy that is item vendor, a turning point or more of the same is the question of the of the seminar, and we I'm certain Ambassador Hoysken would be absolutely honored to hear your views on this absolutely crucial subject of Germany's foreign policy in the context of the dramatically changed security environment in Europe. Ambassador Hoysken, the floor is yours. Yes, thank you. Thank you very much for for having me, David, it's a, it's a really a pleasure to be to be with you. As you mentioned before I'm retired from the German Foreign Foreign Service, which I regret and so far as my ambition in life was always to before retirement to become ambassador of Germany to Ireland, because my birthday is March 17, and I always wanted to be in the country where this is a national holiday so I didn't make it. I did second best because my first birthday was Chicago, my first posting was Chicago, and I was told that Chicago 70 March festivities are as colorful and as, as, how can I say it as liquid as it is back in Ireland so thank you very much for, for having me and I was, as you said 12 years national security advisor for diplomatic advisor to Chancellor Merkel but afterwards I was for four years and Ambassador of Germany to the United Nations and in interesting time. I was there doing the Trump administration, which was a special challenge also in the Security Council. But then when, when I left, so to speak, Germany handed over its seat to Ireland and I must say that Geraldine, Geraldine Bernaysen was a wonderful colleague I love to work with doing the years, I was in New York and you have a wonderful representative of your country in, in, in New York. And now you asked me to talk about German foreign policy which I'm happy, happy to do. And maybe it was intentional that you that you didn't ask somebody who is actually part of the government to respond to this question but somebody who is retired and therefore maybe more open to discuss also what you have hinted at in the subtitle, turning point or more, more of, of the same. So, let me, let me try to describe our the current situation here in Berlin. And we had a handover between Chancellor Merkel and Chancellor Schultz in a way that not many countries have for Chancellor Merkel, as I said work for as her advisor between 2005 and 2017 for her. And it was very important to demonstrate continuity and to represent also certain stability and in the center of Europe so, although it was, you know, the major rival of the Christian Democratic Party the Social Democratic Party that took over the country, nevertheless for it was very important to demonstrate this continuity so for instance, on her last G7 summit in Italy she took the new chancellor with her to introduce him to her partner so that there was a smooth tradition and now this was all well planned and actually the handover work well and also a lot of continuity, but then the Russian invasion of Ukraine took place. It was a shock for Germany, it was a shock for Europe, it was a shock for the international community. I must say, you mentioned David that I've taken over the chairmanship of the Munich Security Conference on its last day when I physically took over there was 20th of February. Before the invasion I have to admit that I, I still thought that Putin would not invade. I thought that he would not invade because what we witnessed in Munich was something I had not witnessed for many years at that conference and that was transatlantic or even beyond that international unity in Putin's declared plans about what he about his, you know, his claim that there was no right basically of Ukraine to exist and that his crude historic description of Ukraine as a not really having an identity and no, you know, actually basically no right to to exist and that there was this very clear opposition by by the United States by all European countries and beyond saying that he cannot do it and if he does it he will be hit with very stern opposition and sanctions, etc. He went ahead anyway. He put in met with this opposition that already was lining up in in Munich. I don't think that when Putin looks at the situation in Ukraine today that he will be happy with this situation. I think one of the reasons, if we go a bit into the into a very human direction there one of the reasons why Putin actually invaded why he ignored what was happening outside Russia has to do with the fact that basically the guy was for more than than two years practically isolated. He was sitting in his bunker. He was not receiving in personal for personal conversation any, you know, foreigner or any foreigner who was ready to have an open talk with him and he's surrounded as it happens very often in totalitarian states by people who don't who not necessarily tell their opinion but they just now present the picture that Putin wanted wanted to see. So I think that he was surprised by the weakness of its own of its own army he was surprised by the strength of the Ukrainian army by the strength of the Ukrainian identity that has been formed in the last years, mainly, mainly thanks to the to the Russian pressure. But coming to Germany, again, the 24th of February was a shock. Hardly anybody in Germany believed Russia would do this. Russia invaded Ukraine for the first time in 2014 and 15. It was in disguise. There were many here who then said well somehow Crimea, you know, you could somehow construe that it was part of Russia and this is only part of it and then we were able in 2015 to stop the Russian advance to the Minsk agreement so we were back into negotiations and we didn't think that Putin would just ignore all these agreements and actually ignore with this intervention on, you know, international covenants from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the UN, the CSE funding act, the NATO, NATO, Russia funding act, the Charter of Paris, the Budapest memorandum and I can go on and on and ignoring everything, no respect for international law and then invading Ukraine. It was a shock for for the country. It was, of course, quite a challenge for the new government that had been in office only for for a few weeks, actually, and then the Chancellor, three days later on the 27th of February, gave a speech in the parliament, which I think one, one, I don't want to have an inflation of using this word but was a historic speech because he broke with a tradition of German foreign policy tradition in particular of the foreign policy of the social democrats by clearing by clearly calling a spade a spade calling out Russia's aggression and clearly pointing at the consequences for for Germany and that is the now total change in in our security and defense policy by now finally actually adhering to the objective set by NATO in with regards to the 2% of GDP for defense expenditure. Also, you know, everything that German politicians actually from both IELTS had said before that Germany would not do he over the weeks turned around 180 degrees, everything from, you know, exclusion of Russian banks from from suspending North Korean to from delivery of of arms and including now delivery of of heavy weapons. In the international from the international perspective probably in Ireland as well Germany was seen of of lagging lagging behind. And to a certain degree that is true that Germany was lagging lagging behind, but in the end, you know, most of these packages including now including now the latest one the embargo on oil and oil products Germany is joining in. And it should do a lot with the with the fact, as I said earlier that the Russia through the invasion destroyed the policy of many the beliefs of many in Russia and destroyed a lot of how German foreign policy should be should be conducted while I think one was clear also in a broad in almost all parties every few that we have to react harsh and we have to turn around politics, it was for some, you know, against their DNA. I mean, you have to understand when you when you complain about sometimes the reluctance or Germany lagging behind in taking some of the decisions and some of the basic assumptions and basic components of German, German foreign policy had actually been destroyed and you have to understand where some people come from those who look back at German history at the fact that in the Second World War, Germany was responsible for 27 million debt among the population of the then Soviet Union with, by the way, a lot in Ukraine. And so Germany has this historic guilt we then also in a retrospect in a period of weakness Germany was reunified. Putin had been in power, I don't think that we would have had to reunification it was thanks to Gorbachev a weak president but he was ready at that time also. You remember this perestroika etc the opening of Russia we were in a good moment where also our Western allies all agreed, where by the way, we benefited also by what Germany in previous year had done on the one hand with the integration to the other hand with Billy Bryant and others in clarifying our relations to the East recognizing post war borders etc so out of this feeling that somehow we owe the Russian some things we have been for many proponents of that policy what happened in Russia made it in Ukraine made it difficult then to turn to turn around. There has been this turnaround. When you ask is this really a turning point or is it more of the same. Yes, there are retarded factors. You would see that in when it comes to budget negotiations when it comes into the defense council. Also our defense ministry admittedly is not the fastest in carrying through armament programs. There will still be some hesitations and discussions but my prediction is that through this shock that shock waves that Putin sent to Germany also the resistance to putting the money into the defense budget to actually purchase the weapons that we badly need. I think this will this will happen with regards also to a reorientation of foreign policy from me it is clear, and I hear this also that there is no way back to a normal relationship or any relationship with Vladimir Putin as I described before the violation of international law to an extent that we have not witnessed in a long time. Therefore, I think a return to the status quo a return to having normal nations to normal relations to Putin and Putin government is excluded from my from my perspective. So the question more of the same I don't think it will be more of the same so we will have this isolation of Russia, we will have a more spending in the defense in the in the defense area. I also believe and but there I, we have to make more question marks that what Russia has done will give new impetus to the development of a common foreign and security and particularly defense policy I think there will be a push to go into this direction. And how far will this go I am not sure what is clear is that what the European Union will be will build in the coming month and years in terms of European defense. And it will be clear that this can only take place under the umbrella of NATO. We have seen around this time around how, how clear, how clear President Biden was when you look at the means that are spent now in support of Ukraine and again the US who pays the biggest bulk of it so there is a return of the US to to Europe, and I think this will. We will, we will continue to follow follow this and strengthen first our defense forces within EU but doing everything also to strengthen nature so that will follow, we will with regard to the energy dependence yes we are slow. There have been mistakes in the past that our exposure to Russian energy was too high. You have to understand that, you know, energy cooperation or pipeline cooperation or the cooperation in fossil fuel and even beyond. And we're kind of the basis for our relations, where we say, always handle, wandle, change through trading. There was a belief that by, you know, interact interacting by having trade also we created actually Chancellor Schröder did that. There's so called Peters Bogar dialogue the St. Petersburg dialogue which puts which used to assemble representatives from politics from defense from then also civil society from from youth. And this was established and we also thought by just interlinking economy more politics, civil society youth, and there will be a rapprochement that we will get closer together this all has proven wrong. And while I believe it was right to try it has chosen to it has gone in the wrong direction. And, as I said, to work with putting in the foreseeable future is from my perspective excluded. What does this mean for German policy I think that we will need now after the reelection of President Macron maybe one still needs to wait for the outcome of the parliamentary elections but I think we should use this beyond a revitalization of the transatlantic relations to also reassert ourselves as as a European Union, we have to be ready for a moment for a crisis where the US would say, Listen, this is your job you have to resolve this crisis we will not send our troops or support to a certain degree to a to what would be theoretically feasible in a conflict but as for Europe to take up to pick up the bill. If the Republicans come back this will be even more the case we all of course still are afraid of a repetition of Trump one, if Trump wins or somebody like him wins the elections very basically didn't commit to article five NATO. And this is of course a nightmare therefore, while really investing in transatlantic unity investing in Democrats but also Republicans for the case of a government change. I think we also have to think in terms of worst case scenario which also that means to really build up Europe and talking about European sovereignty. And I believe that this is a bit exaggerated because we see right now in this conflict without American forces, we would not be able to relate resilient to leadership it would have been difficult to counter Putin as we are doing and I think we should do everything to strengthen that we should work within the European Union, and there we know the difficulties, we know the possibilities of reinforce cooperation. So we, we really have to step up to the plate and see to it that also in the European framework our, our troops are ready to to to intervene. The question is how much France that is calling for the strategic autonomy. We are ready to actually export or have the European Union take over and see as part of our defense the French nuclear powers. And I think that's an issue that will come up. And I will always recommend to do this very carefully because you know the force the frappe is a consequence of the very frustrating second World War, and this is something that the goal already said, must not happen to France again so it's a pretty national weapon at the same time, talking about Geraldine, and she will have witnessed in her first year that within the Security Council, it is difficult to promote European ideas to have the European Union give to have, you know, I'll speak to European on one line it has again a bit to do with our French friends for whom the membership in the Security Council the permanent membership is something special. Something where they for them it's very important something where you know also the kind of greatness of the nation is somehow reflected in this permanent seat so I was not able and my other colleagues were not able to actually have them in the Security Council have our French colleague or one of the other EU members in the Security Council speak in one voice for the European Union. This is for the individual countries so far the African Union by the way does this regularly they have three countries in the Security Council, and they on many occasions they agree that only one country speaks and then referring to the African African Union. So, and I wanted to also come back. In Europe we have to do more. There's one point which for me is very, very important. When we look and interpret the present conflict we tend to say that the West is in war with Russia or what could be the repercussions on the West. We tend to assume such and such no responsibilities. I strongly advise against using the expression of West, because while we all, you know, across the channel within Europe, we are following more or less the same view we say clearly who the aggressor is and we clearly sanctions and when you go beyond Europe you'll find much more differentiate way you find many countries that highlight, not what is happening Ukraine but highlight the consequences which is increased food prices increased energy prices inflation, and they just want to get it over with they don't care is it Ukraine or is Ukraine responsible or Russia, they just want to get it, get it, and it, and this is something that we have to cope with to see that countries are affected by the repercussion of the conflict and not necessarily go into a principle to what does that mean for for us I think we have to do much more lobbying and engagement with countries outside the European Union that are not necessarily joining their forces with us. I think it is important that we reach out to to have to continue to have a majority in the general assembly because if we don't have a majority there. It can happen that resolutions are adopted under the leadership of of China, in particular, where we are not satisfied with the substance at all but if they have a majority if they have bright so to speak too many that many African or Latin American countries are Asian countries we are all all of a sudden in a in a minority there and therefore we have to go beyond the expression West we have to defend the international rule space order the we have to respect the UN Charter the UN Declaration of Human Rights because these are not European values or transatlantic values these are universal values and I think that's very important that we then remind people that the invasion by Russia of Ukraine is not, you know, seen as an attack on NATO it is seen as an attack of the rules based international order of binding resolutions of the Security Council and by pointing fingers at that fact I think makes it also easier to to maintain this majority that we have in in the UN, if you go too much by the West, you know these double standards from Iraq to Grinna and Panama and others will be raised against us. I would like to close with a bit the expectations that I have for for German politics. I hope that they behave the way I demonstrated it. The aspect which is very key for us to set before you know this, not talking about the West but the rules based international order. I think we have as Europeans, Germans, in kind of a military relationship, we have to be much more active in third countries outside the European Union we have to increase the, maybe we can can actually establish European embassies. So I'm a bit doubtful if we succeed but in any case, our countries have to invest a lot in in Africa and Latin America and Asia to actually be present there to present a counterpart to the Chinese and countries which are filled by, you know, sometimes hundreds of people, and they of course and have a larger leverage in their host countries when they can with their companies with their influence can go to the president of a given country and this isn't this, and we are ready to build you can either pay us or, you know, you, you will make long term contracts, which may turn out having China take over partly part of territory and its own sovereignty so we have to have to be, we have to do more, we have to talk to countries that we believe are somehow on track to implement the international rules based order where you have a division of powers and I think we need to go into these countries and heavily invest by really having joint forces because this is a global contest and we must not be complacent and seen we have a wonderful unity now countering Russia in Europe know we have to go beyond and lobby lobby outside I think this will be, this will be extremely, extremely important David I would like to leave it at this right now. I'm very happy to continue to talk about details if you want to, if that is not too boring about a coalition built by three parties and how are they dynamics and what can they achieve and whatnot but I leave that up to you and your and those participating in this seminar so thanks again for having me.