 Good afternoon, everyone. I'm very pleased to welcome you to the Institute for International European Affairs this afternoon. I'd like to welcome in particular, Ambassador Norio Maruyama, the newly arrived Ambassador of Japan, who is who is attending the Institute today for the first of what I hope will be many visits here over the course of his time in Ireland. This event has been organized in conjunction with the Embassy of Japan, and is being delivered to an in person and an online audience. We're delighted to be joined today by Professor Michito Tsuruoka, Associate Professor at Keio University, who has been generous enough to take time out of the schedule to come all the way from Tokyo to Dublin to speak to us. Professor Tsuruoka will speak for about 20 minutes or so, and then we will have a question and answer session with the audience. And for those of you in the room, if you would like to ask a question, please put up your hand and a microphone will be brought to you. And for those of you joining us online, and you will be able to join the discussion using the Q&A function on Zoom, which you should see on your screens. Feel free to send your questions in throughout the session as they occur to you, and we will come to them after Professor Tsuruoka has finished his presentation. And please be sure to include your name and affiliation with your question. And for those of you who joined the discussion on Twitter using the handle at IEEA. And a reminder that today's presentation and Q&A are both on the record. So now let me formally introduce Professor Tsuruoka before giving him the floor. He is an Associate Professor at Keio University in Tokyo. He is concurrently a Senior Fellow at the Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research. And a Senior Fellow at the Center for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Brussels School of Governance. Before joining Keio in 2017, he was a Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies from 2009. At this time, he was seconded to the Ministry of Defense as a Deputy Director of the International Policy Division, where he was in charge of multilateral security and defense cooperation in the Asia Pacific region. He also spent one year as a Visiting Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies in London from 2013 to 2014. And before joining the National Institute for Defense Studies, he was a Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels in 2009. And he served as an advisor for NATO at the Embassy of Japan in Belgium from 2005 until 2008. So he has a lot of experience of Europe as well as Japan and Asia, and I know that we are all looking forward very much to hearing his presentation. So without further ado, I will give him the floor. Thank you very much Ambassador for the very kind introduction and I'm very pleased to be here. This is actually the very first time to come to this beautiful city and so I'm very much delighted. Thank you very much for the organizers and of course the Ambassador Mariyama and the Embassy of Japan. So today's topic is Europe and Asia in the wake of the war in Ukraine. So I'm going to talk a bit about the linkages, security linkages between the two regions. And the Japan's foreign security and defense policy because this is a great timing, because it just last month, not last month already we are in February but back in December last year. The Japan issued a new national security strategy along with national defense strategy and other defense documents. And we are very much in the process of changing Japan's security and defense policy. And this is very much in the context of the war in Ukraine, and another regional security developments surrounding Japan. So first, let me start saying by saying a few words on the, on Russia's invasion of Ukraine and it's impact to Japan and to the to the region, to the Asia Pacific in Pacific region. The Russia's invasion to be quite frank was a huge shock to Japan. But in the wake up in the run up to the invasion, the 24th of February last year, the talk is awareness about the seriousness of the situation was not quite high. Yes, I understand that the, at the end of a, at the end of 2021, the already in Europe, the people are everyone was talking about Russia's mobilization and Russia's concentration Russian forces near the border with Ukraine. But in Japan, the, the people are not quite much paying much attention to that. But after the invasion, the situation and, and the recognition in Japan, suddenly changed. And also the government led by premise exceeded imposed an unprecedented level of economic sanctions on Russia. So the, but the expectations to be quite honest about Japan's imposing sanctions of Russia were not quite high. And that is because of the experience of Japan's sanctions on Russia in the wake of the annexation primary back in 2014. And at the same time, the, the government by by permission of a bear was not quite enthusiastic about imposing sanctions on Russia. Because at the time he was very much committed to improve relations with Russia, hoping to get some islands back from Russia, because the between Japan and Russia. The northern territories, the four islands between Hokkaido, the northern part of Japan, and Russia. And the Prime Minister Abe was very much eager, committed to conclude a peace treaty with Russia. So he didn't want to squander all that possibility. As a result of the annexation quite near. And the Japan imposed on the nominal set of sanctions back then, but this time, the scale of Russia's action and Russia's behavior and Russia's destruction and the number of casualties in Ukraine. It's very different from what happened in 2014. So the Japan, the Prime Minister Kishida was very much committed to impose a very strong set of sanctions for the first time. And second reason why this time Japan has reacted in a much stronger manner. But to do with the fact that we are now in Japanese mind, we see more direct linkage between what happens in Ukraine and what could happen in East Asia. So now the people are very much talking about the linkage between Ukraine and Taiwan continuously. Of course, the situation is not that simple. The Russians invading Ukraine doesn't necessarily mean that Chinese to invade Taiwan, but the this linkage is something that we are very much aware of. Prime Minister Kishida has been saying that the Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow, and that's something that has been repeatedly emphasized. So the context within which Japan responds to this invasion, Russia's invasion Ukraine, this time is very different from what we saw back in 2014. And the one of the messages that the government has been has been given is that the Japan is determined to align itself with other G7 partners, because the group of seven G7 for Japan is really important. And yes, it's a bit exclusive crap, but it is very much at the very center of Japan's foreign policy. Of course, there when it comes to security and defense the alliance with the United States is the is the biggest and most important foundation but so when it comes to foreign policy including economic international economic relations, the G7 cooperation with G7 is a farming and this year actually Japan is holding G7 presidency. So Japan is going to host not only G7 summit, but also series of foreign ministers and other ministers meetings in Japan, and also the online meetings are supposed to be taking place as well. So the cooperation with G7 is something that we are committed to and the Japan's response to Russia's invasion was also very much situated in that context. And also the looking at the impact of this war and invasion to Japan's domestic discussions of foreign security policy that's also quite important and interesting because the looking at this war, the people in Japan, including ordinary people, not paying regular attention to international and security issues. They have also realized how important it is to think about security and what it takes to defend a country and defend people. So this is something that ordinary Japanese didn't quite think of for many, many, many, but so now suddenly we have to think about this. So the, and also the level of public interest in Japan in war in Ukraine has been surprisingly high. This is a, at some working on European security issues. This is a very surprising thing to be quite honest. So there have been so for a few months since the following the start of this invasion, I was sort of a appearing on the TV program twice or three times a day. That's sort of a very crazy situation is there and everyone is talking about specific weapons systems or the high Mars and everyone is talking about high Mars or the infant, the fighting vehicles and it's, it's quite new situation in Japan. So the, I was quite surprised by, to be quite honest, by the high level interest among ordinary Japanese in this war. And this has affected the evolution of Japan's domestic discussions on foreign security and defense policy. I mentioned the fact that the Japanese government to be issued a new national security strategy and national defense strategy last December. And it introduced a, I would say, set of revolutionary changes to post war, Japan's security and defense policy. So one of the most important and most controversial issues is the idea of increasing defense budget. So for a long time, Japan spent only 1% of GDP on defense. There was a sort of a political ceiling for a long, long time. So 1% of GDP. But now suddenly that government is committed to spend 2% of GDP. But the, there are some tricks behind that. So the, when we were talking about 1% of GDP, it was only about MODA, Ministry of Defense budget. But now, in the context of 2% of GDP, we are talking about including other security related budget items like Coast Guard and defense related research and development. But so to, it's not that we are going to spend 2% of GDP, just for the Ministry of Defense, that's not the case, but, but still, there's going to be a huge increase of the next five years. So the, but people have been surprisingly supportive of that. Of course, where to find money is controversial, as you can imagine. But the very idea of spending more money on defense is somehow accepted by many people. So looking at opinion polls, the majority of Japanese still support that. But of course, when it comes to where to find money, still, that's a really controversial issue. And particularly, it's quite interesting that within the LDP, the ruling party, liberal democratic party, that's a ruling party. Within the party, there are, there are so many politicians who oppose the idea of increasing tax for that. And there are so many people who argue that we just can issue more government bonds to fund the increase of the defense budget. So there are various ways to prepare money for that. One is of course increasing tax, which is that quite popular as you can imagine, and borrowing more money. So the easing government bond, that's somehow quite popular among LDP ruling party politicians, and the decreasing other budget items. Also, it's not quite popular for those who could be affected by that. And the optimists within the government say that we can just expect natural increase of revenue. Yes, of course, if that really happens, that's the best solution, but still, we have to think about trade-offs between defense budget and other budget items. And politics is all about prioritization. The substantial increase of defense budget without cost is just an illusion. So we have to be very honest, and we have to think more about what sort of trade-off we have to address. And that, of course, could include the increasing tax. So the people have to have to shoulder some part of the burden, of course. But this discussion, it's only slowly starting. So we have to see how this leads go in the coming months and years. Another quite important new element in the national security strategy and national defense strategy is the idea about fire, what we call counter-strike capability. So it is a strike capability like cruise missiles and longer-range anti-ship missiles and other types of missiles. And that includes the standard of the missiles, the air-to-air and air-to-ship or air-to-ground missiles as well. But this is also a really new start for Japan. Because for more than seven decades, Japan didn't have such capability. But now suddenly, we are going to acquire those capabilities. So it represents a huge change. So I would often say that this is Japan's titan vendor, so the huge change turning point in history. But this idea of acquiring strike capability didn't attract much opposition. Of course, the opposition parties are still very much against this. But if you look at the opinion polls, the ordinary people are quite supportive of this. So five years ago, 10 years ago, it's just impossible to even think of that. But now, partly because of the war in Ukraine and also because of North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons development. Because last year, we had a huge record high number of North Korean missile launches and some of which flew over Japan. And that, of course, ignited Japanese concerns about Japan's security. And also the heightened tensions over Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait, is also something that has affected Japan's security concerns and security awareness among people. And this document, so looking at the political aspect of this document, one of the things that always attract a lot of attention is how we portray China. So the, and this document says that China presents an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge to Japan. So this is a sort of a new language, but it's still all short of calling China a threat. So the, but this is a new element and also there when it comes to Ukraine, the national security strategy says that similar serious situation may arise in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia. So this also shows that how connected in Japan's mind, the situation between the situation in Ukraine and the situation in East Asia. And now let me turn to two specific issues, which are of course they're connected to what I have just discussed. One is the Ukraine-Taiwan comparison, because now a lot of people are talking about what could happen. Based on what happens in Ukraine, what could happen to Taiwan and how the United States would respond to a potential crisis of Taiwan. The one important commonalities, one of the most important commonalities between Ukraine and Taiwan is that neither of them is a formal ally of the United States. Ukraine is not part of NATO. Taiwan has a, the United States has a domestic legislation called Taiwan Relations Act. So somehow the US is committed to the defense of Taiwan. But it's very different from US-Japan Security Treaty. It's just a domestic legislation, it's not an international treaty. So the Taiwan is not seen as a treaty on the United States. Given the fact that the United States is not directly intervening into the war in Ukraine. So the big question for us in Japan and other people in the region is whether the United States would intervene in a conflict involving Taiwan. So there are two hypotheses. So starting with the discussion of why the United States is not currently intervening in the war in Ukraine. Of course, the weapons provision is substantial and also the other various logistical intelligence assistance to the Ukrainian forces by the United States and other NATO allies. It's quite substantial, but still the US is not a formal party to the war. And the one reason why the US is not intervening is that Ukraine is not important. Ukraine is not important enough. If that's the case, you could make an argument that Taiwan is more important than Ukraine. If the main reason of non-intervention of the United States in this war is the lack of importance of Ukraine to the United States. Then it's a very bad news for Ukrainians, but good news, sort of good news for Taiwanese. Because if they can claim that Taiwan is more important than Ukraine, then you can expect American intervention. And Taiwan has good reasons to claim that, particularly now, the rising importance of semiconductor industry, so TSMC and other Taiwanese companies are now seen as more important. Everyone wants to get TSMC factories, including Japan and the United States. But there could be another reason why the US is not intervening now in the war in Ukraine. It could be because the US wants to avoid World War III. The US wants to avoid nuclear armageddon, that's what President Biden mentioned a couple of times. If that's the real reason why US is hesitant to intervene in Ukraine, then that's a very bad news for Taiwanese, and perhaps Japanese as well. Because the fact that Russia has nuclear weapons, if that fact affects American calculation, then if something really serious happens in Taiwan, then the United States will have to think about the fact that China also has nuclear weapons. So Taiwan contingency is supposed to take place under Chinese nuclear shadow, just as the current war in Ukraine is done under Russian nuclear shadow. So if the US is not prepared to do what it thinks is necessary vis-à-vis Russia, then how we could expect the United States to do what is necessary and what Japan and other US allies and partners would expect the United States to do. So that is why the reason why the US is not intervening in this war matters a lot for us in thinking about potential Taiwan contingency. So this is very much about how we could address the country wanting to change the status quo by force, having nuclear weapons. So how we could address nuclear weapon states if they try to change the status quo by force, like Russia today, and then the challenge we might face over Taiwan vis-à-vis China. And the second, the topic I wanted to discuss before closing, is the deepening Japan-Europe cooperation and Japan-Europe relations. So I talked a bit about the importance of G7 for Japan, and this is really important because the G7 of course, the United States is part of G7. But for Japan, the most important element and aspect of G7 is that Europeans are there. Because the US-Japan relations, that's there regardless of what happens in other parts of Japan's foreign security policy. So the US-Japan relationship is there, but the G7 is a great place for Japanese prime minister or foreign minister of whoever attends the G7 meetings to meet European counterparts. So Japanese media keep forgetting about the fact that the EU is a formal member of G7. So I always need to tell them that you need to put the EU flag in a chart showing G7, but they keep forgetting about that. But we can meet. So at the G7 summit, and actually the G7 summit, there are nine people attending. And so the Japanese Prime Minister, US President, Canadian Prime Minister, and all others are from Europe. And the European Union, there are two for summit meetings, so the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council. So the people say that Europe is overrepresented. Yeah, that might be quite the case, but I assume that just behind you, of course, other European countries, including of course Ireland, is there. So it's good. So for Japanese actually, so the very important element of G7 is that we see European counterparts. And when it comes to imposing functions of Russia, we have a talk a lot about this topic within G7 context. So this is really a part of a Japan, Europe, policy coordination and cooperation. And also the role of the EU, of course, is also something that the war in Ukraine and policy coordination following that has highlighted. And also, between Japan and the EU, there are new agendas, and which are very much related to what we call economic security. So in Japan, everyone is now talking about economic security. So it is about the supply chain security and export control measures. And so in the European context, I think you talk more in the context of resilience and technology control. And these are, so this area is also something that the Japan and the could expand cooperation. And I also did not just between Japan and the of course they need to, you know, the, the, the aligners with the United States as well. And NATO, NATO Japan cooperation is also a developing quite fast. And so last year on the occasion of a NATO summit meeting in Madrid, where NATO's new strategic concept was adopted. It was the first time what NATO calls AP for the Asia Pacific for partners. So the Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. So the audio audio heads of the state and government from four countries attended the Madrid summit. And that was really a symbolically and a substantial in substantial terms as well. Very important because NATO is not really busy dealing with the war in Ukraine. But still, NATO showed that given all what takes place in Ukraine, still, NATO is capable of paying attention to the Indo-Pacific region. And that's quite something. And also, just last week, the NATO Secretary General, Mr. Stoltenberg visited Korea and Japan. And actually I personally hosted him, his talk at my university, Kerry University. And I was really impressed by Mr. Stoltenberg's very seriousness about talking to Japanese and talking to Japanese students. And he talked a lot about Russia in front of Japanese. It's quite new, because it used to be that whenever NATO Secretary General comes to Tokyo, then he pays a lot of lip services to Japan, how important Japan is for NATO, blah, blah, blah. But this time, his visit was really serious. So in South Korea, he asked South Koreans to send weapons to Ukraine. That's also very much part of a serious business. And in Japan, he didn't quite directly ask Japanese weapons transfer to Ukraine, but he's the way in which he talked about Russia. And China as well, were really serious. And I was quite thrilled to see that just sitting next to him at Kerry University. So the back to national security strategy, it now talks about enhancing deterrence with like-minded countries, including those in Europe. So before that, deterrence was a terminology that we only used in the context of the alliance with the United States. But now, Japan is using the term, talking about deterrence in its, in the context of its relations with like-minded countries, in Europe. So this is a new sort of, it could be a new start. So the, so I think I have very used my time. So I'll stop here, but I very much look forward to discussions and questions, comments, whatever. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Professor Tsuroka, for a very interesting presentation. So I will avail of my prerogative as chairman to ask you the first question. And that is related, in fact, to the last topic you mentioned of deterrence. And because before his assassination last year, former Prime Minister Abe, in response to the invasion of Ukraine, he talked about the need to start a discussion about nuclear weapons, and possibly a nuclear sharing program with other countries. In the light of the more positive public reaction to the new security strategy in Japan, is this something that might also become more acceptable to people in Japan, do you think? Thank you very much for that question. I don't think it's quite realistic to think about nuclear sharing with the United States, or of course the Japan's going nuclear is also still very much out of the question. So the discussions are there, and the interest is really high, but when it comes to the feasibility, it's still very much near to zero. And the Japanese people are not quite supportive of any direct role in hosting nuclear weapons and having nuclear weapons. What is quite interesting is that there's a huge difference between Japanese discussions and discussions in Korea, South Korea. So in South Korea, there are so many politicians now arguing for reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean soil. And people are quite supportive of the idea of getting a reintroduction of US weapons, because for a long time South Korea hosted actually nuclear weapons, US nuclear weapons on its own. Sorry. So there is a huge difference between these two countries. Thank you. We have a question from one of our online participants, Olena Tregub from the Independent Defense Anti-Corruption Commission in Ukraine, and she asks in fact about South Korea, and do you expect that they will change their mutual policy and begin to supply weapons to Ukraine? Yeah, that's a really tricky issue, because already South Korea is selling like the various kinds of ammunition to the United States, and that enables the US to supply the same kind of ammunition to Ukraine. So it's already a sort of an indirect route from Korea to the United States and to Ukraine. And I understand that Canada too is doing a similar sort of arrangement, but still the South Korean, even under the current government, even under the current president, they're still a bit hesitant to openly do such a thing. But what is quite interesting is that now the role of South Korea as a defense equipment producer is growing in Europe as well. So last year we saw an unprecedented level of a huge contract between Poland and Korea. And Poland needs to buy 1,000 tanks from South Korea. It's quite a lot. And so looking at various countries in Europe and United States, Canada, Japan, we don't have much spare capacity or production of weapons and ammunition. But South Korea has, because South Korea is one of the very few countries in the world which maintain what we call war economy, because the Korean war is just the armistice. So they have maintained a spare capacity. So that is now playing a big role in Europe. As for Poland, yes, the Polish people say that the divine weapons from Korea was not their first choice. But in the end, sourcing your equipment from other parts of the world makes a huge strategic sense. Now you have war in Europe and there is no spare capacity for defensive equipment here in Europe. So then buying weapons from other parts of the world, different parts of the world, that makes a lot of sense. So I think the role of Korea is set to continue and I think set to increase more. Perhaps more indirectly rather than. Poland, the fact that Poland is able to buy tanks from Korea means that Poland can give what they already have to Korea. Yes, Michael. Thank you very much. My name is Michael Sanfi, Policy Planning Unit of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Dublin. Thanks for your talk. Just with regard to the section of your remarks about the comparison between Ukraine and Taiwan, you mentioned two hypotheses. And it's just personally the first one seems to me not to hold any water, whatever, which is that Ukraine is simply not important enough. I mean, to me, it seems overwhelmingly more likely that it's the second reason that they want to avoid World War Three. So my question is, does a large section, I mean, to what extent is there a section of society or whatever in Japan that actually believes that the first hypothesis has any weight, whatever, you know, that that it's a case that Ukraine is not important enough. It just seems to me, absolutely not the case. Yeah, thank you very much. That's a great question. And, yeah, looking at the volume of US weapons transfer to Ukraine. Yes, the US is now really serious and committed. But in the early phase, early days of the war, US was not that committed. So the only other result of seeing that the Ukrainians are capable of countering Russian invasion, then the US gradually became more serious in supporting Ukraine. And also, the, it's easy to say that. Because Ukraine is not a NATO member, US doesn't have the obligation to defend Ukraine. That's factually true. But you don't really have to have a formal treaty relationship with Ukraine. If you really want to get involved. Because the right of collective self defense is according to the UN Charter is an inherent right of all nations. So the United States can, if it chooses to do so, can invoke the right of collective self defense to Ukraine, despite the fact that Ukraine is not part of NATO. And that's what Americans have done, number of times. So for some of the most one of the most recent cases is a global coalition against the Islamic State. But the US and other like many partners conducted airstrikes against Islamic State, both in Iraq and Syria. And it was done, formal, when it comes to the formal procedure, it was done as a result of the request from Iraq. So the US used the right of collective self defense upon request from Iraq. But the US doesn't have a treaty alliance with Iraq. If you are very serious, then you can do things. But so the fact that NATO is not involved formally involved in this war is NATO decision not to do so. So the Ukraine is not part of NATO is a sort of excuse. But that is not quite based on international law because if you are really serious, then you can do things. So, from that perspective, I said that there is a hypothesis that Ukraine is not important enough. Thank you very much. My name is Rita. And I'm a Chinese studying at Trinity College Dublin. I'm working on my PhD thesis on language policy and a planning in higher education. Thank you for the wonderful talk. I have basically two questions. The first one is it seems like all of the narratives from Japanese government or normal people are hugely influenced by the strategic plan from an upper level, let's say, from the governmental level. I'm curious if there are some influence from the Asian level, say, from some neighboring countries in Asia about the beliefs or ideology concerning the Ukrainian war, or that brings me another question about the China US relation. How do normal Japanese people think about the Taiwan problem or let's say the power relation between Chinese government and the US government, and what's the role here in this issue in East Asia Pacific about from the Japanese government perspective or from the Japanese normal people perspective. Thank you very much. If I could just add to that question. And we have a question from another former ambassador to Japan, Boris Murphy, who also asks about what do people in Japan think about the Chinese reaction to the war in Ukraine. So it follows very much from the first starting with a the Japanese perception about the Chinese reaction to the war. Yeah, it's disappointing. That's quite true. The, and also the, we see a substantial level of paradox or irony in China's reaction and China's approach to the war, because on one hand, non intervention in other countries business other countries politics is very much part of China's very important principle of its foreign policy. So what the Russians are doing now vis-à-vis Ukraine is just the violation, brutal violation of that principle, non intervention in other countries politics. So the how we are wondering how tennis policy makers can reconcile on the one hand the principle of non intervention, and what they are seeing in Ukraine. So the, and also the in the Chinese language, I understand that the, they don't want to use the term war or invasion. They often use the term crash. Right. So the, that shows that they don't want to say this is a war. This is an invasion because if you say this is an invasion then the next question is with responsible. So it's a quite a, a interesting Chinese way of dodging the very, the essential is by using the term crash. So the, when I talk to Chinese experts on that side, I was quite honestly impressed by that way of talking about this war. And the Japanese people's perceptions about the US China strategic competition. Yes, they are very much concerned about that. And the one of the most direct consequences we are already feeling is the export control measures. So the US is now more determined to impose stricter much stricter, it's for control measures against China, including semiconductor manufacturing machines and other things. And Japanese companies are very much afraid of what sort of impact the US policy is going to have on Japan. What we are now seeing is that the within companies within private companies, now they sort of a decoupling between the section dealing with United States and section dealing with China. But this option is only possible for big companies, the smaller companies, they just cannot afford to do such a thing. So the, yes, the Japanese government itself is now becoming more serious in addressing what we call economic security agenda. But the business community is still very much concerned about the potential at first impact of that because it's still the China business for them is really important. So the, and particularly the Japanese companies in China, the, for those who use China, only as a manufacturing base, it's relatively easy for them to leave China. But for those who depend on Chinese market, in addition to using China as a manufacturing base, it's far more difficult for them to leave China. So the, so there's no consensus in Japan on how to deal with this situation and how to address this sort of challenges and the, at the very fundamental level, what we are now wondering is where to draw a line between what is acceptable when it comes to China's behaviors, investments and other things, what is acceptable and what is not acceptable. But drawing a line between the two is really difficult. But how we can align ourselves between Japan and other like many countries, of course, including the United States. So this is still a huge challenge and I would say that there's no consensus, not only in Japan, but also in other countries as well on how to deal with China. Yes, please. Thank you very much. My name is Lyle, I'm from the Norwegian Ambassador to Ireland, and a few years back I worked for NATO. I was a special representative for Women, Peace and Security. And in that job, I had the pleasure of collaborating with Japanese partners on the agenda and it ended with the second one of a Japanese colonel to the office. So we thought that was quite groundbreaking also when it came to the strategic relationship between Japan and NATO. And I was wondering if you could elaborate a little bit more concretely on what your partnership with NATO looks like today. Thank you. Great, so thank you very much. Yes, the NATO-Japan cooperation has developed over the past decade or so. I was at the embassy in Brussels from 2005 to 2008 and dealing with NATO and at the time Ambassador Maria was a direct for European policy division and dealing with NATO and among other things. But the other time, it was only a very early phase of the development of NATO-Japan cooperation, but now becoming more substantial, particularly in the field of cyber security and cyber defense and maritime security of course. And but my personal view is that the NATO's strengths, one of the NATO's strengths lies in the standardization. So interoperability and standardization. So you have a huge accumulation of standardization agreements called STANAX. So this is what Japan could learn a lot and also given the fact that now Japan is going to do a joint development of next generation of jet fighters with the UK and Italy, which means that we will be very much in the context of NATO standardization, NATO STANAX. So the so far we have been thinking of the adjusting to NATO standards. But in the course of this new joint development of next generation of jet fighters, then we believe that we will be in the process of making new standardization of NATO. This is the participation of Japanese. And that's, that's a, that's going to be a very new phase of standardization and interoperability cooperation between the two. And also the reality on the ground has already developed a lot, because a lot of countries, a lot of a increasing number of European countries have been sending ships and aircraft to Japan and to other parts of the Indo-Pacific region. So one and a half years ago, we had a UK-led carrier strike group, so the aircraft carrier, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, visited Japan and the carrier strike group stayed in the region for many weeks actually. And we did a lot of joint training, not only was between the UK carrier strike group and Japan, but also involving other like many countries and US allies. And Germany also is now a frequent sort of a visitor. So the German frigate came to Japan the last year, one and a half years ago. And also the interesting data to German, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the fight is also visited Japan. So this sort of a bilateral defense cooperation is also a very big part of Japan, Europe, security and defense ties. So yesterday looking at specifically at NATO, it's, NATO doesn't have any ships, so the NATO cannot be the one to send ships to the Indo-Pacific region, but NATO countries are there. So the, and this sort of cooperation is becoming more substantial. And another interesting element of this is that US is very much at the center of this. Because whenever European countries send ships to the region, US Navy is there to help. So this is from a Japanese perspective, this is about plug those European countries in to the US alliance networks in the region. So the US-Japan alliance is there and US-Australia alliance is there. And whenever European countries come to this, come to that region, then not only the US, but US-Japan alliance is there and US-Australia alliance is there. And that's sort of a US element is also something that we can think of. We don't have very much time, but we still have some really interesting questions that I'd like to know. It's really interesting. We have a question from Dr. Dr. Declan Downey, who is a lecturer at University College Dublin with a strong interest in Japan. And it's about the national defense and security strategy. You talked earlier about the counter-strike capability that is one of the features. But Dr. Downey asks, is there a parallel policy for a protective strategy similar to Israel's iron dome policy to protect against inward attacks? Is that also a feature of the new strategy? Sure, sure, sure. Missile defense is something that Japan has been quite eager to develop for more than 20 years. So the eases ships we deploy and also the Patriot missile defense system we operate. And we are going to add more eases capable vessels in the coming years. So this is quite an important part of Japan's defense and deterrence posture. But a bit of sort of a caveat here is that we have been saying that our missile defense is mainly about North Korea. Because given the size of China's missiles, it's just impossible to address and intercept all the Chinese missiles. So that's why we have been saying that this is a limited system and mainly about North Korea. But the reality is that China has far more, much bigger number of missiles which could reach Japan. So then we might have to think about that as well in the context of missile defense. Did you want to ask a question? If it's Gerald, I'm a member of the Institute and coming from a defense background. I noted your answer to the ambassador here beside me on the relationship with NATO. Of course, NATO being dominated by the European countries and its standardization that it brings with its stand eggs and so forth. What about a more localized defense pact? Is there any prospect for a more localized defense pact that Japan could enter with? What do you mean? With Korea, for instance. Would you see a future in that? Yeah, great question. Easy question. I personally cannot be quite optimistic about the prospect of Japan-Korea security and defense cooperation. But at least we should be able to deal with immediate challenges together. And not only together between Japan and Korea, but in the context of US-Japan-Korea trilateral cooperation. So the technical cooperation has been there. But when it comes to moving to a political and strategic level, then all the political problems are still there. And we have to address those political issues before thinking of more substantial security and defense ties. And quite interestingly, Japan has been expanding strategic cooperation, including of course security and defense ties, with an increasing number of countries in Southeast Asia. So ASEAN countries. So just this week, and perhaps now, the Filipino President is visiting Tokyo. And the Philippines is actually one of the closest strategic security and defense partners for Japan in the region. And so this is a sort of a new development and also the Vietnam is a quite important strategic partner for Japan. So they say more security and defense ties, including the capacity building and the defense domains, it's something that Japan has been doing nearly 10 years now. So the bilaterally and also in the context of the multilateral frameworks in the region, including the ADMN plus, the ASEAN Defense Ministry meeting plus, that's a 10 ASEAN countries plus countries in framework. And it's quite a vibrant and interesting new framework. But still, when it comes to substantial assistance and substantial relationship, we have been developing bilateral relations, particularly with the Philippines and Vietnam. Thank you. We have a question from Dr. Paul Gillespie, who is in the UCD School of Politics and International Relations. He's also well known to everybody here as an Irish Times column, and his question is about the developing discussion in and between the European Union and ASEAN, about how closer interregional cooperation between them could help to mitigate the polarization caused by U.S. on one side and China on the other side. Is this something that Japan could contribute to this discussion? Yeah, the strategic importance of ASEAN is on the rise. So now everyone is talking about the strengthening relations with ASEAN. So ASEAN is quite popular. And one of the reasons for that is that the ASEAN is seen as a very important sort of a China plus destination of foreign direct investment. Now, out of concerns about the security of global supply chain, now that we are encouraged to not too much focus on China, so that at least China plus alpha is needed. And in that context, the importance of ASEAN has increased quite a lot. And Japan has been in ASEAN for many, many years, and it's really good that the Europeans are now very more attention to ASEAN. And so the very important element of this is that the ASEAN people, ASEAN countries and ASEAN people are very much concerned about the polarization of the world between China and the United States, and they don't want to take the side. So the China is there, it's just impossible for Southeast Asians to kick out Chinese, it's just impossible, they are there. And they don't want to be seen as anti-Chinese. But at the same time, they are also concerned about adverse effects of Chinese presence, not only in economic terms, but also political security terms as well. So what they need is other choice alternatives. And that's what Japan is trying to ensure in ASEAN countries, that, for example, thinking about infrastructure project, if there is only one proposal that is China, Chinese, then you have no other choice. But if you have alternatives, then you can choose. And the Japan's approach is not to kick out Chinese from Southeast Asia, because we know it's impossible. And also, we don't really think that the kicking Chinese out is good for them. But always always ensure that there are alternatives, that is important. And that's also very much part of Japan-EU, what we call connectivity partnership. So they're ensuring that there are always alternatives, and alternatives that are better in terms of transparency, sustainability. And these are the things that we can do, Japan can do, cooperate with the European Union, including Southeast Asia. Well, unfortunately, we have gone over our time, so I have to bring this discussion to an end, but it's been a really fascinating discussion. And I think we've all enjoyed listening to you and very much. I think we've all learned a great deal of listening to you as well. So on behalf of everybody, I would like to thank you very sincerely for coming here today and talking to us at such length.