 Section 5 of Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 presidential election. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Read by Angelique G. Campbell, May 2019. Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election by Robert Mueller. Section 5. Russian government links to and contacts with the Trump campaign. The office identified multiple contacts, links, in the words of the appointment order, between Trump campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The office investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted Russian interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election. In particular, the investigation examined whether these contacts involved are resulted in coordination or conspiracy with the Trump campaign and Russia, including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the campaign in exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future. Based on the available information, the investigation did not establish such coordination. This section describes the principal links between the Trump campaign and individuals with ties to the Russian government, including some contacts with campaign officials or associates that have been publicly reported to involve Russian contacts. Each subsection begins with an overview of the Russian contact at issue and then describes in detail the relevant facts, which are generally presented in chronological order. Beginning with the early months of the campaign and extending through the post-election transition period. Subsection A. Campaign period. Running from September 2015 to November the 8th, 2016. Russian government-connected individuals and media entities began showing interest in Trump's campaign in the months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015. As Trump's status as a public figure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior business and entertainment dealings, this office investigated whether a business contact with Russian-linked individuals and entities during the campaign period, the Trump Tower Moscow Project, led to an involved coordination of election assistance. Outreach from individuals with ties to Russia continued in the spring and summer of 2016 when Trump was moving toward and eventually becoming the Republican nominee for president. As set forth below, the office also evaluated a series of links during this period. Outreach to two of Trump's then recently named foreign policy advisors, including a representation that Russia had dirt on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails, dealings with a DC-based think tank that specializes in Russia and has connections with its government. A meeting at Trump Tower between the campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was, quote, part of Russia and its government support for Trump, end quote. Events at the Republican National Convention, post-convention contacts between Trump campaign officials and Russia's ambassador to the United States, and contacts through campaign chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for a Russian Oliark and a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine. Subsection 1, Trump Tower Moscow Project. The Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside the United States as part of its real estate portfolio. Some projects have involved the acquisition and ownership through subsidiary corporate structures of properties. In other cases, the Trump Organization has executed licensing deals with real estate developers and management companies, often local to the country where the project was located. Between at least 2013 and 2016, the Trump Organization explored a similar licensing deal in Russia involving the construction of a Trump-branded property in Moscow. The project, commonly referred to as a Trump Tower Moscow, or Trump Moscow Project, anticipated a combination of commercial, hotel, and residential properties all within the same building. Between 2013 and June 2016, several employees of the Trump Organization, including then-president of the Organization, Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties. From the fall of 2015 until the middle of 2016, Michael Cohen spearheaded the Trump Organization's pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow Project, including by reporting on the project's status to candidate Trump and other executives in the Trump Organization. Subsection A. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group in the years 2013 to 2014. The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group, a Russian real estate conglomerate owned and controlled by Eris Agolerov, began discussing a Russia-based real estate project shortly after the conclusion of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow. Donald J. Trump Jr. served as the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization. Imin Agolerov, an Iraqi-ike Cavaladze, represented the Crocus Group during negotiations with the occasional assistance of Robert Goldstone. In December 2013, Cavaladze and Trump Jr. negotiated and signed preliminary terms of an agreement for the Trump Tower Moscow Project when December 23, 2013, after discussions with Donald J. Trump, the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the organization received a flat 3.5% commission on all sales with no licensing fees or incentives. The parties negotiated a letter of intent during January and February 2014. From January 2014 through November 2014, the Trump Organization and Crocus Group discussed development plans for the Moscow Project. Some die before January 24, 2014, the Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a proposal for a 800-unit, 194-meter building to be constructed on Agolerov-owned site in Moscow called Crocus City, which had also been the site of the Miss Universe pageant. In February 2014, Ivanka Trump met with Imin Agolerov and toured the Crocus City site during a visit to Moscow. From March 2014 through July 2014, the group discussed design standards and other architectural elements. For example, in July 2014, members of the Trump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the demographics of these prospective buyers in the Crocus City area, the development of neighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portions of the building. In August 2014, the Trump Organization requested specifications for competing Marriott branded tower being built in Crocus City. Beginning in September 2014, the Trump Organization stopped responding in a timely fashion to correspondence and proposals from the Crocus Group. Communications between the two groups continued through November 2014 with decreasing frequency, what appears to be the last communication as dated November 24, 2014. The project appears not to have developed past the planning stage and no construction occurred. Subsection B, Communications with JC Expert Investment Company and Georgia Ritz Highlights, Summer and Fall 2015. In the late summer of 2015, the Trump Organization received a new inquiry about pursuing a Trump Tower project in Moscow. In approximately September 15, Felix Seder, a New York-based real estate advisor, contacted Michael Cohen, then Executive Vice President of the Trump Organization and Special Counsel to Donald J. Trump. Seder had previously worked with the Trump Organization and advised it on a number of domestic and international projects. Seder had explored the possibility of a Trump Tower project in Moscow while working with the Trump Organization and therefore knew of the organization's general interest in completing a deal there. Seder had also served as an informal agent of the Trump Organization in Moscow previously and had accompanied Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr. to Moscow in the mid-2000s. Seder contacted Cohen on behalf of the I.C. Expert Investment Company, a Russian real estate development corporation controlled by Andrey Veromerovich Razov. Seder had known Razov since approximately 2007 and in 2014 has served as an agent on behalf of Razov during Razov's purchase of a building in New York City. Seder later contacted Razov and proposed that I.C. Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project in which I.C. Expert would license the name and brand from the Trump Organization but construct the building on its own. Seder worked on the deal with Razov and another employee of I.C. Expert. Cohen was the only Trump Organization representative to negotiate directly with I.C. Experts or its agents. In approximately September 2015, Cohen obtained approval to negotiate with I.C. Expert from candidate Trump, who was then President of the Trump Organization. Cohen provided updates directly to Trump about the project throughout 2015 and into 2016, assuring him the project was continuing. Cohen also discussed the Trump Moscow project with Ivanka Trump as to design elements, such as possible architects to use for the project, and Donald J. Trump Jr. about his experience in Moscow and possible involvement in the project during the fall of 2015. Also during the fall of 2015, Cohen communicated about the Trump Tower proposal with Georgie Ritzelitz, a business executive who previously had been involved in the development deal with the Trump Organization in Batumi, Georgia. Cohen stated that he spoke to Ritzelitz in part because Ritzelitz had pursued business ventures in Moscow, including a licensing deal with a Lagarov-owned Crocus Group. On September 22, 2015, Cohen forwarded a preliminary design study for the Trump Moscow project to Ritzelitz adding a quote, I look forward to your reply about the spectacular project in Moscow, end quote. Ritzelitz forwarded Cohen's email to an associate and wrote, quote, if we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of the Russian government and Mr. Trump, this project would definitely receive the worldwide attention, end quote. On September 24, 2015, Ritzelitz sent Cohen an attachment that he described as a proposed, quote, letter to the mayor of Moscow from Trump Organization, explaining that we need to send this letter to the mayor of Moscow, second guy in Russia, who is aware of the potential project and will pledge his support, end quote. In a second email to Cohen sent the same day, Ritzelitz provided a translation of the letter, which described the Trump Moscow project as a, quote, symbol of stronger economic, business, and cultural relationships between New York and Moscow, and therefore United States and the Russian Federation, end quote. On September 27, 2015, Ritzelitz sent another email to Cohen, proposing that the Trump Organization partner on the Trump Moscow project with Global Development Group, LLC, which he described as being controlled by Mikhail Poshkin, a Russian architect, and Simon Nisaradze. Cohen told the office that he ultimately declined the proposal and instead continued to work with the LC expert, the company represented by Felix Seder. The letter of intent and contacts to Russian government from October 2015 to January 2016. Trump signs the letter of intent on behalf of the Trump Organization. Between approximately October 13, 2015, and November 2, 2015, the Trump Organization threw its subsidiary Trump Acquisition, LLC, and IC expert completed a letter of intent, LOI, for Trump Moscow property. The LOI, signed by Trump for the Trump Organization, and Razov on behalf of IC expert, was intended to facilitate further discussions in order to attempt to enter into a mutually acceptable agreement related to the Trump-branded project in Moscow. The LOI contemplated a development with residential, hotel, commercial, and office components, and asked for a quote, approximately 250 first-class luxury residential condominiums, as well as one first-class luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 floors and containing not fewer than 150 hotel rooms. End quote. For the residential and commercial portions of the project, the Trump Organization would receive between 1% and 5% of all condominium sales, plus 3% of all rental and other revenue. For the project's hotel portion, the Trump Organization would receive a base fee of 30% of gross operating revenues for the first five years and 4% thereafter, plus a separate incentive fee of 20% of operating profit. Under the LOI, the Trump Organization also would receive $4 million upfront fee prior to ground-breaking. Under these terms, the Trump Organization stood to earn substantial sums over the lifetime of the project without assuming significant liabilities or financing commitments. On November 3rd, 2015, a day after the Trump Organization transmitted the LOI, Seder emailed Cohen suggesting that the Trump-Moscow project could be used to increase candidate Trump's chances of being elected. Writing, quote, Buddy, our boy can become president of the USA and we can engineer it. I will get all of Putin's team to buy in on this. I will manage this process. Michael, Putin gets on stage with Donald for a ribbon-cutting for Trump-Moscow and Donald owns the Republican nomination and possibly beats Hillary and our boy as in. We will manage this process better than anyone. You and I will get Donald and Vladimir on a stage together very shortly. That's the game changer, unquote. Later that day, Seder followed up, quote, Donald doesn't stare down. He negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin only wants to deal with the pragmatic leader and a successful businessman is a good candidate for someone who knows how to negotiate. Business, politics, whatever. It is all the same for someone who knows how to deal. I think I can get Putin to say that at the Trump-Moscow press conference. If he says it, we own this election. America's most difficult adversary agreeing that Donald is a good guy to negotiate, we can own this election. Michael, my next steps are very sensitive with Putin's very, very close people. We can pull this off. Michael, let's go. Two boys from Brooklyn getting a U.S. president elected. This is good. Really good. End, quote. According to Cohen, he did not consider the political import of the Trump-Moscow project to the 2016 U.S. presidential election at the time. Cohen also did not recall candidate Trump or anyone affiliated with the Trump campaign discussing the political implications of the Trump-Moscow project with him. However, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the candidate suggested that his campaign would be a significant infomercial for Trump-branded properties. Subsection two, post-LOI contacts with individuals in Russia. Given the size of the Trump-Moscow project, Seder and Cohen believed the project required approval, whether expressed or implicit, from the Russian national government, including from the presidential administration of Russia. Seder stated that he therefore began to contact the presidential administration through another Russian business contact. In early negotiations with the Trump organization, Seder had alluded to the need for government approval and his attempts to set up meetings with Russian officials. On October 12, 2015, for example, Seder wrote to Cohen that, quote, all we need is Putin on board and we are golden, and that a meeting with Putin and top deputy is tentatively set for the 14th of October, end quote. This meeting was being coordinated by associates in Russia and that he had no direct interaction with the Russian government. Approximately a month later, after the LOI had been signed, Nina Rakova emailed Ivanka Trump on behalf of Arkava's then husband, Dmitry Klokov, to offer Klokov's assistance to the Trump campaign. Klokov was at that time director of external communications for PJSC Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System, a large Russian electricity transmission company and had been previously employed as an aide and press secretary to Russia's energy minister. Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen. He told the office that after receiving this inquiry, he had conducted an internet search for Klokov's name and concluded incorrectly that Klokov was a former Olympic weightlifter. Between November 8 and 19, 2015, Klokov and Cohen had at least one telephone call and exchanged several emails, describing himself in emails to Cohen as a trusted person who could offer the campaign political synergy and synergy on a government level. Klokov recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary. Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the candidate and an individual Klokov described as, quote, our person of interest, end quote. In an email to the office, Arkava later identified the person of interest as Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the telephone call and follow-on emails from Klokov, Cohen discussed his desire to use a near-term trip to Russia to do site surveys and talk over the Trump-Moscow project with local developers. Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidentified intermediary, but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump, including a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin, would need to be, quote, in conjunction with the development at an official visit, end quote, with the Trump organization receiving a formal invitation to visit. Klokov had written previously that, quote, the visit by candidate Trump to Russia has to be informal, end quote. Klokov had also previously recommended to Cohen that he separate their negotiations of a possible meeting between Trump and the person of interest from any existing business track, re-emphasizing that his outreach was not done on behalf of any business. Klokov added in second email to Cohen that if publicized well, such a meeting could have, quote, phenomenal impact in a business dimension and that the person of interest, most important support, could have significant ramifications for the levels of projects and their capacity, end quote. Klokov concluded by telling Cohen that there was, quote, no bigger warranty in any project than the consent of the person of interest, end quote. Cohen rejected the proposal saying that, quote, currently our LOI developer is in talk with the BP's chief of staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to meet, end quote. This email appears to be their final exchange and the investigation did not identify evidence that Cohen brought Klokov's initial offer of assistance to the campaign's attention or that anyone associated with the Trump organization or the campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date. Cohen explained that he did not pursue the proposed meeting because he was already working on the Moscow project with Seder who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government. By late December 2015, however, Cohen was complaining that Seder had not been able to use those connections to set up the promised meeting with the Russian government officials. Cohen told Seder that he was setting up the meeting myself. On January 11, 2016, Cohen emailed the office of Dmitry Peskov, the Russian government's press secretary, indicating that he desired contact with Sergei Avanov, Putin's chief of staff. Cohen erroneously used an email address so the email apparently did not go through. On January 14, 2016, Cohen emailed a different address with the following message, quote, Dear Mr. Peskov, over the past few months, I have been working with a company based in Russia regarding the development of a Trump Tower Moscow project in Moscow City. Without getting into lengthy specifics, the communication between our two sides has stalled. As this project is too important, I am hereby requesting your assistance. I respectfully request someone, preferably you, contact me so that I might discuss the specifics as well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals. I thank you in advance for your assistance and look forward to hearing from you soon, end quote. Two days later, Cohen sent an email repeating his request to speak with Sergei Avanov. Cohen testified to Congress and initially told the office that he did not recall receiving a response to this email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump Moscow project as of January 2016. Cohen later admitted that these statements were false. In fact, Cohen had received and recalled receiving a response to his inquiry and he continued to work on and update candidate Trump on the project through as late as June 2016. On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email from Elena Polyakova, Peskov's personal assistant. Writing from her personal email account, Polyakova stated that she had been trying to reach Cohen and asked that he call her on the personal number that she provided. Shortly after receiving Polyakova's email, Cohen called and spoke to her for 20 minutes. Cohen described to Polyakova his position at the Trump Organization and outlined the proposed Trump Moscow project, including information about the Russian counterparty with which the Trump Organization had partnered. Cohen requested assistance in moving the project forward, both in securing land to build the project and with financing. According to Cohen, Polyakova asked detailed questions and took notes stating that she would need to follow up with the others in Russia. Cohen could not recall any direct follow-up from Polyakova or from any other representative of the Russian government, nor did the office identify any evidence of direct follow-up. However, the day after Cohen's call with Polyakova, Seder texted Cohen, asking him to call me when you have a few minutes to chat. It's about Putin. They called today. Seder then sent a draft invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow to discuss the Trump Moscow project, along with a note to tell me if the letter is good as amended by me or make whatever changes you want and send it back to me. After a further round of edits on January 25th, 2016, Seder sent Cohen an invitation signed by Andrey Rabinensky of the company MHJ to travel to, quote, Moscow for a working visit about the prospects of development and the construction business in Russia, the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous tower, and the opportunity to coordinate a follow-up visit to Moscow by Mr. Donald Trump, end quote. According to Cohen, he elected not to travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete proposals about land plots that could be considered as options for the project. Subsection D, discussions about Russia travel by Michael Cohen or candidate Trump from December 2015 to June 2016. Seder's overtures to Cohen to travel to Russia. The late January communication was neither the first nor the last time that Cohen contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the Trump Moscow project, beginning in late 2015, Seder repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump as representatives of the Trump Organization to travel to Russia to meet with Russian government officials and possible financing partners. In June 2015, Seder sent Cohen a number of emails about logistics for traveling to Russia for meetings. On December 19th, 2015, Seder wrote, quote, please call me. I have Avache Dovaskin on the other line. He needs a copy of yours and Donald's passports. They need a scan of every page of the passports. Invitations and visas will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump Tower Moscow. Politically, neither Putin's office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue invite, so they are inviting commercially business. VTB is Russia's second-biggest bank and VTB Bank CEO Andre Kauston will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business meeting not political. We will be invited to Russia consulate this week to receive invite and have visa issued, end quote. In response, Cohen texted Seder an image of his own passport. Cohen told the office that at one point he requested a copy of candidate Trump's passport from Ronald Graff, Trump's executive assistant at the Trump Organization, and the graph later brought Trump's passport to Cohen's office. The investigation did not, however, establish that the passport was forwarded to Seder. In the spring of 2016, Seder and Cohen continued to discuss a trip to Moscow in connection with the Trump-Moscow project. On April 20, 2016, Seder wrote Cohen, quote, that people wanted to know when you were coming, end quote. On May 4, 2016, Seder followed up, quote, I had a chat with Moscow assuming the trip does happen. The question is before or after the convention. I said I believe, but don't know for sure, that it's probably after the convention. Obviously, the pre-meeting trip, you only, can happen at any time you want, were the two big guys with the question. I said I would confirm him or Burt. Let me know about it if I was right by saying I believed after Cleveland and also when you want to speak to them and possibly fly over, end quote. Cohen responded, my trip before Cleveland, Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention. The day after this exchange, Seder tied Cohen's travel to Russia to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, also known as Forum, an annual event attended by prominent Russian politicians and businessmen. Seder told the office that he was informed by a business associate that Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to the forum. On May 5, 2016, Seder wrote to Cohen, quote, Peskov would like to invite you as his guest at St. Petersburg Forum, which is Russia's Davos, is June 16th or 19th. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev, as they are not sure if one or both will be there. This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia will be there as well. He said anything you want to discuss, including dates and subjects, are on the table to discuss, end quote. The following day, Seder asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel. On June 9, 2016, Seder sent Cohen a notice that he, Seder, was completing the badges for the forum, adding, quote, Putin is there on the 17th. Very strong chant, you will meet him as well, end quote. On June 13, 2016, Seder forwarded Cohen an invitation to the forum signed by the director of the Ross Congress Foundation, the Russian entity organizing the forum. Seder also sent Cohen a Russian visa application and asked him to send two passport photos. According to Cohen, the invitation gave no indication that Peskov had been involved in inviting him. Cohen was concerned that Russian officials were not actually involved or were not interested in meeting with him, as Seder had alleged, and so he decided not to go to the forum. On June 14, 2016, Cohen met Seder in the lobby of the Trump Tower in New York and informed him that he would not be traveling at this time. Subsection two, candidate Trump's opportunities to travel to Russia. The investigation identified evidence that during the period the Trump Moscow project was under consideration, the possibility of candidate Trump visiting Russia arose in two contexts. First, in interviews with the office, Cohen stated that he discussed the subject of traveling to Russia with Trump twice, once in late 2015 and again in spring 2016. According to Cohen, Trump indicated a willingness to travel if it would assist the project significantly. On one occasion, Trump told Cohen to speak with then campaign manager Corey Lewandowski to coordinate the candidate's schedule. Cohen recalled that he spoke with Lewandowski, who suggested that they speak again when Cohen had actual dates to evaluate. Cohen indicated, however, that he knew that travel prior to the Republican National Convention would be impossible, given the candidate's pre-existing commitments to the campaign. Second, like Cohen, Trump received and turned down an invitation to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. In late December 2015, Myra Duma, a contact of Ivanka Trump's from the fashion industry, first passed along invitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate Trump from Sergei Prokhodko, a deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation. On January 14th, 2016, Ronan Graff sent an email to Duma stating that Trump was, quote, honored to be asked to participate in the highly prestigious forum event but that he would have to decline the invitation given his very grueling and full travel schedule as a presidential candidate, end quote. Graff asked Duma whether she recommended that Graff, quote, send a formal note to the deputy prime minister, end quote, declining his invitation. Duma replied that a formal note would be great. It does not appear that Graff prepared that note immediately. According to written answers from President Trump, he received an email from Deputy Prime Minister Prokhodko on March 17th, 2016, again inviting Trump to participate in the 2016 forum in St. Petersburg. Two weeks later, on March 31st, 2016, Graff prepared for Trump's signature a two-paragraph letter declining the invitation. The letter stated that Trump's, quote, schedules have become extremely demanding because of the presidential campaign that he already had several commitments in the United States for the time of the forum and that he otherwise would have gladly given every consideration to attending such an important event, end quote. Graff forwarded the letter to another executive assistant at the Trump Organization with instructions to print the document on letter had for Trump to sign. At approximately the same time that the letter was being prepared, Robert Forzman, a New York-based investment banker, began reaching out to Graff to secure an in-person meeting with candidate Trump. According to Forzman, he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov, a Russian presidential aide involved with the Ross Congress Foundation to see if Trump could speak at the forum. Forzman first emailed Graff on March 31st, 2016 following a phone introduction brokered through Trump Business Associate Mark Burnett, who produced the television show The Apprentice. In his email, Forzman referenced his longstanding personal and professional expertise in Russia and Ukraine, his work setting up an early private channel between Vladimir Putin and former US President George W. Bush, and an approach he had received from senior Kremlin officials about the candidate. Forzman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate, Corey Lewandowski, or another relevant person to discuss this and other concrete things, Forzman felt uncomfortable discussing over unsecure email. On April 4th, 2016, Graff forwarded Forzman's meeting request to Jessica Machia, another executive assistant to Trump. With no response forthcoming, Forzman twice sent reminders to Graff, first on April 26th and again on April 30th, 2016. Graff's an an apology to Forzman and forwarded his April 26th email as well as his initial March 26th email to Lewandowski. On May 2nd, 2016, Graff forwarded Forzman's April 30th email which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald Trump Jr. or Eric Trump so that Forzman could convey to them information that, quote, should be conveyed to the candidate personally or to someone the candidate absolutely trusts, end quote. To policy advisor Stephen Miller, no communications or other evidence obtained by the office indicate that the Trump campaign learned that Forzman was reaching out to invite the candidate to the forum or that the campaign otherwise followed up with Forzman until after the election when he interacted with the transition team as he pursued a possible position in the incoming administration. When interviewed by the office, Forzman denied that the specific approach from senior Kremlin officials noted in his March 31st, 2016, email was anything other than Kobyakov's invitation to Ross Congress. According to Forzman, the concrete things he referenced in the same email were a combination of the invitation itself, Forzman's personal perspectives on the invitation, and Russia policy in general, and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U.S. think tank East-West Institute. Forzman told the office that Kobyakov had extended similar invitations through him to another Republican presidential candidate and one other politician. Forzman also said that Kobyakov had asked Foreman to invite Trump to speak after that other presidential candidate withdrew from the race and the other politician's participation did not work out. Finally, Forzman claimed to have no plans to establish a back channel involving Trump, stating the reference to his involvement in the Bush-Putin back channel was meant to burnish his credentials to the campaign. Forzman commented that he had not recognized any of the experts announced as Trump's foreign policy team in March 2016 and wanted to secure an in-person meeting with the candidate to share his professional background and policy views, including that Trump should decline Kabyavka's invitation to speak at the forum. Subsection 2. George Papadopoulos George Papadopoulos was a foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign from March 2016 to early October 2016. In late April 2016, Papadopoulos was told by London-based professor Joseph Mifsud immediately after Mifsud's return from a trip to Moscow that the Russian government had obtained dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. One week later, on May 6th, 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to candidate Clinton. Papadopoulos shared information about Russian dirt with people outside of the campaign and the office investigated whether he also provided it to a campaign official. Papadopoulos and the campaign officials with whom he interacted told the office that they did not recall that Papadopoulos passed them the information. Throughout the relevant period of time and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the campaign and the Russian government. That meeting never came to pass. Subsection A, Origins of Campaign Work In March 2016, Papadopoulos became a foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign. As early as the summer of 2015, he had sought a role as a policy advisor to the campaign, but in a September 30, 2015 email, he was told that the campaign was not hiring policy advisors. In late 2015, Papadopoulos obtained a paid position on the campaign of Republican presidential candidate Ben Carson. Although Carson remained in the presidential race until early March 2016, Papadopoulos had stopped actively working for his campaign by early February 2016. At that time, Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Center of International Law Practice, or L-C-I-L-P, which built itself as a, quote, unique institution comprising high-level professional international law practitioners dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the practice of international law, end quote. Papadopoulos said that he had finished his role with the Carson campaign and asked if L-C-I-L-P was hiring. In early February, Papadopoulos agreed to join L-C-I-L-P and arrived in London to begin work. As he was taking his position at L-C-I-L-P, Papadopoulos contacted Trump campaign manager Corey Lewandowski via LinkedIn and emailed campaign official Michael Glasner about his interest in joining the Trump campaign. On March 2nd, 2016, Papadopoulos sent Glasner another message reiterating his interest. Glasner passed a long word of Papadopoulos' interest to another campaign official, Joy Lutz, who notified Papadopoulos by email that she had been told by Glasner to introduce Papadopoulos to Sam Clovis, the Trump campaign's national co-chair and chief policy advisor. At the time of Papadopoulos' March 2nd email, the media was criticizing the Trump campaign for lack of experienced foreign policy or national security advisors within its ranks. To address that issue, senior campaign officials asked Clovis to put a foreign policy team together on short notice. After receiving Papadopoulos' name from Lutz, Clovis performed a Google search on Papadopoulos, learned that he had worked at the Hudson Institute and believed that he had credibility on energy issues. On March 3rd, 2016, Clovis arranged to speak with Papadopoulos by phone to discuss Papadopoulos joining the campaign as a foreign policy advisor, and on March 6th, 2016, the two spoke. Papadopoulos recalled that Russia was mentioned as the topic and he understood from the conversation that Russia would be an important aspect of the campaign's foreign policy. At the end of the conversation, Clovis offered Papadopoulos a role as policy advisor to the campaign and Papadopoulos accepted the offer. Subsection B, initial Russia-related contacts. Approximately a week after signing on as a foreign policy advisor, Papadopoulos traveled to Rome, Italy, as part of his duties with L-C-I-L-P. The purpose of the trip was to meet officials affiliated with Link Campus University, a sole-profit institution headed by a former Italian government official. During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsut. Mifsut is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London Academy of Diplomacy in London, England. Although Mifsut worked out of London and was also affiliated with L-C-I-L-P, the encounter in Rome was the first time that Papadopoulos met him. Mifsut maintained various Russian contacts while living in London, as later discussed. Among his contacts was Redaction Investigative Technique, a one-time employee of the IRA, the entity that carried out the Russian social media campaign. In January and February 2016, Mifsut and Redaction Investigative Technique discussed possibly meeting in Russia. The investigation did not identify evidence of them meeting. Later in the spring of 2016, Redacted Investigative Technique was also in contact with Redacted Investigative Technique that was linked to an employee of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russian military-controlled Facebook accounts that included accounts used to promote the D.C. leaks releases in the course of the GRU's hack and release operations. According to Papadopoulos, Mifsut at first seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when they met in Rome. After Papadopoulos informed Mifsut about his role in the Trump campaign, however, Mifsut appeared to take greater interest in Papadopoulos. The two discussed Mifsut's European and Russian contacts and had a general discussion about Russia. Mifsut also offered to introduce Papadopoulos to European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian government. Papadopoulos told the office that Mifsut's claim of substantial connections with Russian government officials interested Papadopoulos, who thought that such connections could increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Trump campaign. On March 17, 2016, Papadopoulos returned to London. Four days later, candidate Trump publicly named him as a member of the foreign policy and national security advisory team chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions, describing Papadopoulos as an oil and energy consultant and an excellent guy. On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos met with Mifsut in London. Mifsut was accompanied by a Russian female named Olga Ponskaya. Mifsut introduced Ponskaya as a former student of his who had connections to Vladimir Putin. Papadopoulos understood at the time that Ponskaya may have been Putin's niece, but later learned that this was not true. During the meeting, Ponskaya offered to help Papadopoulos establish contacts in Russia and stated that the Russian ambassador in London was a friend of hers. Based on this interaction, Papadopoulos expected Mifsut and Ponskaya to introduce him to the Russian ambassador in London, but that did not occur. Following his meeting with Mifsut, Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump campaign's foreign policy advisory team. The subject line of the message was meeting with Russian leadership, including Putin. The message stated in part, quote, are just finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine, Joseph Mifsut, the director of the London Academy of Diplomacy, who introduced me to both Putin's niece and the Russian ambassador in London, who also acts as the deputy foreign minister. The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to discuss U.S. Russia ties under President Trump. There are keen to host us on a neutral city more directly in Moscow. They said the leadership, including Putin, is ready to meet with us and Mr. Trump, should there be interest. Waiting for everyone's thoughts on moving forward with this very important issue, end quote. Papadopoulos's message came at a time when Klovis perceived a shift in the campaign's approach toward Russia, from one of engaging with Russia through the NATO framework and taking a strong stance on Russian aggression in Ukraine to redacted grand jury. Klovis's response to Papadopoulos, however, did not reflect that shift. Replying to Papadopoulos and other members of the foreign policy advisory team copied on the initial email, Klovis wrote, quote, this is most informative. Let me work it through the campaign. No commitments until we see how this plays out. My thought is that we probably should not go forward with any meeting with the Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies, especially France, Germany, and Great Britain. We need to reassure our allies that we are not going to advance anything with Russia until we have everyone on the same page. More thoughts later today. Great work, end quote. Subsection C. 1 Foreign Policy Team Meeting. The campaign held a meeting of the foreign policy advisory team with Senator Sessions and candidate Trump approximately one week later on March 31, 2016, in Washington, D.C. The meeting, which was intended to generate press coverage for the campaign, took place at the Trump International Hotel. Papadopoulos flew to Washington for the event. At the meeting, Senator Sessions sat at one end of an oval table while Trump sat at the other. As reflected in the photo included with the written report, which was posted to Trump's Instagram account, Papadopoulos sat between the two, two seats, to Sessions left. During the meeting, each of the newly announced foreign policy advisors introduced themselves and briefly described their areas of experience or expertise. Papadopoulos spoke about his previous work in the energy sector and then brought up a potential meeting with Russian officials. Specifically, Papadopoulos told the group that he had learned through his contacts in London that Putin wanted to meet with candidate Trump and that these connections could help arrange the meeting. Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos' statement. Papadopoulos and campaign advisor J.D. Gordon, who told investigators in an interview that he had a crystal clear recollection of the meeting, have stated that Trump was interested in and receptive to the idea of a meeting with Putin. Papadopoulos understood Sessions to be similarly supportive of his efforts to arrange a meeting. Gordon and two other attendees, however, recall that Sessions generally opposed the proposal, though they differ in their accounts of the concerns he voiced or the strength of the opposition he expressed. Subsection D. George Papadopoulos learns that Russia has dirt in the form of Clinton emails. Whatever Sessions' precise words at the March 31st meeting, Papadopoulos did not understand Sessions or anyone else in the Trump campaign to have directed that he refrain from making further efforts to arrange a meeting between the campaign and the Russian government. To the contrary, Papadopoulos told the office that he understood the campaign to be supportive of his efforts to arrange such a meeting. Accordingly, when he returned to London, Papadopoulos resumed those efforts. Throughout April 2016, Papadopoulos continued to correspond with, meet with, and seek Russia contacts through Mifsid and at times, Polinskaya. For example, within a week of her initial March 24th meeting with him, Polinskaya attempted to send to Papadopoulos a text message which email exchanges showed have been drafted or edited by Mifsid, addressing Papadopoulos's wish to engage with the Russian Federation. When Papadopoulos learned from Mifsid that Polinskaya had tried to message him, he sent her an email seeking another meeting. Polinskaya responded the next day that she was, quotes, back in St. Petersburg, but would be very pleased to support Papadopoulos's initiatives between our two countries and to meet him again, end quote. Papadopoulos stated in reply that he thought, quotes, a good step would be to introduce him to the Russian ambassador in London and that he would like to talk to the ambassador or anyone else she recommend about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia, end quotes. Mifsid, who had been copied on the email exchanges, replied on the morning of April 11th, 2016. He wrote, quotes, this has already been agreed. I am flying to Moscow on the 18th for a Valde meeting plus other meetings at the Duma. We will talk tomorrow, end quotes. The two bodies referenced by Mifsid are part of or associated with the Russian government. The Duma is a Russian legislative assembly, while Valde refers to the Valde Discussion Club, a Moscow-based group that is close to Russia's foreign policy establishment. Papadopoulos thanked Mifsid and said that he would see him tomorrow. For her part, Pauline Skyer responded that she had, quotes, already alerted my personal links to our conversation and your request that we are all excited the possibility of a good relationship with Mr. Trump and that the Russian Federation would love to welcome him once his candidature would be officially announced, end quotes. Papadopoulos and Mifsid's mentions of seeing each other tomorrow referenced a meeting that the two had scheduled for the next morning, April 12th, 2016, at the Andes Hotel in London. Papadopoulos acknowledged the meeting during interviews with the office and records from Papadopoulos's UK cell phone and his Internet search history all indicated that the meeting took place. Following the meeting, Mifsid traveled as planned to Moscow. On April 18th, 2016, while in Russia, Mifsid introduced Papadopoulos over email to Ivan Timaviv, a member of the Russian International Affairs Council, RIAC. Mifsid had described Timaviv as having connections with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the executive entity in Russia responsible for Russian foreign relations. Over the next several weeks, Papadopoulos and Timaviv had multiple conversations with Skype and email about setting the groundwork for a potential meeting between the campaign and Russian government officials. Papadopoulos told the office that, on one Skype call, he believed that his conversation with Timaviv was being monitored or supervised by an unknown third party because Timaviv spoke in an official manner and Papadopoulos heard odd noises on the line. Timaviv also told Papadopoulos in an April 25th, 2016 email that he had just spoken, quotes, to Igor Ivanov, the president of RIAC and former Foreign Minister of Russia, and conveyed Ivanov's advice about how best to arrange a Moscow visit, end quotes. After a stop in Rome, Mifsid returned to England on April 25th, 2016. The next day, Papadopoulos met Mifsid for breakfast at the Andes Hotel, the same location as their last meeting. During that meeting, Mifsid told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level Russian government officials during his recent trip to Moscow. Mifsid also said that, on the trip, he'd learned that the Russians had obtained dirt on candidate Hillary Clinton. As Papadopoulos later stated to the FBI, Mifsid said that the dirt was in the form of emails of Clinton and that they have thousands of emails. On May 6th, 2016, ten days after that meeting with Mifsid, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist at the campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton. Subsection E, Russia-related communications with the campaign. While he was discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised of his efforts. On April 25th, 2016, the day before Mifsid told Papadopoulos about the emails, Papadopoulos wrote to senior policy adviser Stephen Miller that, quotes, the Russian government has an open invitation by Putin for Mr. Trump to meet him when he is ready and that the advantages of being in London is that these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in neutral cities. End of quotes. On April 27th, 2016, after his meeting with Mifsid, Papadopoulos wrote a second message to Miller stating that, quote, some interesting messages were coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right. End quote. The same day, Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling Lewandowski that Papadopoulos had, quote, been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin wanting to host Trump and the team when the time is right. End quote. Papadopoulos's Russian-related communications with campaign officials continued throughout the spring and summer of 2016. On May 4th, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an email from Tim Aviv raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow asking Lewandowski whether that was something we want to move forward with. The next day, Papadopoulos forwarded the same Tim Aviv email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top of the email Russia Update, included the same email in a May 21st, 2016, message to senior campaign official Paul Manafort under the subject line, request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump, stating that, quote, Russia has been eager to meet Mr. Trump for quite some time and have been reaching out to me to discuss. Manafort forwarded the message to another campaign official without including Papadopoulos and stated, quote, let's discuss. We need someone to communicate that Trump is not doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the campaign so as not to send any signal, end quote. On June 1st, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about a rush of visit, asking if Lewandowski, quotes, wanted to have a call about this topic and whether we are following up with it, end quotes. After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos, too, quotes, connect with Clovis because he was running point, Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that the Russian MFA was asking him if Mr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point, end quotes. Papadopoulos wrote in an email that he, quotes, wanted to pass this information along to you for you to decide what's best to do with it or what message I should send or to ignore, end quotes. After several email and Skype exchanges with Tim Aviv, Papadopoulos sent one more email to Lewandowski on June 19th, 2016, Lewandowski's last day as campaign manager. The email stated that the Russian military of foreign affairs had contacted him and asked whether if Mr. Trump could not travel to Russia, a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could attend meetings. Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was, quote, willing to make the trip off the record if it's in the interest of Mr. Trump and the campaign to meet specific people, end quote. Following Lewandowski's departure from the campaign, Papadopoulos communicated with Clovis and Wally Ferrez, another member of the foreign policy advisory team, about an off-the-record meeting between the campaign and Russian government officials or with Papadopoulos's other Russian connections, Mifsid and Tim Aviv. Papadopoulos also interacted directly with Clovis and Ferrez in connection with the summit of the transatlantic parliamentary group on counterterrorism, TAG, a group for which Ferrez was co-secretary general. On July 16, 2016, Papadopoulos attended the TAG summit in Washington, D.C., where he sat next to Clovis. Included within the document is a photo of this incident. Although Clovis claimed to have no recollection of attending the TAG summit, Papadopoulos remembered discussing Russia and a foreign policy trip with Clovis and Ferrez during the event. Papadopoulos's recollection is consistent with emails sent before and after the TAG summit. The pre-summit messages included a July 11, 2016 email in which Ferrez suggested meeting Papadopoulos the day after the summit to chat and a July 12 message in the same chain in which Ferrez advised Papadopoulos that other summit attendees, quote, are very nervous about Russia, so be aware, end quote. Ten days after the summit, Papadopoulos sent an email listing Ferrez and Clovis as other participants in a potential meeting at the London Academy of Diplomacy. Finally, Papadopoulos's recollection is also consistent with handwritten notes from a journal that he kept at the time. Those notes appear to refer to potential September 2016 meetings in London with representatives of the Office of Putin and suggest that Ferrez, Clovis, and Papadopoulos would attend without the official backing of the campaign, quote, no official letter, no message from Trump. Additional Papadopoulos notes in fragmentary form are included with the report and are as follows. September, have an exploratory meeting. In September, if allowed, they will blast Mr. Trump. We want the meeting in London, England. No official letter, no message from Trump. They are talking to us. It is a lot of risk. Office of Putin, explore. We are a campaign. Willingness to meet with Sam Walid. Useful to have a session with him. End of Papadopoulos journal notes. Subsection F, Trump campaign knowledge of dirt. Papadopoulos admitted telling at least one individual outside of the campaign, specifically the then-Greek foreign minister about Russia's obtaining Clinton-related emails. In addition, a different foreign government informed the FBI that 10 days after meeting with MIFSA in late April 2016, Papadopoulos suggested that the Trump campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton. This conversation occurred after the GRU's spearfished Clinton campaign chairman, John Podesta, and stole his emails, and the GRU hacked into the DCCC and DNC. Such disclosures raised questions about whether Papadopoulos informed any Trump campaign official about the emails. When interviewed, Papadopoulos and the campaign officials who interacted with him told the office that they could not recall Papadopoulos sharing the information that Russia had obtained dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of emails or that Russia could assist the campaign through the anonymous release of information about Clinton. Papadopoulos stated that he could not clearly recall having told anyone on the campaign and wavered about whether he accurately remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upset after hearing Papadopoulos tell Clovis that Papadopoulos thought that they have her emails. The campaign officials who interacted or corresponded with Papadopoulos have similarly stated with varying degrees of certainty that he did not tell them. Senior Policy Advisor Stephen Miller, for example, did not remember hearing anything from Papadopoulos or Clovis about Russia having emails of or dirt on candidate Clinton. Clovis stated that he did not recall anyone, including Papadopoulos, having given him non-public information that a foreign government might be in possession of material damaging to Hillary Clinton. Redaction. Grand Jury. No documentary evidence and nothing in the email accounts or other communications reviewed by the office shows that Papadopoulos shared this information with the campaign. Additional George Papadopoulos contact. The office investigated another Russia-related contact with Papadopoulos. The office was not fully able to explore the contact because the individual had issue. Surgeon Millian remained out of the country since the inception of our investigation and declined to meet with members of the office despite ever-repeated efforts to obtain an interview. Papadopoulos first connected with Millian via LinkedIn on July 15, 2016, shortly after Papadopoulos had attended the TAG Summit with Clovis. Millian, an American citizen who was a native of Belarus, introduced himself as president of the New York-based Russian-American Chamber of Commerce and claimed that through that position he had, quote, insider knowledge and direct access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics, end quote. Papadopoulos asked Tim Aviv whether he had heard of Millian, although Tim Aviv said no, Papadopoulos met Millian in New York City. The meetings took place on July 30 and August 1, 2016. Afterwards, Millian invited Papadopoulos to attend and potentially speak at two international energy conferences, including one that was to be held in Moscow in September 2016. Papadopoulos ultimately did not attend either conference. On July 31, 2016, following his first in-person meeting with Millian, Papadopoulos emailed Trump campaign official Bo Denizik to say that he had been contacted, quotes, by some leaders of Russian-American voters here in the U.S. about their interest in voting for Mr. Trump and asked whether he should put you in touch with their group, U.S.-Russia Chamber of Commerce, end quote. Denizik thanked Papadopoulos for taking the initiative but asked him to hold off with outreach to Russian-Americans because too many articles had already portrayed the campaign than campaign chairman Paul Manafort and candidate Trump as being pro-Russian, end quotes. On August 23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he would, quote, share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your political work for the campaign, end quote. Papadopoulos claimed to have no recollection of this matter. On November 9, 2016, shortly after the election, Papadopoulos arranged to meet Millian in Chicago to discuss business opportunities, including potential work with Russian, quote, billionaires who are not under sanctions, end quote. The meeting took place on November 14, 2016 at the Trump Hotel and Tower in Chicago. According to Papadopoulos, the two men discussed partnering on business deals, but Papadopoulos perceived that Millian's attitude toward him changed when Papadopoulos stated that he was only pursuing private sector opportunities and was not interested in a job in the administration. The two remained in contact, however, and had extended online discussions about possible business opportunities in Russia. The two also arranged to meet at a Washington, D.C. bar when both attended Trump's inauguration in late January, 2017. End Section 5, Read by Angelique G. Campbell, June, 2019. Section 6 of the report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Lynn Jarrow. Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election by Robert Mueller. Part 4, Russian government links to and contacts with the Trump campaign. Section A, Subsection 3. Carter Page. Carter Page worked for the Trump campaign from January 2016 to September 2016. He was formally and publicly announced as a foreign policy advisor by the candidate in March 2016. Page had lived and worked in Russia and he had been approached by Russian intelligence officers several years before he volunteered for the Trump campaign. During his time with the campaign, Page advocated pro-Russia foreign policy positions and traveled to Moscow in his personal capacity. Russian intelligence officials had formed relationships with Page in 2008 and 2013 and Russian officials may have focused on Page in 2016 because of his affiliation with the campaign. However, the investigation did not establish that Page coordinated with the Russian government in its efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election. A, Background. Before he began working for the campaign in January 2016, Page had substantial prior experience studying Russian policy issues and living and working in Moscow. From 2004 to 2007, Page was the deputy branch manager of Merrill Lynch's Moscow office. There he worked on transactions involving the Russian energy company Gazprom and came to know Gazprom's deputy chief financial officer, Sergei Yatsenko. In 2008, Page founded Global Energy Capital LLC, GEC, investment management and advisory firm focused on the energy sector and emerging markets. Redacted, Grand Jury. The company otherwise had no sources of income and Page was forced to draw down his life savings to support himself and pursue his business venture. Page asked Yatsenko to work with him at GEC as a senior advisor on a contingency basis. Redacted, Grand Jury. In 2008, Page met Alexander Bulatov, a Russian government official who worked at the Russian Consulate in New York. Page later learned that Bulatov was a Russian intelligence officer. Redacted, Grand Jury. In 2013, Viktor Podobny, another Russian intelligence officer working covertly in the United States under diplomatic cover, formed a relationship with Page. Podobny met Page at an energy symposium in New York City and began exchanging emails with him. Podobny and Page also met in person on multiple occasions, during which Page offered his outlook on the future of the energy industry and provided documents to Podobny about the energy business. In a recorded conversation on April 8, 2013, Podobny told another intelligence officer that Page was interested in business opportunities in Russia. In Podobny's words, Page got hooked on Gazprom, thinking that if they have a project he could rise up. Maybe he can. It's obvious that he wants to earn lots of money. Podobny said that he had led Page on by feeding him empty promises that Podobny would use his Russian business connections to help Page. Podobny told the other intelligence officer that his method of recruiting foreign sources was to promise them favors and then discard them once he obtained relevant information from them. In 2015, Podobny and two other Russian intelligence officers were charged with conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign government. The criminal complaint detailed Podobny's interactions with and conversations about Page, who was identified only as male one. Based on the criminal complaint's description of the interactions, Page was aware that he was the individual described as male one. Page later spoke with a Russian government official at the United Nations General Assembly and identified himself so that the official would understand he was male one from the Podobny complaint. Page told the official that he didn't do anything. Redacted, grand jury. In the interviews with the FBI before the office's opening, Page acknowledged that he understood that the individuals he had associated with were members of the Russian intelligence services, but he stated that he had only provided immaterial non-public information to them and that he did not view this relationship as a back channel. Page told investigating agents that the more immaterial non-public information I give them, the better for this country. B. Origins of and early campaign work. In January 2016, Page began volunteering on an informal unpaid basis for the Trump campaign after Ed Cox, a state Republican Party official, introduced Page to Trump campaign officials. Page told the office that his goal in working on the campaign was to help candidate Trump improve relations with Russia. To that end, Page emailed campaign officials offering his thoughts on US-Russia relations, prepared talking points and briefing memos on Russia, and proposed that candidate Trump meet with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. In communications with campaign officials, Page also repeatedly touted his high-level contacts in Russia and his ability to forge connections between candidate Trump and senior Russian government officials. For example, on January 30, 2016, Page sent an email to senior campaign officials stating that he had spent the past week in Europe and had been in discussions with some individuals with close ties to the Kremlin who recognized that Trump could have a game-changing effect in bringing the end of the new Cold War. The email stated that through his discussions with these high-level contacts, Page believed that a direct meeting in Moscow between Mr. Trump and Putin could be arranged. Page closed the email by criticizing US sanctions on Russia. Redacted, grand jury. On March 21, 2016, candidate Trump formally and publicly identified Page as a member of his foreign policy team to advise on Russia and the energy sector. Over the next several months, Page continued providing policy-related work products to campaign officials. For example, in April 2016, Page provided feedback on an outline for a foreign policy speech that the candidate gave at the Mayflower Hotel. C. Volume 1, Section 4.A.4, Infra. In May 2016, Page prepared an outline of an energy policy speech for the campaign and then traveled to Bismarck, North Dakota to watch the candidate deliver the speech. Chief Policy Advisor Sam Clovis expressed appreciation for Page's work and praised his work to other campaign officials. C. Carter Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow. Page's affiliation with the Trump campaign took on a higher profile and drew the attention of Russian officials after the candidate named him a Foreign Policy Advisor. As a result, in late April 2016, Page was invited to give a speech at the July 2016 Commencement Ceremony at the New Economic School, NES, in Moscow. The NES Commencement Ceremony generally featured high-profile speakers. For example, President Barack Obama delivered a commencement address at the school in 2009. NES officials told the office that the interest in inviting Page to speak at NES was based entirely on his status as a Trump campaign advisor who served as the candidate's Russia expert. Andres Krikovich, an associate of Page's and assistant professor at the Higher School of Economics in Russia, recommended that NES Rector Shlomo Weber invite Page to give the commencement address based on his connection to the Trump campaign. Denis Klimentov, an employee of NES, said that when Russians learned of Page's involvement in the Trump campaign in March 2016 the excitement was palpable. Weber recalled that in summer 2016 there was substantial interest in the Trump campaign in Moscow and he felt that bringing a member of the campaign to the school would be beneficial. Page was eager to accept the invitation to speak at NES and he sought approval from Trump campaign officials to make the trip to Russia. On May 16, 2016 while that request was still under consideration Page emailed Clovis, J.D. Corden and Wallid Ferris and suggested that candidate Trump take his place speaking at the commencement ceremony in Moscow. On June 19, 2016, Page followed up again to request approval to speak at the NES event and to reiterate that NES would love to have Mr. Trump speak at this annual celebration in Page's place. Campaign manager Corey Lewandowski responded the same day saying if you want to do this it would be outside, sick of your role with the DJT for President campaign. I am certain Mr. Trump will not be able to attend. In early July 2016 Page traveled to Russia for the NES events. On July 5, 2016 Denis Klementov, copying his brother Dmitry Klementov emailed Maria Zakharova the director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Press Department about Page's visit and his connection to the Trump campaign. Denis Klementov said in the email that he wanted to draw the Russian government's attention to Page's visit in Moscow. His message to Zakharova continued, Page is Trump's adviser on foreign policy. He is a known businessman. He used to work in Russia. If you have any questions I will be happy to help contact him. Dmitry Klementov then contacted Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov about Page's visit to see if Peskov wanted to introduce Page to any Russian government officials. The following day Peskov responded to what appears to have been the same Denis Klementov-Zakharova email thread. Peskov wrote, I have read about Page. Specialists say that he is far from being the main one. So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin. On July 7, 2016 Page delivered the first of his two speeches in Moscow at NES. In the speech, Page criticized the US government's foreign policy toward Russia, stating that Washington and other western capitals have impeded potential progress due their often hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption, and regime change. On July 8, 2016, Page delivered a speech during the NES commencement. After Page delivered his commencement address, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovic spoke at the ceremony and stated that the sanctions the United States had imposed on Russia had hurt the NES. Page and Dvorkovic shook hands at the commencement ceremony and Weber recalled that Dvorkovic made statements to Page about working together in the future. Redacted, grand jury. Page said that during his time in Moscow he met with friends and associates he knew from when he lived in Russia, including Andrey Baranov, a former gas-prom employee who had become the head of investor relations at Rosneft, a Russian energy company. Page stated that he and Baranov talked about immaterial non-public information. Page believed he and Baranov discussed Rosneft president Igor Sechin and he thought Baranov might have mentioned the possibility of a sale of a stake in Rosneft in passing. Page recalled mentioning his involvement in the Trump campaign with Baranov, although he did not remember details of the conversation. Page also met with individuals from Tatneft, a Russian energy company, to discuss possible business deals, including having Page work as a consultant. On July 8, 2016, while he was in Moscow, Page emailed several campaign officials and stated that he would send a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I've received from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the presidential administration here. On July 9, 2016, Page emailed Klovis, writing, in pertinent part, Russian deputy prime minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke before the event. In a private conversation, Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Mr. Trump and a desire to work together toward devising better solutions in response to the vast range of current international problems. Based on feedback from a diverse array of other sources close to the presidential administration, it was readily apparent that this sentiment is widely held at all levels of government. Despite these representations to the campaign, redacted grand jury, the office was unable to obtain additional evidence or testimony about who Page may have met or communicated with in Moscow. Thus, Page's activities in Russia, as described in his emails with the campaign, were not fully explained. D. Later campaign work and removal from the campaign. In July 2016, after returning from Russia, Page travelled to the Republican National Convention in Cleveland. While there, Page met Russian ambassador to the United States Sergei Kislyak. That interaction is described in volume 1, section 4.a.6a, Infra. Page later emailed campaign officials with feedback he said he received from ambassadors he had met at the convention and he wrote that ambassador Kislyak was very worried about candidate Clinton's world views. Redacted grand jury. Following the convention, Page's trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russian foreign policy drew the media's attention and began to generate substantial press coverage. The campaign responded by distancing itself from Page, describing him as an informal policy advisor who did not speak for Mr. Trump or the campaign. On September 23, 2016, Yahoo News reported that U.S. intelligence officials were investigating whether Page had opened private communications with senior Russian officials to discuss U.S. sanctions policy under a possible Trump administration. A campaign spokesman told Yahoo News that Page had no role in the campaign and that the campaign was not aware of any of his activities past or present. On September 24, 2016, Page was formally removed from the campaign. Although Page had been removed from the campaign, after the election he sought a position in the Trump administration. On November 14, 2016, he submitted an application to the transition team that inflated his credentials and experiences, stating that in his capacity as a Trump campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with top world leaders and effectively responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior government officials in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas. Page received no response from the transition team. When Page took a personal trip to Moscow in December 2016, he met again with at least one Russian government official. That interaction and a discussion of the December trip are set forth in Volume 1, Section 4.B.6, Infra. 4. Dmitry Symes and the Center for the National Interest Members of the Trump campaign interacted on several occasions with the Center for the National Interest, CNI, principally through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Dmitry Symes. CNI is a think tank with expertise in and connection to the Russian government. Symes was born in the former Soviet Union and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. In April 2016 candidate Trump delivered his first speech on foreign policy and national security at an event hosted by the National Interest, a publication affiliated with CNI. Then Senator Jeff Sessions and Russian Ambassador Kislyak both attended the event and as a result it gained some attention in relation to Sessions' confirmation hearings to become Attorney General. Sessions had various other contexts with CNI during the campaign period on foreign policy matters, including Russia. Jared Kushner also interacted with Symes about Russian issues during the campaign. The investigation did not identify evidence that the campaign passed or received any messages to or from the Russian government through CNI or Symes. A. CNI and Dmitry Symes connect with the Trump campaign. CNI is a Washington-based nonprofit organization that grew out of the center founded by former President Richard Nixon. CNI describes itself as a voice for strategic realism in U.S. foreign policy and publishes a bimonthly foreign policy magazine, the National Interest. CNI is overseen by a board of directors and an advisory council that is largely honorary and whose members at the relevant time included Sessions, who served as an advisor to candidate Trump on national security and foreign policy issues. Dmitry Symes is president and CEO of CNI and the publisher and CEO of the National Interest. Symes was born in the former Soviet Union, emigrated to the United States in the early 1970s and joined CNI's predecessor after working at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Symes personally has many contacts with current and former Russian government officials as does CNI collectively. As CNI stated when seeking a grant from the Carnegie Corporation in 2015, CNI has unparalleled access to Russian officials and politicians among Washington think-tanks, in part because CNI has arranged for U.S. delegations to visit Russia and for Russian delegations to visit the United States as part of so-called Track 2 diplomatic efforts. On March 14, 2016, CNI board member Richard Plepler organized a luncheon for CNI and its honorary chairman Henry Kissinger at the Time Warner Building in New York. The idea behind the event was to generate interest in CNI's work and recruit new board members for CNI. Along with Symes, attendees at the event included Jared Kushner, son-in-law of candidate Trump. Kushner told the office that the event came at a time when the Trump campaign was having trouble securing support from experienced foreign policy professionals and that, as a result, he decided to seek Symes' assistance during the March 14th event. Symes and Kushner spoke again on a March 24, 2016 telephone call. Three days after, Trump had publicly named the team of foreign policy advisors that had been put together on short notice. On March 31, 2016, Symes and Kushner had an in-person one-on-one meeting in Kushner's New York office. During that meeting, Symes told Kushner that the best way to handle foreign policy issues for the Trump campaign would be to organize an advisory group of experts to meet with candidate Trump and develop a foreign policy approach that was consistent with Trump's voice. Symes believed that Kushner was receptive to that suggestion. Symes also had contact with other individuals associated with the Trump campaign regarding the campaign's foreign policy positions. For example, on June 17, 2016, Symes sent JD Gordon an email with a memo to Senator Sessions that we discussed at our recent meeting and asked Gordon to both read it and share it with Sessions. The memorandum proposed building a small and carefully selected group of experts to assist Sessions with the campaign, operating under the assumption that Hillary Clinton is very vulnerable on national security and foreign policy issues. The memorandum outlined key issues for the campaign, including a new beginning with Russia. B. National interest hosts a foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel. During both their March 24 phone call and their March 31 in-person meeting, Symes and Kushner discussed the possibility of CNI hosting a foreign policy speech by candidate Trump. Following those conversations, Symes agreed that he and others associated with CNI would provide behind-the-scenes input on the substance of the foreign policy speech and that CNI officials would coordinate the logistics of the speech with Sessions and his staff, including Sessions' chief of staff, Rick Dearborn. In mid-April 2016, Kushner put Symes in contact with senior policy adviser Stephen Miller and forwarded to Symes an outline of a foreign policy speech that Miller had prepared. Symes sent back to the campaign bullet points with ideas for the speech that he had drafted with CNI executive director Paul Saunders and board member Richard Burt. Symes received subsequent draft outlines from Miller and he and Saunders spoke to Miller by phone about substantive changes to the speech. It is not clear, however, whether CNI officials received an actual draft of the speech for comment. While Saunders recalled having received an actual draft, Symes did not, and the emails that CNI produced to this office do not contain such a draft. After board members expressed concern to Symes that CNI's hosting the speech could be perceived as an endorsement of a particular candidate, CNI decided to have its publication The National Interest serve as the host and to have the event at the National Press Club. Kushner later requested that the event be moved to the Mayflower Hotel, which was another venue that Symes had mentioned during initial discussions with the campaign in order to address concerns about security and capacity. On April 25, 2016, Saunders booked event rooms at the Mayflower to host both the speech and the VIP reception that was to be held beforehand. Saunders understood that the reception, at which invitees would have the chance to meet candidate Trump, would be a small event. Saunders decided who would attend by looking at the list of CNI's invitees to the speech itself and then choosing a subset for the reception. CNI's invitees to the reception included Sessions and Kislyak. The week before the speech, Symes had informed Kislyak that he would be invited to the speech and that he would have the opportunity to meet Trump. When the pre-speech reception began on April 27, a receiving line was quickly organized so that attendees could meet Trump. Sessions first stood next to Trump to introduce him to the members of Congress who were in attendance. After those members had been introduced, Symes stood next to Trump and introduced him to the CNI invitees in attendance including Kislyak. Symes perceived the introduction to be positive and friendly but thought it clear that Kislyak and Trump had just met for the first time. Kislyak also met Kushner during the pre-speech reception. The two shook hands and chatted for a minute or two during which Kushner recalled Kislyak saying, We like what your candidate is saying, it's refreshing. Several public reports state that in addition to speaking to Kushner at the pre-speech reception, Kislyak also met or conversed with Sessions at that time. Sessions stated to investigators, however, that he did not remember any such conversation nor did anyone else affiliated with CNI or the national interest specifically recall a conversation or meeting between Sessions and Kislyak at the pre-speech reception. It appears that if a conversation occurred at the pre-speech reception, it was a brief one conducted in public view similar to the exchange between Kushner and Kislyak. The office found no evidence that Kislyak conversed with either Trump or Sessions after the speech or would have had the opportunity to do so. Simes, for example, did not recall seeing Kislyak at the post-speech luncheon, and the only witness who accounted for Sessions' whereabouts stated that Sessions may have spoken to the press after the event but then departed for Capitol Hill. Saunders recalled, based in part on a food-related request he received from a campaign staff member, that Trump left the hotel a few minutes after the speech to go to the airport. C. Jeff Sessions post-speech interactions with CNI. In the wake of Sessions' confirmation hearings as Attorney General, questions arose about whether Sessions' campaign period interactions with CNI, apart from the Mayflower speech, included any additional meetings with Ambassador Kislyak or involved Russian-related matters. With respect to Kislyak contacts, on May 23, 2016, Sessions attended CNI's Distinguished Service Award dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, D.C. Sessions attended a pre-dinner reception and was seated at one of two-head tables for the event. A seating chart prepared by Saunders indicates that Sessions was scheduled to be seated next to Kislyak, who appears to have responded to the invitation by indicating he would attend the event. Sessions, however, did not remember seeing, speaking with, or sitting next to Kislyak at the dinner. Although CNI board member Charles Boyd said he may have seen Kislyak at the dinner, Simes, Saunders, and Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of the National Interest, all had no recollection of seeing Kislyak at the May 23 event. Kislyak also does not appear in any of the photos from the event that the office obtained. In the summer of 2016, CNI organized at least two dinners in Washington, D.C. for Sessions to meet with experienced foreign policy professionals. The dinners included CNI-affiliated individuals, such as Richard Burt and Zalmay Khalilzad, a former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq, and the person who had introduced Trump before the April 27, 2016 foreign policy speech. Khalilzad also met with Sessions one-on-one separately from the dinners. At the dinners and in the meetings, the participants addressed U.S. relations with Russia, including how U.S. relations with NATO and European countries affected U.S. policy toward Russia. But the discussions were not exclusively focused on Russia. Khalilzad, for example, recalled discussing nation-building and violent extremism with Sessions. In addition, Sessions asked Saunders of CNI to draft two memoranda not specific to Russia, one on Hillary Clinton's foreign policy shortcomings and another on Egypt. D. Jared Kushner's continuing contacts with Simes. Between the April 2016 speech at the Mayflower Hotel and the presidential election, Jared Kushner had periodic contacts with Simes. Those contacts consisted of both in-person meetings and phone conversations, which concerned how to address issues relating to Russia in the campaign and how to move forward with the advisory group of foreign policy experts that Simes had proposed. Simes recalled that he, not Kushner, initiated all conversations about Russia and that Kushner never asked him to set up back-channel conversations with Russians. According to Simes, after the Mayflower speech in late April, Simes raised the issue of Russian contacts with Kushner, advised that it was bad optics for the campaign to develop hidden Russian contacts, and told Kushner both that the campaign should not highlight Russia as an issue and should handle any contacts with Russians with care. Kushner generally provided a similar account of his interactions with Simes. Among the Kushner-Simes meetings was one held on August 17th, 2016 with Simes' request in Kushner's New York office. The meeting was to address foreign policy advice that CNI was providing and how to respond to the Clinton campaign's Russia-related attacks on candidate Trump. In advance of the meetings, Simes sent Kushner a Russian policy memo laying out what Mr. Trump may want to say about Russia. In a cover email transmitting that memo and a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned a well-documented story of highly questionable connections between Bill Clinton and the Russian government, parts of which, according to Simes, had even been discussed with the CIA and FBI in the late 1990s and shared with the Independent Council at the end of the Clinton presidency. Kushner forwarded the email to senior Trump campaign officials Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick Gates with the note, Suggestion Only. Manafort subsequently forwarded the email to his assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes. Manafort was on the verge of leaving the campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with Simes and Simes ended up meeting Only with Kushner. During the August 17th meeting, Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information that he had promised. Simes told Kushner that redacted personal privacy. Simes claimed that he had received this information from former CIA and Reagan White House official Fritz Ermarth who claimed to have learned it from U.S. intelligence sources, not from Russians. Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or use to the campaign because it was, in Simes' words, old news. When interviewed by the office, Kushner stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about the Clintons given their long career as public figures and that he never received from Simes information that could be operationalized for the Trump campaign. Despite Kushner's reaction, Simes believed that he provided the same information at a small group meeting of foreign policy experts that CNI organized for sessions. End of section 6, recording by Lynn Jarrow.