 Okay, before going out to questions, I think we've got clearly a bit of a dispute here about the dispute resolution mechanism. So maybe just tease that issue out a little between David and Tom before we throw it open to the floor. So maybe David, you'd like to sort of start with responding perhaps to that, if you're familiar with that particular Romania-Swedan issue, or more generally some cases that have been brought up and that are quite controversial. Well, thank you, Dan, and if we should open to the floor, would I just like to make a couple of comments on what Tom said, because I think they're important. Firstly, on ISDS, Germany invented ISDS. The Germans invented the Bilateral Investment Treaty. They have some 1,200 bilateral investment treaties. They're the country's most heavily biggest user of that. Every single one of those agreements contains Investor to State Dispute Settlement Clause. Frankly, none of this was very controversial, and yes, there are some cases. There's the one you mentioned. I'm not familiar with the details, but there's the Wattenthal case against Germany on the Energie Verwendung, but which is taken under the Energy Charter, not under Bilateral Investment Treaty, but where German companies are also suing the German government because of investments they made in nuclear installations, which now will not be able to see the light of day. So there are occasional cases, but two-thirds of all ISDS disputes are won by governments. So there's no inherent bias in the system against governments. And the fact is that we are proposing very substantial modifications, in particular in terms of defining what is the perimeter of what cases can be taken. So under the new text proposed by the European Commission, for example, the Philip Morris case against Australia would not be admissible. And I believe that what the Americans are negotiating in the Pacific Deal is also a redefinition of the perimeter of ISDS to make it absolutely clear that government's right to regulate for the purposes of general public policy cannot be the subject of the Investor to State Dispute Settlement. It is exclusively dealt with the unfair discriminatory treatment of foreign investors. On the question of public services, this is an absolute non-problem. We are absolutely clear. We have said this for, I've been through this, with every trade negotiation we've ever had. All our trade deals contain clauses which say they are without prejudice to the right of governments to choose what they nationalize or what is provided through public provision versus private provision. The Americans are on the same line, and by the way, Mike Froman and Cecilia Malstrom issued a joint declaration before the summer clarifying this to deal with the speculation in the UK that somehow TTIP could challenge the existence of the National Health Service as a former trade negotiator. I can't even imagine how you would draw up such a trade agreement, but okay. So there were absolutely on record on both sides of saying that this will not, this trade deal cannot affect the decision of governments as to public versus private provision of services. On environment and labor, we are committed to a sustainable development chapter which will deal with environmental standards, will deal with labor standards, particular reference to the ILO. This is the practice both of ourselves and of the Americans, and I imagine we will continue it in our, in this deal. Finally, on the economic benefits of TTIP, there I agree with you, Tom. I'm not trying to oversell this. I'm not saying this is the magic bullet, the silver bullet. This is the solution to all our problems. No. I'm just saying it will add to our net economic wealth. It will add to job creation. Point to me, a trade deal that we have concluded in the last 20 years that did not do that. We have, all our trade deals have had net positive effects. With Korea, we've increased our exports to Korea by 35%. That's all I'm saying. I'm not saying this will be the solution to Ireland's economic difficulties. I'm just saying it will create new economic opportunities. It will create economic wealth. It will create new jobs. And it will be a net positive for both the Americans and ourselves. And finally, with the AFL-CIO, the American Trade Union, yes, I've had lengthy discussions with them. They're not opposed to TTIP. They have far fewer problems with TTIP than they do with the Pacific deal because they accept that we are a high wage, high labor standards, high environmental standards economy in Europe so they don't feel threatened. The big issue for the American trade unions as for the European trade unions, as for some members of the European Parliament, is this investor-state dispute settlement issue. But frankly, the suggestions I've seen coming from the AFL-CIO almost look like a carbon copy of what the Commission has proposed as a way of revamping and modernizing this mechanism to address some of the concerns of trade unions and civil society. Thank you. Just before giving Tom the opportunity to respond to that, could you just clarify that controversial case of Philip Morris in Australia? Did you say that that couldn't happen under TTIP? Because the reason it happened in Australia is being dealt with under TTIP? Yes. I mean, there is, under the existing ISDS provision, which is the Bilateral Investment Treaty, which the Philip Morris are using, the Australian government has mounted a very strong defense that it's a case which should not be retained. We're waiting to see what the arbitrators will say. In the meantime, faced with that case, we have already put into the Canada Agreement a redefinition of the scope of ISDS to make absolutely sure that there is no question of a company being able to take a case against a government for what is a matter of horizontal public policy and which is not a discrimination against foreign investors. And the Americans are doing exactly the same thing in the Pacific deal. So that loophole, if you like, which may or may not be accepted by the arbitrators in the case of Australia, has already been closed down in one of our agreements. And as I understand it, the Americans are working in the same direction in TPP because you will remember that Australia will be a party to TPP, and I think it was one of their insistences that that loophole would also be closed off in any new trade deal. Thank you. Anybody who wants to ask a question or make a point, please just indicate your interest at Tom. Just briefly on the principle of ISDS, it is that there would be an arbitration mechanism outside and over and above the national legal system, and that really raises a question about what is wrong with the national legal systems. Now, reference has been made to the principle of discrimination, for example, against European investors. But if we go down that route, we have to be very clear that where would these arbitration bodies be, where would they be accountable? Who would actually compose these structures? And what balance would there be between corporate rights, between citizen rights, workers rights? The burden of proof, it seems to me, is on those who are promoting ISDS as an essential component of a TTIP agreement. And that still remains an area of huge uncertainty. I mean, just to give one brief example, I mean, supposing a right, a comprehensive right in the full sense to collective bargaining was implemented in Ireland, which seems to be unique in regards to this, or the progress has been made legally in recent months. But if it became a comprehensive right and it was not open to constitutional challenge here, what if it was open to challenge under some provision of ISDS? This is not an unreal possibility. And it's ironic that if Germany was the country that more or less made ISDS, that in fact the Wattenfahl case came back to haunt and that when Germany decided not to proceed with nuclear energy provision there, that they were taken to task by Swedish company Wattenfahl. So I think there are still major issues and concerns here, and it strikes me that reform of ISDS is not the answer. It's to take ISDS away completely. Look, when Argentina nationalized Repsol, the Spanish petroleum company, there was no way that Repsol could go to court in Argentina to claim compensation for the seizure of their assets because it was legal under Argentinian law. They had passed a law enabling the government to nationalize the assets. What was the purpose of ISDS? The purpose of ISDS is not to force the Argentinians not to nationalize. It was to monetize the compensation which was due to a company who basically had had their assets stolen. That's because that's what it is, it's theft. And that is the issue. The example you cite of collective bargaining could never enter into the remit of ISDS because it is not a discrimination against a foreign investor. I'm very sorry, Tom, but I'm clear on this. This is only in situations where a foreign company has been manifestly discriminated against in a national jurisdiction where recourse to that national jurisdiction could not possibly give any satisfaction. And the outcome of the process is simply a monetization of the damage done. It is not to force the government to change the regulations or to go back on what they've decided. It simply says, has there been theft of assets or theft of market rights which otherwise would have been accrued to the company? So it's a process of putting a monetary value on a potential seizure of assets belonging to a foreign investor. And that is why it has always been considered an indispensable part of bilateral investment treaties because when you invest in foreign countries, you run certain risks, particularly those with unstable governments or unstable legal situations. Between ourselves and the US, I imagine it will rarely be used. But the issue arises, which to me is still extremely important, that if we don't have it in an agreement between ourselves and the United States, do we then have it with ourselves in China, with ourselves in Vietnam, with ourselves in Argentina, with ourselves in India? Where do we draw the line between what is a legal system that we feel we don't need ISDS for? And where do we say that a system does require ISDS? Isn't it much simpler to have an intelligent, revamped, modernized system of ISDS between the US and the EU, which can be the model which we would both then use in our dealings with third countries? OK, thank you. Let's open it to the floor.