 Welcome to a primer on joint all domain operations. I'm major Scott Vandewater from the May Center for Doctrine And I'll be taking you through some of the latest thinking on joint all domain operations or JADO a special Thanks to Dr. Mogan from half a3 for several of these slides Join all domain operations has been in the news a lot lately Many of our senior leaders are looking very closely at what the future of American War looks like As a result the joint staff has taken a special interest Into what some are calling joint all domain operations and the subset joint all domain command and control or JADC2 The term JADO at its surface calls for increased cooperation Across all of the war fighting domains as defined by joint doctrine that said what is a domain? There is presently no doctrinal definition of a domain Joint doctrine does provide a list of war fighting domains They include space, air, land, maritime and cyberspace, which is part of the information environment The electromagnetic spectrum is not technically a doctrinal domain But there have been several attempts to make it so with some efforts ongoing Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-99 defines joint all domain operations as actions by the joint force in multiple domains integrated in planning and Synchronized and executed at speed and scale needed to gain advantage and accomplish the mission comprised of air, land, maritime, cyberspace and space domains plus the electromagnetic spectrum EMS and Joint all domain command and control as the art and science of decision-making to rapidly translate decisions into action Leveraging capabilities across all domains with mission partners to achieve operational and informational advantage in competition and conflict Some have described these definitions as unsatisfying. So if you feel that way, you're not alone Ultimately JADO is trying to present a solution to some of the issues identified by the national security strategy With respect to the erosion of our national competitive edge Our adversaries have made asymmetric investments in A2AD complexes, which have challenged our ability to operate with impunity With the return of great power competition to our national consciousness. We have gained greater awareness of the challenges that lie ahead The preceding 20 years of low intensity conflict have led to an appreciation of the challenges We face in integrating capabilities across domains and across government due to factors such as operational timeline manpower intensive planning inflexible operational constructs bound by a high-level coordination and artificialities associated with administrative boundaries be they geographic service domain or US code title So what's the big deal? Didn't Goldwater Nichols already tell us to be joint and all domain? Join all domain operations is the next step in this evolution While we take the first few steps in JADO under the current operating paradigm Many believe that a much more significant change needs to happen to realize the ultimate vision modifications to the unified command plan joint command and control structures and Even the Goldwater Nichols Act have been called for in an effort to posture the DOD for the future That's a lot of change. So as all of this really new we've been doing operations across domain boundaries for centuries Why is what we're talking about now different? The critical insight to this question is in the increasing convergence of and fluidity between domains For simplicity, let's look at the air domain as an example Air capabilities are increasingly enhanced and dependent upon space cyber and land an Air platform must now address attack vectors from four other domains to assure its success Let's look at this in an analogy Historically, we've made some assumptions about our access and dominance across domains All of our domains have lined up alongside each other and so long as everyone stays roughly online We move forward into the battle space with minimal concerns about our cross-domain flanks Our adversaries have been developing a number of asymmetric capabilities Which have challenged our domain dominance in novel ways as a result we can no longer assume that our flanks are secure As an example, let's look at a suppression of enemy air defenses mission Historically our air forces red in the graphic have advanced on the enemy's surface-to-air missile capabilities blue and been successful Let us suppose however that our adversary has some EMS or cyber capability Green which is capable of affecting our air assets This intra domain flanking maneuver presents access to our squishy underbelly our dependence on other domains for mission success This is both a vulnerability and an opportunity The adversary is no less susceptible to intra domain attack though in many cases the character of their vulnerability may be different So purely for the purpose of this briefing. Let me outline some terms Keep in mind. These are descriptions which are useful for thinking but are non-doctrinal Intra domain means from one domain to the same domain Inter domain means from one domain into another and Trans domain and again for this briefing only means from one domain into another to achieve objectives in still another An example would be using EMS to jam a satellite which is critical to an RPA That is EMS to space yielding an air effect Another analogy our ability to dominate globally has been built on the back of the American taxpayer Since World War two we have leveraged the most exquisite capabilities and platforms across every domain and have created the equivalent of a military dream team as Our technology accelerates and our ability to sustain the remnant of the Cold War wanes. We are faced with a choice Continue to limp along a huge force or modernize a smaller one Jado presents a third option Create a miracle on ice type of joint force a more rough and ready less exquisite force where the strength lies in team synergies vice individual efforts This concept dovetails nicely into thinking in terms of systems rather than individual lines of effort Having teams capable of a deeper understanding of team dynamics and having a reflexive ability to make connections at speed and volume One of my all-time favorite quotes is all models are wrong some are useful by the mathematician George E.P. Box On the bottom of the slide are two models of the operating environment depicting the domains Right side in red and the environments The left side is from joint pub 5.0 the right side is from the Jado doctrine publication as Mentioned earlier agility between domains is a critical change in the operating environment Nations and their militaries are dealing with these changes in different ways The Chinese Communist Party for example along with some Russian elements are trying to limit and control the agility across domains and environments through things like social credit systems and leveraging analog communication systems The u.s. On the other hand has taken a much more permissive view and is attempting to accelerate Enhance and harness the agility enabled by technology in many ways. This is the central tension in two competing theories of victory Historically due to the cumbersome nature of inter and trans domain operations for simplicity among other reasons We have aligned our forces to domains and have oriented our seams along those lines So long as it our adversary does the same we meet principally in intra domain tactical competitions Some may say why have seams at all? This presents a logistics and coordination problem, which is as old as warfare without silos the number of planners For example, which would need to coordinate with one another becomes untenable and unmanageable Ultimately what jato intends to do is to orient the seams perpendicular to the adversary to allow the forces closest to the enemy to work seamlessly Pun intended with one another and to leverage one another strengths to expose adversary weakness and To prevent adversary exploitation of friendly seams One last model if our seams are tailored to have dissimilar structures This presents an even more challenging problem to the adversary as they attempt to find a seam Which is both accessible and exploitable in this final model tearing any one seam will leave a force Which is able to maintain its momentum and integrity and continue to fight while repairing the exploited seam Two critical points here some have asked what about our allies? Great point in the news recently in fact You can find evidence that our senior leaders are already thinking this way The Air Force and Army have agreed to work on what they're calling see jad C2 highlighting the need to consider our allies Additionally just as Russia and China are leveraging other parts of their governments to address great power competition Jato as a concept acknowledges the need for interagency cooperation and a need to coordinate and attain unity of effort when unity of command Is not attainable. This is particularly applicable when we talk about competitive activities short of war and gray zone activities So what are the main points? How might we operate under a Jato construct? The Jato concept is still in development, but the doctrine center has pulled six core ideas, which are applicable to operations today Centralized control decentralized execution through mission type orders. I want to be clear about something here This is nothing new that said we've created a system for the violent extremist fight Which runs counter to the decentralized execution portion? This return to the foundational premise of air power will allow Decentralized commanders to execute with disciplined initiative even if disconnected from higher headquarters Delegation of authority. I would like to pull an important thread on this This is not intended to be only decision authority But also authorities in the legal sense Due to the character of our ongoing conflicts the decision authority to utilize certain effects or even something as simple as target engagement Authority TA has been retained at arguably arbitrarily high levels To be effective against a peer or near peer competitor The joint force must have the ability to make decisions without halting to mother may I four or five echelons above sharing of information Information sharing has been an important part of operations across recorded history Often the sources of information are disconnected from the consumers of the same Linked only through higher headquarters who collect process exploit synthesize and disseminate that information In JADO as envisioned machine-to-machine communication coupled with automated synthesis Will enable our tactical edge to have the best possible battlefield picture even when disconnected from higher headquarters this may sound a bit like science fiction and We have a long way to go before this is realized at scale But ongoing efforts like the army's project convergence and the Air Force's ABMS system of systems The MDTF and the shadow operation center are working hard to enable sharing and processing of information at the tactical edge To enable our forces with the most up-to-date and relevant knowledge at the time of need Integrated planning Reflecting on the seams slide our current planning integration for air for example is Conducted at the JFAC or CFAC level and across an entire theater as a result integration with other domains Space cyber land etc is limited by the planning cycle and is often the first thing to drop when our planning elements are cognitive bandwidth limited Now let's take this to a major combat operation, which is global and scope and scale Conducting integrated planning across all domains globally is too large of a task for even the largest air operations center And you better believe that air operations center would be a high-priority target for an adversary if they have the chance to take it out As a result the vision for integrated planning resembles a more distributed model with integration taking place across domains at echelon rather than centrally Certain high-demand low-density assets would be centrally managed and forces would be assigned or attached to meet the needs of joint commanders Leading forces akin to those of a joint task force These joint task force commanders and their planners would ensure their forces were synchronized and Integrated to achieve their objectives risk identification and mitigation Risk across the force takes on many nomenclatures for some the terms risk to force and risk to mission are the two metrics To the air component. There is largely consideration for acceptable level of risk or ALR still further among cyber and space professionals measures like intel gain loss and Technical gain loss IGL and TGL are measures of risk While the JADO framework does not yet propose a common lexicon for risk and there are some existing joint risk frameworks The message in JADO is that our view of risk is generally very domain-specific and neglects risk Which we displace to other domains for example an ISR aircraft Which doesn't take off due to weather hasn't simply mitigated risk It is displaced risk to the ground force which decides to action its objective in spite of the lack of ISR support This inter-domain risk displacement is generally unaccounted for in decision-making The use of joint structures for command and control and force employment Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the 3-99 is titled the daff role in JADO for a very important reason We at Air Force doctrine cannot write joint doctrine in a vacuum as a result The doctrine as it is written will constitute a portion of the Air Force's submission to the joint force When it begins the process of codifying how the joint force will move forward with the service ideas on JADO and JADC2 Part of our entering argument is that we will need to be fighting in groups Which resemble joint task forces in order to accomplish the level of integration and synchronization These joint organizations will be more than coordination or liaison elements They will be the C2 which underpins our joint integration As we apply those principles through the lenses of the seven joint functions, we see four primary outcomes First and this one might sound familiar a Substantiated need for JADC2 structures Because as I mentioned the need for JADC2 structures is part of the hypothesis If we do not demonstrate their necessity to our joint partners We will not be able to achieve JADO as envisioned as a result an output of our approach must be the demonstration and Substantiation of a need for JADC2 Accelerate and increase the capacity to develop decision quality information If we intend to delegate authority and authorities to our leaders at echelon We need to provide them with the relevant information to make good decisions at a speed and scale appropriate to their circumstance as We look at the principle of information sharing and apply that through our seven joint functions We see this increase in capacity for decision quality information as an output Organize train and equip forces to converge in multiple domains in operationally relevant time frames This again speaks to an attempt to keep the lens of the daff role in JADO to a service perspective For the daff to contribute to JADO. We must OT&E forces to enable joint force convergence across domains Create dilemmas for an adversary Not only must our forces be posture to converge But we must also be postured to do so deliberately in an effort to create dilemmas for an adversary These dilemmas force the enemy to make a choice between too bad often equally bad courses of action One way of thinking about certain portions of JADO is to consider the explorer exploit tension The idea of explorer versus exploit comes from mathematics and can be thought of through the lens of a casino Imagine you have several slot machines lined up all with a certain chance of a payout How would you maximize the amount of money you have over time? I know some of you are probably thinking by walking away. Well, that's right in this case, but bear with me here In the case of these fictional slot machines with no knowledge You would start by trying each of them equally then as some seem to pay off more You would lean on them harder as you had a greater knowledge of the environment But you'd always have to leave some amount of room for experimentally finding out your theory was wrong This simplistic example solution does not have direct applicability to warfare. However, the concepts do Explorer exploit holds true in jam versus collect or destroy versus observe or launch versus hold on alert or Surge versus reconstitute Joint commanders can use knowledge of explore versus exploit to posture themselves across domains Appropriately to assume risk and to force package in ways advantageous to the phase of competition or conflict in which they find themselves The joint concept for operations in the information environment or J.C.O.I.E Arguees that the joint force must understand how to manipulate and leverage information and the inherent informational aspects of activities to send deliberate messages all Joint force actions written or spoken words or Displayed or related images have informational aspects that communicate some message or intent Which can be leveraged to support the achievement of joint force objectives The J.C.O.I.E. describes the construct of informational power IP as the ability to leverage information to shape perceptions attitudes and other elements that drive desired behavior and the course of events It established the imperative to operationalize and institutionalize the integration of information with traditional military physical power So where are we today? Across the joint force there is some uncertainty on where we're all headed The army published trade-off manual 525-3-1 Entitled the US army in multi-domain operations 2028 which is their guiding document the Marine Corps has force design 2030 and the Navy has a design for maintaining maritime superiority 2.0 Each of these speaks to how the services intend to interoperate in the future operating environment Largely independent of these efforts, the joint staff has put out a few classified documents in draft to include the joint concept for command and control And the joint warfighting concept which outlined many of the ideas previously discussed Together these documents begin to paint a picture of our future force The DAF role in JADO doctrine publication along with the AFWIC JADO and JADC2 concepts Supported by technological development and education Represent the Air Force's current trajectory in contribution to the larger DOD discussion If you would like to know more, please join our APAN website You can reach it at www.doctrine.af.mil slash jdo There you'll find multimedia resources to include videos and documents from around the joint force on related topics In addition, you can contribute to the discussion by registering with the site and contributing via posts Thank you for your time and attention. 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