 Great. Good morning, everyone. Thank you for joining us. We're delighted to have you here. Ambassador, I will tell you there were people here at 7.30 waiting to come in to hear you this morning. I questioned their judgment, too, but they're good friends. They're very close, personal friends, so I can say that. Welcome to all of you. We're delighted you're here. This is going to be a really interesting discussion. I had a chance to, I first met Ambassador Crocker, gosh, back in 2003 when you were at the very early days of the Provisional Authority, and of course his career, the last part of his exceptional career, was interwoven with the trajectory that we've taken as a nation in Iraq. We were very anxious to have him come because this is a topic that is mysteriously dropped off the pages of the newspaper. You're going to fix that, Bob. Here in Washington, we don't talk about Iraq anymore. Here we are seven months into this political trauma in Iraq, and we're just not talking about it. We've made an astounding investment as a nation in the political future of Iraq, and it just does not enjoy the discussion and debate it should have in our policy consciousness. This is a modest effort to try to fix that. We're very lucky to have Ambassador Ryan Crocker with us today. He's probably one of the most gifted ambassadors we've had. You know this because every time you've got an impossible situation, we'd send him in. This is the mark of one of the really gifted career ambassadors, and we're very fortunate that he served so ably for the United States, and of course he's now down at the Bush School in Texas, where he is going to do equally wonderful things, and we're very pleased that he was here. Nate is going to be the guy that's going to lead us and do the real introduction, but I wanted to say welcome to all of you, and a special thank you to you, Ambassador, for your remarkable service to America, and now your willingness to help all of us today. Thank you. Nate, why don't you get us started for real? Thank you, Dr. Hamry. Welcome to all. As you all may know, the military strategy forum, this type of event, is graciously sponsored by Rolls Royce North America. Through the forum, CSIS invites a variety of senior defense military and diplomatic leaders to offer their views on key defense-relevant issues impacting the country. These events always generate lively discussion and drawing together very diverse communities of interest and practice. Today's topic, Iraq and America's Future in Iraq, is no exception. As you're well aware, on the 1st of September this year, the United States officially ended its combat mission in Iraq, and is now focused on the more narrow mission of advising and assisting Iraqi security forces, prosecuting partner counterterrorism operations with the Iraqis, and protecting the United States government's ongoing civilian-led capacity building mission. A great many security challenges remain in Iraq, and by December 31st next year, the U.S. military presence will end there. While much has been accomplished in Iraq, those of us who watch it are well aware that the post-election government formation process appears headed for an eighth month of somewhat deadlock. Violence continues there as well. Iraq's political process may be producing also may be producing dangerous zero-sum outcomes, leaving both our commitment there and Iraq's future on uncertain ground. Today we're pleased and honored to have a keynote speaker, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who is well positioned to provide us all with key insights on Iraq's future stability and security. Take an opportunity to make yourself familiar with Ambassador Crocker's bio. I won't review it all, but let me highlight a few of the highlights for you here. Ambassador Crocker is now Dean and Executive Professor at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He is a five-time Ambassador and Chief of Mission serving in Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, Pakistan, and most recently Iraq. Ambassador Crocker was also dispatched to Afghanistan in January 2002 to reopen the American diplomatic mission there after the fall of the Taliban. In Iraq, Ambassador Crocker is credited with forging alongside senior American military leaders the kind of civil military design that was needed to help the Iraqis reverse their spiral into civil war. Ambassador Crocker's many awards and accolades include the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the Presidential Distinguished Service Award, the Secretary of State's Award for Distinguished Service, the Distinguished Honor Award and Award for Valor as well as DoD's Medal for Distinguished Civilian Service. As a credit to Ambassador Crocker's superb public service, Secretary Hillary Clinton established the Ryan C. Crocker Award for Outstanding Achievement in Expeditionary Diplomacy in 2009. Ambassador Crocker is a superb public servant who has served with great distinction through, as Dr. Hamry said, one of our most difficult periods in history, in our history. And we are very grateful to have him with us today. So please join me in welcoming Ambassador Crocker to the podium. Thank you. Thank you, Nate. Dr. Hamry, it's great to be back at CSIS. All I can say is that if people were here at 7.30 in the morning, it was because rumor had spread that once again CSIS was handing out Bloody Marys. I thank both John and Nate for a generous introduction. The truth is what I actually represent is what I call the doctrine of expendability. You know, if there is a dicey situation out there where it might work or it might not or more to the point that people you send out might come back or might not. This started back in Lebanon in 1990. The embassy had been closed for 18 months when I was asked to go reopen it. And basically what President Bush 41, for whom I am now working again, what he was saying was go give it a shot if it works great and if it doesn't, we won't have lost much. Well, any rock, if it doesn't work, we will have lost a very great deal. I will be, I hope, brief in my remarks, make this a dialogue, not a monologue. There is a lot of talent and expertise in this room. In addition, of course, to Tony Cordesman and others on the panel, we have some other Iraq vets that I was privileged to serve with. Ambassador Charlie Reese, Betsy Phillips, you can contribute at least as much as I can to an assessment of where we are and more importantly, a look at where we might be going. I like the title for this forum, Stability, Security and U.S. Policy, because it's all interconnected. And there is a certain amount of good news. There is a fair bit of security and stability, and that has been connected to, I think, the direction and weight of U.S. policy over the last several years, with some important continuity between administrations from Bush to Obama. But, as I have said in other fora, we need to understand that seven and a half years after the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom, we're still very much at the beginning of the story, or more to the point the Iraqis are at the beginning of their new narrative in their history. And for all of the extraordinary achievements that we've seen, the challenges, the list of challenges is even greater. Now, I know Tony Cordesman was there. Who else suffered through my remarks yesterday at lunch at the National Council on U.S. Arab Relations? Oh, thank God. So, Tony can go have a cup of coffee and I'll just give the same remarks again. It is relevant, because what I tried to do at the Council was kind of go through the challenges that are out in front of Iraq. Kurdish Arab tensions, which overlay or underlay unresolved institutional issues. How does a regional government relate to a federal government relate to provincial governments? On profound questions, we've seen it with hydrocarbons among the Kurds, but also the right of a regional government to raise and command forces. How do regional forces relate to the role of federal forces, command and control? Can regional forces operate outside their region with what mandate? These are fundamental states' rights issues. Just as they were unresolved in our society for a very long time and precipitated our most catastrophic war from 1861 to 1865, so too they are fundamental challenges to the development of, again, a stable, secure Iraq going forward. Huge issues of economic and social development. Problems with the integration of the Sons of Iraq, in many cases former insurgents. May they not be once and future insurgents, as the New York Times asserted last week. Problems of refugees internally displaced. Problems of a significant imbalance between civilian and military capacity. I noted yesterday the extreme criticism that the Bush administration received for the disbanding of the Iraqi security forces in 2003, and I won't go through the revisionism on that. Except to point out that with Iraq's new security forces, you are already seen as significant imbalance between their abilities, their cohesion, their organization, and those on the civilian side, not in favor of the civilians. So again, you have Iraqi military officers saying, why are we fighting and dying for our country just to let the civilians mess it up? Sentiments that have been heard a time or two in this country. But the principle of civil control over the military in America is beyond question. It is not beyond question in Iraq, and given Iraq's own history with the military and politics, this too, I think, is going to be a challenge of some significance going forward. And as one looks at what Prime Minister Maliki has done over the last few years, I think it puts a somewhat different light on some of his actions. He has been criticized for being overly dictatorial and in particular for establishing operational commands that report directly to him and not through the, excuse me, the chief of military staff or the minister of defense. Maliki's argument is that if civil control over the military is to have a chance in the new Iraq, the prime minister has got to find every way he can to ensure that he is in fact commanding Iraq's military forces, because the weight of Iraqi history is in the other direction. Now, the reason I give you this laundry list of challenges out there, and these are just the internal challenges, these are just some of the internal challenges. Another, for example, is the issue of disputed internal borders, the gerrymandering of Iraq that Saddam practiced to redraw provincial lines to reward allies and punish enemies. Kirkuk, of course, is the one that's best known, but it's not the only one. There is an issue, for example, between Anbar and Karbala. Saddam removed basically two-thirds of the province of Karbala and handed it to Anbar so that those rebellious shia would no longer be sitting astride the primary land pilgrimage route to Mecca. That's the district of Nuhayb in what is now eastern Anbar. The Karbalawees want it back. For Anbaris, them would be fighting words. Tell audiences in Texas that it'd be kind of like somebody saying that North Texas is now going to revert to Oklahoma, which actually in some quarters would be taken as a good idea. But these are existential issues in an Iraqi context, and they are unresolved. And overlaying all of this is a profound trust deficit. You see it in the negotiations for a new government. I've said on many occasions that if I were compelled to resort to only one word to describe Iraq, that word would be fear. As in Kananma Kiya's great book written before 2003, The Republic of Fear, Saddam used fear to dominate society at every level, down to within families where family members would fear being informed on by other family members. Iraq wrestles with that legacy today, compounded, of course, by the events and actions of 2003 and on. So they are wrestling with profoundly existential issues, and doing so in a climate that does not easily engender compromise or brokered solutions. It's all or nothing. It's you or me. There's a pithy little phrase out in that region. Two men, one grave. You or me. Where compromise can not only have negative political consequences, they can cause somebody to collect early on your insurance policy. So my mantra has been for quite a while. Iraq's hard. It's hard all the time. It's going to go on being hard. Well, that's kind of why. And you see this play out in the negotiations for the formation of a government. When the elections took place, I was asked in a TV interview the day after when I thought a government would be formed. You know, this was second week of March. I said maybe by the beginning of Ramadan, the reviewer was horrified. It would take five months. I was horrified too because I knew I'd been guilty of irrational exuberance. And so it plays out. You know, the 9189 Alawi-Maliki outcome virtually guaranteed the intense deadlock we've seen. I do think they will get there. My prediction is the next prime minister of Iraq is going to be the last prime minister of Iraq, Nurel Maliki. The question will be with what breadth of coalition against which set of concessions and political arrangements. Something we can talk about if you're interested. We should also talk about the region. I won't go around the horn on this, except to say that while Iraq's problems are profound in and of themselves, they are not left to be worked out of and by themselves. Iraq exists in a very tough region, a region that it did its best to make tough for so many years. Some of its neighbors see it as payback time. Iran is particularly problematic, and we can talk about that. Turkey has played a significant and broadly speaking positive role, but there are questions in Ankara and questions around Ankara about what Turkey's strategic orientation should be going forward. Is this the time Turks asked themselves to question Ataturk's strategic reorientation of Turkey when the state was created in the 1920s toward the west? I don't know how that will be answered, but it could have the most profound implications for NATO, for the United States, for Iraq, and for the region. Syria, again, a very interesting relationship with Iraq, almost to the point of hostility a year ago. They've walked back a bit, but the implications of the Iraq-Syrian relationship going forward also carry great weight. But let me turn to, I think, what the heart of our consideration is today, the U.S. and Iraq. I never spent a lot of time debating about or even thinking about should we or shouldn't we in 2003. We did. And PhD theses will be written for generations on the should we or shouldn't we. That's why you have PhD theses. I'm a newcomer to academia, and I'm groping for some logical reason to have PhDs at all. So maybe that's one. But in my work in Iraq and my consideration of Iraq subsequently, that isn't the question vis-a-vis Iraq. It's where do we go from here, and from here, of course, is a constantly moving point. As you know, we negotiated two agreements on my watch, the security agreement, and the strategic framework agreement. What that did was put in place an architecture for U.S.-Iraqi relations and also for transition from the Bush to the Obama administrations. Both agreements were publicly embraced by the Obama administration in its first months, and the Obama administration has followed those two roadmaps. The drawdown to 50,000 troops, of course, was not part of the security agreement. That was an Obama unilateral initiative reached by the end of August, at which point the president said, we are turning the page in Iraq. Well, I think most Americans saw that as closing the book on Iraq. As we noted at the outset, Iraq has kind of dropped off the screen, but it's still very much there. There were two polls conducted at the end of August, a CBS poll in the U.S. that found that 70% of Americans didn't want to hear about Iraq anymore, wanted to pull forces out, just wanted to be done. A poll conducted in Iraq came up with the same percentage, 70%, but 70% of Iraqis felt it would be a cataclysmic mistake for the U.S. to withdraw from Iraq. So where are we today? We're in a period of transition from a military lead to a civilian lead. I worry a great deal about that transition. I worry that what we're seeing is a transition from a military lead to no lead or military engagement to a tiny fraction of that engagement. Simply put, the capacity does not exist on the civilian side to take on the vast array of roles and missions that the military has so able performed in Iraq. Iraq was remissioned at the end of August from a combat to an advise and assist mission. In effect, there was nothing magic about August 31st, as you all know. That transition had been underway for a long time. It was underway before I ever left Iraq, as combat dropped to marginal levels. What our military was doing was very much on the advise and assist and not just in a technical military sense. U.S. Division North has been profoundly engaged in managing Arab Kurdish federal regional disputes. The whole notion of joint patrols was of course the U.S. initiative. I worry enormously about our capacity to carry on with these kinds of critical roles at a time when the Iraqis simply are not in a position to work these things out for themselves. They are moving in that direction but once again I think we see Washington clocks and Iraq clocks diverging. What do I think is likely to happen when there is an Iraqi government formed? I think that government is going to come to us and say you know that agreement on the withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011 that that idiot Crocker negotiated back in 2008. Let's re-look that. Let's look at a longer horizon and we'll have to figure out how to style it but basically we Iraq will need U.S. forces in country for a significant period of time not in a combat role but to give us two sets of assurances. Assurances among ourselves that you stand there as a guarantee that it isn't going to be one grave for two men, that no community, no party can be oppressed or worse for political reasons. You're our psychological guarantee that will allow us to go forward and develop the means and abilities to work out these profound political and social problems. The other is the guarantee in the neighborhood. Again, a rough neighborhood and a neighborhood in which by the end of 2011 Iraq will not have combat air power, will not have working air defense systems, will not have main battle tanks, will not have significant artillery, not a good situation to be in. We're moving ahead now with the procurement process but these are huge systems and as we all know you're talking about what 2013-2014 before they're fielded. So this is what I would anticipate that the Iraqis will come to us and ask for an extended U.S. deployed presence. I hope very much that when and if they do we will respond positively. Again, Washington clocks and regional clocks. When you look at the Iraqi region, particularly two of its more problematic neighbors, Syria and Iran, what you see is a situation in which both countries have not had a great couple of years in Iraq, particularly the Iranians. The decision of the Maliki government to stand up against the Iranian-backed Jai Shalmahti in 2008 was a game changer. The conclusion of our two agreements was done in the face of bitter Iranian opposition. The Iraqis, she as well as Sunni, said you know the more they don't like it the more we do. I mean it is a reminder that Iraq and Iran fought a bitter eight-year ground war and that Shia in this context manifestly does not equal Persian. So those fault lines of empire, of civilizations, of ethnicity, of history and language remain very profound. But the Iranians play a long game and part of the discourse now between Baghdad and Tehran is along the lines of the Iranians saying well looks like the Americans are leaving you know and guess what flash news we're staying. We've always been here we're always going to be here. So you better kind of redo your calculations figure out how badly you really want to piss us off because they're going to be gone and we'll be back and it is that long game. Our adversaries count on our strategic impatience count on us closing books while the story still goes on and that's what we see in Iraq to do so again I would suggest will be profoundly to our disadvantage as well as to the disadvantages of the Iraqis themselves. So I hope we will muster that patience. The administration has to set the course in the direction. Congress has to back it with necessary resources and frankly I'm not sure I see either of those things happening. So on that optimistic note we will now turn this into a dialogue. I'd like to have the Bloody Mary circulated and we'll get on with the day. Great what I just like to make a couple of points. Thank you very much Ambassador Crocker for the for your upfront remarks. There will be microphones back there if you could please raise your hand if you want ambassador if it's okay with you you can identify the the the questioner and we'll get a microphone up to you if you could clearly identify yourself upfront and keep your question very brief. Thank you. Michael Gordon New York Times Ambassador Crocker one of the probably the primary sectarian fault line in Iraq today is the Kurdish Arab set of issues that you alluded to. I'd like to get you your views on what you really think how involved the United States ought to be in trying to broker these a solution to these set of issues. There's an argument that the issues are not right for solution that nothing can be done until there's a new government that there has to be some will on those two sides on the other hand is we're providing weapons to the Iraqi army which could be weapons of instruments of intimidation vis-a-vis the Kurds main battle tanks and the like and it doesn't seem like American influence to address this conflict will be greater in the future as American forces leave and the checkpoints have been set up to deconflict conflicts are removed so we have ambassadors for the Middle East roving ambassadors for AFPAC there's no real equivalent for this set of issues even though it's a special representative what should the American policy be and how proactive should it should we be I think again that's why I led with it it's a clear example as to why our ongoing engagement is is essential you know I think increasingly we have to shift our engagement to the back room and we have that happened while I was there that doesn't mean we're less engaged it means we're less visibly engaged and we're not holding press conferences about our engagement but I have lost track long ago of how many discussions I had over the two-year period I was there aimed at trying to find ways forward between Arabs and Kurds between again regional and federal issues or at least trying to prevent things from getting worse you know and we had kind of many crisis after many crisis and were engaged in you know a huge majority of them I think we are an indispensable player on the Iraqi stage at this point Iraqis must take responsibility for their own actions and their own future yeah we all know that I got it but for some period of years that really isn't likely to happen without our engagement and sometimes it can be as simple as conversations I would have with Kurdish leaders particularly in the KDP when tempers were running high I'd say something like you know I'm trying to figure it out what were the very worst of times in modern Kurdish history in Iraq and you'd get a lively debate because there are lots of bad times to choose from generally it'd be a consensus around the on-fall campaign halabcha then I'd ask what are the best of times and no debate there right now baby today never had it so good you know security is excellent the economy is booming everybody's making money some of it legit but today's as good as it's ever been and then I'd say yeah you're right now don't blow it you know take a deep breath go sit under a tree look at at the sweep of your history and figure out a way to make this nascent federal process work for you and we're gonna have to keep on doing that you know we're not the only actor obviously the UN has played a very prominent role in the last couple of years trying to come up for example with some initiatives on disputed internal boundaries Stefan de Mistura and I both knew it wasn't gonna work but it it almost doesn't matter it's a process some problems just have to be managed until you can get to the point where solutions are possible but to keep problems from becoming crises management isn't just possible it's essential and I see us as again the indispensable crisis managers in this whole panoply of Kurdish Arab tensions and hope very much that we will continue to be both engaged and resourced for that engagement on down the line yeah said my name is Sayyed Ericat I'm with Al-Quds daily newspaper but until last May and for five years I was the United Nations spokesman in Iraq good CEO again sir and I remember we worked very hard on that 500 page report on the disputed territory you know I'm really quite distressed in this town ever since I came back because Iraq is really off the radar screen there's absolutely no serious discussion and if it wasn't for the diligence of someone like Tony Courtman there'd be actually nothing going on around town and I think there is with Iraq there's a great deal of disconnect between the current government and the Iraqi people there's been a great deal of failure by the United Nations in terms of getting programs out and affecting them and really implementing these programs it's a lengthy topic my question to you sir you said that the new Iraqi government would come to you and say we want to renegotiate the Soviet agreement and the agreement how do you revamp the presence how intrusive this presence should be how influential it ought to be to bring back some sort of a semblance of order to Iraq thank you very much and great to see you again good to see you and thank you for your service out there and some challenging times well again I mean if you're you know how do you bring order to Iraq you buy time I mean seven and a half years for America is an infinity in the development of a complex political order under conditions of great strain and violence it didn't very much at all so again we got agreements that gave structure to our relationship I'd like to see much more done on the strategic framework agreement for example you know that sets out the determination of both countries to develop relationships in the security in the non-security fields I'd like to see us both bear down with more diligence after the formation of an Iraqi government to make that meaningful trade in commerce education this is a tremendous opportunity I'll uh Eljubar said yesterday that there are 30,000 Saudi students in US universities by what I like to see 30,000 Iraqi students in US universities one thing that has hurt both countries over the years is there are relatively few very few Iraqi graduates of US universities in Iraq I think that hurts both the ability of both nations to understand each others it also has dampened Iraq's ability to pursue its own development so there are lots more things we can do to strengthen and deepen a US Iraqi ties outside of security but security will remain profoundly important for them and for us and you know the reason I expect they're gonna come and ask us for an extension of the agreement is because when we negotiated the damn thing in 2008 and I was pressing for conditionality that full withdrawal subject to conditions subject to review by both parties subject to a six-month assessment yada yada yada Maliki's position was this has to be absolute and unconditioned because that is the only way you take the occupation assertion out of Iraqi politics you know no Americans have never heard of the Treaty of Portsmouth 1948 between the UK and Iraq Iraqis know all about the Treaty of Portsmouth certainly Nuri Omaliki did because popular protests over the perception of Iraqi capitulations to the British in the security realm led to the downfall of Iraq's first Shia Prime Minister Nuri Omaliki didn't want to be the second Shia Prime Minister to be brought down over controversy over a security agreement with the Western power and he was right the security agreement passed with overwhelming support in the Iraqi parliament only the solder is supposed and even the solder has stopped talking about occupation but what Maliki said at the time was we're going to need you here for 10 or 20 more years and what we're going to do is come back to you about a year out and in a very different climate a very different political climate say let's relook at this that's why I think that's going to happen and as I said I think it is profoundly important that it does happen because that's what buys you I think the fundamental sense of internal and regional security that allows this difficult process of political compromise to move forward. John Alderman from CSIS it's good to see you again I wanted to draw on your experience both directly and directly with the Iranians it seems to me that one of the game changers for Iran is Iraqi oil production getting to really substantial levels that affects global oil markets and draws down the amount of money the government of Iran has at its disposal with its quite weak economy that gives the Iranians a tremendous incentive to disrupt Iraqi oil production before it really gets going to 6 million barrels a day 7 million barrels a day and on the one hand we in the Iraqis are trying to build something and the Iranians have a tremendous incentive to destroy something it's hard to for us to cooperate with the Iranians because we're trying to do all sorts of things to punish the Iranians from all directions so as you think through how we game dealing with the Iranian incentive to make trouble in Iraq in the context that it's hard for us to cut a deal with the Iranians because we're trying to pressure them on all sorts of non-Iraq related issues how do we approach that diplomacy? Yeah that's a it's a great question and very thoughtfully put underscores just how complex this particular dynamic is you know Maliki had part of the answer for that when we were doing the first round of negotiations on the PSAs the production sharing agreements his comment to me was we really want you guys over on our eastern border because if it's a US major the Iranians aren't going to mess aren't going to mess with you you know kind of an interesting observation and of course ExxonMobil is out there doing just that we'll see whether the Iranians mess with them or not you know the Iraqi philosophy for dealing with Iran by and large is kind of like the Iraqi philosophy for dealing with everything show strength first and then mop up the survivors so I think that that would be their answer be very assertive very direct in asserting the Iraqi interest in the full development of its oil sector you know they're highly ambitious goals to be up over 10 million barrels and show that you've got the the backbone the strength and the friends to get that done and then once that you've established that fact look for other ways and avenues you can signal that this isn't full jacket confrontation and you know Maliki does a I think a pretty fair job on that he has asserted himself against the Iranians but then as part of his regional swing he's in Tehran sees the leadership talked to Moqtada Sader and I don't know if anybody wants to take bets on what the half life of the endurance of that political alliance will be you move ahead because it is a complex relationship you know I think for Iraq the development of its oil sector has to be a non-negotiable imperative and I think they will look to us to to help back that up but then to signal there are other things that are negotiable there are other good subjects for dialogue and and let's have them in terms of our own relationship with Iran I think Iraq is not that subject at least not now I think Afghanistan is so it was encouraging for me to see the Iranians join the talks at the level of an MFA director general and I think as we take on the huge agenda we've got with the Iranians much of which is is highly confrontational we also want to continue to look for areas where we may be able to have a discussion that's conducted in lower decibels that subject in my view would be as it has been in the past Afghanistan Ambassador Viola Ganger from Bloomberg News what do you think it takes it would take in terms of U.S. political leadership either on the administration side or in terms of Congress to sell the idea of a more long-term robust U.S. presence in Iraq and how feasible do you think that is under the current political in the current political climate I think the administration primarily through the the vice president has sent that signal you know the vice president's personal engagement his multiple trips his regular phone calls the stream of Iraqi visitors through his office I think have all sent a very visible signal of high-level U.S. engagement and it's going to be important to sustain that moving forward to me it was it was quite interesting there were two major administration speeches in two days on Iraq the president's overall office speech and then vice president Biden's change of command speech the following day in Baghdad obviously carefully calibrated but strikingly different thrusts because the vice president's speech was all about engagement going forward I think that speech needs to be given again and again and again that's the administration's responsibility the the congressional responsibility is again to provide some focus you know I would like to see more committee hearings on Iraq but fundamentally resources for well articulated well defended administration requests and I really worry about the congressional will to do just that I worry a little bit about the way the administration structure its requests mercifully I'm not in that business anymore so nice to be in Washington as a visitor with no responsibilities but as we look at this transition there are elements of it that really concern me you know as you move from as you move to totally civilian security for example well masses of American contractors truly stunning security budget I would rather have seen the State Department do what it has done so well and so deftly almost everywhere else in the world which is present a proposal for the gradual erochization of security you know look I spent six years in Lebanon during a pretty tough time like a civil war our security both in movements and perimeter was always all Lebanese we never had incidents of guards turning on us absolutely loyal carefully vetted well trained and the benefit we got in situational awareness I mean these guys lived in that city they could tell you what was going on in the neighborhood and when you got to checkpoints how valuable is it to have people in your lead vehicle speaking the same language as the guys with the guns at the checkpoints so you know I think again it's just a small example except it's a small example that's got about a hundred and seventy five million dollar price tag attached to it for the first year we need some again creative imaginative well focused thinking on the part of the administration combined with a solid sustained public message close engagement with congress and for congress I think to take again a responsible attitude to support our long-term interests in Iraq which I would suggest are profound I think we have time for one more question okay hi Jennifer so from CNN the Pentagon's bracing for wiki leaks to release hundreds and hundreds of thousands of documents pertaining to the Iraq war what do you think we'll see out of those documents and are you concerned well you know I yeah I'm concerned about the whole wiki leak phenomenon you know I don't know what this stuff is going to say you know could I make the point for the record I was never there it wasn't me it's what I'd really be worried about in in this context where we're not fighting a hot war it's it's not the same set of issues in Afghanistan although there may be some carry over I'd really be worried if as looks to be the case you have Iraqi political figures named in a context or a connection that can make them politically and physically vulnerable to their adversaries you know that just has a utterly chilling effect on the willingness of political figures to talk to us not just in Iraq anywhere in the world and I think a hugely irresponsible step on the part of wiki leaks so just in a different sense than we saw in Afghanistan this too is going to put lives at risk needlessly and irresponsibly okay sir on behalf of all of us here at CSIS as well as Rolls Royce North America thank you very much for your thoughtful remarks today thank you