 Well, hello, this is Matt Goodman at CSIS in Washington, and I'm delighted to be with Mike Callahan at the Lowy Institute in Sydney. How are you, Mike? Good, Matt. Great to be with you. Good to be with you. I wondered, what's your view of the global economy at this point, and what do you think the big challenges and risks are, and how do you think the G20 plays a part in helping to address some of those challenges? Well, Matt, I think in terms of the global economy, you'd have to sum it up in the words of subpar and vulnerable and fragile. I think we've seen the IMF refer to it as a three-speed global economy. We have in the rapidly growing emerging markets, and their rate of growth is coming off, but we have to remember that they have contributed the main part of global growth. We then have some advanced economies that are doing okay, and in that is Australia and even the US. The US has signs of life in the US, although I think as we're just seeing the IMF managing director refer to it that the US has some self-inflicted wounds in terms of the extent of the fiscal contraction that comes, I put it, by the policy paralysis in the US. In the third speed, we have Europe, which is still in recession. The thing that concerns me, Matt, is that there's a degree of policy complacency here. If we look at Europe, it seems as if they will only respond if there's a crisis. The banking union, the movement for a banking union, 12 months ago they had emergency meetings, they were going to make some fast movement on having a banking union, and we're still waiting to see it develop. The other concern I have is that what I call it, we're in a macroeconomic policy experiment, particularly in terms of what we're seeing in the use of unorthodox monetary policy, the quantitative easing, and we don't know how this is going to end. I think the exit strategy is going to be very difficult, could be very messy, and it's going to require a great deal of good cooperation, international cooperation. That brings us to the G20. The G20, as we know, it has done well in terms of responding to the crisis, but one of the concerns I have is that it can be losing its focus. In a paper that I put out earlier in the year about relaunching the G20 and drawing lessons from the experience to date, they said that to use the expression from Bill Clinton's campaign to the presidency in 1982, it's the economy stupid. I think that's the same applies to the G20. It really has to focus, it has to focus on what are the global challenges, the economic challenges, those vulnerabilities and what's required to try and lift growth and achieve sustainable global growth. I think that really is the challenge, to be focused, but I'd be interested in your views, Matt, as the way you see the G20 shaping up. Well, thanks, Mike. I agree with almost everything you said, in fact, everything you said. I think the way you've characterized the global economy is exactly right. I think there are some signs of improvement, some countries that are doing better, including, I think, the US, which is notwithstanding the fiscal drag showing some signs of life on the private side of the economy, but with that substantial fiscal problem. Japan is showing some signs of life, and I'll come back to that in a second, in terms of your characterization of the monetary policy risk, and I think the emerging markets are, of course, doing better, though China's situation clearly growth has slowed in China, and there are some substantial strains in the economy and other aspects of the country, including environmental challenges and others, which I think are a source of concern. And then, of course, as you said, Europe, we are obviously in a challenging situation in Europe, and so I do think that the agenda is a very important one for the G20, and as you say, the G20 yet, as you say, the G20 has lost some momentum in the last several summits. I think there's been a loss of sense of common concern about these challenges and common commitment to deal with them, and I think the G20 does need to get back to a focus on those macroeconomic challenges and how the group can work together and in concert to try to address these challenges, and there has been a lack of focus and a bit of a distraction from issues that are not quite at the core of that agenda. I think it's a challenging time, and I think the G20 really still plays a very important role in bringing together the major economies to try to take on these issues. Yes, I agree very much with you there, Matt. In terms of when you say the G20, it's lost a bit of its common resolve, common interest. I keep saying the world economy is no less integrated now than it was in 2008 when it faced the crisis. In terms of Japan, if we use Prime Minister Abe's analogy, that third arrow, the structural reform, is the most important one. That's where the growth is going to come from. Well, I think you're right. There is a very active array of regional discussions going on in trade and finance, and whether it's APEC or the East Asia Summit or some of the bilateral or mini-lateral arrangements that are being negotiated. And I think all of that is very, on one level, very complicated and complex, and there are concerns expressed about a sort of spaghetti bowl of different arrangements that's being established here. I think on some level it's inevitable in a place as complex as the Asia Pacific that you're going to have an array of different approaches, and it's going to be very hard to get one template for regional integration for the time being. And so I think all of these things can coexist, but I think a better coordination of efforts would be very helpful. And I think both on the trade and the finance side, I think over time there are these two big trade arrangements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which the US and Australia are both participating in. And then there's the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which brings together the ASEAN countries, the 10 Southeast Asian countries with, again, Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, Korea, China, but not the United States, and that arrangement hasn't really gotten off the ground yet. But I think the two things that are sometimes seen as in conflict or mutually exclusive. In fact, I think actually they could be compatible. And I think everyone should be thinking about how do we start to bring these arrangements together? How do we make them interoperable, at least? And here's where I go back to your point about the G20. I agree with you that as host of the G20 and a participant in all of those arrangements I mentioned, I think Australia has a very important opportunity here in 2014 to help bring some of these strands together. Again, about half of the, in fact, I think it's exactly 10 of the 20 G20 countries are Asia Pacific countries. And I think there's a particular Asia Pacific dimension that Australia could bring to the conversation next year in Brisbane. And there's a lot of devil in the detail there, but I think as a theme that that would be something that Australia should be thinking about. And I hope the Lowy Institute, I'm sure the Lowy Institute is giving a lot of thought to that now as you shape the agenda for Australia next year. And I look very much forward to seeing how those plans unfold. But I think this has been a very interesting conversation, Mike. I've enjoyed it and enjoyed talking to you and look forward again to hearing about Australia's plans for the G20 in 2014. Thanks very much, Matt. Great talking to you. Good to talk to you. Thanks.