 Question 55 of Summa Theologica, Paras Prima on the Angels and on the Six Days. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Paras Prima on the Angels and on the Six Days by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 55 of the Medium of the Angelic Knowledge. Next in order, the question arises as to the Medium of the Angelic Knowledge. Under this heading, there are three points of inquiry. Do the Angels know everything by their substance or by some species? If by species, is it by co-natural species or is it by such as they have derived from things? And do the higher Angels know by more universal species than the lower Angels? First article, whether the Angels know all things by their substance. Objection 1, it would seem that the Angels know all things by their substance. For Dionysius says that the Angels, according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are happening upon earth. But the Angels nature is his essence, therefore the Angel knows things by his essence. Objection 2, further, according to the philosopher, in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same as the object understood. But the object understood is the same as the one who understands it as regards that whereby it is understood. Therefore, in things without matter such as the Angels, the medium whereby the object is understood, is the very substance of the one understanding it. Objection 3, further, everything which is contained in another is there according to the mode of the container. But an Angel has an intellectual nature, therefore whatever is in him is there in an intelligible mode. But all things are in him because the lower orders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the lower, participatively. And therefore Dionysius says that God enfolds the whole in the whole, that is, all in all. Therefore the Angel knows all things in his substance. On the contrary, Dionysius says that the Angels are enlightened by the forms of things. Therefore they know by the forms of things and not by their own substance. I answer that the medium through which the intellect understands is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form because it is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is that in things which are corruptible the form does not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter because the potentiality of the matter extends to more things that are contained under this or that form. But the intellect of power of the Angel extends to understanding all things because the object of the intellect is universal being or universal truth. The Angel's essence however does not comprise all things in itself since it is an essence restricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the divine essence which is infinite simply and perfectly to comprise all things in itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by his essence but an Angel cannot know all things by his essence and his intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things. Reply to Objection 1. When it is said that the Angel knows things according to his own nature the words according to does not determine the medium of such knowledge since the medium is the similitude of the thing known but they denote the knowing power which belongs to the Angel of his own nature. Reply to Objection 2. As the sense enact is the sensible enact as stated in Deonima not so that the sensitive power is the sensible object's likeness contained in the sense but because one thing is made from both as from act and potentiality so likewise the intellect enact is said to be the thing understood enact not that the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it understands but because that similitude is its form. Now it is precisely the same thing to say in things which are without matter the intellect is the same thing as the object understood as to say that the intellect enact is the thing understood enact for a thing is actually understood precisely because it is immaterial. Reply to Objection 3. The things which are beneath the Angel and those which are above him are in a measure in his substance not indeed perfectly nor according to their own proper formality as the Angel's essence as being finite is distinguished by its own formality from other things but according to some common formality yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in God's essence as in the first and universal operative power from which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything therefore God has a proper knowledge of all things by his own essence and this the Angel has not but only a common knowledge. Second article whether the Angels understand by species drawn from things Objection 1. It would seem that the Angels understand by species drawn from things where everything understood is apprehended by some likeness within him who understands it but the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar so that the likeness is the cause of the thing or else by way of an image so that it is caused by such thing all knowledge then of the person understanding must either be the cause of the object understood or else caused by it now the Angels knowledge is not the cause of existing things that belongs to the divine knowledge alone therefore it is necessary for the species by which the Angelic mind understands to be derived from things Objection 2. Further the Angelic light is stronger than the light of the active intellect of the soul but the light of the active intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms therefore the light of the Angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things so there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the Angel understands through species drawn from things Objection 3. Further the species in the intellect are indifferent to what is present or distant except insofar as they are taken from sensible objects therefore if the Angel does not understand by species drawn from things his knowledge would be indifferent as to things present and distant and so he would be moved locally to no purpose on the contrary Dionysius says that the Angels do not gather their divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible I answer that the species whereby the Angels understand are not drawn from things but are co-natural to them for we must observe that there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances the highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully perfected by the form whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by the form but receives from some agent now one form now another in like fashion also the lower intellectual substances that is to say human souls have a power of understanding which is not naturally complete but is successively completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things but in the higher spiritual substances that is the Angels the power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species insofar as they have such species co-natural to them so as to understand all things which they can know naturally the same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances the lower spiritual substances that is souls have in nature akin to a body insofar as they are the forms of bodies and consequently from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies and through bodies otherwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose on the other hand the higher substances that is the Angels are utterly free from bodies and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible outpouring whereby they received from God the species of things known together with their intellectual nature hence Augustine says the other things which are lower than the Angels are so created that they first receive existence in the knowledge of the rational creature and then in their own nature replied to objection one there are images of creatures in the Angels mind not indeed derived from creatures but from God who is the cause of creatures and in whom the likenesses of creatures first exist hence Augustine says that as the type according to which the creature is fashioned is in the word of God before the creature which is fashioned so the knowledge of the same type exists first in the intellectual creature and is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature replied to objection two to go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to pass through the middle now the nature of a form in the imagination which form is without matter but not without material conditions stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and from material conditions consequently however powerful the Angelic mind might be it could not reduce material forms to an intelligible condition except it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined forms which is impossible since the Angel has no imagination as was said above even granted that he could abstract intelligible species from material things yet he would not do so because he would not need them for he has conatural intelligible species replied to objection three the Angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what is near or distant nevertheless his local movement is not purposeless on that account for he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring knowledge but for the purpose of operation third article whether the higher Angels understand by more universal species than the lower Angels objection one it would seem that the higher Angels do not understand by more universal species than the lower Angels for the universal seemingly is what is abstracted from particulars but Angels do not understand by species abstracted from things therefore it cannot be said that the species of the Angelic intellect are more or less universal objection two further whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known than what is known generically to know anything generically is in a fashion midway between potentiality and act if therefore the higher Angels know by more universal species than the lower it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower which is not befitting objection three further the same cannot be the proper type of many but if the higher Angel knows various things by one universal form by several special forms it follows that the higher Angel uses one universal form for knowing various things therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each which seems unbecoming on the contrary Dionysius says that the higher Angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower and in Decausius it is said that the higher Angels have more universal forms that for this reason are some things of a more exalted nature because they are nearer to and more like unto the first which is God now in God the whole plentitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in one thing that is to say in the divine essence by which God knows all things this plentitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a lower manner and less simply consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what God knows by one and by so many forms the more according as the intellect is lower thus the higher the Angel is by so much the fewer species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects therefore his forms must be more universal each one of them as it were extending to more things an example of this can in some measure be observed in ourselves for some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible truth unless it be explained to them in every part and detail this comes of their weakness of the intellect while there are others of stronger intellect who can grasp many things from few reply to objection one it is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from particulars insofar as the intellect knowing it derives its knowledge from things but if there be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from things the universal which it knows will not be abstracted from things but in a measure will be pre-existing to them either according to the order of causality as the universal ideas of things are in the word of God or at least in the order of nature as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind reply to objection two to know anything universally can be taken in two senses in one way on the part of the thing known namely that only the universal nature of the thing is known to know a thing thus is something less perfect for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of a man who only knew him to be an animal in another way on the part of the medium of such knowledge in this way it is more perfect to know a thing in the universal for the intellect which by one universal medium can know each of the things which are properly contained in it is more perfect than one which cannot reply to objection three the same cannot be the proper and adequate type of several things but if it be eminent then it can be taken as the proper type and likeness of many just as in man there is a universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues which can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity and in the fox to acts of wariness and so on of the rest the divine essence on account of its eminence is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each thing contained therein hence each one is likened to it according to its proper type the same applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the angel so that on account of its excellence many things can be known through it with a proper knowledge the end of question 55 question 56 of the sumo theologica paris prima on the angels and on the six days this is a LibraVox recording all LibraVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibraVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy sumo theologica paris prima on the angels and on the six days by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 56 of the angels knowledge of immaterial things we now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the objects known by them we shall treat of their knowledge first of immaterial things secondly of things material under the first heading there are three points of inquiry does an angel know himself does one angel know another and does the angel know God does not know his own natural principles first article whether an angel knows himself objection one it would seem that an angel does not know himself for Dionysia says that the angels do not know their own powers but when the substance is known the power is known therefore an angel does not know his own essence objection two further an angel is a single substance otherwise he would not act belong to single substances but nothing single is intelligible therefore since the angel possesses only knowledge which is intellectual no angel can know himself objection three further the intellect is moved by the intelligible object because as stated in Dionysia understanding is a kind of passion but nothing is moved by or is passive to itself as appears in corporeal things therefore the angel cannot understand himself on the contrary Augustine says that the angel knew himself when he was established that is enlightened by truth I answer that as is evident from what has been previously said the object is on a different footing in an imminent and in a transient action in a transient action the object or matter into which the action passes is something separate from the agent as the thing heated is from what gave it heat and the building from the builder whereas in an imminent action for the action to proceed the object must be united with the agent just as the sensible object must be in contact with sense in order that sense may actually perceive and the object which is united to a faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the form which is the principle of action and other agents for as heat is the formal principle of heating in the fire so is the species of the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye it must however be born in mind that this image of the object exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty there is only knowledge in potentiality and in order that there may be actual knowledge it is required that the faculty of knowledge be actuated by the species but if it always actually possesses the species it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding change or reception from this it is evident that it is not of the nature of knower as knowing by the object but as knowing in potentiality now for the form to be the principle of the action it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something else or self-subsisting because heat would give forth heat nonetheless if it were self-subsisting then it does by inhering in something else so therefore if in the order of intelligible beings there be any subsisting intelligible form it will understand itself and since an angel is immaterial he is a subsisting form and consequently he is actually intelligible hence it follows that he understands himself by his form which is his substance reply to objection one that is the text of the old translation which is amended in the new one thus furthermore they that is to say the angels knew their own powers instead of which the old translation read and furthermore they do not know their own powers although even the letter of the old translation might be kept in this respect that the angels do not know their own power perfectly according as it proceeds from the order of the divine wisdom which to the angels is incomprehensible reply to objection two we have no knowledge of single corporeal things not because of their particularity but on account of the matter which is their principle of individuation accordingly if there be any single thing subsisting without matter as the angels are there is nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible reply to objection three it belongs to the intellect in so far as it is in potentiality to be moved and to be passive hence this does not happen in the angelic intellect especially as regards the fact that he understands himself besides the action of the intellect is not of the same nature as the action found in corporeal things which passes into some other matter second article whether one angel knows another objection one it would seem that one angel does not know another for the philosopher says that if the human intellect were to have in itself any one of the sensible things then such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending external things as likewise if the pupil of the eye were colored with some particular color it could not see every color but as the human intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things so is the angelic mind for understanding immaterial things therefore since the angelic intellect has within itself someone determinant nature from the number of such natures it would seem that it cannot understand other natures objection two further is stated in Decauses that every intelligence knows what is above it in so far as it is caused by it and what is beneath it in so far as it is its cause but one angel is not the cause of another therefore one angel does not know another objection three further one angel cannot be known to another angel by the essence of the one knowing because all knowledge is affected by way of consciousness but the essence of the angel knowing is not the essence of the angel known except generically as is clear from what has been said before hence it follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of another but only a general knowledge in like manner it cannot be said that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known because that whereby the intellect understands is something within the intellect and can penetrate the mind again it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species because that species would not differ from the angel understood since each is immaterial therefore in no way does it appear that one angel can understand another objection four further if one angel did understand another this would be either by an innate species and so what would follow that if God were now able to create another angel such an angel could not be known by the existing angels where else he would have to be known by a species drawn from things and so it would follow that the higher angels could not know the lower from whom they receive nothing therefore in no way does it seem that one angel knows another on the contrary we read in day causes that every intelligence knows the things which are not corrupted I answer that as Augustine says such things as pre-existed from eternity in the word of God came forth from him in two ways first into the angelic mind and secondly so as to subsist in their own natures they proceeded into the angelic mind in such a way that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the things which he produced in their own natural being now in the word of God from eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal things but likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures so in every one of these spiritual creatures the forms of all things both corporeal and spiritual were impressed by the word of God yet so that in every angel there was impressed the form of his own species according to both its natural and its intelligible condition so that he should subsist in the nature of his species and understand himself by it while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed in him only according to their intelligible natures so that by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual creatures reply to objection one the spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from one another in a certain order as was already observed so the nature of an angel does not hinder him from knowing the other angelic natures since both the higher and lower bear affinity to his nature the only difference being according to their various degrees of perfection reply to objection two the nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel to know another except on account of likeness so far as cause and effect are alike therefore if likeness without causality be admitted in the angels this will suffice for one to know another reply to objection three one angel knows another by the species of such angel existing in his intellect which differs from the angel whose image it is not according to material and immaterial nature but according to natural and intentional existence the angel is himself a subsisting form in his natural being but his species in the intellect another angel is not so for there it possesses only an intelligible existence as the form of color on the wall has a natural existence but in the different medium it has only intentional existence reply to objection four God made every creature proportionate to the universe which he determined to make therefore had God resolved to make more angels or more natures of things he would have impressed more intelligible species in the angelic minds as a builder who if he had intended to build a larger house would have made larger foundations hence for God to add a new creature to the universe means that he would add a new intelligible species to an angel third article whether an angel by his own natural principles objection one it would seem that the angels cannot know God by their natural principles for Dionysius says that God by his incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds afterwards he adds that since he is above all substances he is remote from all knowledge objection two further God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel but what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached therefore it appears that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles objection three further it is written we see now through a glass in a dark manner but then face to face from this it appears that there is a twofold knowledge of God the one whereby he is seen in his essence according to which he is seen face to face the other whereby he is seen in the mirror of creatures as was already shown an angel cannot have the former knowledge by his natural principles nor does vision through a mirror belong to the angels since they do not derive their knowledge of God from sensible things as Dionysius observes therefore the angels cannot know God by their natural powers on the contrary the angels can have knowledge than men yet men can know God through their natural principles according to Romans what is known of God is manifest in them therefore much more so can the angels I answer that the angels can have some knowledge of God by their own principles in evidence whereof it must be born in mind that a thing is known in three ways its essence in the knower as light can be seen in the eye and so we have said that an angel knows himself secondly by the presence of its similitude in the power which knows it as a stone is seen by the eye from its image being in the eye thirdly when the image of the object known is not drawn directly from the object itself but from something else in which it is made to appear when we behold a man in a mirror to the first name class that knowledge of God is likened by which he is seen through his essence and knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural principles as was said above the third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know God while we are on earth by his likeness reflected in creatures according to Romans the two things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made hence too we are said to see God in a mirror but the knowledge whereby according to his natural principles the angel knows God stands midway between these two and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is seen through the species abstracted from it for since God's image is impressed by the very nature of the angel in his essence the angel knows God in as much as he is the image of God yet he does not behold God's essence because no created likeness is sufficient to represent the divine essence such knowledge then approaches rather to the specular kind because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the divine image reply to objection one Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of comprehension as his words expressly state in this way God is not known by any created intellect reply to objection two since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely remote from God it follows that he cannot comprehend him nor can he see God's essence through his own nature but it does not follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of him at all because as God is infinitely remote from the angel so the knowledge which God has of himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has of him reply to objection three the knowledge which an angel has of God is midway between these two kinds of knowledge nevertheless it approaches more as was said above the end of question 56 question 57 of Summa Theologica Parse Prima on the angels and on the six days this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Parse Prima on the angels and on the six days by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 57 of the angels knowledge of material things we next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels under this heading there are five points of inquiry whether the angels know the natures of material things whether they know single things whether they know the future whether they know secret thoughts and whether they know all mysteries of grace first article whether the angels know material things Objection one it would seem that the angels do not know material things for the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it but material things are not be the perfections of angels since they are beneath them therefore the angels do not know material things Objection two further intellectual vision is only of such things as exist within the soul by their essence as is said in the gloss taken from Augustine but the material things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul nor into the angels mind therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision but only by imaginary vision whereby the images of bodies are apprehended and by sensible vision which regards bodies in themselves now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels but only intellectual therefore the angels cannot know material things Objection three further material things are not actually intelligible but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination which does not exist in the angels therefore angels do not know material things on the contrary whatever the lower power can do the higher can do likewise but man's intellect which in the order of nature is inferior to the angels can know material things therefore much more can the mind of an angel I answer that the established order of things is for the higher beings to be more perfect than the lower and for whatever is contained efficiently, partially and in manifold manner in the lower beings to be contained in the higher eminently and in a certain degree of fullness and simplicity therefore in God as in the highest source of things all things pre-exist super substantially in respect of his simple being itself as Dionysia says but among other creatures the angels are nearest to God and resemble him more hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the divine goodness as Dionysia says consequently all material things pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in themselves yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly in God now whatever exists in any subject is contained in it after the manner of such subject but the angels are intellectual beings of their own nature therefore as God knows material things by his essence so do the angels know them for as much as they are in the angels by their intelligible species reply to objection one the thing understood is the perfection the one who understands by reason of the intelligible species which he has in his intellect and thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect reply to objection two sense does not apprehend the essences of things but only their outward accidents in like manner neither does the imagination for it apprehends only the images of bodies the intellect alone apprehends the essences of things and so it is said that the object of the intellect is what a thing is regarding which it does not err as neither does sense regarding its proper sensible object so therefore the essences of material things are in the intellect of man and angels as the thing understood is in him who understands and not according to both natures but some things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures and in either case there is intellectual vision reply to objection three if an angel were to draw his knowledge of material things from the material things themselves he would require to make them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction but he does not derive his knowledge of himself he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things which species are co-natural to him just as our intellect has by species which it makes intelligible by abstraction second article whether an angel knows singulars objection one it would seem that angels do not know singulars for the philosopher says the sense has for its object but the intellect universals now in the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual power as is evident from what was said above consequently they do not know singulars objection two further all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of the knower to the object known but it is not possible for any assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object as far as it is singular because as was observed above an angel is immaterial while matter is the principle of singularity therefore the angel cannot know singulars objection three further if an angel does know singulars it is either by singular or by universal species but it is not by singular species because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of species nor is it by universal species since the universal is not the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such because singular things are not known in the universal except potentially therefore the angel does not know singulars on the contrary no one can guard what he does not know but angels guard individual men according to the psalms he hath given his angels charge over by consequently the angels know singulars I answer that some have denied to the angels all knowledge of singulars in the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels according to Hebrews they are all ministering spirits now if they had no knowledge of singulars they could exercise no provision over what is in this world since acts belong to individuals and this is against the text of Ecclesiastes say not before the angel there is no providence secondly it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy according to which the angels are stated to be the movers of the heavenly spheres and to move them according to their knowledge and will consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of singulars but in their universal causes to which all particular effects are reduced as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens this opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications because to know a singular merely in its universal causes is not to know it as singular that is as it exists here and now the astronomer knowing from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to happen knows it in the universal yet he does not know it as taking place now except by the senses but administration, providence and movement are of singulars as they are here and now existing therefore it must be said differently that as man by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes of things apprehending universals and immaterial things by his intellect and things singular and corporeal by the senses so an angel knows both by his one mental power for the order of things runs in this way that the higher a thing is so much the more is its power united and far reaching thus in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than the proper sense although it is but one faculty knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses and some other things which no outer sense knows for example the difference between white and sweet the same is to be observed in other cases accordingly since an angel is above man in the order of nature it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one his powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge namely the intellect does not know hence Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord which is known to us should be unknown to God the manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered from this that as things proceed from God in order that they may subsist in their own powers so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in the angelic mind now it is clear that there comes forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of individuation since he is the cause of the entire substance of the thing as to both its matter and its form and for as much as he causes does he know for his knowledge is the cause of the thing as was shown about therefore as by his evidence by which he causes all things God is the likeness of all things and knows all things not only as to their universal natures but also as to their singularity so through the species imparted to them do the angels know things not only as to their universal nature but likewise in their individual conditions in so far as they are the manifold representations of that one simple essence reply to objection one the philosopher is speaking of our intellect which apprehends only by a process of abstraction and by such abstraction from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of the angels and above and consequently there is no comparison reply to objection two it is not according to their nature that the angels are likened to material things as one thing resembles another by agreement in genus species or accident but as the higher bears resemblance to the lower as the sun does to fire even in this way there is in God a resemblance of all things matter and form in so far as there pre-exists in him as in its cause whatever is to be found in things for the same reason the species in the angels intellect which are images drawn from the divine essence are the images of things not only as to their form but also as to their matter reply to objection three angels know singulars by universal forms which nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal and as to their individuating principles how many things can be known by the same species has been already stated above third article whether angels know the future objection one it would seem that the angels know future events for angels are mightier in knowledge than men but some men know many future events therefore much more do the angels objection two further the present and the future are differences of time but the angels intellect is above time because as he said in Decalces an intelligence keeps pace with eternity that is av eternity therefore to the angels mind past and future are not different but he knows each indifferently objection three further the angel does not understand by species derived from things but by innate universal species but universal species refer equally to present past and future therefore it appears that the angels know indifferently things past present and future objection four further as the thing is spoken of as distant by reason of time so it is by reason of place but angels know things which are distant according to place therefore they likewise know things distant according to future time on the contrary whatever is the exclusive sign of the divinity does not belong to the angels but to know future events is the exclusive sign of the divinity according to Isaiah show the things that are to come here after and we shall know that ye are gods therefore the angels do not know future events I answer that the future can be known in two ways first it can be known in its cause and thus future events which proceed necessarily from their causes are known with sure knowledge as that the sun will rise tomorrow but events which proceed from their causes in the majority of cases are not known for certain but conjecturally thus the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient this manner of knowing future events exists in the angels and by so much more than it does in us as they understand the causes of things both more universally and more perfectly thus doctors who penetrate more deeply into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a sureer verdict on the future issue thereof but events which proceed from their causes in the minority of cases are quite unknown such as casual and chance events in another way future events are known in themselves to know the future in this way belongs to God alone and not merely to know those events which happen of necessity or in the majority of cases but even casual and chance events where God sees all things in his eternity which being simple is present to all time and embraces all time therefore God's one glance is cast over all things which happen to all time as present before him and he beholds all things as they are in themselves as was said before when dealing with God's knowledge but the mind of an angel and every created intellect fall far short of God's eternity hence the future as it is in itself cannot be known by any created intellect reply to objection one men cannot know future things what causes or by God's revelation the angels know the future in the same way but much more distinctly reply to objection two although the angels intellect is above that time according to which corporeal movements are reckoned yet there is a time in his mind according to the succession of intelligible concepts of which Augustine says that God moves the spiritual creature according to time and thus since there is succession in the angels intellect not all things that happen through all time are present to the angelic mind reply to objection three although the species in the intellect of an angel in so far as they are species refer equally to things present past and future nevertheless the present past and future do not bear the same relations as the species present things have a nature according to which they resemble the species in the mind of an angel and so they can be known thereby things which are yet to come have not yet a nature whereby they are likened to such species consequently they cannot be known by those species reply to objection four things distant according to place are already existing in nature and share in some species the angel whereas this is not true of future things as has been stated consequently there is no comparison fourth article whether angels know secret thoughts objection one it would seem that the angels know secret thoughts for Gregory explaining Job gold or crystal cannot equal it says that then namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself and when once the mind of each is seen his conscience will at the same time be penetrated but those who rise shall be like the angels as is stated therefore an angel can see what is in another's conscience objection to further intelligible species bear the same relation to the intellect as shapes do to bodies but when the body is seen its shape is seen therefore when the intellectual substance is seen the intelligible species within it is also seen consequently when one angel beholds another or even a soul it seems that he can see the thoughts of both objection three further the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more than do the images in our imagination because the former are actually understood while the latter are understood only but the images in our imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal things are known because the imagination is a corporeal faculty therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of the intellect on the contrary what is proper to God does not belong to the angels but it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts according to Jeremiah the heart is perverse above all things and unsearchable who can know it? I am the Lord who searched the heart therefore angels do not know the secrets of hearts I answer that a secret thought can be known in two ways first in its effect in this way it can be known not only by an angel but also by man and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect is the more hidden for thought is sometimes discovered not merely by outward act but by change of countenance and doctors can tell some passions of the soul by the mere pulse much more than can angels or even demons the more deeply they penetrate those occult bodily modifications hence Augustine says that demons sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions not only when expressed by speech but even when conceived in thought when the soul expresses them in the body although he says it cannot be asserted how this is done and another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind and affections as they are in the will and thus God alone can know this the thoughts of hearts and affections of wills the reason of this is because the rational creature is subject to God only the alone can work in it who is its principal object and last end and this will be developed later consequently all that is in the will and all things that depend only on the will are known to God alone now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will for anyone actually to consider anything because a man who has a habit of knowledge or any intelligible species uses them at will hence the apostle says for what man knoweth the things of a man but the spirit of a man that is in him replied to objection one in the present life one man's thought is not known by another owing to a two fold hindrance namely on account of the grossness of the body and because the will shuts up its secrets the first obstacle will be removed at the resurrection and does not exist at all in the angels while the will remain and is in the angels now nevertheless the brightness of the body will show forth the quality of the soul as to its amount of grace and of glory in this way one will be able to see the mind of another replied to objection to although one angel sees the intelligible species of another by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of those substances according to greater or lesser universality yet it does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by actual consideration replied to objection three the appetite of the brute does not control its act but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause since therefore the angels know corporeal things and their dispositions they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts and even of man in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes through following some bodily impression influences his conduct as always happens in brutes yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are moved by the soul and reason because even the lower part of the soul has some share of reason as obeying its ruler as is said in the ethics but it does not follow that if the angel knows what is passing through man's sensitive appetite or imagination he knows what is in the thought or will because the intellect or will is not subject to the sensitive appetite or the imagination but can use of them fifth article whether the angels know the mysteries of grace objection one it would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace for the mystery of the incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries but the angels knew of it from the beginning for Augustine says this mystery was hidden in God through the ages yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places and the apostle says that great mystery of godliness appeared unto angels therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace objection two further the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained in the divine wisdom but the angels behold God's wisdom which is his essence therefore they know the mysteries of grace objection three further the prophets are enlightened by the angels as is clear from Dionysius but the prophets knew mysteries of grace for it is said for the Lord God does nothing without revealing his secret to his servants the prophets therefore angels know the mysteries of grace on the contrary no one learns what he knows already yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace for it is stated that sacred scripture describes some heavenly essences as questioning Jesus and learning from him the knowledge of his divine work for us and Jesus as teaching them directly as is evident in Isaiah where on the angels asking who is he who cometh up from Edom Jesus answered it is I who speak justice therefore the angels do not know the mysteries of grace I answer that there is a two fold knowledge in the angel the first is his natural knowledge according to which he knows things by his essence and by innate species by such knowledge the angels cannot know mysteries of grace where these mysteries depend upon the pure will of God and if an angel cannot learn the thought of another angel which depend upon the will of such angel much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon God's will the apostle reasons in this fashion no one knoweth the things of a man but the spirit of a man that is in him so the things also that are of God no man knoweth but the spirit of God there is another knowledge of the angels which renders them happy it is the knowledge whereby they see the word and things in the word by such vision they know mysteries of grace but not all mysteries nor do they all know them equally but just as God wills them to learn by revelation as the apostle says but to us God hath revealed them through his spirit yet so that the higher angels beholding the divine wisdom more clearly learn more and deeper mysteries in the vision of God which mysteries they communicate to the lower angels by enlightening them some of these mysteries they knew from the very beginning of their creation others they are taught afterwards if it's their ministrations reply to objection one one can speak in two ways of the mystery of the incarnation first of all in general and in this way it was revealed to all from the commencement of their beatitude the reason of this is that this is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are ordered for all are ministering spirits sent to minister for them who shall see the inheritance of salvation and this is brought about by the mystery of the incarnation hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in this mystery from the very beginning we can speak of the mystery of the incarnation in another way as to its special conditions thus not all the angels were instructed on all points from the beginning even the higher angels learned these afterwards as appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted reply to objection two although the angels in bliss behold the divine wisdom yet they do not comprehend it so it is not necessary for them to know everything hidden in it reply to objection three whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the mysteries of grace was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels and although God revealed in general to the prophets what he was one way to do regarding the salvation of the human race still the apostles knew some particulars of the same which the prophets did not know thus we read as you reading may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ which in other generations was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed to his holy apostles among the prophets also the later ones knew what the former did not according to the Psalms I have had understanding above ancients and Gregory says the knowledge of divine things increased as time went on the end of question 57 question 58 of the Summa Theologica Paris Prima on the angels and on the six days this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Paris Prima on the angels and on the six days by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 58 of the mode of angelic knowledge after the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic knowledge concerning which there are seven points of inquiry whether the angels intellect be sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act whether the angel can understand many things at the same time whether the angels knowledge is discursive whether he understands exposing and dividing whether there can be error in the angels intellect whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening and whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same or do they differ first article whether the angels intellect is sometimes in potentiality sometimes in act Objection one it would seem that the angels intellect is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act for movement is the act of what is in potentiality as stated in the physics but the angels minds are moved by understanding as Dionysia says therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality Objection two further since desire is of a thing not possessed but possible to have whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality there too but it is said on whom the angels desire to look therefore the angels intellect is sometimes in potentiality Objection three further in the book de Causes it is stated that an intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance but the angels substance has some admixture of potentiality therefore it sometimes understands potentially on the contrary Augustine says since the angels were created in the eternity of the word they enjoy holy and devout contemplation now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality but in act therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality I answer that as the philosopher states the intellect is in potentiality in two ways first as before learning or discovering that is before it has the habit of knowledge secondly as when it possesses the habit of knowledge but does not actually consider in the first way an angels intellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural knowledge extends for as the higher namely the heavenly bodies have no potentiality to existence which is not fully actuated in the same way the heavenly intellects the angels have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by co-natural intelligible species but with regard to things divinely revealed to them there is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality because even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by the sun in the second way an angels intellect can be in potentiality with regard to learned by natural knowledge for he is not always actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge but as to the knowledge of the word and of the things he beholds in the word he is never in this way in potentiality because he is always actually beholding the word and the things he sees in the word for the bliss of the angels he exists in such vision and beatitude does not consist in habit but in act as the philosopher says reply to objection one movement is taken there not as the act of something imperfect that is of something existing in potentiality but as the act of something perfect that is of one actually existing in this way understanding and feeling are termed movements as stated in De Anima reply to objection two such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude the object desired but weariness thereof or they are said to desire the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations which they receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform reply to objection three in the angel substance there is no potentiality divested of act in the same way the angels intellect is never so in potentiality as to be without act second article whether an angel can understand many things at the same time objection one it would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time for the philosopher says that it may happen that we know many things but understand only one objection two further nothing is understood unless the intellect be informed by an intelligible species just that the body is formed by shape but one body cannot be formed into many shapes therefore neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various intelligible things objection three further to understand is a kind of movement but no movement terminates in various terms therefore many things cannot be understood altogether on the contrary Augustine says the spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time all things that it tells I answer that as unity of term is requisite for unity of movement so is unity of object required for unity of operation now it happens that several things may be taken as several or as one like the parts of a continuous whole for if each of the parts be considered severally they are many consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation all at once in another way they are taken as forming one in the whole and so they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation as long as the entire continuous whole is considered as is stated in De Anima in this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate as forming parts of one proposition as two things compared together according as they agree in one point of comparison from this it is evident that many things in so far as they are distinct cannot be understood at once but in so far as they are comprised under one intelligible concept they can be understood together now everything is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect all things then which can be known by one intelligible species are known as one intelligible object and therefore are understood simultaneously but things known by various intelligible species are apprehended as different intelligible objects consequently by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the word they know all things under one intelligible species which is the divine essence therefore as regards such knowledge they know all things at once just as in heaven our thoughts will not be fleeting going and returning from one thing to another but we shall survey all our knowledge at the same time by one glance as Augustine says but by that knowledge where with the angels know things by innate species they can at one time know all things which can be comprised under one species but not such as are under various species reply to objection one to understand many things as one is so to speak to understand one thing reply to objection two the intellect is informed by the intelligible species which it has within it so it can behold at the same time many intelligible objects under one species as one body can by one shape be likened to many bodies to the third objection the answer is the same as the first third article whether an angel's knowledge is discursive objection one it would seem that the knowledge of an angel is discursive where the discursive movement of the mind comes from one thing being known through another but the angels know one thing through another for they know creatures through the word therefore the intellect of an angel knows by discursive method objection two further whatever a lower power can do the higher power can do but the human intellect can syllogize and no causes in effects all of which is the discursive method therefore the intellect of the angel which is higher in the order of nature can with greater reason do this objection three further Isidor says that demons learn more things by experience but experimental knowledge is discursive for one experience comes of many remembrances and one universal from many experiences as Aristotle observes therefore an angels knowledge is discursive on the contrary Dionysius says that the angels do not acquire divine knowledge from separate discourses nor are they led to something particular from something common I answer that as has often been stated the angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances for Dionysius calls them heavenly minds now the difference between heavenly bodies is this that earthly bodies obtain their last perfection by chance and movement while the heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very nature so likewise the lower namely the human intellects obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual operation that is to say as they advance from one known thing to another but if the knowledge of a known principle they were straight away to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions then there would be no discursive process at all such is the condition of the angels because in the truths which they know naturally they at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known in them therefore they are called intellectual beings because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said to be understood and intellect is defined as the habit of first principles but human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by the discursive method are called rational and this comes of the feebleness of their intellectual light for if they possess the fullness of intellectual light like the angels then in the first aspect of their principles they would at once comprehend their whole range by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them reply to objection one Discursion expresses movement of a kind now all movement is from something before to something after hence discursive knowledge comes about according as from something previously known one attains to the knowledge afterwards known and which was previously unknown but if in the thing perceived something else be seen at the same time as an object and its image are seen simultaneously in a mirror it is not discursive knowledge and in this way the angels know things in the word reply to objection to the angels can syllogize in the sense of knowing a syllogism and they see certain causes and causes and effects yet they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way by syllogizing from causes to effect or from effect to cause reply to objection three experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by way of similitude for as much as they know sensible things which are present yet without any discursion with all fourth article whether the angels understand by composing and dividing objection one it would seem that the angels understand by composing and dividing for where there is multiplicity of things understood there is composition of the same as is said in the anima but there is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind because angels apprehend different things by various species and not all at one time therefore there is composition and division in the angels mind objection two further negation is far more remote from affirmation than any two opposite natures are because the first of distinctions is that of affirmation and negation but the angel knows certain distant natures not of one but by diverse species as is evident from what was said therefore he must know affirmation and negation by diverse species and so it seems that he understands by composing and dividing objection three further speech is a sign of the intellect but in speaking to men angels use affirmative and negative expressions which are signs of composition and of division in the intellect as is manifest from many passages of sacred scripture therefore it seems that the angel understands by composing and dividing on the contrary Dionysius says that the intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear simplicity of divine concepts but as simple intelligence is without composition and division therefore the angel understands without composition or division I answer that as in the intellect when reasoning the conclusion is compared with the principle so in the intellect composing and dividing the predicate is compared with the subject for if our intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the principle it would never understand by discretion and reasoning in like manner if the intellect in apprehending the quittity of the subject where it wants to have knowledge of all that can be attributed to or removed from the subject it would never understand by composing and dividing but only by understanding the essence thus it is evident that for the self same reason our intellect understands by discretion and by composing and dividing namely that in the first apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp all that is virtually contained in it and this comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within us as has been said hence since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel for he is a pure and most clear mirror as Dionysius says it follows that as the angel does not understand by reasoning so neither does he by composing and dividing nevertheless he understands the composition and the division of enunciations just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms for he understands simply such things as our composite things moveable immovably and material things immaterially reply to objection one not every multitude of things understood causes composition but a multitude of such things understood that one of them is attributed to or denied of another when an angel apprehends the nature of anything he at the same time understands whatever can be either attributed to it or denied of it hence in apprehending a nature he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by composing and dividing reply to objection two the various natures of things differ less as to their code of existing than to affirmation and negation yet as to the way in which they are known affirmation and negation have something more in common because directly the truth of an affirmation is known the falsehood of the opposite negation is known also reply to objection three the fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms of speech shows that they know both and division yet not that they know by composing and dividing but by knowing simply the nature of a thing fifth article whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel objection one it would seem that there can be falsehood in the angels intellect for perversity appertains to falsehood but as Dionysia says there is a perverted fancy in the demons therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of the angels objection two further nescience is the cause of estimating falsely but as Dionysia says there can be nescience in the angels therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them objection three further everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom and which has a depraved reason has falsehood or error in its intellect but Dionysia affirms this of the demons therefore it seems there can be error in the minds of the angels on the contrary the philosopher says that the intelligence is always true Augustin likewise says that nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood in the angels knowledge I answer that the truth of this question depends partly upon what is gone before where it has been said that an angel understands not by composing and dividing but by understanding what a thing is now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing is just as the sense regarding its proper object as is said in Dionysia but by accident deception and falsehood creep in when we understand the essence of a thing by some kind of composition and this happens either when we take the definition of one thing for another or when the parts of a definition do not hang together as if we were to accept what is the definition of some creature a four footed flying beast where there is no such animal and this comes about in things composite the definition of which is drawn from diverse elements one of which is as matter to the other but there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities as is stated in the metaphysics for either they are not grasped at all or respecting them or else they are known precisely as they exist so therefore no falsehood error or deception can exist of itself in the mind of any angel yet it does so happen accidentally but very differently from the way it befalls us for we sometimes get at the quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process as when by division and demonstration we seek out the truth of a definition such is not the method of the angels but through the knowledge of the essence of a thing they know everything that can be said regarding it now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can be a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such thing or excluded from it but not of what may be dependent on God's supernatural ordinance consequently owing to their upright will from their knowing the nature of every creature the good angels form no judgments as to the nature of the qualities therein save under the divine ordinance hence there can be no error or falsehood in them but since the minds of demons are utterly perverted from the divine wisdom they at times form their opinions of things simply according to the natural conditions of the same nor are they ever deceived as to the natural properties of anything but they can be misled with regard to supernatural matters for example on seeing a dead man they may suppose that he will not rise again or on beholding Christ they may judge him not to be God from all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the question are evident for the perversity of the demons of their not being subject to the divine wisdom while Nessians is in the angels as regards things knowable not naturally but supernaturally it is furthermore evident that their understanding of what a thing is is always true save accidentally according as it is in an undo manner referred to some composition or division sixth article whether there is a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels objection one it would seem that there is neither an evening nor a morning knowledge in the angels because evening and morning have an admixture of darkness but there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel since there is no error nor falsehood therefore the angelic knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening knowledge objection two further between evening and morning the night intervenes while noonday falls between morning and evening consequently if there be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels for the same reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night knowledge objection three further knowledge is diversified according to the difference of the objects known hence the philosopher says the sciences are divided just as things are but there is a threefold existence of things to wit in the word in their own natures and in the angelic knowledge as Augustine observes if therefore a morning and an evening knowledge be admitted in the angels because of the existence of things in the word and in their own nature then there ought to be admitted the class of knowledge on account of the existence of things in the angelic mind on the contrary Augustine divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and evening knowledge I answer that the expression morning and evening knowledge was devised by Augustine who interprets the six days where in God made all things not as ordinary days measured by an angelic knowledge but as one day namely the day of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things as in the ordinary day morning is the beginning and evening the close of day so their knowledge of the primordial being of things is called morning knowledge and this is according as things exist in the word but their knowledge of the very being of the thing created by the hands in its own nature is termed evening knowledge because the being of things flows from the word as from a kind of primordial principle and this flow is terminated in the being which they have in themselves replied to objection one evening and morning knowledge and the angelic knowledge are not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness but as compared to beginning and end as it can be said as Augustine puts it that there is nothing to prevent us from calling something light in comparison with one thing and darkness with respect to another in the same way the life of the faithful and the just is called light in comparison with the wicked according to Ephesians you were here to for darkness but now light in the Lord yet this very life of the faithful when set in contrast to the life of glory is termed darkness according to the second letter of Peter you have the firm prophetic word where unto you do well to attend as to a light that shineth in a dark place so the angels knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature is day in comparison with ignorance or error yet it is dark in comparison with the vision of the word replied to objection two the morning and evening knowledge belong to the day that is to the enlightened angels who are quite apart from the darkness that is from the evil spirits the good angels while knowing the creature do not adhere to it for that would be to turn to darkness and to night but they refer this back to the praise of God in whom as in their principle they know all things consequently after evening there is no night but morning so that morning is the end of the preceding day and the beginning of the following in so far as the angels refer to God's praise their knowledge of the preceding work noon days comprised under the name of day as the middle between the two extremes or else the noon can be referred to their knowledge of God himself who has neither beginning nor end replied to objection three the angels themselves are also creatures accordingly the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under evening knowledge as also the existence of things in their own nature seventh article whether the morning and evening knowledge are one objection one it would seem that the morning and the evening are one or it is said there was evening and morning one day but by the expression day the knowledge of the angels is to be understood as Augustine says therefore the morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same objection two further it is impossible for one faculty to have two operations at the same time but the angels are always using their morning knowledge because there is God in all things in God according to Matthew therefore if the evening knowledge were different from the morning the angel could never exercise his evening knowledge objection three further the apostle says when that which is perfect is come that which is in part shall be done away but if the evening knowledge be different from the morning it is compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect therefore the evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge on the contrary Augustine says there is a vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the word of God and as it is in its own nature so that the former belongs to the day and the latter to the evening I answer that as was observed the evening knowledge is that by which the angels know things in their proper nature this cannot be understood as if they drew their knowledge from the proper nature of things so that the preposition in denotes the form of a principle because as has been already stated the angels do not draw their knowledge from things it follows then that when we say in their proper nature we refer to the aspect of the thing known in so far as it is knowledge that is to say that the evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the being of things which those things have in their own nature now they know this through a two fold medium namely by innate ideas or by the forms of things existing in the word for by beholding the word they know not merely the being of things as existing in the word but the being as possessed by the things themselves as God by contemplating himself sees that being which things have in their own nature if therefore it be called evening knowledge in so far as when the angels behold the word they know the being which things have in their proper nature then the morning and the evening knowledge are essentially one and the same and only differ as to the things known if it be called evening knowledge in so far as through innate ideas they know the being which things have in their own nature then the morning and the evening knowledge differ thus Augustine seems to understand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other reply to objection one the six days as Augustine understands them are taken as the six classes of things known by the angels so that the days unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood which nevertheless can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it reply to objection two there can be two operations of the same faculty at one time one of which is referred to the other as is evident when the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end and the intellect at the same instant perceives principles and conclusions through those principles when it has already acquired knowledge as Augustine says the evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels hence there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the angels reply to objection three on the coming of what is perfect the opposite imperfect is done away just as faith which is of the things that are not seen is made void when vision succeeds but the imperfection of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the morning knowledge for that a thing be known in itself is not opposite to its being known in its cause nor again is there any inconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums one of which is more perfect and the other less perfect just as we can have it demonstrative and probable medium for reaching the same conclusion in like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the uncreated word and through an innate idea end of question 58