 The microphone, if you can maybe introduce yourself before putting questions or comments, please. Daniel Dayano with the Remainer Central Bank and member of the board, I want to raise one issue and then make an observation on the approach the discussion has been evolving up to now. Now, one question is, and Senor Canterra has emphasized it. In the banking union, unless we have a collective deposit insurance scheme, then we have a huge issue. But both explicitly and implicitly, that's bring at the surface the issue of fiscal arrangements. And that's the main stumbling block. I mean, it's like, if we don't solve it, I mean, it will continue with fragmentation. Obviously, now, Banque Espiritu, Banca Popolare, then the Italian solution, and you differentiated. You said, look, everybody was invited to participate in the scheme and the Spanish scheme. But at the end of the day, the solution in Portugal was Portuguese. In Spain, it was Spanish. In Italy, it was Italian. And that's what matters. Now, let me suggest for discussion, because it looks like in banking, in finance, we are scrutinizing ourselves. It's like we have finance diverse from the rest of society of economy. But let's change the perspective and say, look, there is technological change underway, enormous technological change, which creates losers and winners in society among economies. Then we have the low interest rate environment, which it's because of what's been going on in our economies. So probably, I think, the way the discussion should also evolve in the future is, I mean, let's take a look at what's happening in our economies and see to what extent finance, banking is responsive to what's happening in our society. Otherwise, I mean, it's like we are scrutinizing ourselves for our own sake and then demanding from policymakers to do what you think it's appropriate. Probably, the perspective should be different. Thank you. Let me maybe collect a few more questions, and then we have around. I have Richard here, and then. Three questions directed specifically, though. One on organizational structure. The Nordea structure is a single headquarters with branches in the four different countries. Santander, on the other hand, has in the UK a fully fledged subsidiary. Why? Why the difference? What are the advantages and disadvantages? Second question is for Torsten, as opposed to the others, in a sense, why don't the nine eurozone countries go ahead and join the banking union? What are the obstacles? And what are the prospects? And finally, resolution. Andrea, you quoted, I guess it was Alka Kunich, about you say that resolution is for the few, not the many. Some of us think that the triage has not gone anywhere near far enough. And that resolution is still for the many if authorities are willing to face up to it. But will the national supervisory authorities allow that in the end? David Esser from Management Investment. Two questions. The first one for Mr. Thurston. Can you explain me how a bank like Populaar, you said that Populaar is the optimal resolution? Given the hundreds of lawsuits the private sector filed, which didn't in the chains of Ennito in many other cases, I'm surprised by your statement, simply by looking at the objectivity of what has happened. And can you explain me how a bank that on the 6th of May gets from the ECB and all the regulators a full bill of full health, full pass, including stress test, which is one in 200 years event, of plus 10 billion euro, and then within one month goes to minus 10. So there's a 20 billion swing. How can you say it's a perfect solution? Because to me it's shocking from a private sector perspective. Then the second question, this is mainly for Andrea Ria. Private sector, the SRB does not have any money, de facto. So what happens? Now private sector will follow the SRB and wherever they go, they will run. Because if cold interaction for them is very simple, they only have one solution, bail-in. So I think if the all objective is to make the system stronger, you now have achieved the solution reality where as soon as they show up, private capital will run and it will self-inflict a bank run. So are we sure that the reality we have achieved a better and stronger system? Because from our perspective actually has made it worse. Governor Sturnares and then I think we close because we are coming closer to the end of the panel. So please. Yes, good morning. Jan Sturnares, governor of the Bank of Greece. First of all, I would like to thank you for excellent presentations. Very useful. For the sake of saving time, I would address only two questions to Thorstein back and one question to Jose Antonio. First of all, you said that in 2015, there was a conflict of interest for the ECB. What exactly do you mean and how do you perceive that? Second, on Italian banks, OK, we all know that some people have been dissatisfied that the full BRRD has not been applied. But you know, as answered, Greeks used to say, everything should be applied in good measure. What would have happened if we had applied full BRRD to senior shareholders in Italy? The question to Jose Antonio is that we used to compare. We compare the rate of return on assets and equity between eurozone banks and US banks. The institutional environment and the way that the authorities intervene are vastly different. I have not seen any academic analysis to what extent this difference in the rate of return is a function of these differences in the institutions. I will just say one example. Not the segmentation, which is well-established facts, but the Fed intervened and bought all the non-performing markets loans from the balance sheet of banks and it put it on its own balance sheet. That has a huge influence on the rate of return on American banks. So to what extent do you think that this is a main cause of the difference between the rate of return on American banks and eurozone banks? Thank you. There were many other questions, but we are running out of time. So I would ask the speakers to be very fast in their responses no more than two minutes each. So very concise. Please, Thorsten, you start first. OK, great. So banking union without deposit insurance, without funding mechanism, yet that's exactly the point I tried to make. Ultimately, it is a political decision to move to that. There are some actually people like Martin Sundbu from the Financial Times who think that maybe a full-fledged banking union with a funding mechanism and risk sharing system, sorry, it's early for me, is actually a substitute for fiscal union. I think there's some vanity to this point, although I haven't completely thought it through. And yes, the banking system has to be certainly responsive to the real sector. That's the point I tried to make on my first slide, that it is about the beneficiaries of the financial system. It's not about the financial system per se. I mean, that's what we ultimately should care about. If I understood you correctly, Richard, the non-eurozone EU countries, whether they should join the banking union, I think it depends very much on the cross-border interlinkages. I mean, the case Sweden, Sweden, for example, and partly maybe Denmark, I think there might be a valid point for that given the cross-border linkages, for example, through Nordea. But of course, there are also downsides, especially the risks, especially if you go to a full-fledged banking union in terms of the funding and potentially having access to credit lines from the ECB, liquidity lines from the ECB, if you are part of the banking union. So I think that it's not an easy thing, but I think there's a case to be made in some cases to actually go this step. On Banco Popular, I talked specifically about the resolution. I did not talk about the run-up to the resolution. I talked about the weekend. I think it was a weekend solution where the bank was intervened and was sold off to Santander. So I did not talk about any mistake that might have been made before. My point was purely on the fact that it was resolved quickly without panicking the market with no taxpayer money. And by the way, one in 200 years does not mean an event happens every 200 years. That's kind of a mistaken interpretation of statistic. It's just something that happens with a probability of 0.5%. So again, I mean, I think a bank resolution without any lawsuits might be too good to be true. The conflict of interest that I pointed out, I didn't talk about it during the Greece crisis. Sorry, the Greeks standoff in 2015. I didn't want to talk about it for the interest of time. I was just to mention it. So it's on the one hand, the ECB has the objective of monetary of financial stability and of maintaining the euro, which I think is also an objective of the ECB, although it might not be formally there. On the other hand, it's a creditor of the Greek government. And of course, it was also a creditor to the Greek banks. And there is some conflict there. On the Italian banks, actually, I perfectly agree with you. I don't think, I mean, this is exactly the problem I pointed out. Applying a new regulatory framework without cleaning up the legacy problems first. And the legacy problems, in this case, were senior bond holders being retail, having been miss-sold, these bonds. So I think that's exactly the kind of the, I mean, again, there were political reasons for that, but kind of the wrong sequencing of events where we should have cleaned up the legacy problems first, like it was possible in the US, for example, and then put into place a new regulatory framework. So again, of course, it also shows that no regulatory framework is perfect. And yes, we should all apply to the rules that goes to my German friends. But we also should apply to sensible rules. That's very important. Thanks. Okay, very quickly. Looking at ourselves, yes, we are looking all the time at improving supply. And that's why I said in my conclusions that it's all about supply and demand. But let me be in Frankfurt and be in this building that I talk about, you know, what the other side we think could be doing. But clearly, yes, we are all the time looking at how to improve the supply side of credit. And I just put one example, but we can definitely talk a lot about that. Differences between SPE and MP. We are a multiple point of entry bank. There are very few of those. We believe that having the capital distributed locally and trapped locally gives us the option to cut the ties with that in case there was a problem. That, there is a big argument about whether, you know, that option can be executed, the cost of it been executed, et cetera, et cetera. But there's no doubt that we have that option. And that option is worth something. So far, TLAC and other regulatory frameworks have not captured the value of that option in our opinion properly. We are working with the authorities and we've had some meetings with the SRP to discuss that. They see the benefits of that. It's very difficult to quantify the benefits of having the capital distributed and distributed locally. So, and clearly diversification of capital, particularly in the countries where we operate, which are Brazil, Chile, Argentina, US, Mexico, UK, Spain, Portugal, et cetera. Clearly, we think adds a lot of value. And I will let Haiki answer the single point of entry branch model. Perhaps I'll take that. And the explanation is actually exactly the same. We operate in one market, primarily Nordics, which is sort of, we consider that to be one single market. And since the establishment of Nordea, we have operated as one bank in that market. If we would have sort of, we would have operations in Brazil, we could perhaps then have a subsidiary there instead of grants, but for us that sort of source of economics of scale and sort of synergies that we can run the bank as one bank. And that is the reason why the legal structure was not aligned with our operating model, where we have Nordic operators, not sort of operations in each and every Nordic country separately. Just one very quickly about US banks profitability. When we compare return on tangible equity, which is the measure that we should use, not return on equity. Return on tangible equity, where you have Wells Fargo, JPMorgan are earning 12%. We also have 12% banks in Europe, right? We are earning 12% return on tangible equity. So there are similar profitability levels. The difference is how quickly banks as a whole earned more than the cost of capital after the crisis hit. And on average, they earned that level faster in the US, that in Europe. There may be lots of explanations for that, the economy, this one country, et cetera, et cetera. Other might be the way policy makers responded to the crisis. Relating to banking union and common deposit guarantee scheme, I would leave the audience with an idea I got from a senior central bank. He was saying, why not to build a common deposit guarantee scheme system. Along the lines we have a resolution and supervision so that there will be a common deposit guarantee scheme and a system for banks which are directly supervised by the ECB banking supervision, which are directly handled by the single resolution board. And then national banks would be in national schemes. Just leave that idea with you. Okay, thank you very much. Let me say a few words. I mean, first of all, I know this is very difficult in terms of communication, but let me say once again that let's say stress test do not give a clean bill of health to anybody. I mean, they're basically instruments for us in particular to disseminate information to investors, market participants, so now the banks would fair with the same adverse scenario and then it's something for the supervisors to work through and to be honest, let's say popular, didn't fair as a top notch bank in the stress test. It was in the bottom of the distribution. Supervised reaction was started after the stress test and there was a serious liquidity problem that developed. On the SRB, let's say, first of all, the SRB has money. It has a single resolution fund that should be operated, still little money to be honest and still segmented into national compartments, but gradually should build up a common fund and the key point is to create a backstop for that money as soon as possible on these, I agree. But I see the point, but the other point is that the resolution framework is not only, let's say, on managing the crisis, is on preparing for crisis. So the resolution planning phase should be the core business of the, and the build up of loss absorbing capacity should be the core business of resolution authorities more than the management. So again, it's an issue of seeing whether the new system could work and too much resolution. I mean, I'm not sure. I mean, the point here is to understand what is the best way of managing a crisis with the least deployment of taxpayers' money and the smoothest outcome for the markets. I mean, that, I think, is the question. And if we found the right balance here, I think that we need to take stock from the recent cases and come back with an answer in ideal in a short time. So I'm sorry that we ate up a bit of the coffee break, but I think it was an interesting discussion. Let me thank all the panelists and you all for the questions. I'm sorry for those who couldn't have their questions. Thank you.