 I reserve the right to comment a little bit and then we engage in the fierce conversation. Jean-Claude, my notes of the last year are, of course, dated the beginning of October. So beginning of October, you were absolutely right. Jay Powell was saying inflation in the U.S. is transitory. And I have reasonable expectations that in the course of next year, namely 22, we will be around 2%. He said that in October. And you were right when you said old central banks more or less were saying the same. By the way, I have to say the modeling and John was very clear on that. The dynamics, stochastic, general equilibrium model are plain wrong when you are in a very rapid period of transition. We experienced that with the real economy in after Lehman bankruptcy. And we are experiencing that because Jay Powell could not say that without having some papers by the thousands of PhDs that are in the staff of the Federal Reserve. So there we have an immense problem, which explains largely the lags. There are other technical reason for the lag to have been considerable because in November he said it's not transitory. And the first increase of rates is only in March. So a big, big delay between the lucidity, recovered lucidity and what they did. In my opinion, it's also due to the fact that they had, I would say, some kind of link between the non-conventional, quantitative part of monetary policy and the conventional interest rates. They said we will increase interest rates only after we have stopped the net purchases of tradeable securities. It was said on both sides of the Atlantic and it was one of the reasons why there was an additional delay of five months, six months depending on the central bank. That was, in my opinion, in retrospect, a big mistake to link the two. As far as I am concerned, I was not preaching the fact that there was no problem. I wrote myself, don't follow the professor's... I was not accusing you. But you were just scooting your colleagues. Yeah, but I have always been against the theory according to which interest rates were eternally very low and that you had to borrow massively in order to be in the best situation possible. A lot, unfortunately. It was a little bit close to a conventional wisdom at a certain moment. It was obviously wrong. Other remark, I'm not sure that we have the same figures as regards core inflation. I look only at core inflation and I look at core inflation as is published by Eurostat for Europe and by the statistical office in the U.S. We have the same level of core inflation, which is around 6.3, 6.5%. I have the figures for the Euro area, 6.6% in November. 6.6 is not four. 6.6 means that even if you put aside oil and gas and the agro products, you still have a level of inflation which is impressive. And the job of the central banks is to get down from 6.6 to 2% in three years' time, as I think they can. But the fact that we have the same level of underlying inflation, say core inflation on both sides of the Atlantic and not the same level of headline, underlines what has been said by many of us, namely that there are differences between the U.S. and Europe, because in Europe it's very much more of a supply problem, and in the U.S. it's much more of a demand problem. And I give you the headline, headline 10% in Europe, 7.7. Last figures I have in mind for the U.S. So 2.3% full difference, which means that the real economy in Europe is attacked by the situation, by inflation, and by the war in Ukraine much more, of course, than in the U.S. So that explains why the monetary policy in Europe is much more benign than the monetary policy in the U.S. But both seem to me exactly appropriate if we want the core inflation to get down. Because again, even in Europe it is not only oil, gas, and agro-products there. And I'm not sure that I'm in full agreement with the idea that there is no spiraling of prices. To get 6.6% you must have some spiraling of prices, not massively yet wages and salaries, but in the U.S. you have 6% wages and salaries. So practically the level of core inflation that I was mentioning. So I think we have to be very careful, including in Europe, because we are more or less the same problem. I agree that it is good that there is a difference of interest rates, which is significant, very significant to be frank, between the U.S. and Europe. And of course it has also the inconvenience that was underlined by our Korean friend. Namely, the euro is weak and we import inflation in Europe. And that's a problem. But I will not call for accelerating the increase of rates in Europe, but I'm reasonably satisfied when both interest rates are going up calmly, quietly, but firmly. Because it's very important that we are all convinced, all the economic agents are convinced that 2% is credible in the medium term, which is not absolutely obvious today, frankly speaking. Two other remarks. One, on the fact that we are likely to have inflationary pressures in the time to come, it's probably a secular nature and not of, I would say, cyclical nature. We have the green transition. It was mentioned, I think it's very important. We have deglobalization, which has been mentioned with nuances, but I think it's part of the fact that in comparison with the previous period, we have to expect more pressures, say upward for the prices. And we have the blue color issue or the uneasiness of the middle class or the lower middle class and so forth. It seems to me that it is already there. And to the extent that in some respect the US is a little bit the leader, I interpret the sequence Trump-Biden as, I would say, accompanying the emergence of the blue color furious, I would say, infuriation transmitted in the political arena, because clearly to imagine that the Republican candidate for the presidential election could not be the, I would say, the guy defending big business, but the guy defending blue color is really something which is absolutely incredible. And the Biden, of course, is on the same line for very good reasons, of course. So I mentioned that and I take it that in all European countries, as you said, clearly it is also the case. I mean, we have to expect, but it will play the role of a pressure, an inflationary pressure also, because unit labor costs are inflation. Arrhythmically. So a last point I wanted to mention also, we are in a situation where you mentioned Minsky, animal spirits, it's absolutely clear that we have, we had the abnormal situation that you consider part of capitalism. And Ken said that also eloquently, Minsky very eloquently. So I think it's undeniable. But from time to time you have situation which looks a little bit out of historical record. And we are very close to situation where accumulation of debt, piling up of debt, accumulation of incredibly accommodating policies over 10 years, and this very rapid change of monetary policy for good reasons. All that creates a universe which, frankly speaking, seems to me a little bit less rosy than was said by most of us, frankly. So I don't want to be loiseau de mauvais augure, it seems to me that maybe we have serious problems ahead of us.