 Richard Brunovski, president of New South Wales chapter of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and I'm talking to Professor Trevor Finlay, who has a career previously in the Department of Foreign Affairs, has been a diplomat, is now a noted Australian, a distinguished Australian academic, and if I can quote from his bio, he's also, and this is most important, chair of the United Nations Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters for 2017. So welcome, Trevor. Thank you, Richard. And my first question to you, Willie, asks for your comment on the fact that the the the board and the atomic scientists has just moved the atomic clock from three minutes to two and a half minutes to midnight. What significance do you attribute to that in the context of the current nuclear countries in the world and what's been going on? Well, I think there are a few things that have gone into that decision. One is clearly the advent of the Trump administration, and the Trump administration currently doesn't have a clear nuclear policy really in any realm. We've had different statements from the president and and other statements from key administrative. We don't really know what he thinks. No, we don't. But then you have some real live situations like North Korea, which is seeking nuclear weapons. The Iran agreement is being verified adequately, but the Trump administration hasn't made clear what it wants to do about Iran. So we do have several nuclear situations happening, but the bulletin also takes into account climate change now. So that's rather new. It used to only take into account nuclear development. Yes. President Trump has said that he very much opposes the agreement between the six in Europe and the United States and Iran. I think personally it's an extremely beneficial and promising agreement we have. What's your view on it? Do you think it's going to be disbanded or not? I don't think the Trump administration can actually do that. The underpowers will certainly stand up to that, and that will include Russia, which seems to be a favorite of Trump and China. All those countries involved have to agree to dismantle it. Yes. And Iran has been complying with it. The International Atomic Energy Agency has been verifying that Iran so far is complying with pretty much all the aspects. There were a few minor technical glitches, but by and large it's been complied with. Now you've talked about North Korea. That seems to be the biggest threat to destabilization and proliferation of nuclear. For example, Japan and South Korea could go nuclear if they don't get the right guarantees from the United States for their nuclear protection. North Korea though, there have been five nuclear detonations, yet they haven't yet developed a missile that could carry a militarized version of a bomb. As it's been said recently in the press that they've got a bullet, but they don't have the gun to fire it. Do you think that if North Korea did develop an intercontinental ballistic missile that could take a warhead, they would use it against the United States? Would they would initiate activity against the United States? Or do you think it's a kind of a protective device, a deterrence against raising change by the United States? Well, I think what we've always seen when a United States develop nuclear weapons is that they very quickly get into a deterrent situation vis-à-vis their enemies. It's almost the natural thing to do. And North Korea says it wants these weapons for defensive purposes. I'm not sure they use the word deterrent, but I think that's exactly what will happen. And so you'll have a normal deterrent situation developing. But as you said, the worst-case scenario will be if they do this, then Japan and South Korea will reconsider their own non-nuclear status. International atomic energy agency. It seems to me that they don't have a big enough budget to do all the things they're supposed to do, which is a worldwide surveillance of nuclear facilities, not just weapons one. In fact, not really weapons ones. The Indians won't let them in there. But the civil programs, how do you think they're traveling? And do you think it's still a competent organization that is worth not just preserving, but building up into a more effective organization? I think it's the one of the most competent UN-type organizations. Budget is a big problem. They've been held to zero real growth for 20 years, which is pretty astonishing that they've actually kept going and doing the programs they do. But their mandates also increased at the same time. So they now worry about nuclear security, which is to do with preventing terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, and also nuclear safety, particularly after Fukushima. So their mandates expanded, and their financing has stayed exactly the same as 20 years ago, except for increases in inflation. So there's no other organization in the world that really has had to put up with such conditions. And they have access into all the country's signatories to the NPT and the IAEA regulations, do they? Pretty well. Yes. What about North Korea? North Korea withdrew from the IAEA. And of course, that's a problem. Once the country withdraws and withdraws from safeguards, then there's nothing the agency can do, although they still buy satellite photograph imagery. So they still keep an eye from above, as it were. But the agency relies on a cooperation of the state, of course. And since the additional protocol, which is a new safeguards system after the Iraq debacle, states are much more intensively verified than ever before. So more intensive inspections, more information is required of the state, more less cradle to grave information on their nuclear enterprise. India, Pakistan? No, well, they're not party to the NPT, of course. Neither is Israel. So they didn't have partial safeguards agreements. India did this deal where it would put all of its declared civilian facilities under safeguards. But of course, that leaves out all the weapons facilities. Indeed. Look, thank you so much. I guess you put your finger on it when we talked about President Trump and what he's going to do. We really don't know yet. It's going to be interesting to see how he travels, which way he goes, whether, of all the conflicting things he said about nuclear weaponry and proliferation, what he's going to do. Because, of course, the United States is extremely important in this whole match. So thank you once again. My pleasure, Richard.